His primary argument is that a sovereign and predictable Russia is better for the West’s interests than a vassalized state (whether to the West or to China), a “Balkanized” mess, or a North Korean-like “hermit kingdom”, all of which are potential outcomes of the West’s new “war of attrition” against it.
I suspect such arguments have no persuasive power among Western leaders. By definition, an empire's concern is not limited to money, but also power. It is from an oligarch's viewpoint, it makes more sense to give my country some sovereignty so I can be protected when I run afoul of the empire, because buying out a local official is cheaper than buying off an imperial lord. While I don't like systems with political power highly concentrated, I also know that systems with financial power highly concentrated are no good either. Not only does power corrupt (soul or morality, fill in the blanks), but money also corrupts.
Concentration of power or money merely means corruption is more concentrated at a few points and at a higher proportion, and more difficult to reverse. A smoothed-out distribution curve for either political or financial power makes systems less efficient, as was the case when the US was closer to a theoretical democracy. And it is not limited to the political arena. Few companies have survived well after two or three successful CEO transitions after the original founders retire. Not IBM, not Intel, not Nissan, and soon it will be proven that not TSMC, either. In the last 3000 years, we humans simply have not figured out a reliable way for talent cultivation and leadership transition. Not at the national level, not at the company level. Heck, if some Chinese proverb is any guide, not even in a family with the same surname. Note that ancient China did not have the mechanism to protect inherited wealth. And when the political system is unstable, no wealth can be easily maintained.
In Europe, we have known the kind of power it seems you like: feodality. Believe me, this era was such a hell and a mess that, in reaction, England first, followed by France invented the state centralisation.
In China, in the first half of 20th century, it was the hell of lords of war.
When Tocqueville visited the young USA near 1830, people had described him this country as land of freedom. When he travelled and crossed USA, he was horrified saying that if in Europe, we knew one tyrant, In USA every neighbour could become a tyrant.
China had feudalism as well. The classical form was destroyed when the Qin kingdom united China. But that was the preliminary agricultural era; the lords may be brutal, but that does not seem to be the case if you believe in history compiled by Confucius. According to Confucius, lords of those early days were much more focused on acquiring political power, sometimes invasion of neighbors, and, much more often, royal court intrigue. Fighting a war was difficult at the beginning because each nation was fairly small. A subset of northern China today hosted 800-1000 feudal lords.
The problem was that after China had been under central power/government for a long time, there was still a new class of lords: some from rich businessmen buying a title (say, an oligarch sending one of his servants to become vice president, etc.), retired senior government officials, or more often, the relatives of senior officials. Local governments and police dared not interfere with these "lords"; private lynching was widespread. In many aspects, this class can be characterized as "landlords". Land ownership concentration has been a major reason for political dynasty change in China for more than a thousand years. Being an agriculture-centric nation, holding land is holding wealth. Yes, China was still like that on the eve of the Republic Revolution.
When a lord controls only 100 square kilometers, and peasants have axes and knives, it is not easy for the lords to be arbitrary or brutal. When a president controls more than half a million ground troops, and the military has weapons unimaginable and unavailable to civilians, things will be different.
Chinese (political) history is hard to fully grasp for Westerners, I think. For one it is long, but also, it depends on who's telling the story. I'm curious if there's reasonably short references/books that you find accurate Nakayama? Not CPP sympathetic, but also not too biased for or against the Han majority.
Yes, but a président is limited by a Constitution and powerful state corps, justice, supreme court, médias, political parties, public opinion, syndicates, army, police and all the administration.
While you can see the limitless power of the leader of a small sect, or the chief or council of village, tribe , church in some part of the world.
It's precisely what horrified Tocqueville about USA in 1830..he said that a little bunch could take all the levers of a county, police, judge, newspaper, town hall and this bunch was able to launch a true dictature toward all the other people. He was frighten because nothing guaranteed the Constitution because the Supreme Court depended of the will of a president and this president depended of the will of a state governor. And it's what we saw later with Cherokees vs state of Georgia.
He was horrified by the power of the crowd, not the people, the crowd, because he saw that everywhere , crowds lynched folks for anything, often only for suspicion, without judgement.
It's your local power.
In France Revolution of 1789 didn't began against the monarchy, aristocracy or clergy. Not at all. It began against the provincial parliaments. Bunch of corrupted magistrats who were local tyrants.
And the most funny is that those SoB became, few years later, when Robespierre was killed, the new masters. And Bonaparte was their man.
Jacobins, the most resolute among revolutionaries, was create to destroy all corrupted and abusive local powers to guarantee the same law for everybody.
They became even more tyrannic than the most tyrannic king.
Very true. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen said (in the early 1920s) that European emperors ruled much stricter autocracies than most emperors in Chinese history. There were probably 10 emperors or so serving enough time who were extremely autocratic and brutal. The vast majority of Chinese emperors were subject to a lot of constraints. Quite often, an emperor could not pick his wife or divorce his wife. The situation was certainly not as bad as the Japanese emperor, but with enough ritual, conventions, and SOPs to follow. Killing anybody without going through the highest judicial review (roughly the combination of US circuit courts and DoJ and FBI) would trigger subordinates writing reports to argue against his orders. And royal court journalists were supposed to write down such "offenses" for later historians. Of course, many journalists changed the log per the emperor's request, but the formality existed. Part of the issue is that the unified China is larger than most European nations by an order of magnitude. The emperor's power simply did not extend down to drive the civilians' lives that much, except through tax and conscription policies.
The US in 1830 was terribly self-sorting, too though. Much of the country lacked a real leadership/professional class. Large portions (like the whole south) had almost nothing that could be called a proper city. And of course, the fronter often attracted those that were somewhat at odds with the law and or creditors.
You're not all wrong about the problems of petty local power though -- the book "The Naked Quaker: True Crimes and Controversies from the Courts of Colonial New England" is a fun little read that tells stories from actual court records.
While Melnichenko’s interview is interesting and presents valid points , it seems obvious that foreign policy that repeatedly results in geopolitical chaos and war is bad for the majority of the world’s citizens. However, it is a reliable tool for wealth extraction and hegemony over critical natural resources that benefit a tiny minority of elites.
It is useless, absolutely useless, for a Russian to tell Westerners what is good for them. Does it serve any purpose for a Western oligarch to tell Russians what would be good for them? The USA dreamed of the end of history in 1991, with themselves as sole masters of the world. They are now in the process of sobering up, torn between the bellicose jollity of a late-night party's end and the snarling anxiety of a hangover's onset. They want to keep the party going, scouring their pockets for more money to drink, then shaking down their drinking buddies to buy a bottle. The Europeans see an opening to no longer put up with the drunkard's breath and oppressive embrace, dreaming of a new momentum, a return to the stage. Without realizing that their show has been has-been for a long time. A very long time. And that you can't make something new out of something old. What do you expect from a reasonable discussion with that kind of gang of drunks at five in the morning after a night of binge drinking?
The Economist published 3 articles. The first was an introduction to Melnichenko and the second was written by Melnichenko himself. In a desperate attempt at narrative management, a third article was rushed out to tell Economist readers how they should interpret Melnichenko's words!
Article reference appreciated, even if to an almost altogether odious mag - 'almost', because we not uncommonly pick up recent print back copies at the library. (What it does best is obits, perhaps betraying its fundamental mindset...)
What the author speaks of for Russia applies in our time to the US - riven from outside or inside, whether a polity coheres is at issue, coheres enough to be allowed to make its own mistakes. (Unless ideology - esp as it can enwrap hatred & jealousy - overtakes and endangers others, compelling intervention against.)
But beneath it all is indeed the author's own stated formative lesson from the mid-80s. The very means of human livelihood and sustenance of modernity and even more so hypermodernity - let no one think this is postmodern in any constructive sense as pretended - should be at the core of consideration. We cannot expect stepping down from such means given human dependencies more or less locked in, not to mention aspirations still playing out to join the materially affluent club of would-be sovereigns.
There is no full sovereignty with such dependencies. It's about "more or less".
The motive for such a mag to host such commentary suggests rather to me that practically its direction has caught sufficient wind of what I have been suggesting, that the cleavage is too deeply set now, between essentially Br-inspired convolution into a system piggybacking on "green" for diminished sovereignties internationally, ruled unaccountably from behind; between that and older-school throwbacks for kicking the "mere" modernity basis down the road for a time, until technological & commercial supremacy can (maybe - they hope) be ratcheted up to another level outstripping hegemonic competitors again. In a shorter word, pharma-CBDC vs oil/related-USD/related. It is of particular note that the author appears to align with the latter.
I remember,e.g., Putin's positive, but one supposes merely aspirational, statements back when about organic agriculture (basis of my own business for decades). Ruling over Russia's strong dependency on the likes of what the author's business trades in, yet entertaining an un-"piggybacked" version of "green" - Putin's alleged dithering seems to me a function of attempting to balance incommensurables. Yet, e.g., one of the fathers of enviro thinking, EF Schumacher, was resolutely I think against shutting down the coal industry in Br. But his inspirational "small is beautiful" one can see as hijackable by those out to conquer unseen from behind into a world of dependent fragmentation - not only Russia's, but people from each other as well, beholden to their rule as intermediary (covidiana was "official" kick-off; it was something of a disappointment to witness Russian assimilation to vax mania, to an extent).
We Westerners are the Third Reich today. We want world domination at any cost. Since we are sociopathic by nature, we will put everything on the line to achieve our goal. Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing should finally realize this.
For every Columbus, Hernán Cortés, or Francisco Pizarro who made it, there are thousands who died on the path to infinite wealth. For us, the “50 Cent” motto applies: “Get rich or die tryin’.”
We are not interested in our human or natural environment; we are not even interested in our own environment. Over the past 35 years, the West has destroyed itself out of sheer greed.
The smart people in Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing need to keep THAT in mind at all times. We are sociopaths. We are the Epstein class. We accept no partners; we accept only submission—or annihilation.
Of conquerors and extractors of tribute like every previous (except perhaps to a modest extent the USSR).
As to piracy that was specific to maritime empires and here is a the proud description of England's fortunes by JM Keynes:
"Economic possibilities for our grandchildren" (1930)
“The modern age opened; I think, with the accumulation of capital which began in the sixteenth century. I believe – for reasons with which I must not encumber the present argument – that this was initially due to the rise of prices, and the profits to which that led, which resulted from the treasure of gold and silver which Spain brought from the New World into the Old. [...] For I trace the beginnings of British foreign investment to the treasure which Drake stole from Spain in 1580. In that year he returned to England bringing with him the prodigious spoils of the Golden Hind.
Queen Elizabeth was a considerable shareholder in the syndicate which had financed the expedition. Out of her share she paid off the whole of England’s foreign debt, balanced her Budget, and found herself with about £40,000 in hand. This she invested in the Levant Company – which prospered. Out of the profits of the Levant Company, the East India Company was founded; and the profits of this great enterprise were the foundation of England’s subsequent foreign investment.
Now it happens that £40,000 accumulating at 3½ per cent compound interest approximately corresponds to the actual volume of England’s foreign investments at various dates, and would actually amount to-day to the total of £4,000,000,000 which I have already quoted as being what our foreign investments now are. Thus, every £1 which Drake brought home in 1580 has now become £100,000.”
I see two huge logical fallacies distorting diagnosis: (1) the powers that be want peace, rather than dynamic instability where they compensate for their deficiencies by becoming the (relative) safe havens, and (2) that Germay is genuinely on board with aggression towards Russia, instead of feigning NATO commitment while pursuing Russian reconciliation, that Germany's satellite states are genuinely anti Russia rather than trying to firewall a Berlin-Mosciw axis to replace the Berlin-Paris one, and where DC, London and Paris are maneuvering Berlin & Moscow into neutralising one another on a Polish battlespace.
Rather than "little known" I would say less flamboyant than most others, but still he appears *twice* at the top of the following list that someone posted a while ago about the years 2000-2020:
“For 20 years of rising from their knees, the following combat surface ships of I and II ranks were built:
– 2 frigates project 22350 (2x $450 million)
– 3 frigates project 11356 (3x $430 million)
– 7 corvettes pr. 20380/85 (7x $250m)
– 2 BDK pr. 11711 (2x $160 mln)
During the same years, the following yachts were built:
«since the alternative of protracted unpredictability from Russia is inordinately worse for everyone»
I agree with the other commenters who say that Melnichenko is unrealistic and of the four most likely options "the west" would only dislike Russia becoming a chinese junior partner (which is probably the best outcome for Russia). There are at least these things that give hope to "the west":
* It took only 40 years from 1950 to 1990 to get rid of the USSR. After the collapse "the west" bought all the USSR secrets and people and discovered that the USSR was very much weaker than they expected. The Russian Federation is much weaker than the USSR. It took only 11 years from 1993 to 2014 to take control of the Ukraine.
* Politics and diplomacy are the continuation of war by other means (and not vice-versa) and are done on a give-and-take basis. So the oligarchs of "the west" will ask the RF oligarchs like Melnichenko "You want something definite like being left alone in your sovereignty, what are you give us in exchange?" Then Melnichenko will reply "Nothing because it is in your own long term interests" and then the oligarchs of "the west" will reply "So you want to give you something definite now in exchange for something not so clear and in the future? Are we suckers? HHAHAHHA!"
The real issue that "some commentators" need to begin to discuss is the new security architecture in Eurasia. Because these same commentators have no useful skills, the loss of prestige from being on the wrong side of history seems existential to them.
Perhaps they should consider what the consequences of NATO's defeat by Russia and the ongoing embarresment of the US military in West Asia actually means about their underlying mistaken beliefs, and their contribution to this debacle.
«discuss is the new security architecture in Eurasia.»
Vladimir Vladimirovich is that you? :-) Perhaps you have not learned yet from many attempts to discuss a new security architecture with "the west": if you want something you have to give something as the oligarchs of "the west" do not make free gifts. Their question is "we can give you a new security architecture, but in exchange of what?" and you have not answered with a big enough offer yet.
My guess is that if the RF gave "the west" a chain of DoW+CIA bases all along the northern and western chinese borders the oligarchs of the "the west" would leave the RF alone for a while, but once China was fucked up and the russian oligarchs has therefore lost their only possible ally and were no longer useful it would be Russia's turn to be fucked up. Because a deal between oligarchs is only valid as long as it is profitable or enforceable.
The Russians are European so this is where they belong. Russia in territory is 40% of Europe. The anti_ Russia attitude rests with aa small cabal of Jews that must be ignored. Over the past 500 years they were thrown out of Spain ,6 million were killed by Germans. Russia got rid of their jewws in th 1937 -39 Purges . Leon Trotsky escapec to Mexico City wher a Russian agent killed him . Cased CLOSSED. They now reside in our AMERICA. This is a dannger to our country.
I suspect such arguments have no persuasive power among Western leaders. By definition, an empire's concern is not limited to money, but also power. It is from an oligarch's viewpoint, it makes more sense to give my country some sovereignty so I can be protected when I run afoul of the empire, because buying out a local official is cheaper than buying off an imperial lord. While I don't like systems with political power highly concentrated, I also know that systems with financial power highly concentrated are no good either. Not only does power corrupt (soul or morality, fill in the blanks), but money also corrupts.
Concentration of power or money merely means corruption is more concentrated at a few points and at a higher proportion, and more difficult to reverse. A smoothed-out distribution curve for either political or financial power makes systems less efficient, as was the case when the US was closer to a theoretical democracy. And it is not limited to the political arena. Few companies have survived well after two or three successful CEO transitions after the original founders retire. Not IBM, not Intel, not Nissan, and soon it will be proven that not TSMC, either. In the last 3000 years, we humans simply have not figured out a reliable way for talent cultivation and leadership transition. Not at the national level, not at the company level. Heck, if some Chinese proverb is any guide, not even in a family with the same surname. Note that ancient China did not have the mechanism to protect inherited wealth. And when the political system is unstable, no wealth can be easily maintained.
In Europe, we have known the kind of power it seems you like: feodality. Believe me, this era was such a hell and a mess that, in reaction, England first, followed by France invented the state centralisation.
In China, in the first half of 20th century, it was the hell of lords of war.
When Tocqueville visited the young USA near 1830, people had described him this country as land of freedom. When he travelled and crossed USA, he was horrified saying that if in Europe, we knew one tyrant, In USA every neighbour could become a tyrant.
Feudalism is far from equal power distribution.
China had feudalism as well. The classical form was destroyed when the Qin kingdom united China. But that was the preliminary agricultural era; the lords may be brutal, but that does not seem to be the case if you believe in history compiled by Confucius. According to Confucius, lords of those early days were much more focused on acquiring political power, sometimes invasion of neighbors, and, much more often, royal court intrigue. Fighting a war was difficult at the beginning because each nation was fairly small. A subset of northern China today hosted 800-1000 feudal lords.
The problem was that after China had been under central power/government for a long time, there was still a new class of lords: some from rich businessmen buying a title (say, an oligarch sending one of his servants to become vice president, etc.), retired senior government officials, or more often, the relatives of senior officials. Local governments and police dared not interfere with these "lords"; private lynching was widespread. In many aspects, this class can be characterized as "landlords". Land ownership concentration has been a major reason for political dynasty change in China for more than a thousand years. Being an agriculture-centric nation, holding land is holding wealth. Yes, China was still like that on the eve of the Republic Revolution.
When a lord controls only 100 square kilometers, and peasants have axes and knives, it is not easy for the lords to be arbitrary or brutal. When a president controls more than half a million ground troops, and the military has weapons unimaginable and unavailable to civilians, things will be different.
Chinese (political) history is hard to fully grasp for Westerners, I think. For one it is long, but also, it depends on who's telling the story. I'm curious if there's reasonably short references/books that you find accurate Nakayama? Not CPP sympathetic, but also not too biased for or against the Han majority.
Yes, but a président is limited by a Constitution and powerful state corps, justice, supreme court, médias, political parties, public opinion, syndicates, army, police and all the administration.
While you can see the limitless power of the leader of a small sect, or the chief or council of village, tribe , church in some part of the world.
It's precisely what horrified Tocqueville about USA in 1830..he said that a little bunch could take all the levers of a county, police, judge, newspaper, town hall and this bunch was able to launch a true dictature toward all the other people. He was frighten because nothing guaranteed the Constitution because the Supreme Court depended of the will of a president and this president depended of the will of a state governor. And it's what we saw later with Cherokees vs state of Georgia.
He was horrified by the power of the crowd, not the people, the crowd, because he saw that everywhere , crowds lynched folks for anything, often only for suspicion, without judgement.
It's your local power.
In France Revolution of 1789 didn't began against the monarchy, aristocracy or clergy. Not at all. It began against the provincial parliaments. Bunch of corrupted magistrats who were local tyrants.
And the most funny is that those SoB became, few years later, when Robespierre was killed, the new masters. And Bonaparte was their man.
Jacobins, the most resolute among revolutionaries, was create to destroy all corrupted and abusive local powers to guarantee the same law for everybody.
They became even more tyrannic than the most tyrannic king.
Very true. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen said (in the early 1920s) that European emperors ruled much stricter autocracies than most emperors in Chinese history. There were probably 10 emperors or so serving enough time who were extremely autocratic and brutal. The vast majority of Chinese emperors were subject to a lot of constraints. Quite often, an emperor could not pick his wife or divorce his wife. The situation was certainly not as bad as the Japanese emperor, but with enough ritual, conventions, and SOPs to follow. Killing anybody without going through the highest judicial review (roughly the combination of US circuit courts and DoJ and FBI) would trigger subordinates writing reports to argue against his orders. And royal court journalists were supposed to write down such "offenses" for later historians. Of course, many journalists changed the log per the emperor's request, but the formality existed. Part of the issue is that the unified China is larger than most European nations by an order of magnitude. The emperor's power simply did not extend down to drive the civilians' lives that much, except through tax and conscription policies.
The US in 1830 was terribly self-sorting, too though. Much of the country lacked a real leadership/professional class. Large portions (like the whole south) had almost nothing that could be called a proper city. And of course, the fronter often attracted those that were somewhat at odds with the law and or creditors.
You're not all wrong about the problems of petty local power though -- the book "The Naked Quaker: True Crimes and Controversies from the Courts of Colonial New England" is a fun little read that tells stories from actual court records.
While Melnichenko’s interview is interesting and presents valid points , it seems obvious that foreign policy that repeatedly results in geopolitical chaos and war is bad for the majority of the world’s citizens. However, it is a reliable tool for wealth extraction and hegemony over critical natural resources that benefit a tiny minority of elites.
It is useless, absolutely useless, for a Russian to tell Westerners what is good for them. Does it serve any purpose for a Western oligarch to tell Russians what would be good for them? The USA dreamed of the end of history in 1991, with themselves as sole masters of the world. They are now in the process of sobering up, torn between the bellicose jollity of a late-night party's end and the snarling anxiety of a hangover's onset. They want to keep the party going, scouring their pockets for more money to drink, then shaking down their drinking buddies to buy a bottle. The Europeans see an opening to no longer put up with the drunkard's breath and oppressive embrace, dreaming of a new momentum, a return to the stage. Without realizing that their show has been has-been for a long time. A very long time. And that you can't make something new out of something old. What do you expect from a reasonable discussion with that kind of gang of drunks at five in the morning after a night of binge drinking?
The Economist published 3 articles. The first was an introduction to Melnichenko and the second was written by Melnichenko himself. In a desperate attempt at narrative management, a third article was rushed out to tell Economist readers how they should interpret Melnichenko's words!
Article reference appreciated, even if to an almost altogether odious mag - 'almost', because we not uncommonly pick up recent print back copies at the library. (What it does best is obits, perhaps betraying its fundamental mindset...)
What the author speaks of for Russia applies in our time to the US - riven from outside or inside, whether a polity coheres is at issue, coheres enough to be allowed to make its own mistakes. (Unless ideology - esp as it can enwrap hatred & jealousy - overtakes and endangers others, compelling intervention against.)
But beneath it all is indeed the author's own stated formative lesson from the mid-80s. The very means of human livelihood and sustenance of modernity and even more so hypermodernity - let no one think this is postmodern in any constructive sense as pretended - should be at the core of consideration. We cannot expect stepping down from such means given human dependencies more or less locked in, not to mention aspirations still playing out to join the materially affluent club of would-be sovereigns.
There is no full sovereignty with such dependencies. It's about "more or less".
The motive for such a mag to host such commentary suggests rather to me that practically its direction has caught sufficient wind of what I have been suggesting, that the cleavage is too deeply set now, between essentially Br-inspired convolution into a system piggybacking on "green" for diminished sovereignties internationally, ruled unaccountably from behind; between that and older-school throwbacks for kicking the "mere" modernity basis down the road for a time, until technological & commercial supremacy can (maybe - they hope) be ratcheted up to another level outstripping hegemonic competitors again. In a shorter word, pharma-CBDC vs oil/related-USD/related. It is of particular note that the author appears to align with the latter.
I remember,e.g., Putin's positive, but one supposes merely aspirational, statements back when about organic agriculture (basis of my own business for decades). Ruling over Russia's strong dependency on the likes of what the author's business trades in, yet entertaining an un-"piggybacked" version of "green" - Putin's alleged dithering seems to me a function of attempting to balance incommensurables. Yet, e.g., one of the fathers of enviro thinking, EF Schumacher, was resolutely I think against shutting down the coal industry in Br. But his inspirational "small is beautiful" one can see as hijackable by those out to conquer unseen from behind into a world of dependent fragmentation - not only Russia's, but people from each other as well, beholden to their rule as intermediary (covidiana was "official" kick-off; it was something of a disappointment to witness Russian assimilation to vax mania, to an extent).
"Please don't hurt us any more!"
Nobody in the West cares.
Found on internet:
We Westerners are the Third Reich today. We want world domination at any cost. Since we are sociopathic by nature, we will put everything on the line to achieve our goal. Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing should finally realize this.
For every Columbus, Hernán Cortés, or Francisco Pizarro who made it, there are thousands who died on the path to infinite wealth. For us, the “50 Cent” motto applies: “Get rich or die tryin’.”
We are not interested in our human or natural environment; we are not even interested in our own environment. Over the past 35 years, the West has destroyed itself out of sheer greed.
The smart people in Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing need to keep THAT in mind at all times. We are sociopaths. We are the Epstein class. We accept no partners; we accept only submission—or annihilation.
A civilisation of pirates.
It works.
«A civilisation of pirates.»
Of conquerors and extractors of tribute like every previous (except perhaps to a modest extent the USSR).
As to piracy that was specific to maritime empires and here is a the proud description of England's fortunes by JM Keynes:
"Economic possibilities for our grandchildren" (1930)
“The modern age opened; I think, with the accumulation of capital which began in the sixteenth century. I believe – for reasons with which I must not encumber the present argument – that this was initially due to the rise of prices, and the profits to which that led, which resulted from the treasure of gold and silver which Spain brought from the New World into the Old. [...] For I trace the beginnings of British foreign investment to the treasure which Drake stole from Spain in 1580. In that year he returned to England bringing with him the prodigious spoils of the Golden Hind.
Queen Elizabeth was a considerable shareholder in the syndicate which had financed the expedition. Out of her share she paid off the whole of England’s foreign debt, balanced her Budget, and found herself with about £40,000 in hand. This she invested in the Levant Company – which prospered. Out of the profits of the Levant Company, the East India Company was founded; and the profits of this great enterprise were the foundation of England’s subsequent foreign investment.
Now it happens that £40,000 accumulating at 3½ per cent compound interest approximately corresponds to the actual volume of England’s foreign investments at various dates, and would actually amount to-day to the total of £4,000,000,000 which I have already quoted as being what our foreign investments now are. Thus, every £1 which Drake brought home in 1580 has now become £100,000.”
I see two huge logical fallacies distorting diagnosis: (1) the powers that be want peace, rather than dynamic instability where they compensate for their deficiencies by becoming the (relative) safe havens, and (2) that Germay is genuinely on board with aggression towards Russia, instead of feigning NATO commitment while pursuing Russian reconciliation, that Germany's satellite states are genuinely anti Russia rather than trying to firewall a Berlin-Mosciw axis to replace the Berlin-Paris one, and where DC, London and Paris are maneuvering Berlin & Moscow into neutralising one another on a Polish battlespace.
«A Little-Known Russian Oligarch»
Rather than "little known" I would say less flamboyant than most others, but still he appears *twice* at the top of the following list that someone posted a while ago about the years 2000-2020:
“For 20 years of rising from their knees, the following combat surface ships of I and II ranks were built:
– 2 frigates project 22350 (2x $450 million)
– 3 frigates project 11356 (3x $430 million)
– 7 corvettes pr. 20380/85 (7x $250m)
– 2 BDK pr. 11711 (2x $160 mln)
During the same years, the following yachts were built:
– “Dilbar” Usmanov ($550 million, seized)
– “Eclipse” Abramovich ($460 million)
– “Sailing Yacht A” Melnichenko ($425 million)
– “Ocean Victory” Rashnikov ($310 million)
– “Motor Yacht A” Melnichenko ($255 million)
– “Luna” Akhmedov ($230 million)
– “Quantum Blue” Galitsky ($225 million)
– “Black Pearl” Burlakov ($220 million)
– “Ona” Usmanov ($210 million)
– “Palladium” Prokhorov ($155 million)
– “Madame Gu” Skoch ($135 million)
– “Pacific” Michelson ($130 million)
– “Barbara” Potanin ($125 million)
– “Here Comes The Sun” Japaridze ($125 million)
– “Tango” Vekselberg ($110 million)
– “Areti” Makarov ($110 million)
– “Kibo” Mamuta ($105 million)
– “Alfa Nero” Guryev ($105 million)
– “Nirvana” Potanin ($100 million)
– “Anastasia” Potanin ($80 million)
Etc.”
«since the alternative of protracted unpredictability from Russia is inordinately worse for everyone»
I agree with the other commenters who say that Melnichenko is unrealistic and of the four most likely options "the west" would only dislike Russia becoming a chinese junior partner (which is probably the best outcome for Russia). There are at least these things that give hope to "the west":
* It took only 40 years from 1950 to 1990 to get rid of the USSR. After the collapse "the west" bought all the USSR secrets and people and discovered that the USSR was very much weaker than they expected. The Russian Federation is much weaker than the USSR. It took only 11 years from 1993 to 2014 to take control of the Ukraine.
* Politics and diplomacy are the continuation of war by other means (and not vice-versa) and are done on a give-and-take basis. So the oligarchs of "the west" will ask the RF oligarchs like Melnichenko "You want something definite like being left alone in your sovereignty, what are you give us in exchange?" Then Melnichenko will reply "Nothing because it is in your own long term interests" and then the oligarchs of "the west" will reply "So you want to give you something definite now in exchange for something not so clear and in the future? Are we suckers? HHAHAHHA!"
The real issue that "some commentators" need to begin to discuss is the new security architecture in Eurasia. Because these same commentators have no useful skills, the loss of prestige from being on the wrong side of history seems existential to them.
Perhaps they should consider what the consequences of NATO's defeat by Russia and the ongoing embarresment of the US military in West Asia actually means about their underlying mistaken beliefs, and their contribution to this debacle.
«discuss is the new security architecture in Eurasia.»
Vladimir Vladimirovich is that you? :-) Perhaps you have not learned yet from many attempts to discuss a new security architecture with "the west": if you want something you have to give something as the oligarchs of "the west" do not make free gifts. Their question is "we can give you a new security architecture, but in exchange of what?" and you have not answered with a big enough offer yet.
My guess is that if the RF gave "the west" a chain of DoW+CIA bases all along the northern and western chinese borders the oligarchs of the "the west" would leave the RF alone for a while, but once China was fucked up and the russian oligarchs has therefore lost their only possible ally and were no longer useful it would be Russia's turn to be fucked up. Because a deal between oligarchs is only valid as long as it is profitable or enforceable.
The Russians are European so this is where they belong. Russia in territory is 40% of Europe. The anti_ Russia attitude rests with aa small cabal of Jews that must be ignored. Over the past 500 years they were thrown out of Spain ,6 million were killed by Germans. Russia got rid of their jewws in th 1937 -39 Purges . Leon Trotsky escapec to Mexico City wher a Russian agent killed him . Cased CLOSSED. They now reside in our AMERICA. This is a dannger to our country.