Explaining The Polish Judge’s Rationale For Not Extraditing The Nord Stream Suspect To Germany

This importantly doesn’t equate to endorsing his controversial logic, which observers should in any case try to understand even if they disagree with it since his rationale aligns with Polish state interests.

Judge Dariusz Lubowski ordered the release of the suspect whose extradition Germany had demanded due to his alleged involvement in the Nord Stream attack. According to him, “Blowing up of critical infrastructure…during a just, defensive war…is not sabotage, but rather military actions…which under no circumstances can constitute crimes.” He also questioned Germany’s jurisdiction over international waters and said that only the Ukrainian state bears responsibility if it indeed ordered the attack.

All of this is controversial, but the rationale will now be explained, which importantly doesn’t equate to endorsing it. Regarding the first point, Lubowski couldn’t realistically reach any other conclusion about the nature of Ukraine’s decision to continue fighting Russia due to how the conflict is perceived in Polish society, namely as a so-called “just, defensive war”. Ruling otherwise would also discredit the state’s decision to donate its entire stockpile to Ukraine and therefore possibly lead to trouble for himself.

Moreover, the independence cause that some of his compatriots intermittently fought for during Poland’s 123-year-long erasure from the map involved some acts that could be described as terrorism, so describing the attack against Nord Stream as such or at least unjust would risk discrediting them too. This fact isn’t meant to compare that cause to Ukraine’s current one, nor to similar acts that the Palestinians have carried out against Israel on the same pretext, but just to contextualize his decision.

As for his second point, it’s contentious because Nord Stream is partially owned by Germany and is a critical infrastructure project for powering its economy, yet Lubowski might be onto something with respect to questioning Germany’s jurisdiction over international waters. He was probably looking for a legal pretext to avoid extraditing the suspect who allegedly carried out the attack that he sympathizes with, but it’s still worth thinking about the implications of granting any country such jurisdiction.

And finally, the same can be said for his third point, since the suspect might have indeed committed a crime per German law (if Germany was afforded jurisdiction over the international waters in which it occurred and if the suspect was guilty) and therefore deserved to take legal responsibility for it if so. The Ukrainian state could also bear some legal responsibility too, but its alleged orchestration of this attack wouldn’t grant immunity under German law to its conspirators who carried it out.

For as compelling as some might consider Lubowski’s points to be, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto disagreed, posting on X that “according to Poland, if you don’t like an infrastructure in Europe, you can blow it up. With this, they gave advance permission for terrorist attacks in Europe. Poland has not only released but is celebrating a terrorist—this is what European rule of law has come to.” That’s a compelling point too even if one disagrees that Ukraine is guilty and blames the US like Russia does.

In any case, Lubowski’s rationale has put Poland at odds with Germany and Hungary, the first of which it’s competing against amidst the recent revival of its Great Power status and the second of which is its nominal ally in the unofficially defunct Visegrad Group that the latest Czech elections might still revive. No matter one’s opinion on his ruling and the rationale that he relied upon to justify it, everything is consistent with his controversial logic, which also aligns with Polish state interests as explained here.