Can The US Salvage Its Nigerien Base Deal?
The resolution of this dispute will reveal a lot about the Nigerien military leadership’s internal dynamics, which can in turn enable astute observers to better predict the policies that they might then promulgate.
US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander told the House Armed Services Committee that their country hasn’t received an official request from Niger to withdraw from its two bases there after the military leadership scrapped their military pact last weekend. The pretext was that visiting US officials disrespected their hosts by not announcing their agenda or date of arrival in advance. Niamey also accused Washington of denying it the right to choose security partners.
Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh subsequently confirmed that “U.S. officials expressed concern over Niger's potential relationships with Russia and Iran”, the latter country of which the Wall Street Journal reported is suspected by the US of trying to clandestinely purchase uranium from Niger. The West African country’s military leadership rejected these accusations in its spokesman’s declaration last weekend scrapping their pact, but it still remains the subject of much speculation among many.
The ambiguous status of US forces there over the past week of what Wallander described as mixed signals suggests that there are differences of vision within the military leadership over this and related issues. American representatives’ calm reaction to everything also hints that they want to amicably resolve this dispute so as to retain their military presence there. Accordingly, the impression is that the US might salvage its Nigerien base deal, or at least that its ultimate fate shouldn’t yet be assumed.
From the Nigerien perspective, that country has the legal right to kick foreign forces out of its territory for any reason, but then it risks becoming a target of American Hybrid War operations as revenge. So long as those foreign forces remain there, this risk and the associated one of France launching similar such retributive attacks via its regional terrorist proxies remain low, which can help them consolidate power and then further legitimize their rule in the international community’s eyes.
Seen from the American side, pragmatically working with the military leadership in spite of last summer’s coup advances strategic interests at the expense of soft power ones related to “defending democracy”. This trade-off is sensible for now, but it could become risky if Russian military trainers are deployed to the country since they could try to spy on the US’ bases to receive valuable intelligence. On the other hand, the US could also try spying on them for the same reason too, so it goes both ways.
The Iranian dimension in all of this is a wild card since the military leadership and the Wall Street Journal both reminded everyone that Bush Jr.’s claims of an alleged Iraqi-Nigerien uranium conspiracy were debunked, yet American officials once again maintain that something similar is supposedly afoot. It’s therefore either a ruse to pressure the military leadership or there’s some truth to it, in which case the ideologically radical members of the aforesaid might have gotten spooked and decided to cut off ties.
There have already been talks about differences of vision among the military leadership since last summer’s coup so it’s possible that the most hardcore revolutionary faction could be negotiating this against the will of their comparatively more moderate peers. One branch of the leadership might not know what the other is doing, and each might have different levels of influence over the government. That could explain why the pact was scrapped yet mixed signals were then sent due to internal debates.
It's impossible for outside observers to confidently discern what’s really going on within that very opaque group of military leaders, but the fact that no follow-up statements were made demanding a timeline for the Americans’ withdrawal suggests that some elements are second-guessing this decision. That in turn extends credence to speculation about increasingly widening differences of vision among them and their corresponding bifurcation into “revolutionary” and “moderate” factions.
The first might presumably want to cut all security ties with the West in order to maximally accelerate regional multipolar processes while the second could be more cautious about this out of fear that their group hasn’t yet fully consolidated its power to the point of being able to fend off armed resistance. The US already has a backup plan after France signaled interest in sharing its remaining bases in Africa, but Washington sincerely wants to stay in Niger instead of leave and wage a Hybrid War in its wake.
The resolution of this dispute will reveal a lot about the Nigerien military leadership’s internal dynamics, which can in turn enable astute observers to better predict the policies that they might then promulgate. In particular, this concerns the pace with which Niger moves ahead with its Burkinabe and Malian neighbors’ plans to form a military alliance and political confederation, and any deceleration thereof caused by political turmoil within their ranks could endanger the viability of both multipolar projects.