Analyzing Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia
The problem appears to be that there isn’t yet enough trust between Russia and the US to fully overcome their security dilemma in spite of the impressive progress that’s been made thus far.
Trump surprised friends and foes alike when he posted the following on Friday: “Based on the fact that Russia is absolutely 'pounding' Ukraine on the battlefield right now, I am strongly considering large scale Banking Sanctions, Sanctions, and Tariffs on Russia until a Cease Fire and FINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ON PEACE IS REACHED. To Russia and Ukraine, get to the table right now, before it is too late. Thank you.” Few understood how more sanctions could coerce Russia into a ceasefire.
Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg shed more light on this approach in early February when he floated the possibility of much stricter secondary sanctions enforcement. This analysis here at the time assessed that India might then slash its Russian oil imports, thus making Russia more dependent on China for foreign revenue for funding its special operation. If Putin doesn’t agree to a ceasefire, the thinking goes, then Russia would risk becoming China’s junior partner.
India already reduced its import of Russian oil last month to a two-year low ahead of the last Biden-era sanctions entering into effect so the aforesaid scenario isn’t implausible. At the same time, however, India clinched an historic 10-year oil deal with Russia last December and might therefore defy any strict secondary sanctions enforcement at the cost of its ties with the US. Its motive wouldn’t be anti-American, but to prevent Russia from becoming China’s junior partner at the expense of India’s security.
India is still largely dependent on Russian military-technical equipment, including spares, and it correspondingly fears that a China-indebted Russia might one day be pressured by Beijing into curtailing and ultimately cutting off this trade in order to give China an edge in their border disputes. Moreover, India might feel compelled by circumstances into becoming the US’ junior partner out of desperation to balance China’s newfound edge in that event, thus ceding its hard-earned strategic autonomy.
It's for these reasons why it can’t be taken for granted that India would comply with any potentially strict secondary sanctions enforcement by the US like Trump might be implying, but in any case, none of this explains why he’d hint at this course of action amidst the nascent Russian-US “New Détente”. The immediate context is that he just cut off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine in an attempt to coerce Zelensky into a ceasefire, which was then followed by Russia carrying out large-scale strikes in Ukraine.
This sequence led to uncomfortable optics even though it was entirely predictable. Some commentators claimed that this is proof that Russia isn’t interested in compromising on its maximum goals in the conflict, thus discrediting Trump’s peace push, and even going as far as to speculate that he might have cut a secret deal with Putin to give the latter more of the land that he claims as his own without having yet extracted any tangible compromises from Russia in return. This might have triggered Trump’s threat.
If that’s the case, then it would mean that there was either a misunderstanding between Trump and Putin after last month’s call or Putin is unilaterally pressing his advantage in pursuit of better ceasefire terms, either of which could bode ill for their “New Détente” if such trends continue. To be clear, Russia has the right to employ whatever means it deems necessary in advance of its national interests, but this could still inadvertently jeopardize the incipient peace process at this crucial moment.
In defense of Russia’s strikes, they might have been meant to facilitate its counteroffensive in Kursk ahead of agreeing to a ceasefire once that universally recognized Russian region is liberated and/or defying France’s proposed aerial ceasefire and the UK-led initiative for imposing a partial no-fly zone. In other words, it’s possible that they weren’t connected to Trump cutting off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine but were intended to deter France and the UK from conventionally intervening in Ukraine.
On that topic, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared early last month that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to NATO countries’ troops in Ukraine so they’re unlikely to risk being hung out to dry, thus suggesting that France and the UK’s latest rhetoric is more about political messaging. “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe”, while the UK plans to divide-and-rule its continental peers like always, with each considering this rhetoric a means to that end.
Nevertheless, Russia likely still felt like it had to signal that it wasn’t deterred by their words otherwise it would look weak, which could explain the primary motivation behind its latest large-scale strikes that coincidentally followed Trump’s unexpected decision to cut military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. Even so, from Trump’s perspective, what Russia just did was probably interpreted by him as a response to his aforesaid move and therefore possibly even an affront sorts to his noble efforts to broker a peace deal.
The consequent pressure that he came under after Russia’s latest large-scale strikes, which were arguably carried out as a response to France and the UK more so than opportunistically exploiting Ukraine’s newly difficult situation, most convincingly accounts for Trump’s threatening post. From this insight, it can be intuited that he wanted to convey to Russia that strict secondary sanctions enforcement is in the cards if Putin doesn’t compromise on his maximum goals by agreeing to a ceasefire.
Although it would be a risky move as earlier explained with regard to the possibility of India defying US pressure and thus ruining their relations, Trump might be wagering that Putin would prefer to compromise on Ukraine than make Russia even more dependent on China. Going through with such strict secondary sanctions enforcement could also relieve some pressure upon Trump if he frames it as the Russian equivalent of what he’s already done for coercing Ukraine into a ceasefire.
The US can’t cut off Russia’s arms or intelligence like it already did Ukraine’s, but it can create the conditions where a large chunk of the foreign financing upon which Russia partially depends for funding its special operation might be cut off if India complies, thus risking more Russian dependence on China. The US doesn’t want Russia more dependent on China, however, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly declared in a recent interview that this wouldn’t be in their country’s best interests.
It can therefore be concluded that Trump truly expects that his post will have an effect on influencing Putin’s behavior. The best-case scenario from his perspective is that it leads to Putin eschewing more large-scale strikes in Ukraine and then agreeing to a ceasefire after Zelensky is first coerced into this like Trump unsuccessfully sought to do at the White House, while the worst-case one is that Putin is coerced into a ceasefire shortly after the US strictly enforces secondary sanctions against India in pursuit of this.
Trump doesn’t expect that Putin will defy him in both scenarios since he calculates that Putin doesn’t want Russia to become China’s junior partner like might inevitably happen if the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” collapses and India then capitulates to renewed US sanctions pressure to dump Russia. Be that as it may, Trump is also reluctant to go through with what he implied because there’s always the chance that it backfires by either ruining relations with India or turning Russia into China’s junior partner.
The problem appears to be that there isn’t yet enough trust between Russia and the US to fully overcome their security dilemma in spite of the impressive progress that’s been made thus far. That’s why Russia likely carried out its large-scale strikes in Ukraine in response to France and the UK’s latest rhetoric, which coincide with the US cutting off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine, and then Trump made his threatening post. Another Putin-Trump call might therefore be necessary in the near future.
They need to ensure that they’re on the same page with everything after Zelensky’s scandal at the White House abruptly offset the peace trajectory and then the Europeans began openly plotting to sabotage the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” by flirting with a conventional intervention in Ukraine. Trump’s post came as a surprise for all sides and suggested some displeasure with Russia in spite of his public reassurances that peace talks are progressing and that Ukraine, not Russia, is the bigger obstacle.
There’s always the chance that Trump’s latest sanctions threat wasn’t serious and was only meant to deflect from the pressure that he’s come under after Russia’s latest large-scale strikes created uncomfortable optics in the aftermath of him cutting off military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. That said, it would be a mistake not to entertain the possibility that there’s more to it, but Russia and the US’ statements and actions in the coming week will provide more clarity on whether that’s really the case.
Trump’s pre-electoral victory boast of ending the Ukraine war within a day of taking office was premised on the assumption that he could grab Zelensky and Putin by their respective collars and bang their heads together until they reached a comprise that he, alone, deemed acceptable to both sides, or which he thought ought to be acceptable. Even now, Trump seems heedless of the reality that the winners on any battlefield typically have little or no incentive to compromise at all. In short, he never took Putin seriously on any of VVP’s objectives for waging the SMO.
That said, a premise of your arguments in recent months has been that Russia already is, or fears becoming, a junior partner of China - which it never was, still isn’t, nor ever will be, for at least two of several reasons:
First, an intact Russian Federation is of existential importance for Beijing. Both Putin and Xi understand equally well that a dismantled Russia would immediately result in a number of small pro-Western ‘sovereign’ states established along China’s borders, some. or all of which would likely have American missiles and military bases placed on them.
Second. In the midst of escalating tensions between the West and and Russia, the former is now clearly intent upon severing China’s maritime trade links with the world, specifically, the Malacca Strait, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal, Simon’s Town in South Africa, possibly an enlarged naval base in Senegal, West Africa, and the Panama Canal. The latter being the site of the first overt American attempt to sever Beijing’s maritime trade routes.
Which leaves the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic Ocean, which runs roughly parallel to a part of Russia’s Arctic coastline, which in total covers 53% of Russian territory, from St. Petersburg to the Bering Strait. It is along this stretch of coastline that Russia has built or refurbished some fifty naval/military bases, often with funding and assistance by China. Simply put, the Arctic could conceivably become Beijing’s last maritime trade route between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
It is this possibility, this potential vulnerability, that prompted China to revive the old Silk Road by building overland trade routes that connected East and West with roads, railways, bridges and power stations, which provided the requisite energy to construct such infrastructure.
It is this BRI that has aroused the ire of the West for having thwarted its plan to cripple and isolate China by blocking her trade routes and, hence, weakening her economy to the extent that she threatens nobody. Russia’s influence in some of the central Asian regions, through which the BRI passes, adds to the security of the BRI, where it is already being sabotaged in some places by American proxies
I realise, Andrew, that you are more than au fait with all of the above, indeed an expert, but this critique is directed at your huge readership, who may not all be familiar with these arguments. In my book, Russia remains China’s peer, in certain instances its superior.
It's quite clear, that Trump isn't as well informed as he ought to be.
The Russian offensive is in the Kursk region, that is Russia, as Trump ought to know. The reason for the Russian success in Kursk region, isn't Trump blocking intelligence to Ukraine, but Ukraine taking out it's Best forces and replacing them with the unmotivated conscripts. Trump missed that one.