Direct NATO Intervention In Ukraine Might Soon Dangerously Turn Into A Fait Accompli

Trump’s negotiating strategy is to “escalate to-de-escalate” in a very risky attempt to coerce concessions, which he might soon apply against Putin after being emboldened by its success with Iran.

The White House Summit between Trump, Zelensky, and a handful of European leaders officially concerned “security guarantees” for Ukraine, which is an ultra-sensitive issue for Russia. It was therefore alarming from its perspective that Trump subsequently said that the proposed deployment of French and British troops to Ukraine “will not create problems for Russia.” To make it even worse, he also spoke about helping them “by air”, while another report claimed that 10 countries are willing to send troops.

While it hasn’t been confirmed, this sequence of events suggests that Trump’s envisaged endgame in Ukraine is the deployment of NATO troops (even if not under the bloc’s banner), which may include a US-enforced (partial?) no-fly zone and/or promises of US air support if they’re attacked. All three – NATO troops in Ukraine, a no-fly zone, and the de facto extension of Article 5 mutual defense commitments to allies’ troops there (contrary to Hegseth’s declaration in February) – go against Russia’s security interests.

Nevertheless, it’s hypothetically possible that Putin might agree to at least some of the above, but only in exchange for far-reaching Ukrainian and/or Western concessions elsewhere. To be clear, neither he nor any officials below him have even hinted at anything of the sort, instead always opposing these plans and threatening that they might even use force to stop them. Having said that, “diplomacy is the art of the possible” as some have said, and these three briefings would contextualize any such quid pro quo:

* 7 August: “What’s Responsible For The Upcoming Putin-Trump Summit?”

* 16 August: “What’s Standing In The Way Of A Grand Compromise On Ukraine?”

* 21 August: “Which Western Security Guarantees For Ukraine Might Be Acceptable To Putin?”

In sum, Trump’s carrots and sticks might convince Putin that it’s better to accept this scenario than oppose it, but it might also be presented as a fait accompli for pressuring him into accepting it as part of a peace deal if he still opposes it instead of risking an escalation if it unfolds during active hostilities. After all, the US, UK, and the EU are all actively coordinating on the “security guarantees” that they’ll soon present to Russia, and this could dangerously include plans to directly intervene in the conflict.

Trump’s negotiating strategy is to “escalate to-de-escalate”, which thus far most dramatically took the form of the US bombing Iran’s nuclear sites, in a very risky attempt to coerce concessions from others. He might therefore possibly tell Putin that the US will imminently create a (partial?) no-fly zone over Ukraine and provide air support to NATO allies’ troops, who’ll also imminently deploy there, if they’re attacked while carrying out “non-combat” duties if he doesn’t agree to peace on the West’s terms.

Those same terms, however, might include the three aforesaid outcomes – NATO troops in Ukraine, a no-fly zone, and the de facto extension of Article 5 to allies’ troops there – that go against Russia’s security interests. Putin would in that scenario thus be forced into a dilemma whereby he’d either risk World War III by defending its interests via strikes against those troops and breaking the US’ no-fly zone or accepting them for the sake of preventing World War III and hoping that the consequences will be manageable.