All Stakeholders In The Yemeni War Should Consider Russian Mediation

Where Saudi and STC interests align is in stopping the Houthis, the most effective way of which is arguably a bold political decision to recognize their statelet in the North and thus ipso facto the South as a separate sovereign state too as a quid pro quo for ceasing hostilities.

South24’s report that Russian Ambassador to Yemen Yevgeny Kudrov held a video call with the Houthis’ Deputy Foreign Minister Abdulwahid Abu Ras on 12 September prompted interest in Russia’s approach towards the latest phase of the Yemeni War. The Houthis’ blitz down the Red Sea coast and capture of several strategic islands resulted in them obtaining control over the eastern portion of the Bab el-Mandeb. They’ve also launched strikes against Saudi Arabia and taken its East-West Pipeline offline.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was predictably asked about these developments during a press conference with his Saudi counterpart on 8 September. He said that “We regard the Houthi strikes against Saudi infrastructure, including civilian infrastructure, as counterproductive. We fully support Saudi Arabia’s determination to continue to pursue the implementation of the road map that was agreed and approved, and which I mentioned in my opening remarks.”

Lavrov added that “We believe it is unacceptable to attempt to resolve these issues by military means, an approach that not only endangers the civilian population and civilian facilities, but also has a profoundly adverse effect on the world economy, given the significance of the Arabian Peninsula and all the maritime zones bordering its shores for the normal functioning of global trade routes.” Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Anna Evstigneeva then briefed the UNSC two days later.

She importantly told the council on 10 September that “We reiterate our country’s longstanding position in defense of freedom of maritime navigation in all waters of the world, including those adjacent to Yemen…We call on Ansar Allah to exercise restraint and respect the sovereignty of neighboring States, which – when the time is right – could contribute to stabilizing Yemen, preserving its unity and facilitating its economic recovery.”

The next day, on 11 September, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko met with the Saudi Ambassador. His ministry released a statement which noted that “The sides reaffirmed the importance of ending hostilities in Yemen as soon as possible, as well as their support for diplomatic efforts toward creating favorable conditions for the launch of a full-scale UN-brokered dialogue between the parties to the conflict.” This was followed by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov’s remarks two days later.

In response to a question on 13 September about which Yemeni government Russia considers to be legitimate in an allusion to whether Moscow recognizes the Houthis’ statelet centered on Sanaa, he said “Let us wait and see how the situation develops. Now, it is seriously destabilized and is fraught with a major escalation. The most important thing now is to stabilize the situation.” Russia’s Permanent UN Representative Vasily Nebenzia then addressed the UNSC two days later on 15 September.

He didn’t say anything new other than advising that “The response of this body, which is entrusted with the responsibility of preventing threats to international peace and security, is to be rational, carefully weighed and, most importantly, commensurate with what is happening on the ground. The unfortunate experience with Security Council resolution 2722, whose provisions were subsequently misconstrued by a number of Council members, cautions us against hasty and ill-considered steps.”

One week later on 22 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The Kremlin’s readout reported that “the parties reaffirmed the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities (in Yemen) and the creation of conditions for launching a constructive intra-Yemeni dialogue under UN auspices. They also noted the importance of ensuring the safe and unimpeded passage of vessels through international waterways in the region”.

Russia’s approach towards the latest phase of the Yemeni War can be understood from these official statements. It condemns the Houthis’ attacks against Saudi Arabia and their Red Sea blitz. Moscow also wants Yemen to remain united and therefore doesn’t recognize the legitimacy of the Houthis’ government despite its political dialogue with them. A return to the UN-brokered dialogue is its preferred solution to avoid threats to regional shipping and others exploiting these developments.

Contrary to what some have speculated, Russia doesn’t plan to provide any military, technical, or intelligence assistance to the Houthis, which would immediately ruin its hard-earned strategic ties with Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s Aden Government, and especially the UAE, whose leader Putin is known to be very close with. The Houthis’ recent assurance that it doesn’t plan to target regional shipping, only those vessels linked to Saudi Arabia, aligns with Russia’s declared expectations of the group.

About them, contrary to claims that Russia’s interests rest in sparking global chaos such as that which could follow the Houthis’ blockading the Bab el-Mandab in solidarity with their Iranian ally if the Third Gulf War once again escalates, another global economic crisis would indirectly harm Russia. While global energy prices might spike at first and thus bring more revenue into the Kremlin’s coffers, this year’s spree of Ukrainian attacks against its refineries has already reduced its exports, so it couldn’t maximally profit.

Moreover, the consequent global economic slowdown that would follow could lead to a slump in prices for a protracted period of time, thus hitting the Kremlin’s budget with all that entails. Another concern for Russia is the grand strategic impact that such a slowdown could have for China regarding its resilience to the US’ demands to clinch a lopsided trade deal for derailing China’s superpower trajectory. China might then become more pliant to the US’ anti-Russian sanctions demands.

Casual observers likely aren’t aware, but President of BRICS’ New Development Bank Dilma Rousseff confirmed in summer 2023 that her Chinese-based institution complies with these sanctions. A little less than one year later that next summer, a Chinese firm withdrew from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 megaproject in response to sanctions-related pressure, thus dealing a heavy blow to the Kremlin’s plans. In October 2024, a Russian official confirmed that the Chinese-based SCO also complies with these sanctions too.

It’s no small matter that these two leading Chinese-based multipolar institutions adhere to US sanctions against Russia. If Iran and its Houthi allies metaphorically nuke the global economy by targeting all Gulf energy infrastructure at scale, whether as a first strike or in retaliation for a significant American military escalation of some sort, then the Western Hemisphere would fare relatively better than the Eastern one. China might also then be weakened enough to submit to the US’ full sanctions demands vis-à-vis Russia.

Therefore, anything that could even remotely bring about this scenario is opposed by the Kremlin, such as the Houthis’ attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and the possibility of them blockading the Bab el-Mandeb. Imposing a so-called “tollbooth” is also something that Russia is against as proven by Lavrov declaring as much in late August when he told his interlocutor that “we do not want a fee to be introduced (for passage through the Strait of Hormuz) either, but that is a matter for further discussions.”

Moving along to the part of Russian policy regarding its hope that Yemen remains united after having explained its opposition to the Houthis’ attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and their Red Sea blitz, Russia won’t recognize the Houthis’ statelet since that would ruin its ties with Riyadh and Aden. No tangible benefit would be derived from such a diplomatic stunt while tangible costs would follow. That said, if Aden formally ceded the Houthi-controlled North, then Moscow would likely recognize it.

To elaborate, Saudi Arabia failed to defeat the Houthis after over a decade of trying, and its betrayal of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in late 2025-early 2026 during Riyadh’s brief bombing campaign at the time destroyed the only reliable bulwark against the Houthis’ southward expansion in hindsight. The US has yet to come to Saudi Arabia’s rescue and might never, but even if it resumed its prior bombing campaign against the Houthis, there’s no reasonable expectation that it’ll totally destroy them.

It should therefore be taken for granted, no matter what one’s personal hopes might be, that the Houthis are here to stay and that their statelet might ultimately be recognized in some form as part of a political solution to the Yemeni War. Southerners don’t want to live with Northerners in the same state again after their failed merger resulted in the North’s oppression of them. A two-state solution might thus be inevitable, but since Saudi Arabia now totally controls the South, Riyadh would have to agree to this.

MBS might be reluctant to accept what would amount to his Kingdom’s defeat by recognizing an Iranian-allied and Houthi-controlled North Yemen (no matter what it might call itself), but it also might be the only way to preserve his Kingdom’s energy infrastructure and perhaps even his family’s rule. In the event that he’s persuaded that this is the most pragmatic course of action, then he could allow the STC to return to power in South Yemen, thus re-establishing the only bulwark against Houthi expansionism.

Saudi Arabia’s interests in what can be described as East Yemen, basically the historical Hadramout region, can be addressed through dialogue with the STC after the Houthis’ southern drive is stopped. One possibility is UN-supervised elections over the administrative future of the revived South Yemen/Arabia, which could hypothetically become a federation between the South and East that might even include broad Bosnian-like autonomy for the latter portion.

Anyhow, where Saudi and STC interests align is in stopping the Houthis, the most effective way of which is arguably a bold political decision to recognize their statelet in the North and thus ipso facto the South as a separate sovereign state too as a quid pro quo for ceasing hostilities. If there’s interest among all stakeholders – Saudi Arabia, the Aden Government, the STC, and the Houthis – then Russia would likely agree to mediate between them in pursuit of this outcome if its diplomatic services were requested.

Therein lies the strategic role that Russia could play in the latest phase of the Yemeni War, namely as a mediator between the abovementioned stakeholders given its close ties with them all, including the Houthis’ Iranian ally in the event that it decides to link the resolution of this war to the Third Gulf War’s. If there’s no such interest, then Russia is expected to only continue making perfunctory statements about the Yemeni War, over which it has no influence unless the stakeholders agree to its mediation.

This analysis was originally published at South24.