Analyzing Azerbaijan’s Decision To Block Russia’s RIA Novosti
The larger dynamic at play is that while Russia and Azerbaijan have already agreed to the terms of their strategic partnership, they still remain at odds with one another over the pace of Karabakh's reintegration into the national fold.
Azerbaijan recently blocked RIA Novosti, one of Russia’s top publicly financed international media outlets, in response to it reporting on comments from self-described “Minister of State” of the universally unrecognized “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” Artak Belgaryan. He was interviewed by the outlet on Friday, during which time he shared his speculation that some of the foreign militants that he alleged had supported Baku during the Continuation War in late 2020 have since been sent to Ukraine to fight against Russia.
RIA Novosti noted in its article on his remarks that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov confirmed that Moscow does indeed believe that foreign militants fought on Azerbaijan’s side during the conflict, though it nevertheless left the speculation about their subsequent departure for Ukraine as an open question. The outlet also informed their readers of Baku’s position towards Karabakh, which it regards as completely settled, meaning that it also doesn’t recognize Belgaryan’s self-described authority in that region. Objectively speaking, it was fair and accurate reporting about a sensitive issue.
Despite that, Azerbaijan was very angry that one of Russia’s top publicly financed international media outlets would “replicate these provocative statements”, as one of its Foreign Ministry spokespeople phrased it according to RIA’s report on Baku’s blocking of their site shortly thereafter. They also claimed that this incident violated the spirit of friendship between the two nations that was recently reaffirmed in their Declaration on Allied Cooperation from late February. The Azerbaijani public solidly supports their government’s decision and some activists had previously agitated for this to happen even earlier.
Both parties’ positions are understandable. On the one hand, Russian international media has the right to report on relevant issues no matter how sensitive they are so long as they do so in accordance with the journalistic practice of presenting both sides of a dispute like they undeniably did. On the other, however, it’s not difficult to see why many Azerbaijanis were offended by them reporting on Belgaryan’s latest remarks so since they regard him and the separatist cause that he represents to be a national security threat of the highest order.
Having clarified that, there’s also no ignoring the observation that mutual suspicions have again begun to influence their relations. Azerbaijan is displeased at the pace of Karabakh’s reintegration back into the national fold, with some speculating that Russia is delaying this in order to exploit the frozen conflict as leverage. They also claim that its peacekeepers haven’t done enough to disarm and demobilize Armenian militias in their zone of control. For its part, Russia is unhappy with the occasional clashes that have occurred between Armenia and those militias on one hand and Azerbaijan on the other.
RIA’s interview with Belgaryan, despite their inclusion of Baku’s stance towards the conflict in order to provide a sense of balance, was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back and thus served as the pretext for Azerbaijan to make its growing displeasure with Russia more publicly known. This South Caucasus country seems to have been under the impression that their Declaration on Allied Cooperation would have precluded Russia’s creation of such information products whereas the Eurasian Great Power apparently never had any such intention of self-censoring just to avoid offending its partner.
The larger dynamic at play is that while Russia and Azerbaijan have already agreed to the terms of their strategic partnership, they still remain at odds with one another over Karabakh, which is understandably an issue of serious sensitivity for both of them. Although they acknowledge its status as an integral part of Azerbaijan, they differ over the details of its reintegration back into the national fold after nearly three decades of de facto “independence”. Amidst these undeclared disagreements, Russia’s reporting on remarks shared by an unrecognized authority there was interpreted by Azerbaijan as unfriendly.
From the opposite side of the coin, however, it can be argued that Azerbaijan’s implied demand that publicly financed Russian international media self-censor by voluntarily declining to interview relevant figures to the Karabakh Conflict is also unfriendly. The point in drawing attention to each side’s views is that they make sense from their respective positions, especially towards the Karabakh Conflict. They simply don’t see everything the same way, which is natural for any pair of partners, but that shouldn’t become a bone of contention that serves to obstruct the development of their strategic relations.
Reflecting on everything, it appears as though this incident was a convenient opportunity for Azerbaijan to more publicly signal its growing displeasure with Russia’s approach to Karabakh’s reintegration back into the national fold. It’s solidly supported by its people, regarded as “long overdue” by some of them, and projects the optics of a confident regional power that won’t shy away from blocking one of its much larger strategic partner’s top publicly financed international media outlets for offending its sensitivities after it reported on the remarks shared by someone who they consider to be a national security threat.
From Russia’s side, its officials might regard that decision as an unfriendly populist tactic, being convinced that this entire incident is an artificially manufactured scandal that should have been discretely addressed between their diplomats instead of in the public sphere. If there’s any silver lining to what happened, it’s that both parties will now be prompted to more candidly discuss their different approaches towards Karabkah’s reincorporation back into the national fold, hopefully achieving something of tangible substance in this respect throughout the course of their prospective talks.
The best-case scenario is that they smooth over their differences and thus more closely align their policies in order to counteract the influence that mutual suspicions over this sensitive issue are once again beginning to have on their relations. It’s in their objective national interests to pursue this outcome instead of letting this trend spiral out of control with unpredictable consequences. Hopefully this incident will in hindsight be regarded as a minor speedbump on the path to building their strategic partnership and not as a negative turning point in their relations.