BRICS’ Condemnation Of The Pahalgam Terrorist Attack Proves That China Politicized The SCO

China should have included a condemnation of Pahalgam in the draft SCO Defense Ministers’ joint statement during the group’s latest meeting that it chaired since it wasn’t realistically going to oppose this predictable inclusion in the then-upcoming BRICS Rio Declaration.

The Rio Declaration that followed the latest BRICS Summit in that coastal Brazilian city saw all members, including China, condemn late April’s Pahalgam terrorist attack in paragraph 34: “We condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 22 April 2025”. This sharply contrasts with the draft SCO Defense Ministers’ joint statement in late June, which included no condemnation of that attack, hence why India’s Defense Minister refused to sign it. That scandal was analyzed here at the time.

It was assessed that this was a deliberate provocation by this year’s Chinese chair. The triple purpose was to do a favor for its Pakistani ally, craft the optics for lending false credence to the perception that India is the “weak link” in the SCO, and thus strengthen the influence of Russia’s pro-BRI policymaking faction. China was able to pull this off due to its chairmanship giving it extra influence over the group’s workings. No joint declaration was agreed to because China refused to amend the text to satisfy India.

China ironically found itself in the same position during the latest BRICS Summit as the one into which it had just placed India, however, except Beijing decided to condemn Pahalgam this time around in order to avoid the optics of a BRICS founder torpedoing this year’s declaration. Brazilian President Lula da Silva just hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on a state visit, which was analyzed here to be part of his new balancing act, so he wasn’t going to disrespect him by not including Pahalgam in the declaration.

The aforesaid analysis also argues that it was this state visit and associated state dinner which influenced Xi’s unprecedented decision to decline participating in this year’s summit for the first time ever (implausibly citing scheduling conflicts) since he didn’t want to play second fiddle to Modi there. In light of the declaration condemning Pahalgam, which was predictable in retrospect given Lula’s hosting of Modi on a state visit, Xi couldn’t oppose it without discrediting himself personally and rupturing BRICS.

Another reason behind his unprecedented absence could have therefore been to “save face” after tasking his Prime Minister to agree to the declaration despite its condemnation of Pahalgam for the reasons explained above. Having his Defense Minister refuse to amend the joint statement from the SCO meeting that he just chaired two weeks ago so that it condemns Pahalgam to having his Prime Minister inexplicably agree to condemn Pahalgam in the Rio Declaration is a textbook example of flip-flopping.

Even worse, it tacitly draws attention to how China politicized the SCO during its last meeting as touched upon in the analysis that was cited at the end of the introduction, which goes against the spirit of the group. The favor that it did for Pakistan thus backfired since the optics have now been inadvertently crafted for lending credence to Indian suspicions that China has ulterior motives within the SCO and Russia’s pro-BRI policymaking faction might now be discredited by association.

In hindsight, China should have included a condemnation of Pahalgam in the draft SCO Defense Ministers’ joint statement during the group’s latest meeting that it chaired since it wasn’t realistically going to oppose this predictable inclusion in the then-upcoming BRICS Rio Declaration. The fact that it didn’t do so suggests that it either clumsily overlooked this or took for granted that it could convince Brazil not to include it. In any case, China’s reputation just took a hit, and it was entirely avoidable.