Analyzing Russia’s Polite Rejection Of China’s No-First-Use Nuclear Weapons Treaty Proposal

Russia and China aren’t always on the same page about sensitive issues even though they respect one another’s positions and don’t question their intentions.

The Russian Foreign Ministry politely rejected China’s no-first-use nuclear weapons treaty proposal from late last month in a statement that they recently shared with the RBK business daily. It’s in Russian but can easily be read in one’s native language with Google Translate. The present piece will analyze this reaction, which contradicts popular perceptions of these two being on the same page about most issues, and clarify why Russia didn’t enthusiastically embrace this proposal.

Here's the relevant excerpt from RBK’s report per Google Translate:

“The Russian Foreign Ministry, answering questions from RBK about how Moscow evaluates this idea and whether it is being discussed in the format of the ‘nuclear five’ (Great Britain, China, Russia, the USA and France), assured that ‘Moscow and Beijing treat each other’s initiatives not only with special attention, but also with constant respect’ and are aimed ‘at the further progressive development of bilateral relations, which are in the nature of a comprehensive and strategic partnership.’

‘As for the substance of the issue, the proposal put forward by the Chinese partners belongs to the category of ideas that need to be considered in the general context of military-political realities and in connection with other significant factors affecting international security and strategic stability,’ – the department said. — The validity of such an integrated approach is obvious against the backdrop of the continuing deterioration of the situation in the world, including the sharp deterioration of relations between the nuclear powers participating in the ‘nuclear five’ you mentioned.

The Russian Foreign Ministry also emphasized that they give ‘absolute priority’ to measures whose goal is to actually weaken the confrontation between nuclear-armed countries by eliminating ‘fundamental contradictions in the field of security.’”

It’ll now be interpreted in order to better understand Russia’s stance.

The first paragraph can be regarded as a disclaimer intended to cushion the blow from Russia’s rejection in the subsequent one. The Foreign Ministry reaffirmed the respect that it pays to all proposals from the Chinese side, which are always shared with the best of intentions, in order to avoid offending its strategic partner. It wanted to nip in the bud any potential Western speculation that China has ulterior motives that go against Russia’s objective national interests.

About those, the Foreign Ministry strongly implied that it’s unrealistic for their country to formally promote this proposal despite agreeing with their counterparts in principle due to the current context of the Ukrainian Conflict. It deserves mentioning that Foreign Ministter Lavrov confirmed in late January that arms control talks with the US won’t resume until their proxy war, which German Chancellor Scholz inadvertently admitted is actually an undeclared hot but thus far limited one, is over.

RBK also reminded everyone at the end of their article about what President Putin said during his address to the Federal Assembly last month. The Russian leader told his people that “Our position is clear: if you (the US) want to discuss security and stability issues that are critical for the entire planet, this must be done as a package including, of course, all aspects that have to do with our national interests and have a direct bearing on the security of our country, the security of Russia.”

China’s proposal was tabled just days before his speech so it wasn’t contradicting the package aspect of Russian policy on this subject, though it still could be interpreted as a way of gently nudging Moscow to reconsider what Lavrov said about how such talks can’t resume till the Ukrainian Conflict ends. The People’s Republic probably expects that it’s unrealistic for its partners to change their position in this regard but likely still shared their proposal anyhow for broader soft power purposes.

The US has recently begun fearmongering about China’s nuclear intentions in order to precondition the public for expecting their country to eventually pivot from containing Russia in Europe (which Germany could take the lead in doing or carry out together with France and the UK) to containing China in Asia. The most effective way to counteract this false narrative is to make public statements about the need for all nuclear powers to agree to a no-first-use nuclear weapons treaty despite it being unrealistic.

The purpose is to show the global public, especially those members thereof in the West, that China is proactively sharing pragmatic proposals for reducing the risk of World War III by miscalculation. Russia agrees with this in principle like its Foreign Ministry confirmed but importantly believes that it isn’t feasible in the current conditions as explained. It therefore wasn’t offended by what China did, the same as China is unlikely to be offended by Russia’s polite rejection of this proposal.

Nevertheless, what this shows is that Russia and China aren’t always on the same page about sensitive issues, which astute observers would have already known. They disagree on Kashmir, the South China Sea (specifically the Philippines and Vietnam), China’s latest map, and now strategic arms control talks, but they responsibly manage these differences in pursuit of jointly accelerating multipolar trends. This sets a positive example for other Great Powers, even if only non-Western ones might follow their lead.