His primary argument is that a sovereign and predictable Russia is better for the West’s interests than a vassalized state (whether to the West or to China), a “Balkanized” mess, or a North Korean-like “hermit kingdom”, all of which are potential outcomes of the West’s new “war of attrition” against it.
Andrey Melnichenko was a little-known Russian oligarch till The Economist unexpectedly ran a three-part feature on him in early July after he gave them nearly 60 hours’ worth of interviews. Here’s their report about him, here’s the executive summary, and here’s his exclusive article for them. While Valdai Club’s Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov made some important points about The Economist’s motives in promoting Melnichenko, that Russian oligarch also made a few good points in his own article too.
Titled “Why a broken Russia is bad for the world”, Melnichenko argues that the West’s interests are best served by a sovereign and predictable Russia, not the vassalized state (whether to the West or to China), “Balkanized” mess, or North Korean-like “hermit kingdom” that the West wants to turn it into. The “war of attrition” that they’re now waging against Russia through Ukraine to these ends is a recipe for perpetual war, which risks spiraling out of control, ergo the need to change tack and prioritize diplomacy.
No matter how much many Western policymakers might disagree, Russia now conceptualizes its proxy war with them in Ukraine as a struggle to retain its hard-earned sovereignty, after which it still expects to play a leading role in reforming the European security architecture. Melnichenko advises the West to accept this reality for the greater good, or cynically as the proverbial lesser evil, since the alternative of protracted unpredictability from Russia is inordinately worse for everyone.
In his words, “A sovereign Russia will not make every country comfortable. But it will be more advantageous in the long run than the alternatives. The choice for external players is not between a friendly Russia and a hostile one. It is between a Russia whose behaviour is predictable and one whose trajectory is unknown. In the world taking shape now, predictability is more important than sympathy.” He also envisages big businesses bringing together society and the state in the new Russia.
This resembles the task that former top Russian spy Andrey Bezrukov referenced earlier this summer as regards the need to merge the culture of the army with the culture of society to strengthen each other. Big businesses such as Melnichenko’s could be the glue that fastens them together. Reflecting on what he shared with The Economist, it’s most certainly not what the Western elites want to hear, but it’s definitely what they need to hear and should accept sooner than later before it’s too late.
Melnichenko is the most economically influential figure to share his views about Russia’s future, which followed Bezrukov being the most influential spook-expert who shared his own views after Russian experts Dmitri Trenin, Ivan Timofeev, and Vasily Kashin, whose works have all been hyperlinked to. All of this precedes late September’s next Duma elections, the outcome of which some observers expect could serve as the catalyst for various reforms, which the aforesaid five figures so far might hope to influence.
Returning to the intro, Lukyanov is right that The Economist hoped to spin Melnichenko’s views as false “evidence of a split in the Russian ruling class, or as a sign of rebellious sentiment among big business”, but that doesn’t detract from the points that he made. As an oligarch who repatriated to Russia and praised Putin for being right about how the West couldn’t be trusted, he should be assumed to have good intentions unless proven otherwise, and he deserves respect for his article at The Economist.
I suspect such arguments have no persuasive power among Western leaders. By definition, an empire's concern is not limited to money, but also power. It is from an oligarch's viewpoint, it makes more sense to give my country some sovereignty so I can be protected when I run afoul of the empire, because buying out a local official is cheaper than buying off an imperial lord. While I don't like systems with political power highly concentrated, I also know that systems with financial power highly concentrated are no good either. Not only does power corrupt (soul or morality, fill in the blanks), but money also corrupts.
Concentration of power or money merely means corruption is more concentrated at a few points and at a higher proportion, and more difficult to reverse. A smoothed-out distribution curve for either political or financial power makes systems less efficient, as was the case when the US was closer to a theoretical democracy. And it is not limited to the political arena. Few companies have survived well after two or three successful CEO transitions after the original founders retire. Not IBM, not Intel, not Nissan, and soon it will be proven that not TSMC, either. In the last 3000 years, we humans simply have not figured out a reliable way for talent cultivation and leadership transition. Not at the national level, not at the company level. Heck, if some Chinese proverb is any guide, not even in a family with the same surname. Note that ancient China did not have the mechanism to protect inherited wealth. And when the political system is unstable, no wealth can be easily maintained.
While Melnichenko’s interview is interesting and presents valid points , it seems obvious that foreign policy that repeatedly results in geopolitical chaos and war is bad for the majority of the world’s citizens. However, it is a reliable tool for wealth extraction and hegemony over critical natural resources that benefit a tiny minority of elites.