Azerbaijan might meaningfully improve its relations with Russia and double down on its military-security ties with Israel to balance Turkiye if Aliyev suspects that Erdogan has hegemonic ambitions in the event that Baku concludes that Ankara is playing a role in organizing these demonstrations.

“The Azeri-Turkish Brotherhood Is Going Through Some Trouble” after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized hijab bans in his UNGA speech right before the adaptation of allied Azerbaijan’s new school uniform policy that was interpreted by some school administrators in this way. His Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev then criticized unnamed countries for meddling in his country’s affairs in a speech to the ruling party just as Turks on social media began criticizing Azerbaijan over its alleged ban.

Some pro-hijab protests have since taken place in Azerbaijan amidst reports that the authorities have banned several social media sites that could be exploited to coordinate such activity. For background, Azerbaijani is a majority-Shiite but historically secular society, while allied Turkiye is a majority-Sunni but increasingly Islamist society. Both of their titular people are Turkic, and their leaders have famously described bilateral relations for decades as being between “one nation, two states”.

Nevertheless, the Azeri-Turkish brotherhood is being tested by Azerbaijan’s pro-hijab protests since some suspect that Turkish actors are playing an unclear role in organizing them, and speculation is swirling about whether they’re independent activists or somehow connected to the state. To be fair, the same suspicions are circulating regarding an alleged Iranian role in events as well, but the salience is that some Azeris are now wondering whether their Turkish brothers are stabbing them in the back.

Iran’s hatred of Azerbaijan’s close ties with Israel is well-known, but it wasn’t till the Turkish-Israeli split over Gaza that Ankara started worrying about its ally’s ties with Tel Aviv. For background, Foreign Policy reported in 2012 that Israel planned to use Azerbaijan as a clandestine military staging ground against Iran. Iran’s state broadcaster then aired testimony in summer 2025 from locals near the border who reported seeing Israeli jets and drones crossing into the country from Azerbaijan during the 12-Day War.

More recently, CNN reported that Israeli commandos in southern Azerbaijan “carried out intelligence-gathering missions and drone operations” against Iran during the Third Gulf War, but Azerbaijan denied the allegation and is now reportedly suing CNN after it refused to retract the article. Be that as it may, Israel is one of Azerbaijan’s top military partners, and Aliyev just attended the opening ceremony of the first Israeli arms factory in Azerbaijan. All of this certainly riles Turkiye given its new rivalry with Israel.

It’s therefore plausible that Turkish actors, whether truly independent or somehow connected to the state, are playing a role in organizing Azerbaijan’s pro-hijab protests as revenge for such ties with Israel. While it’s premature to conclude that this is the case, if Aliyev assesses that it’s so, then he might reconsider allowing August 2025’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” to be exploited as a Turkish-led NATO military logistics corridor along Russia’s entire southern periphery.

Azerbaijan might then meaningfully improve its relations with Russia and double down on its military ties with Israel to balance Turkiye if he suspects that Erdogan has hegemonic ambitions. In that scenario, it can’t be ruled out that he’d symbolically join the Abraham Accords like Kazakhstan did last year to snub Erdogan, not to mention encouraging his other Central Asian counterparts to follow suit. Israel could then replace Turkiye’s role in their balancing acts vis-à-vis Russia with no objections from the Kremlin.

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Russian-Pakistani ties are at a crossroads amid suspicions by Moscow that Kabul’s claims of Islamabad’s ties with ISIS-K are true, the Kremlin’s similarly growing concerns that Pakistan could facilitate the return of US military infrastructure to the region, and Pakistan’s troll-driven infowar on Russia over false claims that it’s arming the Taliban (even if only indirectly) against Pakistan.

Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Venediktov shared some insight into his country’s ties with Afghanistan following last week’s meeting between Secretary Sergey Shoigu and Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. He didn’t say anything that hasn’t been said by other Russian officials, but it was nevertheless a concise review of their relations. Venediktov repeated Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent praise of the Taliban for its anti-terrorist and governance successes.

He also referenced their cooperation on countering drug production and trafficking, especially of synthetic substances, and reaffirmed that “The SCO is discussing restoring cooperation with Afghanistan through the previously existing contact group.” Venediktov importantly declared that “Afghanistan’s role in regional affairs should not be underestimated” because “a prosperous, peaceful, and independent Afghanistan is in the interests of all countries in the region.”

On that topic, he said that “we must not allow a group like ISIS to rise again” and reminded everyone that “the United States has made no secret of its plans to return military infrastructure to Afghanistan. The establishment of such a stronghold would pose a direct threat to all countries in the region.” Lavrov made both points at the eighth Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, where he and Pakistan’s representative took polar opposite stances towards Taliban-led Afghanistan, which was analyzed here.

The preceding hyperlinked analysis referenced Shoigu’s August 2025 article for the Russian government’s Rossiyskaya Gazeta, his remarks to the SCO in May, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov’s ones to them the month prior in April, and Lavrov’s comments in July that are all of relevance to Venediktov’s briefing. They’re all cited above, but for the convenience of casual readers, they reaffirm the points that he made regarding the flow of terrorists and arms to ISIS in Afghanistan as well as the US’ regional military plans.

Pakistan is the only one of Afghanistan’s neighbors that could realistically facilitate any of this, and it’s notable that Venediktov’s briefing coincided with the four-day visit of Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev to Pakistan, which the Pakistani Interior Ministry described as a “new chapter” in their ties. The Pakistani Embassy in Russia later reported that their talks will place “particular emphasis on strengthening cooperation in internal security, law enforcement & counter-terrorism.”

Given the seriousness of Russia’s implied suspicions about Pakistan’s ties with ISIS-K, which echo the Taliban’s that Muttaqi repeated during the previously mentioned meeting in Moscow and certainly discussed with Shoigu, Kolokoltsev’s lengthy visit to Pakistan is probably about that. It’s ultra-sensitive, however, so observers shouldn’t expect either side to confirm the reasonably conjectured purpose of his visit. In fact, they’ll likely deny it if asked, but such denials shouldn’t be taken at face value as explained.

Russian-Pakistani ties are at a crossroads amid suspicions by Moscow that Kabul’s claims of Islamabad’s ties with ISIS-K are true, the Kremlin’s similarly growing concerns that Pakistan could facilitate the return of US military infrastructure to the region, and Pakistan’s troll-driven infowar on Russia over false claims that it’s arming the Taliban (even if only indirectly) against Pakistan. Venediktov’s briefing lends credence to this assessment and the findings from Kolokoltsev’s visit will influence what Russia does next.

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He adamantly opposes his rhetoric since he might reasonably suspect that it hints at the US’ interest in cutting more deals with Russia like the diesel one even while the Ukrainian Conflict remains ongoing.

Liberal Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who scandalously lent credence to provably false claims that his American namesake is a Russian agent during the latter’s Biden-era interregnum, jabbed Trump once again by strongly suggesting that his recent rhetoric on Ukraine is a “valuable gift” to Putin. Tusk declared during the Warsaw Security Forum that “Anyone who suggests that Ukraine is responsible for the war is giving a valuable gift to the aggressor – Putin.” This follows Trump’s attacks against Zelensky.

Trump unforgettably quipped in April 2025 in reference to Zelensky that “You don’t start a war against someone 20 times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles.” Several days prior to Tusk’s abovementioned remarks, Trump then said that “Zelenskyy could have settled this war many times, many, many times, and he chooses not to. Very difficult. It’s a war that should have never been started.” This essentially reiterates what he said 18 months ago even if he was recently less direct.

The larger context concerns the recent Russian-US diesel deal, which was reached amidst renewed reports that they’re also considering a deal over Nord Stream, and the sour grapes that Ukraine and the Europeans have over the first deal between Russia and the US since 2022 without any Ukrainian terms attached. All of this coincides with reports that Trump might cut off arms and intel to Ukraine if it keeps striking Russian refineries. That would guarantee that Russia brings Ukraine to its knees by winter.

Even if that worst-case scenario from Kiev’s perspective doesn’t play out, then Russia and the US could still cut more deals with each other per the diesel precedent with or without the end of hostilities in Ukraine, which Trump’s recent reiteration of Ukraine’s responsibility for this conflict strongly hints at. While the resource-centric strategic partnership that they’ve been negotiating might not be reached till after the conflict ends, whatever else they might agree to could still be a step in that direction.

Tusk’s ruling liberal coalition is adamantly opposed to that, ergo why he’s once again implying that Trump is a Russian agent by describing the rhetoric that only the latter recently espoused as a “valuable gift” to Putin, but conservative President Karol Nawrocki isn’t a fan of this scenario either. The head of his Office for International Policy reaffirmed that Nawrocki favors keeping the sanctions on Russia, but he importantly never criticizes Trump’s outreaches to Russia, and he’s on very friendly terms with Trump.

Seeing as how Polish foreign policy is formulated through an interplay between the President, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister, contradictory policies might be pursued by the President and the government if Trump’s dealings with Putin lead to a resource-centric strategic partnership. Nawrocki’s pragmatism might inspire him to explore possible Polish participation in such an arrangement, or at least how Polish consumers could benefit from it, while Tusk might remain adamantly opposed to it.

Any deadlock wouldn’t be resolved till fall 2027’s next Sejm elections, and only in the event that a conservative-nationalist coalition replaces the liberal one, which is possible. Even so, if Tusk’s government expands its “snowdrop diplomacy” with Belarus to the point of replicating the US’ rapprochement with it, then he might explore the abovementioned possibility as an electioneering tactic. Nawrocki would thus be wise to make the first move towards Putin with Trump’s mediation.

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These issues and Ukraine will figure prominently in Poland’s next Sejm elections in fall 2027, the outcome of which will determine whether Polish foreign policy remains deadlocked or decisively aligns with Nawrocki’s pro-American vision.

Conservative Polish President Karol Nawrocki spent a significant part of his interview with leading conservative newspaper Rzeczpospolita criticizing liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk upon being asked relevant questions about him given those two’s rivalry that’s influencing its foreign and other policy matters. Nawrocki repeatedly reaffirmed that he perceives Russia to be a threat, but he also condemned Tusk for recently fearmongering about it supposedly plotting to attack Poland in the very near future.

He then declared that “The threat level has not changed significantly over the past six months, but I cannot directly cite the reports or change their clauses. I already had the information Prime Minister Donald Tusk is publicly releasing today when I became president. One thing has changed: one politician is persistently exploiting this threat for his own political gain.” Nawrocki also agreed with his interlocutor who interpreted his remarks as Tusk wanting to “build a so-called flag effect around himself”.

The next thing that Nawrocki said was that he and Tusk should focus on “arming ourselves, maintaining international relations, not offending our strongest allies, and above all, not spreading fear for reasons of personal and partisan interests.” He added that “spending time spreading fear instead of strengthening our resilience is, in my opinion, socially irresponsible and may be playing into our adversary’s playbook.” This implied that Tusk is inadvertently doing Putin’s bidding by spooking Europeans about Russia.

The conversation then segued into Trans-Atlantic ties due to Trump recently confirming that progress has been made on the US establishing a permanent military base in Poland. Nawrocki said that “the most important guarantee (of Poland’s security) is the Polish Army, and the presence of American troops is an additional guarantee.” He then described Tusk as an “anti-American”, “pro-German”, and “pro-European” politician while describing himself as a “pro-American” and “pro-Atlantic” one.

Nawrocki was also predictably asked about recent reports that Trump suggested that Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz defect from the ruling liberal coalition to lead a new conservative government with himself as Prime Minister. He responded that “I can’t say for sure what the American side’s attitude is toward the anti-American Prime Minister Tusk”, thus suggesting that it’s plausible. In any case, for what it’s worth, he claimed that neither he nor Trump discuss the other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Nawrocki described the libertarian-nationalist Confederation of the Polish Crown opposition party of Grzegorz Braun, who’s considered “pro-Russian” by some and is in embroiled in what some perceive to be anti-Semitic scandals, as “a presence in Polish politics.” This hints at his openness to a coalition between Poland’s opposition parties after fall 2027’s Sejm elections despite the (incidentally Jewish) US Ambassador reportedly warning against partnering with Braun’s. Trump might back this too.

The foreign policy significance of Nawrocki’s interview is that it reaffirmed his pro-American/-Atlantic vision and relative (in a Polish context) pragmatism towards Russia in contrast to Tusk’s anti-American, pro-German, and pro-European vision and electorally driven fearmongering about Russia. These issues and Ukraine will figure prominently in Poland’s next Sejm elections, the outcome of which will determine whether Polish foreign policy remains deadlocked or decisively aligns with Nawrocki’s vision.

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Russia still has time to propose Ukrainian-like security guarantees for averting another special operation.

Politico recently published a piece about how “France and Turkey block NATO’s drive to deepen ties with Caucasus countries”, not because they’re opposed to it in principle, but due to Turkiye blocking the renewal of Armenia’s partnership plan after France declined to approve Azerbaijan’s. France and Azerbaijan have long been at odds over Paris’ support of Armenia, particularly in the context of the Karabakh Conflict, and recently over Azerbaijan’s detention of French citizens (who were later released).

Per Politico, “The delay has forced NATO to temporarily extend Armenia and Azerbaijan’s outdated partnerships despite negotiations on the new plans being near-finalized, three of the diplomats said. The new plans would allow their participation in joint military exercises, boost military-to-military training and intensify cultural cooperation all the way down to setting up local English-language lessons, they added.” Joint NATO drills might be held on the Caspian coast with Azerbaijan upon its plan’s approval.

None of this is surprising to astute observers. August 2025’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) has the unstated dual purpose of a NATO military logistics corridor to the Caspian Sea and thenceforth to Central Asia. TRIPP is therefore the means through which NATO aims to contain Russia along the southern flank of the new “cordon sanitaire” that Trump 2.0 assembled around it. Azerbaijan poses a Ukrainian-like challenge to Russia by functioning as TRIPP’s irreplaceable transit state.

If Azerbaijan cooperated with Russia to ensure that TRIPP wouldn’t be exploited for military purposes, then there wouldn’t be any problem, but Baku has no such interests and has instead thrown its weight behind the West. In point of fact, President Ilham Aliyev announced last November that his country’s armed forces have completed the conformation to NATO standards, and their naval drones could threaten Russia’s Caspian Fleet in crisis scenarios just like Ukraine’s currently threaten its Black Sea one.

Azerbaijan is also on pace to further integrate its economy with the EU’s. Not only is it helping the bloc replace Russian energy, but it’s also going to facilitate their trade with Central Asia, to which end European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced last month that “we will aim to crowd in up to €12 billion in public and private investment” in regional logistics along what’s known as the “Middle Corridor”. All of this tightens the containment noose around Russia’s southern flank.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested last month that his people are sometimes optimistic to the point of implied naivete and also tend not to proactively address latent crises. With the deepest of respect for those of them who are responsible for formulating its policies, that arguably appears to be the case regarding the threat that TRIPP poses to Russia. That’s not to imply that Russia should wage a preventive war against Azerbaijan, just that it should urgently wise up to the threats coming from it.

Looking forward, just like NATO’s de facto expansion to the Caspian Sea is inevitable, so too is it inevitable that Russia’s threat perception towards Azerbaijan will intensify. The sooner, the better, since Russia still has time to propose Ukrainian-like security guarantees for averting another special operation. In this context, they could concern Azerbaijan agreeing to Russian inspections of TRIPP’s cargo and not allowing any joint NATO drills on its territory, but Aliyev might not assent unless Putin presses him a bit.

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This refers to the soft power tactic of creating false narratives for strategic purposes, which Zakhar Prilepin and Ivan Prokhorov recently suggested have caused more harm than good for Russia, and they importantly conveyed as much right after Putin’s clarion call to abandon wishful thinking.

Irish journalist Brian McDonald drew attention in early October to a Telegram post by Russian journalist Zakhar Prilepin and a thematically related article at Tsargrad. Both deserve much more attention in Russia’s global media ecosystem than they received from McDonald’s X posts, however, which is the purpose of the present piece. Beginning with Prilepin’s Telegram post, he criticized the false perception of the West’s supposedly inevitable collapse that’s been formulated by Russia’s global media ecosystem.

He wrote that “What we see there are quite stable systems – systems that are holding their own even without our gas” and ominously warned that “as always, it will be a little too late to realize our mistakes.” This theme was coincidentally continued the next day by Tsargrad’s Ivan Prokhorov. In his article titled “Funny Masks Are Worn On Purpose: Who Is Russia Really Fighting In The SMO?”, he lambasts the crude caricatures about his country’s opponents that were created by its global media ecosystem.

Prokhorov implies that this has led to Russia lowering its strategic guard and discredited those who peddle these narratives because such “clownish” foes are still fighting Russia despite false assumptions that they should have already lost long ago. He then segued into arguing that their wherewithal is due to the state mechanisms behind them, which some call the “deep state”, and that Russia is actually at war with such systems as opposed to the people who represent them like is popularly thought.

What links Prilepin’s Telegram post and Prokhorov’s article at Tsargrad is the innuendo that Russia’s global media ecosystem created false narratives about its opponents, these have inadvertently been recycled into policymakers’ feedback loops, and the outcome has been disadvantageous for Russia. The soft power tactic of creating false narratives for strategic purposes was first described as “Potemkinism” here in April 2024, after which it was elaborated upon here that October and here in January 2026.

“Potemkinism” not only always entailed the abovementioned risk of inadvertently polluting policymakers’ feedback loops, but it also risks creating false expectations among Russia’s supporters, who might then become deeply disappointed and possibly more susceptible to adversarial narratives. Examples of the last-mentioned include the notion that Russia must be even more “clownish” than its foes if it can’t already defeat them and conspiracy theories that Putin might have “sold out” to the West.

So serious is the strategic challenge posed by “Potemkinism” that it was referenced here as one of the top three facing Russia. That piece was coincidentally published the same day as Prokhorov’s, while those two and Prilepin’s post importantly followed Putin’s clarion call on 1 October at the Valdai Club’s latest annual summit for a “realistic assessment” of the risks facing Russia. He explicitly advised against “wishful thinking, an abstract and speculative construct or an unrealistic visualisation of our wishes”.

While it can only be speculated whether Prilepin and Prokhorov were influenced by Putin, the fact is that they’re now taking the lead in pushing back against “Potemkinism” (despite not using that term), which can help Russia overcome the strategic challenge associated with it if this trend catches on. Responsible “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” (NRPRs) can assist by taking inspiration from them to politely push back against top NRPR influencers on social media the next time that they peddle “Potemkinist” narratives.

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To be clear, top Russian officials only strongly implied as much and didn’t directly accuse Pakistan, and Russia isn’t arming the Taliban (let alone against Pakistan).

Kamran Yousaf, the Express Tribune’s senior foreign affairs correspondent, published a piece about “Russia’s Taliban Gamble”. He recalled the recent background that his colleague Imtiaz Gul referenced in his own piece on this broader subject two days prior, which was responded to here, regarding the polar opposite views on Taliban-led Afghanistan shared by Russia and Pakistan at the eighth Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan. Yousaf then tried to explain Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban.

He correctly noted that “Moscow wants to preserve its influence in Afghanistan, prevent instability from spreading into Central Asia and contain the threat posed by Daesh. It also wants to limit the prospect of renewed Western military influence in the region.” Russian officials have explicitly said as much. Yousaf then cited some of the speculation that’s swirling around Pakistan about this. According to him, it “could partly reflect a desire to counter Pakistan’s historical influence in Afghanistan.”

He continued: “Islamabad has developed closer ties with the Trump administration, while its Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has added another dimension to its strategic relationships. Some observers speculate that Moscow may view these developments with suspicion, particularly if it believes Pakistan is moving closer to Washington or becoming part of a regional security arrangement that could affect Russian interests.” Yousaf concluded by reaffirming Pakistani policy.

In his words, “For Pakistan, the concern is straightforward: closer regional engagement with Kabul could reduce pressure on the Taliban to act against the TTP. Islamabad argues that dialogue must produce verifiable action against groups launching attacks inside Pakistan.” Ironically, this is identical to India’s approach to others’ ties with Pakistan, which India believes reduce pressure on Pakistan to act against the armed groups that it backs inside India. That’s something for Pakistani policymakers to dwell upon.

As for the two speculative motives behind Russia’s growing ties with the Taliban, the unnamed Pakistanis (presumably experts and/or officials) who he cites couldn’t be more wrong, since Russia doesn’t care about countering Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and doesn’t perceive the Mecca Pact as a threat. What Yousaf and his sources should be aware of, however, is Russia’s latent threat perception of Pakistan as informed by its Secretary of the Security Council, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister.

Their remarks were referenced here, which was cited in the earlier mentioned response to Gul, the gist being that Pakistan is facilitating the flow of arms and terrorists to Afghanistan along with the possible return of Western military infrastructure to the region. None of this could realistically be facilitated by the Central Asian Republics, China, or Iran. To be clear, these Russian officials only strongly implied as much and didn’t directly accuse Pakistan, and Russia isn’t arming the Taliban (let alone against Pakistan).

Be that as it may, Pakistan should address these clearly conveyed suspicions, or it risks losing Russia’s trust with time. Yousaf was right that “Moscow has little reason to abandon its broader relationship with Pakistan” due to differences over the Taliban, but it also has little to lose if Pakistan is the one that abandons them. The same can be said about Pakistan. It therefore can’t be ruled out that Pakistan might sacrifice its ties with Russia over this issue to either make a point or satisfy the interests of its US ally.

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Mobilization would most likely only be declared to exploit an impending breakthrough across the front, but the EU is expected to spin any such move as an impending Russian attack in order to advance its elite’s goals.

The Telegraph recently claimed that Putin is preparing a “stealth mobilization” whereby administrative preparations are allegedly being made in the event that he decides to declare mobilization. The essence of these rumors isn’t new, and Putin responded to them in early September by saying that “There is no such scenario as of today that would require a mobilisation. This is an information attack on behalf of the enemy on the eve of the elections to the State Duma in an attempt to influence their results.”

Both parts of his statement are true, but it can’t be ruled out that circumstances might change, in which case it’s worthwhile analyzing the scenario in which mobilization might occur and how the EU might respond. “Russia’s Locomotive Strike Campaign Threatens To Cripple Ukraine’s Military Logistics” if carried out systematically from now through the coming winter and paired with equally systematic strikes against its gas stations, ports, power plants, and other infrastructure.

If Russian military planners come to believe that this might lead to their long-awaited breakthrough across the front, then they might advise Putin to at least do what he did four years ago by declaring the partial mobilization of experienced reservists for exploiting any such breakthrough. The goal would be to apply more military force at this strategically advantageous moment for coercing Ukraine into complying with all of Russia’s demands, or at least as many as possible, for ending the conflict in a Russian victory.

That’s a reasonable scenario in which at least a partial mobilization might be declared, the possibility of which European NATO (E-NATO) is already arguably preparing for in advance, ergo the recent hysterical fearmongering about an impending Russian attack against several of the bloc’s members. In light of the rapidly shifting military-strategic dynamics of the conflict brought about by Russia’s previously mentioned systematic strike campaign, this narrative can in hindsight be interpreted as preconditioning.

The purpose is to manipulate average folks into perceiving any partial mobilization as preparation for a Russian invasion of the Baltic States and/or Poland, which Putin has said that he has no interest in, and it wouldn’t make sense for him to risk World War III in pursuit of occupying hostile populations anyhow. Nevertheless, this preconditioning could be paired with a false flag (in Poland?) to either justify a dangerous escalation by E-NATO against Russia or accelerate the EU’s military-political centralization.

E-NATO’s ruling liberal elites are being challenged by their conservative oppositions like never before amidst the economic decline caused by surging fuel prices that are due to the anti-Russian sanctions and the Third Gulf War’s disruption of the global energy market. They therefore have an interest in maximally fearmongering about Russia to at minimum rally voters around them while further centralizing the EU and even dangerously escalating against Russia in the most extreme scenario if that fails to help them.

To recap, mobilization would most likely only be declared to exploit an impending breakthrough across the front, but E-NATO is expected to spin any such move as an impending Russian attack in order to advance its elite’s goals. A false flag might even occur to make this narrative more believable. Before E-NATO dangerously escalates against Russia on that pretext, however, it should recall Lavrov’s words that any war between them “will be very short” in an allusion to Russia nuking E-NATO in self-defense.

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Misleading security-related pretexts were exploited by the country’s de facto military dictator as part of his latest power play for further centralizing his control over Pakistan, but he risks replicating what Pakistanis widely consider to be the East Pakistan tragedy, which led to the loss of today’s Bangladesh.

The central government carried out a coup in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) through the imposition of emergency rule on misleading security-related pretexts and the abduction of its democratically elected opposition leadership led by Chief Minister Sohail Afridi. He represents the PTI party of politically persecuted former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan, who’s languishing in prison on trumped-up charges, and was leading a march on Islamabad to demand Khan’s release.

The state alleges that Afridi and his provincial leadership are “the B-team of the TTP”, the “Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan”, more popularly known abroad as the “Pakistani Taliban”. Their reasoning is that terrorism still plagues KPK, but the province has been afflicted by this scourge for the past two decades, so that’s nothing new. KPK also importantly borders Afghanistan, whose Taliban leadership that’s at war with Pakistan is sympathetic to the TTP’s cause, and its mountainous geography facilitates insurgency.

The state also strongly implied that Afridi and his provincial leadership are traitors who are more loyal to Taliban-led Afghanistan than to Pakistan due to their concerns about the collateral damage that another potential large-scale anti-terrorist operation in KPK could have for civilians. Prior such operations failed to eliminate terrorism as history proves, so these concerns are reasonable, not treasonous. In any case, they’ve been abducted by the state and KPK is now under central control, thus completing the coup.

The larger context concerns not only the previously mentioned Afghan-Pakistani War that’s been raging since February, but Pakistan’s rapid mission creep in the Yemeni War, which is widely perceived to be Chief of the Defense Forces Asim Munir’s vanity project. He replaced former Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa, who helped mastermind April 2022’s post-modern coup against Khan, as Pakistan’s de facto military dictator. Khan has referred to both as “small men in big offices” to mock their incompetence.

Munir’s coup in KPK simultaneously satisfies several objectives. First, it further centralizes his power over the country by removing the opposition-led provincial government in Pakistan. Second, he could now more easily advance his reported plot to radically divide Pakistan’s four provinces into anywhere from a dozen to over 100 as part of a typical divide-and-rule strategy. Third, the de facto state of martial law that’s now imposed upon KPK could be expanded across the country on similar security-related pretexts.

To elaborate on the last point, the TTP in KPK and the “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA) in Balochistan are serious problems for the state, the Afghan-Pakistani War is still raging with no end in sight, and direct involvement in Yemen could prompt sectarian killings against Pakistan’s large Shiite minority. Munir’s coup in KPK could therefore be a trial run for formalizing his de facto military dictatorship on these security-related pretexts in the coming future.

In his pursuit of power, however, Munir risks replicating what Pakistanis widely consider to be the East Pakistan tragedy whereby one of his predecessor’s similar pursuits led to the loss of today’s Bangladesh. Khan and Afridi have both warned about this since they, as truly patriotic Pakistanis, fear that Munir might unleash ultimately uncontrollable processes that further “Balkanize” their ethno-regionally diverse nation. Pakistan is at the precipice of such a disaster precisely because of this “small man in a big office”.

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A chill in bilateral ties might be inevitable, and it could last for some time, but experts like him could help prevent the tangible deterioration of relations as a result.

Respected Pakistani academic Imtiaz Gul, who heads the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies, published a piece at the Express Tribune wondering “What’s Russia up to?” in Afghanistan. He posited that Russia’s rapprochement with the Taliban might be “targeting the United States and Pakistan – partners in the anti-Soviet jihad – because the two are now so close that Moscow sees Islamabad as more of a facilitator of Washington’s regional agenda than a neutral partner”.

Gul then cited Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent praise of the Taliban’s anti-terrorist operations against ISIS-K, which clashed with Pakistani Special Representative for Afghanistan Mohammad Sadiq’s accusations that it backs terrorists. Both figures shared their respectively polar opposite views at early October’s eighth Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan. While there hasn’t (at least yet?) been any political fallout, this dispute fueled Pakistani trolls’ new infowar on Russia.

He concluded by asking the following questions: “Are Moscow and Kabul signaling to the United States and Pakistan that if they back the alleged anti-Kabul groups, Russia can also step in to help fend off that threat? Is the Russian claim that Pakistan supplied ammunition to Ukraine also a driver behind Moscow’s recalibration? It perhaps now brackets Pakistan with the pro Ukraine alliance led by US-Europe.” Here are some background briefings on the broader subject before responding to Gul’s article:

* 3 October: “Is India Financing The Taliban’s Reported Purchase Of Belarusian Drones?”

* 5 October: “Russia & Pakistan Have Polar Opposite Views On Taliban-Led Afghanistan”

* 6 October: “What’s The Future Of Russian-Afghan Military Cooperation?”

* 6 October: “Is Pakistan Waging An Infowar On Russia Over Its Ties With The Taliban?”

* 6 October: “How Might Russia’s Threat Perception Of Pakistan Change If It Arms Ukraine?”

* 7 October: “Clarifying Seven Important Points About Russia’s South Asian Policy”

* 8 October: “Russia Hinted At What An Afghan-Pakistani De-Escalation Agreement Could Look Like”

* 9 October: “The Taliban Isn’t Entirely Wrong About Pakistan”

* 9 October: “Five Thoughts About Pakistan’s Rapid Mission Creep In The Yemeni War”

* 10 October: “Fact Check: Pakistan Didn’t Dissolve The USSR”

To summarize, the fake news about India financing the Taliban’s purchase of Belarusian drones with Russia’s approval was exploited as the pretext for initiating what appears to have been a preplanned Pakistani infowar on Russia driven by two possible motives. It’s either to precondition the public for Pakistan arming Ukraine and/or to distract from the opposition’s march on Islamabad and/or Pakistan’s rapid mission creep in the Yemeni War. The jury is still out about which one it is, if not all three.

As for the facts, Russia’s alleged arming of the Taliban (whether directly or indirectly) remains the realm of speculation, but Russia believes that the Taliban is the most potent force for preventing ISIS-K’s expansion into Central Asia. Russia might therefore arm the Taliban for this reason. Russia also signaled over the past year as highlighted here, here, and here that Pakistan is facilitating the flow of arms and terrorists to ISIS-K as well as the possible return of Western military infrastructure to the region.

Even if Pakistan convinces Russia that this isn’t the case, which his unlikely considering how plausible it is as explained above, Russia would still remain close to the Taliban due to their shared interests vis-à-vis ISIS-K. Circling back to Gul, hopefully he’ll become aware of Russia’s actual policy on the subject and recalibrate his analysis on it accordingly. A chill in bilateral ties might be inevitable, and it could last for some time, but experts like him could help prevent the tangible deterioration of relations as a result.

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Neither should be surprised by Russia and the US prioritizing their own interests over others’.

The Russian-US diesel deal, which was announced by Trump on Friday, directly affects Iran and Ukraine. As regards the first, its (imperfect) blockade of the strait will no longer have the same economic impact on the US, not to mention the potential political impact ahead of early November’s next midterms. Regarding the second, Zelensky already complained about it on X, and Trump was seemingly provoked by his blatant disrespect into quipping that “I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president.”

Whether or not the US makes any tangible moves in pursuit of that goal, let alone cuts off intel like Axios cited a source to report that Trump is considering if Ukraine continues striking Russian refineries after the diesel deal, remains to be seen. That said, Trump’s quip shouldn’t be casually dismissed like cynics are prone to do since it’s no small matter that the President of the United States is openly calling for regime change in Ukraine, which could embolden Zelensky’s many rivals.

The Russian-US diesel deal clearly comes at Ukraine’s political expense after the US decided to rubbish its own sanctions against Russia and symbolically do so when a Ukrainian delegation was meeting with Trump’s special envoys in Miami. It was argued in late September that “Zelensky Is Manipulating Trump’s Russiagate PTSD To Get The Upper Hand Over Him” by bombing Russian refineries despite explicitly being told not to, yet it now seems like Trump overcame his PTSD and is paying Zelensky back in spades.

As for the Iranian dimension of the Russian-US diesel deal, readers should remember that Russia and Iran aren’t allies, they’re just strategic partners. “Potemkinism”, which refers to the soft power tactic of creating alternative realities about Russian foreign policy for the purpose of making people like Russia on false premises such as the infamous lie that Putin is secretly an anti-Zionist, is responsible for false perceptions of their relations. Most of Alt-Media accordingly believes that Russia and Iran are allies.

Nevertheless, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed in late August that Moscow is opposed to Iran’s planned imposition of tolls in exchange for safe transit through the Strait of Hormuz, declaring that “We do not want a fee to be introduced either, but that is a matter for further discussions.” Iranian hardliners’ refusal to comply with summer’s MoU with the US for ending the Third Gulf War has perpetuated regional tensions for another one-third of a year. Russia apparently doesn’t like that.

As was earlier mentioned, the Russian-US diesel deal neutralizes the economic and political impact that Iran’s (imperfect) blockade of the strait was intended to have on the US, and it also clearly comes at Ukraine’s political expense as well. Neither should have sour grapes, however, since Russia isn’t Iran’s ally as explained and the US has long been known to prioritize its own interests over others’ like Ukraine’s. Any complaints by Iran’s supporters, not to mention Zelensky’s on social media, are therefore misplaced.

The economic impact of the Russian-US diesel deal for both sides is thought to be negligible, which suggests that political motives were the driving force behind it. Russia likely wanted to show the US that it’s serious about clinching the resource-centric strategic partnership that they’ve been negotiating for the past year while the US likely wanted to show Europe that it’s time to patch up its problems with Russia. Iran and Ukraine are the biggest losers, and neither should be surprised by what just happened.

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Since China declined to radically accelerate multipolarity by defying the US’ sanctions against Russia and cutting Ukraine off from drone-related sales, it’s poetic justice for Russia to radically exacerbate the US’ pressure campaign against China through a resource-centric rapprochement with the US that will derail China’s superpower trajectory.

Trump announced on Friday that he clinched a deal with Putin wherein “Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel to the American and Global Marketplace, another 500,000 Tons during the month of November, and 1,000,000 Tons immediately thereafter. Additionally, based on the condition of their Diesel Refineries, Russia will then deliver, within a short period of time, 3,000,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel.“ This is a step closer towards their long-negotiated resource-centric rapprochement.

The gist thereof was first floated here in November 2024, expanded upon here in January 2025 shortly before Trump returned to office, and most recently elaborated on here in early October amidst the latest reports about potential US stakes in Nord Stream. To summarize for the convenience of casual readers, who can review these analyses here and here from December for more details, Russia and the US have shared interests in strengthening their resource cooperation that long predate the Third Gulf War.

Basically, Russia wants to preemptively avert any potentially disproportionate dependence on China brought about by the West’s unprecedented sanctions over the past nearly half-decade, while the US wants to advance that goal in parallel with denying China access to more Russian resource deposits. Per the last-mentioned interest, American investments (and possibly later those of its sanctions-waived Asian allies like India, Japan, and South Korea) in such deposits would ipso facto deny them to China.

The grand strategic goal that the US is pursuing has been described as the “Strategy of Denial” by Elbridge Colby, who’s now the Under Secretary of War for Policy and considered to be the mastermind behind NATO 3.0 and the US’ complementary “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more robustly containing China. Its control over Venezuela’s oil exports and its (imperfect) blockade’s influence over Gulf energy exports, both from Iran and the Arab Kingdoms, empower the US to decelerate China’s superpower trajectory.

Around half of the foreign energy required for fueling it has now fallen under some degree of US influence, and replicating this approach through mutually beneficial resource deals with Russia as part of the Ukrainian peace process will radically exacerbate the US’ pressure campaign against China. The ultimate goal is to coerce China into a lopsided trade deal that would cap its superpower rise and instead make it the most significant Great Power below the US for ending the systemic challenge that it poses.

Russian officials will never publicly declare as much, but it can be reasonably assumed that they’re deeply disappointed with China, which is why their country is going along with the US’ plans. Not only did China bend to US sanctions pressure by pulling out of a major energy project, but the BRICS and SCO banks that it hosts shockingly comply with these restrictions too, and China still sells drones, spare parts, and fiber optics to Ukraine to this day for indefinitely perpetuating NATO’s proxy war on Russia.

Since China declined to radically accelerate multipolarity by defying the US’ sanctions against Russia and cutting Ukraine off from drone-related sales, it’s poetic justice for Russia to radically exacerbate the US’ pressure campaign against China through a resource-centric rapprochement with the US that will derail China’s superpower trajectory. China had its chance to shape the world order by throwing its weight behind Russia but declined, so now Russia is shaping it instead by throwing its weight behind the US.

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If anything, Poland’s Solidarity movement was the geopolitical trigger that accelerated this process, not the Afghan War.

One of the most popular narratives connected with Pakistani trolls’ infowar against Russia over the past week, which is predicated on the false pretext that India is financing the Taliban’s purchase of Belarusian drones with Russia’s approval, is that the 1980s Afghan War triggered the USSR’s dissolution. This claim is popularly accepted as true among many Pakistanis due to the Soviet Union falling apart just two years after it withdrew from Afghanistan. They therefore believe that they can now “Balkanize” Russia.

This is typically expressed through tweets showing a map of the former Soviet Republics and along with a comment to the effect that the same thing will happen again to Russia if Pakistan wants. The likelihood of random Pakistani accounts all pushing the same narrative on the same week and on the same false premise is nil. This is a coordinated attack either to precondition the public for Pakistan arming Ukraine or to distract from the opposition’s march to Islamabad and/or Pakistan’s mission creep in Yemen.

Whatever the motive may be, and Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies that are collectively known as the Establishment have plenty of reasons to weaponize Russophobia, the fact of the matter is that this viral narrative is patently false. The Afghan War, in which Pakistan colluded with the US to defeat the Soviet Union by proxy through the Mujahedeen, didn’t trigger the USSR’s dissolution. This was instead brought about by political-administrative issues that long predate that conflict.

Absolutely none of the former Soviet Republics that declared independence, including the Russian Federation itself, referenced the Afghan War. Moreover, every single one ended up with their Soviet-era administrative borders (apart from post-“Maidan” Ukraine for reasons beyond the scope of this analysis to explain), which brings to mind Putin’s famous accusation against Lenin. He described the Soviet Republics’ right of secessionism as a “time bomb that was planted under the structure of our statehood.”

It was the combination of this right, Gorbachev’s chaotic “glasnost” and “perestroika” (“openness” and “restructuring”) policies, and the economic troubles brought about by ideologically driven mismanagement that resulted in the USSR’s dissolution, not the Soviet Union’s loss in the Afghan War. If any geopolitical development played a role in this event, it was Poland’s Solidarity movement, which was in some sense a Color Revolution that ultimately crushed communism in Central & Eastern Europe.

The most that the Afghan War did was worsen the USSR’s economic troubles, not spark them, nor did it inspire the individual republics to declare independence. Nevertheless, the false perception of Pakistan’s alleged role in the Soviet Union’s dissolution persists, both abroad (mostly in the West) and especially among Pakistanis. It’s being recycled on social media right now to imbue average Pakistanis with false confidence as part of the Establishment’s infowar against Russia for the reasons that were touched upon.

Whatever their Establishment’s motive may be, the pertinence in fact-checking their trolls’ viral claim about Pakistan’s alleged role in the USSR’s dissolution is that it’s a timely opportunity to educate folks who might have already fallen for this false narrative. If anything, Solidarity was the geopolitical trigger that accelerated this process, not the Afghan War. Looking forward, Establishment-backed Pakistani trolls are expected to continue peddling this narrative, which will further worsen people-to-people ties.

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The containment noose around Russia’s western and southern flanks might eventually tighten.

Zelensky launched the Carpathian Eight (C8, also the Carpathian Integration Initiative) during a summit in late September. This platform was supposed to include Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, Serbia, Romania, and Hungary, but the latter’s leader later denied that it joined. Anyhow, their initiative will optimize the deployment of NATO forces eastward in the spirit of the “military Schengen” as well as military logistics between the western and southern flanks of the new “cordon sanitaire” around Russia.

These conclusions are derived from Zelensky’s speech. Regarding the first strategic function, he said that “We need better transport and logistics. We need more capacity to move large volumes of goods. We need to move faster with the modernization of our roads and railways. ​We need military mobility that improves our defense capability. We need more storage facilities, more renewables, development of the region’s critical minerals, stronger trade links and stronger manufacturing cooperation.”

This is a clear allusion to optimizing the deployment of NATO forces eastward through the construction of more dual-use connectivity infrastructure across the C8 countries, the enhancement of existing such infrastructure, and the expansion of associated storage facilities. The completion of these tasks will facilitate the second strategic function of optimizing military logistics between the western and southern flanks of the new “cordon sanitaire” around Russia on the pretext of expanding trade between them.

According to Zelensky, “The Carpathian macro-region is a natural European gateway for routes coming from the South Caucasus and Asia through the Black Sea…So in the North, we work with the Baltic and Nordic countries. In the South, we have cooperation in the Danube region and around the Black Sea. We also work closely with the Balkan countries and with South-Eastern Europe. And the Carpathian Initiative turns the Carpathians into the strongest link and connection for all neighboring regions.”

The western flank of the “cordon sanitaire” consists of the Swedish-led Viking Bloc in the strategically merged Arctic-Baltic region, Poland’s envisaged sphere of influence in Central Europe (which overlaps with Sweden’s in the Baltic States), and NATO’s Romanian outpost on the Black Sea. The southern flank is Turkish-led and spreads across the South Caucasus and into Central Asia via August 2025’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”, the dual purpose of which is a NATO military logistics corridor.

The optimization of the “cordon sanitaire’s” military logistics through the C8 is an urgent task for the EU now that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen placed Europe on the path to war with Russia after sharing plans which amount to precisely that during her latest annual address. Poland will still play an indispensable role in connecting the Viking Bloc with Turkiye’s Neo-Ottoman Empire, but German-backed Ukraine is now pioneering a complementary east-west corridor across the Carpathians.

The end result will be the tightening of the military logistical noose around Russia’s western and southern flanks unless this connectivity driven grand strategic goal is offset. Therein lies the other significance of the C8 since its threatening function vis-à-vis Russia might motivate the Kremlin to brainstorm creative solutions to this rapidly worsening problem. While it can’t sever the military logistical routes within Europe without sparking World War III, the South Caucasus are another matter.

This analysis was originally published at the Russian International Affairs Council.

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Pakistan’s de facto military dictatorship, which was imposed after April 2022’s post-modern coup against former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan, appears to be seriously considering its armed forces’ large-scale direct involvement in the Yemeni War.

The Pakistani Ministry of Information denied the New York Times’ report, which cited two anonymous Pakistani officials, alleging that their country is carrying out airstrikes against Yemen’s Iranian-aligned Houthi rebels and plans to continue air support for its Saudi allies’ local forces as part of the Mecca Pact. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s rapid deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia proves that it’s plunging into mission creep (and without parliamentary approval either), about which five thoughts will now be shared:

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* Pakistan Risks Sectarian Killings At Home

The Pakistani Establishment, which refers to its powerful military and intelligence agencies that are considered to have run the country since its inception one way or another, has a history of weaponizing sectarianism and radicalism for domestic and foreign purposes. They might therefore do so once again to rally the majority-Sunni public behind any direct involvement in the Saudis’ war against the Zaydi Shia Houthis at the risk of local radicals lynching members of Pakistan’s substantial Shia minority as a result.

* Its Armed Forces Ignoble Reputation As “Hired Guns” Could Be Reaffirmed

The Pakistan Armed Forces are widely perceived as “hired guns” due to their historical alignment abroad with the US, Saudi Arabia, and even recently Turkiye. Their alignment with the first two is thought to be rewarded with bailouts, which their struggling country desperately needs, while the third is thought to reward it with military (specifically drone) technology. It doesn’t matter whether the Pakistan Armed Forces’ reputation is accurate since the point is that their ignoble reputation might soon be reaffirmed.

* Pakistan Is Strategically Aligning With Israel

Despite its officials’ public support of Palestine and harsh rhetoric against Israel, which Pakistan doesn’t officially recognize, there’s no denying that their armed forces’ potentially direct involvement in the Yemeni War would align Pakistan with Israel. As a reminder, Israel also opposes the Houthis, but its prior bombing campaign failed to defeat them. Pakistan might now try to do what Israel couldn’t, which might lead to its ruling clique being perceived among some as Israeli servants, whether rightly or wrongly.

* Its Relations With Iran Might Be At Risk With All That Could Dangerously Entail

Building upon the above, any direct involvement of the Pakistan Armed Forces in the Yemeni War at scale could risk a rupture in their country’s relations with Iran, whose threat perception of Pakistan might accordingly spike as a result of perceiving it as strategically aligning with Israel. Its leadership therefore might not rule out the scenario of Pakistan participating in another round of Israeli and/or US strikes in the coming future like some outlets have reported is being considered with all that entails.

* What Other Rewards Might Pakistan Expect?

Apart from yet another US and/or Saudi bailout, Pakistan might expect geopolitical rewards from both in the scenario that its direct involvement in the Yemeni War results in the Houthis’ defeat. From the US, Pakistan might request to be treated as its top partner in the subcontinent once more like it historically was before the US began eyeing India as a counterweight of sorts to China, while it could demand air and naval bases in Yemen from the Saudis as Damocles’ swords that could sever Indo-EU trade in a crisis.

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Pakistan’s de facto military dictatorship, which was imposed after April 2022’s post-modern coup against former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan, appears to be seriously considering its armed forces’ large-scale direct involvement in the Yemeni War. That scenario could result in significant and far-reaching consequences, not least for the hitherto largely positive perception of Pakistan among many in the Alt-Media Community, who might then perceive it to be a joint American-Israeli puppet regime.

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While Pakistan’s image in their eyes as a fake terrorist-exporting military dictatorship lorded over by a single ethnic group is a caricature, there’s nevertheless some truth to it.

The infowar that Pakistani trolls are waging against Russia on social media over their countries’ newly confirmed polar opposite views on Taliban-led Afghanistan has caught many “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” (NRPRs) by surprise. Most had hitherto developed positive views of Pakistan due to its rapprochement with Russia and support of Palestine, the cause of which is very popular among many NRPRs, which is why they feel confused and even betrayed by the Russophobic hatred that’s been wildly circulating.

These feelings have in turn prompted interest among some of them in the Taliban’s narrative about Pakistan given that those two have been at war since late February, but few NRPRs paid any attention to it till now since the Third Gulf War overshadowed that one. It turns out that the Taliban isn’t entirely wrong about Pakistan. While Pakistan’s image in their eyes as a fake terrorist-exporting military dictatorship lorded over by a single ethnic group is a caricature, there’s nevertheless some truth to it.

The British carved the Durand Line between them at the consequence of partitioning the proud Pashtun people. The millennia-old Indian Civilization – which refers not just to India’s Hindu majority that casual observers nowadays associate with the word India but to the subcontinent’s historically cosmopolitan civilization-state – was itself later partitioned upon Pakistan’s independence. Pakistan then became a stalwart Western ally. Comparisons to Ukraine from the Russian perspective are understandable.

The 1980s Afghan War and subsequent insurgency in Indian Kashmir showcased Pakistan’s mastery of unconventional warfare that the USSR deemed to be terrorism as does India. Likewise, the US also deemed Pakistan’s prior patronage of the Taliban to be terrorism, just like the Taliban now deems Pakistan’s patronage of anti-Taliban groups. Pakistan denies it, but the Taliban also accuses it of backing ISIS-K, which is believable after April 2022’s post-modern coup restored US influence over Pakistan.

The country has since unofficially reverted into a military dictatorship that imprisoned former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan on trumped-up politicized charges and viciously persecutes his supporters. Interestingly, he himself is a proud Pashtun, ergo why some have perceived his persecution (whether accurately or not) to be motivated in part by the ethno-bigotry that they associate with the military’s top Punjabi brass (of course not necessarily with that ethnic group as a whole). This leads to the final point.

Some non-Punjabi Pakistani ethnic groups like the Pashtun and especially Baloch minorities haven’t always been treated fairly by the central government that’s either been directly ruled by the military’s top Punjabi brass since independence or powerfully influenced by it. The acknowledgement of this fact doesn’t equate to endorsing the separatism and even terrorism that some of the aggrieved have resorted to. Pakistan has been poorly governed since its inception and therefore has many problems.

Circling back to the lede, the Pakistani infowar on Russia arguably appears to be at least tacitly encouraged by The Establishment, which refers to Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence agencies. This conclusion is derived from the observation that Establishment-approved media and influencers are waging this campaign. The best-case scenario is that it’s to distract the public from Khan’s supporters’ march on Islamabad while the worst-case one is that it’s to prepare them for Pakistan arming Ukraine.

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Regardless of however the “friendly competition” evolves between Germany and Poland over leading NATO 3.0 , one thing is certain, and it’s that US-led creative energy diplomacy will likely shape the post-war European security architecture.

Reuters cited five unnamed sources to report that US Special Envoy for Russia Jared Kushner held talks with his Russian counterpart Kirill Dmitriev about getting a US investor involved in the Nord Stream pipeline that still has one undamaged segment out of four after September 2022’s terrorist attack. What makes this report credible despite the innate doubts that some skeptics might have is the context in which it was published that will now be briefly reviewed before elaborating more on the report itself.

The Atlantic reported in late September that Trump authorized his Special Envoy to Belarus John Coale to convince Putin to release “political prisoners” in exchange for sanctions relief following the arrangement that he reached with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. This shortly followed what The New Yorker reported in mid-September about how a European spy service caught wind that “Trump and people around him” are considering “reopening the Nord Stream 2 pipeline under American control”.

A few days after that, the New York Times (NYT) reported in early October that “U.S.-Russia Talks on Ukraine Now Involve an Oil Deal Tied to Trump Allies” regarding Lukoil’s global assets, which Trump sanctioned a year ago. Those skeptics who might scoff that these reports are either fake news or a means of manipulating Russia into concessions without anything in return should know that Belarus just sent the US 30,000 tons of potash after the US lifted some sanctions and returned some frozen funds.

This follows Trump boasting about the “massive” potash deal that he and Lukashenko are negotiating, which prompted Lukashenko to propose that the US invest in a fertilizer plant in Belarus together with it and Russia. These fast-moving developments, both the US-Belarusian détente and the spree of reports about US-Russian resource deals, coincide with a NYT report that Putin is preparing to finally bring Ukraine to its knees after nearly five years through systematic infrastructure strikes over the winter.

This analysis here assessed that it’s true and driven by Putin having reportedly been informed by his Finance Minister following talks with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent that (at least significant) sanctions relief of the sort described above can only follow the end of the Ukrainian Conflict. The sooner that the conflict ends, the sooner that Russia can receive such relief for stimulating economic growth amidst the ongoing slowdown and establishing a resource-centric strategic partnership with the US.

The implications were earlier elaborated on here and here, but the Nord Stream dimension thereof that Reuters just reported is being discussed could restore Russia’s dialogue with the EU’s de facto German leader, thus paving the way for military de-escalation. The US’ NATO 3.0 concept envisages European NATO leading Russia’s containment, which could either worsen tensions if Germany’s remilitarization poses a 1941-like threat or result in a new energy-driven modus vivendi under the US’ supervision.

With a view towards best managing the post-war Russian-German relations that might soon rebound with none other than the US’ approval, Poland could make the first move in improving ties with Russia by building upon its new “snowdrop diplomacy” with Belarus. Regardless of however the “friendly competition” between Germany and Poland over leading NATO 3.0 evolves, one thing is certain, and it’s that US-led creative energy diplomacy will likely shape the post-war European security architecture.

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It can be intuited from a reasonable interpretation of Lavrov’s remarks as informed by Kabulov’s.

“Russia & Pakistan Have Polar Opposite Views On Taliban-Led Afghanistan” as revealed by their representatives’ public remarks at the eighth Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, which ended without a joint statement for the first time. Putin’s Special Representative on Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov explained that “Our Afghan colleagues felt that this year, in the text [of the draft joint statement], Afghanistan was mentioned too often in a terrorist context.”

He then added that “To be honest, this surprised us, because the same wording and expressions were used in last year’s text, [after] the seventh meeting. Nevertheless, the Afghans believe that the situation in bilateral relations has changed since then, and this year this statement is unacceptable.” Kabulov concluded by reaffirming that a joint statement isn’t required to continue the format’s work and reminding everyone that “it is not a platform for resolving bilateral disagreements” anyhow.

It can therefore be intuited that the Taliban’s objections were due to their belief that agreeing to such language in the context of the Afghan-Pakistani War would lend legitimacy to Islamabad’s cause with all that entails for delegitimizing the Taliban’s attacks that it frames as retaliation to unprovoked aggression. For background, Pakistan accuses the Taliban of sponsoring the “Pakistani Taliban” (TTP), while the Taliban accuses Pakistan of sponsoring ISIS-K. This is important to keep in mind ahead of the next part.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later separately said that “Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently engaged in fairly serious confrontation because Islamic State operates an offshoot which it calls its Pakistani branch. It’s a troublemaker that carries out terrorist incursions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Perhaps, our key takeaway from this situation is that the countries from outside the region should stop meddling in the developments in this geopolitical space.” He also brought up ISIS’ Iraq War origins.

Him blaming the Afghan-Pakistani War on ISIS implies that Pakistan could recast the TTP attacks that it cites as the basis for what it frames as retaliatory anti-terrorist strikes against the Taliban as ISIS attacks instead in order to advance a diplomatic-security compromise with the Taliban. Both sides could then stop blaming the other for backing terrorists if Pakistan’s recasts the TTP as ISIS’ Pakistani branch, after which joint border patrols could occur together with the accelerated construction of their border fence.

In pursuit of ending the cross-border terrorist attacks that each side blames on the other, the Taliban would tacitly compromise on its refusal to recognize the Durand Line while Pakistan would compromise by repairing political and trade ties with them in exchange. If the Taliban later formally recognizes the Durand Line, then Pakistan would formally recognize the Taliban. In the meantime, mutual de-escalation, joint border patrols, and political normalization could restore work on the trans-Afghan railway.

Russia’s regional vision is for the aforesaid project to connect Russia to India, but the first step is ending the Afghan-Pakistani War, which requires mutual compromises. Moscow’s mediation is impossible without both sides agreeing, however, ergo the importance of informally floating this proposal through a reasonable interpretation of Lavrov’s remarks as informed by Kabulov’s prior ones. It’s now incumbent on each side’s leaders to consider whether this proposal is worth pursuing with Russia’s mediation.

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Such moves could torpedo Trump’s reported plan to replicate his successful Belarusian dealmaking with Russia, keep post-war NATO-Russian tensions high, and tie the US down in Europe after the Ukrainian Conflict ends contrary to the spirit of his administration’s NATO 3.0 concept.

Trump responded in the affirmative when he was recently asked by a Lithuanian reporter whether he’d consider establishing a permanent base there, which the Lithuanian Foreign Minister later confirmed would have its costs covered entirely by Vilnius if Washington agrees to its proposal. This coincided with the Lithuanian Seimas moving forward with lifting the country’s ban on hosting nuclear weapons. Speculation is therefore swirling that Lithuania might host US bases and nukes in the coming future.

The odds of either happening are low, however, since Lithuania is competing with neighboring Poland for both of these “honors” as they’re widely perceived as being in each other’s societies. Trump confirmed last month that “major progress” has been made in talks with Poland over hosting a permanent US base that Warsaw is expected to spend nearly $4.5 billion to construct alongside covering the cost of each US soldier by $15,000 per year. That’s a very enticing offer that Lithuania would struggle to compete with.

After all, Poland is now a $1 trillion economy while Lithuania’s was around $95 billion last year, so Poland could easily outbid Lithuania if it had to. While a permanent US base in Poland would already be provocative enough from Russia’s perspective, one in Lithuania – let alone in both Poland and Lithuania – would be even more so, and Trump might be reluctant to provoke Putin that much. That’s because he’s planning to replicate his successful Belarusian dealmaking with Russia according to a recent report.

It’s beyond the scope of this analysis to elaborate on, but readers can review the preceding hyperlinked analysis to learn more. Moving along, the Polish Deputy Defense Minister claimed in August amidst his ruling liberal coalition’s mixed signaling on Warsaw’s interest in hosting US nukes that “the US doesn’t want to place [nukes] in Poland”, perhaps due to the abovementioned reason. It therefore wouldn’t make sense for the US to ignore Poland, the regional military leader, and base nukes in Lithuania instead.

Lithuania isn’t even part of the elite US-organized Bergen Group that Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby described as driving progress toward NATO 3.0, unlike Poland, which is envisaged to play a leading role in European NATO’s containment of Russia under the US’ supervision per this concept. In fact, if Poland succeeds in leading the Intermarium with US support, then it could take the lead in responding to any contingencies in the Baltic States instead of the US feeling obliged to do so right away.

While provocative from Russia’s perspective as was earlier mentioned, post-war NATO-Russian tensions could still become relatively more manageable in that event than they presently are if Trump mediated the creation of a crisis-control channel between the US, Poland, and Russia. That could then help stabilize the new European security architecture that’s forming and possibly lay the basis for other future arrangements that would altogether reduce the risk of war by miscalculation (or false flag provocation).

By contrast, the permanent deployment of US troops and especially nukes to Lithuania would guarantee that post-war NATO-Russian tensions remain high, not to mention keeping the US tied down in Europe. It would therefore go against the spirit of Colby’s grand strategic plans and is accordingly unlikely to happen, barring some unforeseen development(s). Instead of relying on the US or Germany, which already has a base in Lithuania, Lithuania might thus rely more on Poland for its post-war security.

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It’s nowadays inextricably connected with manufacturing consent for war.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave the keynote speech at the Global Fact-Checking Network’s (GFCN) fourth “Dialogue On Fakes” international forum last month. He began by warning about how “turbulent flows of information fill up people’s lives and the use of modern technology can make any piece of news, even something unverified or audaciously misleading, quickly accessible by millions if not billions of people.” He then strategically contextualized the West’s fake news onslaught against Russia.

In Lavrov’s words, “an information war against us was launched long before the special military operation, immediately after – with President Putin’s arrival in office in the early 2000s – Russia began freeing itself from the neocolonial forms of cooperation with our Western colleagues, pursuing an autonomous policy, and returning to its traditions, customs and roots.” He also referenced how fake news preceded Western aggression against Yugoslav and Iraq before sharing examples against Russia.

These include the alleged poisoning of the Skripals with Novichok, the circumstances surrounding Navalny’s separate poisoning and later death, and the recent drone false flag at the Leipzig Airport. Lavrov then devoted considerable time to describing the Bucha false flag, which he declared that Russia refused to let die even after “This topic later disappeared from the international media space as if it never existed” due to how well it embodies Western mendacity. It was also a defining historical moment.

Lavrov reminded everyone about how the Bucha false flag followed Russia’s withdrawal from Kiev as a “goodwill gesture” for facilitating the completion of the then-ongoing peace talks, after which it was exploited by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to convince Zelensky to withdraw from them. Had the Bucha false flag not been carried out, then Zelensky wouldn’t have had as falsely compelling of a reason in the eyes of the global public to continue fighting. The rest is history.

With a view towards averting such history-making future false flags, Lavrov said that “there are many incidents like Bucha, and others like those raised earlier. Naturally, they require further investigation. I am confident that your organisation will be interested in preventing the information space from being clogged with outright lies – lies that actively undermine the movement towards stronger ties, normal relations and cooperation among all states, and instead sow discord and hatred, holding back the truth.”

The salience of Lavrov’s speech is that he reminded everyone of the geopolitical consequences of fake news, which literally led to wars in the cases of Yugoslavia and Iraq while perpetuating existing ones like the Ukrainian Conflict to the point of making it a de facto forever war by now nearly half a decade later. Fake news can therefore be more meaningful than simply misleading people into disliking whatever country it might be since it’s nowadays inextricably connected with manufacturing consent for war.

Greater awareness of this fact highlights the importance of the GFCN. Without exaggeration, its members’ duties partially pertain to matters as significant as war and peace. Their global network’s goal is to promptly debunk warmongering fake news such as the examples that Lavrov cited and then massively amplify their materials to the audience whose consent for impending aggression is being manufactured through these deceitful means. Some future wars might therefore be averted as a result.

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