If the NATO-OTS duo divides-and-rules them, then another special operation and possible NATO-Russian proxy war might be inevitable, which would be to their detriment while that duo benefits.

Trump 2.0’s Neo-Reagan Doctrine, which refers to its aggressive rolling back of Russian influence worldwide as a means of pressuring Putin into (potentially painful) compromises on Ukraine, has been very successful along Russia’s entire southern periphery in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) has the dual function of a NATO military logistics corridor through the first region to the second across the Caspian Sea.

In his endorsement of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election bid, Trump boasted about how TRIPP “will transform the South Caucasus, and help our wonderful American Energy Companies gain access from Central Asia all the way to the United States.” This is an allusion to the West’s long-discussed plans, that were recently revived by the Turkish Energy Minister, for a Trans-Caspian Pipeline. They haven’t yet materialized due to stringent Russian opposition, but the US appears to be trying once more.

What’s changed in the over one-third of a century since this was first floated in the early 1990s is that Azerbaijan is now a shadow member of NATO after its armed forces completed their conformation to the bloc’s standards last November. TRIPP’s initial military purpose is therefore to consolidate NATO’s de facto presence in Azerbaijan along the lines of what it sought to do in Ukraine prior to the special operation and was one of the reasons why it was authorized after diplomacy failed to stop this.

Pashinyan’s re-election and his implementation of TRIPP, which could be strategically neutralized in the military sense if the patriotic opposition comes to power instead and restores Russian control over this corridor like he himself agreed to in November 2020, are required to fulfill this goal. Given his victory, NATO is now expected to swiftly consolidate its de facto presence in shadow member Azerbaijan ahead of more robustly trying to “poach” Kazakhstan from Russia, which constitutes a a serious latent threat.

Kazakhstan already agreed to a critical minerals deal with the US last November and announced one month later that it plans to produce NATO-standard shells. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also suspiciously went overboard trying to please Trump during the Board of Peace meeting. Moreover, “Kazakhstan’s Self-Declaration As The Golden Horde’s Successor Could Pose A Threat To Russia” by, intentionally or not, laying the ideational basis for future secular Muslim insurgencies inside Russia.

Of relevance, “The FSB Chief Warned That The West’s ‘Holy Grail Of Hybrid War’ Is Being Deployed To The CIS”, which the preceding hyperlinked analysis argues could manifest itself through AI-assisted infowars that advance the aforesaid “defection” and “Balkanization” goals. These two dark scenarios could pair with Kazakhstan following in Azerbaijan’s footsteps with Turkish support, those two being its partners in the “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS), to bring its armed forces up to NATO standards.

The end result could then be a crisis along Russia’s entire southern periphery that overshadows that which it experienced along its western one in the run-up to the ongoing special operation. Just like with the present conflict, that one could also become a “war of attrition” with the risk of a hot NATO-Russian war due to Turkiye’s alliance with Azerbaijan, which has a triple geostrategic identity as a South Caucasus state, a Turkic one, and recently a Central Asian state too after joining its regional integration grouping.

If Russia doesn’t soon apply its version of the Monroe Doctrine in the South Caucasus to nip this sequence in the bud as it was encouraged to do here, then it risks the erasure of its geostrategic influence from this entire region, which would then place it on the defensive in Central Asia. Russia’s grand strategic priority would then be to contain TRIPP-driven NATO threats from the South Caucasus, foreseeably fronted by the Azeri-Turkish Axis, to Central Asia and prevent Kazakhstan’s “defection”.

It was arguably with this imperative in mind that Putin just visited Kazakhstan, during which time he and Tokayev reaffirmed the Russian-Kazakh Strategic Partnership and more importantly agreed to “Seven Foundations of Friendship and Good-Neighborliness between the Peoples of Kazakhstan and Russia”. What follows is the Google Translated word-for-word description of each foundation from Tokayev’s official website:

“1. The first foundation is a common history and a responsible attitude towards its objective understanding in the spirit of friendship and good neighborliness.

2. The second foundation is common efforts to develop Eurasian integration and create a space of cooperation, security, and dialogue in the region.

3. The third basis is the common border as a space of good-neighborliness and cooperation

4. The fourth pillar is economic partnership

5. The fifth pillar is linguistic and cultural diversity as a common asset, traditional values ​​and civilizational closeness

6. The sixth pillar is youth cooperation, educational exchanges and cooperation in the field of sports

7. The Seventh Foundation: A Shared Vision for the Future”

These seven foundations are self-explanatory, but their significance is that they provide the guidelines for maintaining the Russian-Kazakh Strategic Partnership in the face of joint NATO-OTS efforts to divide-and-rule them. Russia is Kazakhstan’s top security partner and its second-largest economic one behind China. They also share the world’s longest land border. Kazakhstan would therefore suffer tremendously if this NATO-OTS divide-and-rule plot succeeds.

Despite what NATO and the OTS are endeavoring to do, Kazakhstan still retains close ties with both, especially the second. That’s because it believes in multi-aligning between competing power centers for maximizing its benefits from each following the model pioneered by Narendra Modi’s India. Nevertheless, Putin or one of his envoys would have certainly conveyed that there are clear limits to how far Kazakhstan can go without such moves being seen as a threat by Russia, ergo the seven points above.

It remains to be seen which mechanisms will be employed for strengthening these foundations, such as if relevant responsibilities will be delegated to pertinent institutions or if a new joint working group will be created for coordinating this, but close supervision is required to ensure full policy implementation. For instance, Russia must closely monitor the evolution of the previously mentioned ideational and AI-related threats in order to promptly inform Kazakhstan if they begin to tangibly materialize.

Given their close security cooperation and in the spirit of the seven foundations for their friendship that were just agreed upon, it would be expected that Kazakhstan would address Russia’s issues, including through monitoring the individuals and entities involved alongside possibly prosecuting them if need be. The same goes for Kazakhstan’s ties with the NATO-OTS duo, which Russia accepts but only within very clear limits, beyond which Kazakhstan would be expected to step back upon Russia’s request.

Joint NATO drills or even bilateral ones with NATO member Turkiye in Kazakhstan would understandably be seen as very unfriendly by Russia, as would an Armenian-like AI alliance with the US that could result in its “digital laboratories” that the FSB chief warned about in the earlier-cited analysis being built there. Sharing basic anti-terrorist experiences with NATO, strengthening socio-cultural ties with fellow Turkic countries, and expanding trade with the West are fine, but anything more could be seen suspiciously.

It’s in Kazakhstan’s objective national interests not to let itself be manipulated into provoking a Ukrainian-like NATO-Russian crisis, let alone a proxy war between them, but the Ukrainian experience shows that governments and their people don’t always act rationally. It’s relatively easy to manipulate some of them into working against their own objective national interests, which in Kazakhstan’s case could be weaponizing Golden Horde nostalgia against Russia and “defecting” from the CSTO.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, that’s a scenario that hasn’t yet materialized, but “Putin Cautioned Russian Strategic Forecasters Against Indulging In Wishful Thinking” in summer 2022 so casually dismissing it as unlikely would be reckless. The US’ playbook is simple: expand its strategic presence, including that of its partners and allies, as close to Russia’s borders as possible in order to maximally pressure it into unilateral concessions that ultimately end with the erasure of its sovereignty.

Close ties with Kazakhstan are therefore indispensable for the future of Russia’s sovereignty. If the NATO-OTS duo divides-and-rules them, then another special operation and possible NATO-Russian proxy war might be inevitable, which would be to their detriment while that duo benefits. The seven foundations of friendship that were just agreed upon provide the guidelines for preemptively averting this dark scenario. It’s now incumbent on Russia and especially Kazakhstan to indefinitely maintain them.

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In his words, talk about Russia attacking NATO “is not simply nonsense; it is a provocation.”

Several top “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” (NRPR) influencers rang the alarm last month about Russia’s alleged plans to attack NATO, which were inspired by top hawk Sergey Karaganov and then Russian Ambassador to the OSCE Dmitry Polyanskiy ominously channeling his rhetoric. Readers can review examples of their warnings here, here, here, here, and here. Casual NRPRs therefore braced themselves for what would have in that scenario almost certainly been the start of World War III had it come to pass.

It obviously hasn’t and it likely won’t ever, however, judging by Putin’s response when he was recently asked about these alleged plans during a meeting with foreign journalists. In his words, “Why would Russia attack Europe or go to war with NATO? What would be the purpose? As I have said before, these claims are not merely nonsense. In my view, they are a deliberate provocation designed to create the impression of a threat that does not actually exist.”

Putin then elaborated that “The objective is to persuade their populations to increase defence spending and, as a first step, to pay for the regime that seized power in Kiev. That, I believe, is the real explanation. It is not simply nonsense; it is a provocation. What surprises me, however, is that some people in European countries appear to believe it. I find that astonishing. The whole notion is simply absurd. It would be amusing if it were not so sad.”

It’s not just “some people in European countries” who “appear to believe it”, but his own top hawk is championing this policy and it was recently amplified to the max by top NRPR influencers, many of whom can be described as “state-adjacent” due to being platformed by publicly financed media, attending government-organized conferences, and/or taking state-secured tours of Donbass. Casual NRPRs are therefore left to wonder whether Putin is telling the truth or is “psyching out the West”.

It’s always best to defer to what Putin himself says in such cases whenever confusion arises, which is due to top NRPR influencers practicing what’s been called “Potemkinism”, or the creation of “alternative realities” about Russian interests and policy for “strategic purposes” (whatever they might be). The most infamous example is that Putin is an anti-Zionist secretly allied with Iran against Israel despite him being a proud lifelong philo-Semite as proven by his many quotes to this end from the official Kremlin website.

Accordingly, while it would be inaccurate describe the fiercely loyal Karaganov as a “provocateur” in the spirit of how Putin condemned such folks who advocate for Russia to attack NATO, he nevertheless powerfully rebuffed hawks such as him as well as the top NRPR influencers who hyped up his rhetoric. That said, Russia’s foreign spy service did indeed warn last month that their country might carry out retaliatory strikes against Latvia if Ukraine launches drones from there, which should be taken seriously.

That’s altogether different than what Karaganov has been pushing for, namely a first strike against NATO that could easily spiral into World War III, and it’s important for casual NRPRs to understand this. As Putin himself phrased it, such talk “is not simply nonsense; it is a provocation.” When those on Russia’s side do it, no matter what their intentions might be, they inadvertently “persuade [Westerners] to increase defence spending and, as a first step, to pay for the regime that seized power in Kiev.”

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Such a move wouldn’t substantively alleviate the newfound pressure upon Russia brought about by the tightening of the containment noose around it in the Arctic-Baltic, Central Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Northeast Asia respectively led by the UK, Poland, Turkiye, and Japan.

Politico reported last week that “Pentagon likely to cancel missile sale to Germany over fears of Russia” but editorialized that “American officials, even if primarily fearful of Russia’s reaction, likely are also worried about the shrinking U.S. weapons stockpile.” It’s the depletion of US stockpiles during the Third Gulf War, not “fears of Russia”, that’s arguably the driving force behind this decision. After all, the most that Russia could do is deploy more missiles – including nukes – to Kaliningrad, Belarus, and/or Crimea.

Russia already has such strategic arms there, however, so the only thing that would change is the quantity. While it’s nevertheless a positive development from Russia’s perspective that the US reportedly plans to cancel its Tomahawk deployment to Germany, the last hyperlinked analysis in the paragraph above assessed that “even if the US hypothetically withdrew all its forces from [Central Europe] as part of a grand compromise with Russia, this wouldn’t fully alleviate Russia’s security concerns”.

That piece pointed to last November’s analysis about how “The Pentagon’s European Drawdown Won’t Alleviate Russia’s Security Concerns” because “The US is offloading most of the responsibilities for containing Russia onto Poland, the UK, France, and Germany”. In fact, it was recently observed that “The Brits, French, & Germans Are Now Right On Russia’s Doorstep”, which is all the more concerning due to Medvedev’s recent warning about the 1941-like threat posed by Germany’s remilitarization.

Be that as it may, and recalling the self-interested calculations that would likely be behind this canceled deployment if confirmed as regards the need to replenish the US’ depleted missile stockpile, such a move could conveniently facilitate the Kremlin’s portrayal of the German-led EU as its top adversary. If Putin cuts a deal over Ukraine by mid-summer as was argued here and here that he might, then this would likely be preceded by Russia shifting its threat perception of the US, which this move helps it do.

Speculation about that conflict aside, this reported decision aligns with the US’ “NATO 3.0” concept as Politico alluded to when writing that “The move is part of a wider American retrenchment from the NATO alliance — including canceled deployments of thousands of U.S. troops to Germany and plans to pull back certain assets — as the U.S. upends the close-knit partnerships that cemented the relationship for generations.” It also cited the head of US forces in Europe recently telling his hosts to “step up”.

The overarching trend is that a “cordon sanitaire” is being assembled around Russia in the Arctic-Baltic through UK-led efforts, Central Europe through Polish-led efforts, its entire southern periphery through Turkish-led efforts, and Northeast Asia through Japanese-led efforts. The US can therefore comfortably withdraw its forces from Europe to the absolute minimum required for maintaining “deterrence” seeing as how the containment noose around Russia has unprecedentedly tightened over the past year.

With Europe “under control” as the US sees it and West Asia on the way thereto pending the outcome of the Third Gulf War, particularly Trump’s demand that the rest of the Gulf Kingdoms join the Abraham Accords, the US can now focus more on Latin America and East Asia. Accordingly, it wouldn’t be surprising if more deployments to Europe are canceled and more troops withdrawn, which Russia would appreciate even though it doesn’t substantively alleviate the newfound pressure upon it as explained.

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He seems to be holding back from more direct critiques, perhaps to avoid fueling propaganda campaigns centered on Russia’s objective shortcomings, which is why reading between the lines is essential.

New President of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) Dmitri Trenin pioneered the trend of breaking Russian political taboos in early April after issuing a clarion call for correcting foreign policy misperceptions. RIAC Director General Ivan Timofeev followed his lead shortly thereafter by calling for far-reaching modernization reforms, which preceded Vasily Kashin openly discussing their country’s “existing (military) limitations” in the special operation. Trenin has now returned to break more taboos.

In his piece about “Peace in Times of War”, he wrote that “What is needed is victory—and that remains entirely achievable, provided that important decisions are taken both at home and on the battlefield”, which alludes to certain decisions that he implies haven’t yet been made for some reason. He then forecast that “This confrontation (with the West) will be a prolonged one and it will require something we have long lacked: long-term goal-setting and a carefully planned strategy for achieving those goals.”

Trenin then advised that “Our principal objective should be to build the Russian ‘civilizational state’ that we have proclaimed but have yet to define. What we need, it seems, is a project aimed at shaping a society grounded in civic solidarity and on foundational core values shared by all: faith, freedom, family, and justice. In this context, the country’s economic and political system would also have to undergo profound renewal.” The innuendo is that far-reaching reforms are needed just like Timofeev suggested.

According to Trenin, “Such a project cannot be left to the elites alone. In fact, the elites themselves are in need of renewal—not only in generational terms, but also for new mechanisms of reproduction and new relations with the majority of society. Meritocracy is unquestionably essential, but it is clearly not enough. The ideological and value-based nature of the elite’s activities, and their commitment to service, are just as important as competence and professionalism.” Such a critique of Russian elites is very rare.

Trenin added, “This new internal character of Russian society and the state will also shape the country’s position on the world stage. It could enable the country, among other things, to become a stronger ‘pole’…However, the most important thing for Russia itself is to avoid the prospect of being forced to align with major geoeconomic and geopolitical powers: the Euro-Atlantic bloc and China.” Alluding to the scenario of Russia becoming China’s junior partner is also very rare and thus similarly taboo.

He concluded by warning about the existential stakes of Russia’s prolonged confrontation with the West, extolling some of Russia’s close partners, and reaffirming his call for Russia to transform itself. Trenin therefore ends on an optimistic note, but caution and concern nevertheless pervade his piece. He seems to be holding back from more direct critiques, perhaps to avoid fueling propaganda campaigns centered on Russia’s objective shortcomings, which is why reading between the lines is essential.

Trenin believes that building Russia’s civilization-state, which requires significant domestic reforms, is paramount. As he wrote, “Only an idea that truly becomes national in character will be capable of transforming Russia. Then it may be said that the Special Military Operation—with its immense trials, extraordinary strain, and irreparable losses and sacrifices—became not merely a turning point in the country’s history, but a prologue to a profound transformation of both the state and the people.”

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The Polish State or at least the conservative and populist elements therein could take a page from history by reminding the US of their civilization-state’s erstwhile self-identified role as the “antemurale”.

The Lithuanian Defense Minister recently revealed that his country is in talks with the US about hosting its nukes as part of the nuclear sharing program, which Politico reminded readers follows on the heels of the Financial Times’ report about how “US in talks to expand nuclear capable deployments in Europe”. Poland would stand to lose if the US deploys nukes to Lithuania or any other country east of Germany, where it already has them, since that would undermine its attempted regional leadership.

Poland seeks to revive its long-lost Great Power status by becoming the centerpiece of NATO’s Eastern Flank through its new role in commanding the EU’s largest army as was explained here last year. It was then assessed that “Poland Will Play A Central Role In Advancing The US’ National Security Strategy In Europe” due to the complementarity of these visions. The “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI), which also functions as a military logistics corridor and regional integration platform, plays a huge role in this too.

The “NATO 3.0” concept is premised on the European members of the bloc playing a greater role in the continent’s security, which Poland has an interest in doing on the US’ behalf in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), but liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk seems to prefer ceding this task to France and Germany. He just agreed to place Poland under France’s nuclear umbrella and earlier gave Germany optimized military logistical access across Poland to its first foreign base in Lithuania through the “military Schengen”.

Further undermining Poland’s regional leadership plans is deteriorating trust with Ukraine caused by Zelensky honoring the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits shortly after accepting Germany’s military patronage. If he doesn’t reverse course and replace Germany with Poland as Ukraine’s top strategic partner behind the US, then it’ll be difficult for Poland to revive its long-lost Great Power status, not to mention if the US deploys nukes to Lithuania or any country east of Germany besides Poland.

Trump 2.0 just handed the conservative opposition aligned with independent President Karol Nawrocki a victory by authorizing the deployment of 5,000 more US troops to popular applause despite his tiff with Tusk, however, which showed that his team still appreciates Poland’s envisaged regional role. If Poland is to become CEE’s leader instead of remain subordinated to the Franco-German Entente, then it must ensure that the US deploys some of its nukes there in parallel with opening a permanent base.

To that end, the Polish State or at least the conservative and populist elements therein could take a page from history by reminding the US of their civilization-state’s erstwhile self-identified role as the “antemurale”, or bulwark against the east. By playing to this concept and actively embracing it, Poland might then receive the US nukes (obviously not transferred under its control) and base that it desires, which could then position it to become European NATO’s main force for managing tensions with Russia.

It was touched upon here how Russia might prefer dealing with a Polish-led Eastern Flank as opposed to a German-dominated European NATO after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, with the logic being more compelling after Medvedev warned about the 1941-like threat posed by Germany’s remilitarization. If Poland plays this role, then it could mitigate the strategic threat from worsening ties with Ukraine in the post-conflict European security architecture while bolstering its sovereignty vis-à-vis the German-led EU.

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AI-assisted infowars could psychologically sever the former USSR’s Turkic populations from Russia.

FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov warned during a recent meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Council of Heads of Security Agencies and Special Services that “The West seeks to disrupt integration processes and undermine stability in CIS countries from within, making nations forget their shared history and trying to pit them against each other in order to take the situation here under control.” This is being advanced in part through new Western “digital laboratories” in the CIS states.

In his words, “According to the information we have, the Western intelligence community is behind programs aimed at establishing a network of digital labs across the Commonwealth, tasked with collecting and analyzing, using AI technologies, standard behavioral profiles of the population, identifying areas of social tension, and modeling public responses to various external factors, including government actions…One of the goals being to implement adaptable scenarios of color revolutions.”

This was foreseen in 2017: ”Russia is accused of ‘exploit[ing] marketing techniques to target individuals based upon their activities, interests, opinions, and values’ in order to ‘disseminate misinformation and propaganda’, but there’s nothing stopping the US from doing this either, nor in crafting the Holy Grail of Hybrid War by ‘integrat[ing] information derived from personal and commercial sources with intelligence collection and data analytic capabilities based on AI and machine learning’”.

The purpose would be “to fully maximize its outreach efficiency via algorithm-created infowar packages custom-tailored for each targeted demographic.” Moreover, “Just as Russia and China are accused of ‘us[ing] propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy’, so too could the US do the same against their governing systems by ‘exploiting information, democratic media freedoms, and international institutions’”.

This could “undermine their legitimacy while championing its own values, principles, and de-facto state ideology.” As applied towards the CIS as Bortnikov just warned, this “Holy Grail of Hybrid War” will most likely be weaponized to promote Pan-Turkism among the CIS members of the Turkic-led “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS), which apart from Azerbaijan, also includes Russia’s CSTO allies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The immediate goal could be to “make them forget their shared history” with Russia.

The secondary goal might then be to get Kazakhstan “to defect” from the CSTO, emboldened as it may be by NATO’s new military logistics corridor to the region whose anti-Russian strategic consequences were warned about here, prior to the ultimate goal of rekindling “Balkanization” processes inside of Russia. That dark scenario was elaborated on here and concerns the weaponization of Kazakhstan’s self-declaration as the Golden Horde’s successor for sparking secular Muslim insurgencies in relevant regions.

It’s possible that Kazakhstan’s Data Center Valley project in one of its Russian-bordering regions, which will be the largest in Central Asia upon completion, could be weaponized by the West for advancing these three interconnected goals following the model pioneered by Armenia’s American AI data center. As was recently warned here, delayed implementation of Russia’s Monroe Doctrine towards the south “risks empowering NATO to blackmail Russia on pain of a major war along its entire southern periphery.”

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Andrey Bezrukov is a Russian hero who’s earned the right through his decades of service to be as constructively critical of his country as he wants.

Former deep-cover Russian agent Andrey Bezrukov gave a speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) about future threats to Russia. He began by evaluating that Russia is embroiled in a new type of war that isn’t about territories but attrition. The West wants to avoid a nuclear war with Russia by “boiling the frog” through the gradual intensification of its provocations. Bezrukov believes that this is part of a new World War that began in Ukraine, spread to Iran, and might end in East Asia.

As regards the first front that’s aimed against Russia, he said that the West seeks to neutralize its nuclear forces through space-based systems (in an allusion to the Golden Dome) and more “Operation Spiderwebs” like the one that targeted Russia’s nuclear triad from inside the country last summer. The next goal is politically destabilizing Russia, to which end AI can be used to overload the system through infinite inputs at a critical moment so that it’s paralyzed and can’t make adequate decisions in a crisis.

Moving along, Bezrukov pointed to attacks against critical infrastructure as another one of the West’s goals, opining that Starlink makes them incredibly accurate and admitting that “we were not prepared” for this development. Rounding out the future threats to Russia is self-explanatory biowarfare. As for what Russia should do, he began by assessing that this “new war” in which their country is embroiled might last a few decades and spread to other regions, so everyone should brace themselves.

Far from focusing entirely on defense, Bezrukov advised that the economy balance between that and development, with the new technological cycle that he believes the world to have entered providing ample opportunities for building new associated infrastructure that should keep unemployment low. The first task must be protecting all critical infrastructure from attacks by either burying them underground or covering them just like nuclear power plants presently are.

He then called for “a new culture of decision-making, a culture of trust, a culture of service, and so on” that more optimally delegates responsibilities from the top of the system downward. His next proposal was a system for monitoring biological threats and merging the culture of the army with the culture of society to strengthen each other. Bezrukov then closed by calling on Russia to stop being so “nice” to its enemies since they no longer fear it after so many “red lines that we talked about remained on paper.”

Bezrukov is a Russian hero who’s earned the right through his decades of service to be as constructively critical of his country as he wants. He’s the fourth and by far most critical establishment voice to speak up over the last two months as documented here, here, and here. His candid admission of Russia’s unpreparedness for precision drone strikes within its own territory, call for a new political-management system, and request for Russia to finally enforce its red lines make his SPIEF speech a truly historic one.

Unlike Dmitry Trenin, Ivan Timofeev, and Vasily Kashin, who are part of the establishment’s expert wing, Bezrukov straddles that one and the intelligence wing, which is very influential in today’s Russia. This therefore makes him the highest-profile and most influential critic of the status quo. His words will consequently reverberate throughout the entirety of the Russian establishment so some long-overdue reforms might finally be implemented for helping Russia survive the coming decades of this “new war”.

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That false narrative might still gain traction, however, due to misguided Russian soft power policies.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs Secretary (East) Rudrendra Tandon said during Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez’s recent visit that there’s “perfect complementarity” in the energy sector between their countries. He’s right too since India is one of the world’s largest energy importers and Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world. It was even foreseen in mid-February that “India Might Soon Replace Russian Oil With Venezuelan At Scale After All” following the US’ capture of Venezuela’s oil sector.

At present, Russia is still India’s largest crude oil supplier, but that’s largely due to the US extending its sanctions waiver for the purchase of such resources from that country. Prior to promulgating the first waiver shortly after the start of the Third Gulf War, the trend from last summer’s punitive US tariffs on India for these purchases till then was for India to reduce its import of Russian oil, all while claiming that US pressure had nothing to do with its decision. Few, including in Russia, believed that was the case.

After all, India stood to lose a lot more in economic-financial terms from the US’ punitive 25% tariffs than from purchasing more expensive oil from other suppliers, plus the US could have accelerated last year’s pivot to Pakistan in ways that could have further worsened India’s national security interests. It therefore made sense, per its rational cost-benefit calculation, to reduce imports of Russian oil under US pressure. Like all countries, India prioritizes its national interests, and it shouldn’t be negatively judged for that.

At the same time, “The Third Gulf War Prompted Yet Another Recalibration Of India’s Russian-US Balancing Act”, albeit this time in Russia’s favor. Moreover, “Top Russian & Indian Think Tanks Devised A Plan For Rebalancing Economic Relations” in spring, and Putin plans to visit India later this year for the BRICS Leaders’ Summit. Bilateral ties provably remain strong, so it was thus bonafide fake news for Pepe Escobar to declare earlier this year that India “betrayed” Russia, yet countless folks were misled by him.

Nevertheless, his narrative might regain traction if Indian imports of Russian oil decline in the future upon the US inevitably ending its waiver for the purchase of such resources from that country after some time, in which case Venezuelan oil might replace Russian at scale after all exactly as was earlier foreseen. In that event, the Alt-Media Community might falsely conclude that India did indeed “betray” Russia, possibly influenced into thinking so by state-adjacent top “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” (NRPR) like Pepe.

The problem is that Russia’s “soft power supervisors” – the members of its publicly financed media, officialdom, and conference/forum organizers who are in touch with top NRPR influencers – aren’t interested in them accurately portraying Russian policy. That’s why they don’t nudge those who misportray it into doing so. It’s more important for them that folks like Russia on false premises, such as it disliking India (the sentiment of which is now popular), than being “bored by the truth” of its policies.

The resultant artificial reality about Russian interests and policy that’s created through these means has been coined “Potemkinism”, with the most infamous example being the easily disproven claim (now treated as dogma by many NRPRs) that Putin is an anti-Zionist secretly allied with Iran against Israel. Likewise, so too might it soon become dogma that Russia supposedly at minimum dislikes India, the narrative of which might wildly proliferate if India replaces Russia with Venezuela as its top oil supplier.

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The likelihood that it secretly installed sensors in Ukraine to monitor its northern drone strikes is nil so it was either informed by Ukraine or at least the Baltic States across whose airspace the drones are credibly speculated by many in Russia to have passed.

Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen revealed that his country somehow or another received advance notice of Ukraine’s drone attack on St. Petersburg ahead of its namesake international economic forum (SPIEF) last week. According to him, “We will not disclose details about which intelligence system and other methods we use to build a situational picture, but we were able to anticipate that situation and we had sufficient preparedness raised during the night.”

It’s important to determine how exactly Finland received such advanced notice. The likelihood that it secretly installed sensors in Ukraine to monitor its northern drone strikes is nil so it was either informed by Ukraine or at least the Baltic States across whose airspace the drones are credibly speculated by many in Russia to have passed. Either of those two scenarios is plausible, the first due to Finland recently complaining about Ukrainian drones and the second due to Russia’s recently threatened retaliation.

As regards the former, it claims that Ukrainian drones accidentally veered into its airspace, possibly due to Russia’s electronic warfare jamming their navigation, while the latter relates to Russia’s foreign spy agency threatening retaliation against Latvia if Ukraine launches drones from its territory. It’s therefore possible that Ukraine either tipped Finland off ahead of time or the Baltic States informed it in real time as Ukrainian drones flew across their airspace (regardless of whether this was with their approval).

Why this matters is because it reaffirms that Finland harbors malicious intent towards Russia by not in turn sharing what it learned, not that it would have made any difference though since Russia presumably detected the drones and wasn’t caught by surprise. It was earlier assessed that “Finland Is On Track To Become One Of Russia’s Most Intractable Foes” as implied by the Russian Ambassador, which accelerates the trend of dangerously merging the Arctic and Baltic fronts of the NATO-Russian New Cold War.

Finland shares NATO’s longest land border with Russia and is therefore of significant importance to the bloc as regards its policy of containing Russia. Even though it hasn’t credibly been accused of hosting Ukrainian drone teams like Latvia recently was and might not risk retaliation from Russia by following in its footsteps, it’s still doing everything that it can to undermine its larger neighbor. This includes hosting more NATO bases and even considering hosting US nuclear weapons too.

Bilateral ties are nowadays altogether different than they were just half a decade ago when friendliness prevailed in their relations and their cross-border trade boomed, but in retrospect, Finland had already been a shadow member of NATO for years prior and only just formalized its ties with the bloc in 2023. After all, it took countries like Albania years to bring its armed forces up to NATO standards, among other criteria, yet Finland was ushered in almost instantly. That says all that needs to be said.

Looking forward, while it’s anyone’s guess whether reportedly Baltic-facilitated Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia will continue, nobody should doubt Finland’s anti-Russian source. It arguably being tipped off about the recent attacks ahead of SPIEF, whether by Ukraine itself or the Baltic States, but declining to inform Russia is the least of its recently unfriendly moves. Finland is truly on track to become one of Russia’s most intractable foes, which is a pity because it’s unprovoked and not what many Finns want.

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One of their leading foreign affairs commentators argued that an inflection point has already supposedly been reached whereby Russia’s strategic defeat is predestined, but upon scrutinizing the claims that they presented in support of that conclusion, it’s clear that this isn’t the case at all.

CNN recently published an article by Brett McGurk, who was the Biden Administration’s National Security Council Coordinator on the Middle East-North Africa, declaring that “Russia is losing in Ukraine. Xi has noticed — Trump should too”. The gist is that shifting on-the-ground dynamics, speculative casualty counts, and Ukrainian deep strikes inside Russia have already predestined Russia’s “strategic defeat”. Xi is thus supposedly biding his time on Taiwan and Trump should put more pressure on Putin.

In the order that McGurk made his case, the on-the-ground dynamics first shifted after Russia’s pullback from Kiev shortly after the special operation began as part of the British- and Polish-sabotaged Istanbul peace process, so there’s nothing new in principle about the battlelines moving back and forth. As for his second point, neither side’s estimates of their own and the other’s casualty counts should be taken at face value as is the case in any conflict, nor should their respective partners’ tallies be either.

And finally, Ukraine’s deep strikes inside Russia are a predictable outcome of this protracted conflict after Ukraine received unprecedented levels of military-technical, logistics, and intelligence support from NATO, thus making the gradual evolution of its respective capabilities unsurprising. Taken together, his claim that “Russia is losing in Ukraine” is premised on giving the arguments that he made the benefit of the doubt, which will only be done by those whose preexisting assumptions were confirmed by his piece.

To be fair, similar counterarguments from the Russian side will only be given the benefit of the doubt by those whose preexisting assumptions are also confirmed by them, but there are three objectively existing points for supporters of both sides to keep in mind. The first is that each side, Russia and NATO (which is fighting Russia by proxy via Ukraine), has kept pace with the other’s military-technical advances in an outcome that has thus far maintained their military-strategic balance.

Second, this in turn raises the chances (absent a breakthrough on either side) that the conflict will end through a series of mutual compromises that falls short of each’s respective maximalist goals, especially NATO’s initial one of forcibly expelling Russia by proxy from all of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory. And lastly, the global processes that were catalyzed by the special operation accelerated multipolarity in ways that are extremely difficult for the US-led West to reverse, thus weakening its antebellum hegemony.

The preceding fact-check and clarification of reality establish the context for assessing whether Trump 2.0 will take him up on his advice to put more pressure on Putin. Judging by the recent scaling down of US forces in Germany and Poland, which follows the National Security and Defense Strategies’ prioritization of the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific, it’ll likely go unheeded. The US can’t risk a European imbroglio, let alone during its ongoing West Asian one, so McGurk is likely to be disappointed.

All in all, the purpose of his piece was to seed the narrative that Russia is already supposedly defeated so it’s time for the US to “escalate to de-escalate” to finish it off with a strategic victory for Ukraine, while debunking his piece serves to show that the exact outcome of the conflict is far from decided. As was argued, the most likely one is a series of mutual compromises that institutionalizes the new European security architecture that has emerged throughout the conflict, but some surprises might still be in store.

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Japanese-Philippine military ties are slated to become even more significant in this context once Japan begins exporting military equipment to the Philippines after recently easing decades-old restrictions.

Putin’s senior aide Nikolay Patrushev assessed late last year that “Japan Will Play A Much Greater Role In Advancing The American Agenda In Asia”. That preceded new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s innuendo about her country defending Taiwan from China, which in turn led to the conclusion that “Japan Might Challenge China Sooner Than Expected”. For background, the US envisages Japan helping to contain China through what can be called the AUKUS+ network, which could become an Asian NATO.

The core is conceived as comprising something what Pentagon officials reportedly refer to as the “Squad”, which is equivalent to the Quad of the US, Australia, Japan, and India but replaces the last-mentioned with the Philippines. It was foreseen as far back as summer 2023 that “The US’ Nascent Trilateral Alliance With Japan & The Philippines Will Integrate Into AUKUS+”. One year later, Japan and the Philippines agreed to a military logistics pact, thus strengthening their part of the Squad.

Japanese-Philippine military ties are slated to become even more significant once Japan begins exporting military equipment to the Philippines after easing decades-old restrictions in late April. China predictably protested its historical nemesis’ move and most recently referenced it yet again in early June after Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning warned that “These dangerous tendencies are surprisingly similar to the Japanese militarists’ preparations for unleashing aggression ahead of World War II”.

From China’s perspective, the US is encouraging its dual mutual defense allies to comprehensively strengthen military ties with the intent of tightening the AUKUS+-led and Squad-centric containment noose around the People’s Republic by means of a new military logistics corridor just east of Taiwan. If coupled with regular naval drills, including those in which the US and other AUKUS+ states participate, then more adversarial military assets could appear more frequently on its southern maritime doorstep.

If this is normalized in parallel with the placement of US intermediate-range missiles in the Philippine island of Luzon and Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, which bookend Taiwan, then Japan and the Philippines would become the tip of the US’ containment spear. China can either let this unfold with all that could entail for a major war if a war later one breaks out with Taiwan, but keep the peace for now, or risk a major war right now by “preventively” attacking the US’ Japanese and Philippine allies (or move on Taiwan now).

The emerging dilemma mirrors what Russia is experiencing with respect to European NATO’s planned expansion of forces along their border that it expects to be led by Germany. Russia can either let this unfold with all that could entail for a major war if another Ukrainian Conflict breaks out once the present one ends, but keep the peace for now (relatively in the sense of no hot war with NATO), or risk a major war now by “preventively” attacking NATO’s Eastern Flank (Finland, the Baltic States, and/or Poland).

If neither Russia nor China acts, then the “cordon sanitaires” along their respective western and southern borders will tighten. Even worse, NATO member Turkiye might succeed in expanding its sphere of influence into Central Asia via the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” across the South Caucasus, which serves a dual NATO military logistics purpose. Russia and China would then risk being pressured by the US along their shared rear. It’s unclear how they’ll avert this worst-case scenario.

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Poland can either accept being excluded; boldly engage Russia (and Belarus) on its own; or rally the “Viking Bloc” and the “Three Seas Initiative” states around the creation of a Polish-led “Intermarium” within “NATO 3.0” as a “cordon sanitaire” between the E3 and Russia.

Bloomberg reported last week that “Germany, France, UK Sketch Plan for Putin Talks on Ukraine”, which follows the EU’s interest in appointing an envoy for talks with Russia. Shortly after Bloomberg’s report, German newspaper of record Die Zeit reported that the German government had already by that time been preparing several weeks for this. Later that same day, Zelensky published an open letter to Putin in which he called for an all-for-all prisoner exchange and a full ceasefire for the duration of resumed talks.

What had hitherto been the US’ exclusive domain as regards Western talks with Russia is therefore on the verge of becoming Europe’s – particularly the E3 of France, Germany, and the UK – as the US steps back to focus more on Iran, the Indo-Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere. The same goes for its hitherto monopoly on Western talks with Russian ally Belarus, which now include French President Emmanuel Macron, who recently called Lukashenko for the first time in four years.

This came one month after France extended its nuclear umbrella over Poland and then other parts of Europe, importantly following the Butyagin-Poczobut prisoner swap that also included several others. That last event gave rise to expectations that Poland might begin to resume bilateral dialogue with Belarus following the US’ lead but has yet to happen. Instead, the Macron-Lukashenko call coincided with the reported visit of the French spy chief to Minsk, thus leaving Poland out of the loop yet again.

Given the recent reports about the potentially impending resumption of EU-Russian talks, with or without the same occurring as regards French, German, and/or UK bilateral ones with Russia, there’s a growing likelihood that Poland will be left in the lurch once more. The last point is important since this wouldn’t be the first time that has happened. “Top Polish Media Lamented Their Country Being Excluded From The Ukrainian Endgame” during Biden’s Berlin Summit on Ukraine in October 2024.

It was then concluded after Politico reported that “Poland fumes about being cut out of Ukraine peace talks” due to not being invited to the next ones in Geneva and London that “All Key Players Have Their Reasons For Excluding Poland From The Ukrainian Peace Process”. Readers can review that preceding hyperlinked analysis to discover each respective reason. History is now on the brink of repeating itself, except this time, the possibly upcoming talks might be the final ones that end the Ukrainian Conflict.

As happened at Yalta, Poland’s nominal allies might once again cut deals with Russia at its expense, albeit without any loss of territory this time around. These could concern everything from the possible resumption of Nord Stream II, though this time under US control, to the future European security architecture. Despite being led by some people of questionable loyalty to Poland, Poles are still a very proud people, and being excluded from such talks would be shameful and infuriating for them.

Poland really only has three options: It can let itself be excluded from such talks with all the entails for potential consequences to its interests; it can boldly engage Russia (and Belarus) on its own bilaterally as European NATO’s largest army and the indisputable leader of its Eastern Flank; or it can rally the “Viking Bloc” and the “Three Seas Initiative” states around the creation of a Polish-led “Intermarium” within “NATO 3.0” as a “cordon sanitaire” between the E3 and Russia. Poland must soon decide what to do.

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Subordination to the West is unthinkable since Putin would never approve of that, nor would the state and society go along with it, so the only real scenarios are stalled talks or Russian muscle-flexing breaking the deadlock.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb’s positive response to the scenario of him being designated by the EU as the bloc’s mediator for talks with Russia, which could also include it replacing the US’ role in mediating between Russia and Ukraine, renewed discussion about the merits of this possibility. Putin suggested in response to a question at an event after the Victory Day parade that his friend Gerhard Schroeder could play such a role, but the EU rubbished his proposal and is looking for someone else.

Whoever they ultimately settle on, the question remains about whether there’d even be any benefit to this, and it’s here where two schools of thought emerge. The relatively pragmatist one posits that it’s better for there to be some dialogue with the EU than none even if it’s ultimately fruitless. Likewise, they feel the same about dialogue with Ukraine, ergo the perceived merits of the EU replacing the US’ role. It’s possible, they believe, that this could lead to some tangible progress in some way or another.

The relatively more hardline school takes a much more cynical approach. According to them, fruitless dialogue is a waste of time and could also create the perception at home that Russia is considering unilateral concessions, thus risking a crisis of confidence among the population with all that could entail. In their view, dialogue should only be recommenced with both once they’re finally willing to agree to tangible compromises with Russia, which can be conveyed to them through existing channels.

The past year of US-mediated Russian-Ukrainian talks resulted in several rounds of prisoner swaps and exchanges of soldiers’ remains but no diplomatic breakthroughs. The closest that they came was the “Spirit of Anchorage” after the Putin-Trump summit in that Alaskan city that was recently described by an RT contributor as Putin promising to cease hostilities if Trump convinces Zelensky to withdraw from Donbass. Despite reported US pressure, Ukraine refused to budge, and no coercive US actions followed.

All the while, the US has rolled back Russian influence across the world through Trump 2.0’s Neo-Reagan Doctrine with an emphasis on the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which doesn’t inspire Russian confidence in the US’ commitment to a fair post-conflict partnership. A “cordon sanitaire” is also being assembled in the Arctic-Baltic through UK-led efforts, Central Europe through Polish-led efforts, its entire southern periphery through Turkish-led efforts, and Northeast Asia through Japanese-led efforts.

To make everything even more troubling for Russia’s national security interests, “The Brits, French, & Germans Are Now Right On Russia’s Doorstep”, while “Kazakhstan’s Self-Declaration As The Golden Horde’s Successor Could Pose A Threat To Russia” by kindling secular Muslim insurgencies. These factors greatly reduce the likelihood that the EU will seriously consider a series of mutual compromises with Russia. It’ll instead likely exploit any revived dialogue for talking down to Russia and issuing ultimatums.

Therefore, even if Russia agrees to receive whoever the EU might appoint as its mediator, their talks will probably go nowhere unless Russia either credibly signals that it’ll resort to kinetic means for breaking the West’s military-strategic encirclement or agrees to peacefully subordinate itself to the West. Subordination is unthinkable since Putin would never approve of that, nor would the state and society go along with it, so the only real scenarios are stalled talks or Russian muscle-flexing breaking the deadlock.

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His logic is that Russia is the only one that benefits from Poles and Ukrainians being at odds, which wouldn’t have happened had Zelensky not glorified the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits, and the consequences of their deteriorating ties could significantly harm Poland’s national interests.

Przemysław Czarnek is the conservative opposition’s prime ministerial candidate ahead of fall 2027’s next Sejm elections. His words therefore carry immense weight and reverberate throughout the nation. That’s why it’s incredibly important to pay attention to what he just alleged about Zelensky amidst the Volhynia Genocide dispute’s latest phase sparked by Zelensky glorifying the OUN-UPA culprits at the state level. The most scandalous part is that Zelensky is serving Russia’s interests on this issue.

His logic is that Russia is the only one that benefits from Poles and Ukrainians being at odds, which wouldn’t have happened had Zelensky not glorified the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits. It was recently explained here how Putin doesn’t benefit from the latest phase of this dispute since Poland is unlikely to cut off aid to Ukraine, both its own and the West’s. That said, Czarnek is correct that the deterioration of people-to-people ties – due to coordinated Ukrainian troll attacks against Poles – surely pleases Russia.

He made two other important points too. One of them was that Zelensky is only still in power due to Poland’s diplomatic offensive during the early days of the large-scale hostilities whereby it successfully rallied the West behind Ukraine while Russian forces were still right outside the capital. That’s a valid point that was earlier elaborated on here in summer 2024. Czarnek therefore considers it to be an act of the highest ingratitude for him to then glorify the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits.

The other point that Czarnek made was that Zelensky’s renaming of an elite commando unit in honor of “the heroes of UPA”, the OUN’s armed group that directly carried out the grisly murder of over 100,000 Poles, is also an act of extreme disloyalty to the Ukrainian nation. He didn’t expand on this point, but it can be reasonably assumed that he was implying that they deserve better than to glorify and thus be associated with fascist war criminals. A lot of people the world over, including in the West, would agree.

Altogether, the gist of Czarnek’s response to Zelensky’s decision to radically escalate the Volhynia Genocide dispute is that he’s working against the interests of his own nation, Poland, and the West as a whole by at minimum inflicting possibly irreparably damage to Ukraine’s reputation in Poles’ eyes. As Newsweek recently had to be reminded, “Poland Is One Of Ukraine’s Biggest Benefactors, Not It’s ‘Biggest Problem’”, with Polish spending on Ukraine and its refugees reaching 4.91% of its GDP.

Poland is trying to revive its long-lost Great Power status as explained here, which Russia views as a threat, albeit not as big as the one posed by Germany’s remilitarization. Be that as it may, Germany’s reported plans to resume talks with Russia together with France and the UK could lead to a partial rapprochement once the conflict ends. In that case, Nord Stream II might be reopened (but under US control) and Germany, its new Ukrainian junior partner, and Russia could all team up against Poland.

That worst-case scenario might only materialize if Zelensky’s keeps serving Russia’s interests as Czarnek argued that he’s doing through his latest moves. It’s therefore imperative that Poland coerces Zelensky into reversing course on this issue as well as replacing Germany with Poland as Ukraine’s top strategic partner behind the US. If Poland fails to do so, then it mustn’t delay contingency planning for the aforesaid scenario, which could be set into motion by Ukraine scapegoating Poland for its loss to Russia.

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Growing NATO-OTS synergy in Kazakhstan combined with Azerbaijan’s Ukrainian-like shadow membership in NATO, as well as its de facto alliances with the UK and Ukraine that were clinched over the past half-year, can lead to the weaponization of Golden Horde nostalgia against Russia.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev recently gave a detailed speech at the international symposium focused on “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization: History, Archaeology, Culture, Identity“ in which he declared his country to be the Golden Horde’s “direct successor”. He’s been flirting with this concept for some time, but directly declaring it is a significant development, let alone within the rapidly evolving regional geostrategic context in which this happened.

For background, the Golden Horde was the Mongols’ gradually Turkified polity that vassalized the successor states of “Old (‘Kievan’) Rus” after the Mongol invasion shattered this de facto confederation’s unity. In Russian historiography, the nearly quarter-millennium subjugation of their people is met with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it represented the humiliating loss of hard-earned sovereignty, but some also believe that it preserved Russian traditions from pernicious Western influence at the time.

In any case, Kazakhstan has the right to consider itself the Golden Horde’s successor state, and this aligns with Russia’s policy of recognizing contemporary civilization-states that was reaffirmed in its joint declaration with China during Putin’s latest trip there. Nevertheless, this move could represent a latent threat due to recent changes in the regional geostrategic order. Last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) serves the dual purpose of a NATO military logistics corridor.

The bloc’s predictably enhanced presence along Russia’s entire southern periphery, with Azerbaijan as the lynchpin after its leader announced last November that his armed forces completed their conformation with NATO standards, emboldened Kazakhstan to produce NATO-standard shells. The preceding hyperlinked analysis warned that this unprecedented Kazakh-NATO cooperation could spiral into a series of national security threats to Russia if it’s not soon brought under control.

One scenario that could materialize is NATO-backed Kazakhstan meddling in the “Orenburg Corridor” amidst the external revival of “Idel-Ural” separatism. Likewise, upon declaring itself the successor of the Golden Horde, Kazakhstan might also be encouraged by NATO and the Turkish-led “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS) in which it participates to encourage separatism in Russia’s neighboring Astrakhan Oblast too. The grounds could be to “return this historic part of the Horde that was unjustly seized by Russia”.

Growing NATO-OTS synergy in Kazakhstan combined with Azerbaijan’s Ukrainian-like shadow membership in NATO, as well as its de facto alliances with the UK and Ukraine that were clinched over the past half-year, can lead to the weaponization of Golden Horde nostalgia against Russia. Associated narratives could serve as the secular rallying cry for Muslim separatism in the Kazakh-neighboring Volga Region (nearby Tatarstan and Bashkortostan) and the Azeri-adjacent North Caucasus.

This worst-case scenario could follow the consolidation of the “cordon sanitaire” that’s being assembled around Russia in the Arctic-Baltic through UK-led efforts, Central Europe through Polish-led efforts, its entire southern periphery through Turkish-led efforts, and Northeast Asia through Japanese-led efforts. It’s therefore imperative that Russia preemptively defends itself from the latent threat posed by Kazakhstan’s self-description as the Golden Horde’s direct successor to avert this impending catastrophe.

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Candace isn’t a “Russian agent” like her critics now claim, nor did Russia ever direct her content that consequently polarized so many Americans as they now speculate, but Russia’s new association with her scandalous content might upset some of its conservative supporters.

Candace Owens traveled to Russia to participate in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum’s (SPIEF) discussion on “A Big Family, a Big Reach: New Demographics and Narratives for Media Leaders”. She also gave interviews to various Russian media outlets and briefly toured Moscow beforehand. Her trip went viral on social media, however, after her critics presented it as supposed proof that she’s paid by Russia. The innuendo, and in some cases outright allegation, is that Russia directs her content.

On that topic, Candace has become an incredibly polarizing figure over the past year. Her (in)famous series on “Becoming Brigitte” purports that French President Emmanuel Macron’s wife is actually her brother, who’s supposedly a transsexual, thus making Macron a homosexual as some have rumored. That was already off-putting enough for those of her followers who got to know her through her work at Ben Shapiro’s The Daily Wire and previously the late Charlie Kirk’s Turning Point USA.

What crossed the line for most of those who followed her from back then was her “Bride of Charlie” series focusing on Charlie’s widow Erika. Candace implied that Erika played a role in his assassination despite the suspect in custody being a radical liberal. The point in referencing these two series, especially her most recent one, is that they polarized a lot of Americans. Her participation at SPIEF thus made her critics suspect that Russia polarized Americans through her this whole time as a form of hybrid warfare.

No evidence has been presented in support of this conspiracy theory, which compellingly appears to be more of a personal vendetta by those like Laura Loomer with whom she’s feuded and the casual observers who despise her for the “Bride of Charlie” series than anything even semi-credible. Being invited to speak at a foreign event isn’t proof that the person’s content up until that point was directed by a foreign entity. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence and there’s none in this case.

Having debunked the faux controversy surrounding Candace’s trip to Russia, it’s time to move along to the veritable one, and this concerns Russia’s new association with her by dint of her having been invited to speak at SPIEF and then interviewed by leading Russian media. As was earlier mentioned, her two series are incredibly polarizing, and many have argued that the “Bride of Charlie” is unchristian cruelty to a widow driven by Candace’s jealousy that Charlie chose Erika over her as his wife.

Whatever one’s opinion about her motives may be, there’s no doubt that Candace’s innuendo that Erika played a role in the assassination of her own husband is scandalous, and this in turn could reflect poorly on Russia due to its association with her through SPIEF. While Russia’s “soft power supervisors” might calculate that “any press is good press”, and perhaps they also expected her to extoll Russia’s beauty to her audience to counteract Western propaganda, it indisputably comes with some reputational risks.

The takeaway is that Candace isn’t a “Russian agent” like her critics now claim, nor did Russia ever direct her content that consequently polarized so many Americans as they now speculate, but Russia’s new association with her scandalous content might upset some of its conservative supporters. Some have already expressed dismay at the decision to invite her to speak at SPIEF. Just like Candace lost a lot of her old supporters but gained even more new ones, however, so too might the same happen with Russia.

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Poland and Turkiye will expand their influence in Central & Eastern Europe via these pipelines.

Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Tomas Taraba declared during a visit to Baku in mid-May that his country wants to sign a decade-long gas deal with Azerbaijan. Several days prior, Bloomberg reported that Turkiye is considering building a military fuel pipeline to Romania via Bulgaria. This analysis here argues that it would be supplied by Azerbaijan via Armenia and could eventually include gas from Turkmenistan unless Russia puts a stop to it. A parallel pipeline could conceivably be built for supplying civilian sectors.

The Dubrovnik Declaration that followed last month’s annual “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) Summit mentions the Solidarity Ring among several regional connectivity projects to be prioritized. This project refers to a pipeline that would connect Slovakia with Azerbaijan via the same route that Bloomberg reported that Turkiye is considering for its military fuel pipeline. Interestingly, this route mirrors that of the scrapped Nabucco Pipeline, which is poised to be de facto revived through these means.

The whole reason why Slovakia is even considering importing costlier gas from far-away Azerbaijan is because of the EU’s decree late last year mandating that the bloc complete the de-Russification of its energy industry by 2028 at the latest for countries like Slovakia that have long-term contracts with Russia. As was analyzed here at the time, Poland is positioning itself as the entry point for US LNG into Central & Eastern Europe, specifically for its fellow Visegrad Group allies Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary.

As of late last year, the relatively new “Poland-Slovakia gas interconnector stands largely idle as Bratislava sticks with Russian supplies”, but that’s expected to soon change so that Poland can profit from facilitating the flow of US LNG to Slovakia and then Hungary. Likewise, Hungary under its new pro-EU government is expected to facilitate the flow of Azeri gas to Slovakia through the Solidarity Ring, thus leading to American and Azeri gas replacing Russian gas upon the de-Russification of their gas industries.

These supplies are more expensive than Russian gas, though Slovakia has little choice but to comply with the EU’s demands, especially since Russian energy imports via Ukraine are unreliable due to Kiev already weaponizing its transit state role. If it’s any consolation, Slovakia is preparing to complete a long-delayed segment along the Via Carpathia highway that’ll optimize trade between the Baltic and Black Seas and thus also between regional economic heavyweights Poland and Turkiye.

Additionally, Romania now plans to complete a branch of this same corridor on its own territory, the A3 motorway, which will shorten travel times between Central Romania and Hungary. Upon the completion of these Via Carpathia projects, Slovakia and Hungary will be at the Baltic-Black Sea trade. Likewise, the completion of the Solidarity Pipeline and seemingly inevitable opening of the Poland-Slovakia gas interconnector will place them at the center of the region’s post-Russian American-Azeri gas duopoly.

All of this is bad for Russia since the Via Carpathia has a dual military logistics role while the Solidarity Pipeline will squeeze its gas out of the EU market. Nevertheless, there doesn’t seem much that Russia can realistically do to stop it. The same goes for Slovakia and Hungary, which could benefit from the Via Carpathia’s commercial aspect but will pay more for American and Azeri gas. Poland and Turkiye gain more than anyone else from these projects, however, which speak to their growing regional influence.

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The people’s sincere desire for a stronger partnership with Russia has been ignored in favor of prioritizing the EU’s interests, and while this is also the case elsewhere in Europe, it’s all the more poignant in Macedonia since much of the population is strongly Russophilic.

New Russian Ambassador to what’s now known as “North Macedonia” Dmitry Zykov shared a quick update on bilateral ties in an interview with TASS in early May. He began by mentioning that “we (Russian diplomats) do not encounter pressure, outright rudeness, attacks on embassy security, or intolerance at the everyday level, as unfortunately happens to our colleagues in a number of other countries. However, since 2022, interaction with Russian diplomats has been minimized”.

The talk then turned towards Macedonia’s EU membership plans, which prompted Zykov to observe that negotiations have been going on for almost a quarter-century since 2005 with no major progress, but local politicians still claim that joining it one day will solve all their country’s problems. Nevertheless, “North Macedonia has adhered to all EU restrictive measures against Russia, including those introduced since 2014. Bilateral trade correspondingly plummeted from $495 million in 2022 to $163 in 2025.

Macedonia is also phasing out Russian gas through a combination of costlier Azeri and Emirati imports that he hinted raises the chances of Serbia following suit upon the completion of the Greece-Macedonia and Macedonia-Serbia interconnectors. Even more unfriendly is Macedonia to arm Ukraine so much so that “Skopje occupies a leading position in NATO in terms of this support per capita”. It never consulted its people about this either. On that topic, Zykov emphasized how friendly they are, unlike their rulers.

They’re “hospitable, open, and positive toward foreigners…Our country’s positive image as a major power with a rich culture that has contributed to world history is very strong. In Macedonia, a country with strong anti-fascist traditions, the memory of the USSR’s role in the defeat of Nazism remains ingrained in the public consciousness. For Orthodox citizens, who make up the majority of the local population, spiritual ties play a special role, shaping the image of Russia as a close, ‘brotherly’ country.”

Zykov was also asked about the views of Macedonia’s Muslim minority towards the Third Gulf War, to which he responded that they strongly support the US per their political traditions. He didn’t mention that they’re ethnic Albanians, however, which would have made this more understandable for readers. In any case, average Russians are unlikely to experience any of what Macedonia has to offer due to the suspension of direct flights and Russia’s visa-free travel there, which has led to minimal Russian tourists.

Reviewing the insight that Zykov shared, it’s tragic that such a largely Russian-friendly population is represented by such anti-Russian rulers, though the latter could of course be worse as he pointed out. It’s beyond the scope of this analysis to detail, but Macedonia was targeted by a progressively unfolding Western meddling plot that began in 2015 and resulted in the fall of its last true nationalist government, which then set into motion fast-moving socio-political changes that ultimately transformed the country.

Since then, the people’s sincere desire for a stronger partnership with Russia has been ignored in favor of prioritizing the EU’s interests, even at the expense of national ones. Such is the case elsewhere in Europe, but it’s all the more poignant in Macedonia since much of the population is strongly Russophilic, something that most observers and even many Russians themselves aren’t aware of. Candidly speaking, the future of their state-to-state ties is bleak, but people-to-people ones can still flourish in spite of that.

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When Sławomir Dębski speaks, Poles listen, including experts and officials.

Sławomir Dębski is one of Poland’s most respected foreign policy experts who served as director of the prestigious Polish Institute of International Affairs from 2007-2010 and 2016-2024. He also served as director of the Centre of Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding from 2011-2016. When he speaks, Poles listen, including experts and officials. That’s why his latest viral post on X, which was seen by over 200,000 people at the time of this analysis’ publication, is worth paying attention to.

According to Dębski, “There is a recurring tendency in parts of Ukrainian political discourse to explain historical setbacks through betrayal by others rather than through the limits of one’s own power, choices, or strategic circumstances. If that pattern returns after the war, Poland may once again find itself blamed not for what it did, but for what Ukraine was unable to achieve.” For background, Poland already spent 4.91% of its GDP on Ukraine, most to refugees, and donated its entire military stockpile.

Nevertheless, Ukrainians have waging an unprecedented infowar campaign against Poles, Poland, and Polish history on social media over the past week after President Karol Nawrocki declared that he’ll seek to revoke the Order of the White Eagle from Zelensky that was bestowed by his predecessor. The reason is Zelensky’s glorification of the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), who killed over 100,000 Poles during World War II.

Ukraine’s transformation into an anti-Polish state, which wasn’t inevitable but was due in no small part to German guidance, therefore lends credence to Dębski’s warning that it’ll scapegoat Poland for its loss to Russia upon failing to reconquer all the territory that it claims as its own once the conflict ends. After all, not even most anti-Russian Western hawks believe that Kiev will reimpose its writ over the entirety of its pre-2014 borders, ergo the extremely high likelihood of the conflict ending without that outcome.

Instead of partaking in long-overdue introspection by questioning why Zelensky didn’t accept Putin’s proposed terms for peace as part of spring 2022’s Istanbul peace process, Ukrainians might be manipulated by their government into blaming Poland, which many of them already hate. It’s not an exaggeration either to claim that many Ukrainians already hate Poland since they themselves proved it by trolling Poles on social media since the latest phase of the Volhynia Genocide dispute began.

They’ve made some of the most insulting posts imaginable about Poles, Poland, and Polish history, including justifying the Volhynia Genocide on the provably false pretext that the OUN-UPA were “anti-imperialists” fighting against “Polish colonists” (who actually lived there for over half a millennium). Poles have lived in today’s Western Ukraine for many centuries longer than self-identified Ukrainians have lived in the region of Crimea that they and their government still to this day claim as their own.

Given Ukraine’s recent transformation into anti-Polish state, which their society has gleefully embraced due to their innate Polonophobia connected with glorifying the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits, Dębski’s warning might soon become a prophecy. Germany’s military patronage of Ukraine all but guarantees this since it’s always benefited from the anti-Polish manifestation of Ukrainian nationalism and would rather that Poland be scapegoated for Ukraine’s loss than Germany or the EU, NATO, and the West as a whole.

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The impending counteroffensive that’s being planned will likely determine the future of Mali.

Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a member of the National Transitional Council and leader of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (a group of pro-government Tuareg), shared some insight into the Malian Crisis with Radio France Internationale in mid-May. He predictably claimed that morale remains high among the government, the armed forces, and the population that they represent while hinting at plans by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and their Russian Africa Corps (AK) allies for a counteroffensive.

What’s most important, however, is what he said about the “Azawad Liberation Front’s” (FLA) alliance with al Qaeda-affiliated “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (JNIM) radical Islamists. According to him, “Our brothers who chose to ally themselves with al-Qaeda haven’t learned the lessons of 2012 [when Tuareg separatists and jihadist factions initially joined forces against the Malian state]. Because in 2012 there was practically the same attempt, and the whole world witnessed what happened.”

He added that “Some of our brothers – not all, because some unfortunately never distanced themselves from the al-Qaeda network – but others were major victims of that organisation, including some of their leaders whose families were decimated by al-Qaeda. This alliance is a very bad thing. I think our brothers need to realise the grotesque mistake they are making and turn back. They should do what the MSA and Gatia did. They allied themselves with the Malian army to fight international terrorism.”

Acharatoumane concluded by declaring that “there’s no point in negotiating with people who are plotting to destroy our country. The Malian state protects its people and its territorial integrity, and there’s absolutely nothing to negotiate with these people as things stand, unless they reconsider their views and plans.” Putting it all together, he’s wisely reminding his fellow Tuareg of the dark fate that likely awaits them if JNIM repeats its predecessor’s persecution of their co-ethnics, which is possible.

He’s also tacitly extending an olive branch to them by encouraging their defection to the pro-government camp, after which it’s implied that autonomy might be considered after the crisis ends as a compromise for abandoning their separatist goals. So long as they remained committed to carving out their own state, not to mention with the foreign support that a different French media outlet recently confirmed that this geopolitical project is receiving, then dialogue with the patriotic military junta is impossible.

The FLA’s rank and file aren’t expected to defect unless the impending FAMA-AK counteroffensive shatters their group’s separatist plans, in which case mass defections are expected following the precedent from 2013 after France destroyed their first jihadist-hijacked polity. Precisely for that reason, however, foreign support for the FLA-JNIM axis is expected to ramp up ahead of the counteroffensive in order to preempt that possibility. The counteroffensive will therefore likely determine the future of Mali.

Success, even if only partial, could lead to mass defections from the FLA for denying JNIM the allies that they require for retaining a semblance of legitimacy abroad. By contrast, failure could embolden another FLA-JNIM push westward, perhaps even timed with a full attempted blockade of Bamako for maximum effect. The second scenario would almost certainly set into motion the previously warned one of a US-backed Nigerian intervention, however, which would also risk destroying the Sahelian Alliance.

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