China Might Not Want Russia To Lose, But It Might Not Want Russia To Win Either
A Russian loss would be catastrophic for China’s security, while a Russian victory could end the discounted energy bonanza that’s helping it maintain its economic growth amidst the slowdown, not to mention accelerate the US’ “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more muscularly containing it.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) cited unnamed sources to report that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his EU counterpart that China doesn’t want Russia to lose in Ukraine because the US’ whole focus might then shift to China. His alleged remarks were spun by the Mainstream Media as an admission that China isn’t as neutral as it claims, just as they and their Alt-Media rivals suspected. Both now believe that China will help Russia win, as in obtain its maximum goals, but that’s likely not the case.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Wang did indeed say what was attributed to him, it would align with the assessment around the conflict’s one-year anniversary in February 2023 that “China Doesn’t Want Anyone To Win In Ukraine”. The SCMP channeled the gist of the preceding analysis by writing that “One interpretation of Wang’s statement in Brussels is that while China did not ask for the war, its prolongation may suit Beijing’s strategic needs, so long as the US remains engaged in Ukraine.”
To explain, not only would the US be unable to “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more muscularly containing China at the scale that Trump envisages if the Ukrainian Conflict drags on, but the continued pressure placed upon the Russian economy by Western sanctions would benefit the Chinese economy. China already imports a staggering amount of discounted Russian oil, which helps maintain its economic growth amidst the slowdown that it’s experiencing, but this could end if sanctions were curtailed.
Additionally, the greater that China’s role becomes in serving as a valve for Russia from Western sanctions pressure (both in terms of energy imports for helping to finance the Russian budget but also exports that replace lost Western products), the more dependent Russia will become on China. The increasingly lopsided nature of their economic relations could then be leveraged to clinch the most preferential long-term energy deals possible as regards the Power of Siberia II and other pipelines.
These outcomes could restore China’s superpower trajectory that was derailed during the first six months of the special operation as explained here at the time, thus strengthening its overall resilience to US pressure and therefore making it less likely that the US can coerce a series of lopsided deals from it. It’s for this reason that Trump’s Special Envoy to Russia Steve Witkoff is reportedly pushing for the US to lift its energy sanctions on Russia in order to deprive China of these financial and strategic benefits.
The nascent Russian-US “New Détente” could restore the Kremlin’s energy clientele as a first step via phased sanctions relief, thus expanding its range of partners to preemptively avert the aforementioned Russian dependence on China, especially in the event of joint energy cooperation in the Arctic. The purpose, as explained here in early January, would be to deprive China of decades-long access to ultra-cheap resources for fueling its superpower rise at the US’ expense.
All in all, a Russian victory (whether in full or in part via compromises) could end the discounted energy bonanza that’s helping China maintain its economic growth amidst the slowdown, ergo why Beijing won’t send military aid or troops to facilitate this (apart from also fearing serious Western sanctions). Likewise, the scenario of the West inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia would be catastrophic for China’s security, ergo another reason for the aforesaid imports in order to help Russia maintain its war economy.
I hope China's power elites do not go down the path of Microsoft. Microsoft software architects think they design smart features. For me, they only make things worse and increase the chance of systemic instability. Then somebody in Microsoft decided to have "World Domination v 2.0". Trying to be too smart usually boomerangs back and hurts badly. Look at Russia's international policy and action after Putin got power, he focuses mostly on domestic revival and maintaining peaceful trade relationships with its neighbors. Putin did not get his subordinates to write books on how a new big beautiful nation rises on the world stage, nor have national newspapers praising of his pointing out directions for the world to follow. Yes, Putin grabs power tightly, and some say relentlessly. But otherwise, most of his focus is on resolving Russia's domestic problems.
About a hundred years ago, when the Founding Father of the Republic of China lectured about the ways for China on the nationalism matters, he said two things. One: equal treatment to all ethnicities in China, there should be no first among the equals. Two: Unite with the people around the world who are willing to help China, and help them in return. Simple goals, but quite difficult to achieve, aren't they? Human nature works against the first, and geopolitics works against the second. I think as much as everything is reciprocal, we will have a chance to get close.
With China, yes, that's my impression too - they are kind of slightly equivocating.
By the way, Russia doesn't import from or export to much to the USA. For Russia, the main Western trade partners are the EU, Japan and S Korea. As long as the EU, EFTA (CH, Au, No, Ic) and J/SK maintain sanctions and aggressive posture, Russia will need to rely on China.