Finland Is Much More Likely To Host French Nukes Than American Ones

The US is scaling back its direct military commitment to the continent, the only possible exception being the permanent deployment of troops to Poland and its possible participation in the nuclear-sharing program, so France might fill the void as part of “NATO 3.0” and deploy its nukes to Finland.

Finland’s decision to allow the hosting of nuclear weapons on its territory is the latest in a series of moves that appear hellbent on making it one of Russia’s most intractable foes after it became a member of the de facto “Viking Bloc” on the Arctic-Baltic front of the “cordon sanitaire” forming around Russia. Given that the US is leading the construction of this geostrategic project for containing its only nuclear rival, many assumed that Finland might host US nukes, but French ones are incomparably more likely.

It was earlier explained how “France’s ‘Forward Deterrence’ Vis-à-vis Russia Raises The Risk Of Nuclear War” due to Paris’ newfound interest in expanding its nuclear umbrella up to NATO’s Eastern Flank. Poland is the centerpiece of France’s plans, but the analysis hyperlinked to at the beginning of this paragraph predicted that Finland might one day participate in its “Forward Deterrence” too, which would align with Trump 2.0’s “NATO 3.0” concept of Europe taking on more defense responsibilities.

While it’s possible that the US might decide to permanently deploy troops to Poland instead of keep its forces there rotational and possibly even include the country in its nuclear-sharing program, that’s the furthest that it’ll probably go in the region. After all, the US just quietly withdrew most of its troops from Estonia, and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth earlier announced a six-month-long force review for the entire continent, which most expect will result in further cuts across Central & Eastern Europe (CEE).

It would therefore be unexpected for the US to then suddenly deploy nukes to Finland, especially since Finland is nowhere near as significant to the US’ regional strategic interests as Poland is, which was explained here late last year after the release of the National Security Strategy. At the same time, “Poland Finally Realizes The Geostrategic Challenge Posed By Ukraine”, namely as a rival for regional leadership in the US’ eyes. It therefore can’t be taken for granted that the US will do any of the above.

In that case, the US would likely agree with Ukrainian troops replacing the American ones that might then be withdrawn from NATO’s Eastern Flank per Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” from late 2024, thus leaving France as Poland’s top partner for preventing joint containment by Ukraine and its German patron. This scenario would further reduce the likelihood of the US deploying its nukes to Finland, which is already difficult to imagine anyhow, thus inversely raising the chance that France deploys its own instead.

The essence of “NATO 3.0” is for the US to “Lead From Behind” while regional partners with shared security interests shoulder more of the burden for advancing their joint goals. As regards the “cordon sanitaire” that’s formed around Russia, Ukraine might replace Poland’s role in Central Europe, while France might replace the US’ direct supervisory role over the whole Eastern Flank through nuke deployments to Poland, Finland, and possibly also Romania (if the US doesn’t deploy its own to Poland).

All in all, Finland is much more likely to host French nukes than American ones (the UK only has sub-launched nukes nowadays), since the most that the US is expected to do in CEE is possibly authorize the permanent deployment of troops to Poland and/or include that country in its nuclear-sharing program. The US also has an interest in France playing a greater role in European NATO’s defense so it’s not expected to object to this; to the contrary, the US might actively encourage it as part of “NATO 3.0”.