Forthcoming Arms Shipments To Somalia Should Be Conditional On Strict End-User Agreements
Shipping arms to Somalia on these terms with strong verification mechanisms in place would preserve regional peace, maintain the complicated Ethio-Somali balancing act that countries like Turkiye are practicing, and reduce the chances of Al-Shabaab following in the Taliban’s footsteps to power.
Last month’s lifting of the three-decade-long UN arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was expected enhance its anti-terrorist capabilities, but the authorities’ latest portrayal of Ethiopia as more of an existential threat than Al-Shabaab (AS) imperils that scenario. As was argued here, the FGS and AS’ converging interests vis-à-vis Ethiopia after its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland over port access in exchange for recognition could lead to an unholy alliance between them.
To summarize for the reader’s convenience, the FGS might delay any potentially planned offensives against AS if the latter wages a hybrid war of terror on Ethiopia and/or Somaliland, following which they’d be presented as ‘heroes’ to the public and peace talks could begin if the group has the political will. After all, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed told the Royal United Services Institute in late November that a political resolution to their conflict is his “preferred option”, not a military one.
The precedent established by the US and its Kabul allies’ talks with the Taliban suggests that AS might exploit this possibility in order to gain recognition as a legitimate actor, buy time to build up its strength, and then ultimately make a nationwide power play to seize over the state at an advantageous time. The UNSC’s calculations in lifting their global body’s arms embargo on the FGS, however, were that the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) could become powerful enough to prevent this worst-case scenario.
The gradual departure of the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia’s (ATMIS’) 17,500 soldiers in 11 months’ time parallels the US’ preplanned withdrawal from Afghanistan in mid-2021, which could lead to a similar security vacuum halfway through that AS could exploit just like the Taliban did. It’s therefore imperative that the SAF learn as much as they can from ATMIS in order to prepare for fully ensuring security on their own in the country by then without that mission’s assistance.
The problem is that HSM’s latest portrayal of Ethiopia as more of an existential threat than AS, despite the first simply recognizing the on-the-ground military-diplomatic realities of the past 33 years while the second is a UN-designated terrorist organization, could lead to the SAF urgently refocusing their mission. Instead of prioritizing the enhancement of their anti-terrorist capabilities like the UNSC expected when they lifted the arms embargo, it might neglect them in favor of prioritizing conventional ones instead.
In that event, AS would have space to grow if it’s not being targeted by the SAF like many thought would happen throughout this year prior to recent developments, and those of its members that attack Ethiopia and/or Somaliland could in theory be armed by the SAF under the cover of corruption. Simply put, those foreign arms that might soon flood into Somalia after the UN arms embargo was just lifted could be put to use against Ethiopia and/or Somaliland by both the SAF and their unholy allies AS.
Accordingly, those countries that officially send arms to Somalia from here on out could either have their wares redirected for use against those two by it and possibly even the AS without their knowledge, or they could be tacitly complicit in this scheme if that was their intent in sending them there all along. In either case, this flood would further worsen the already intense security dilemma between Ethiopia and Somalia, which could spike the risk of a conventional war breaking out between them.
That might be precisely what some of Somalia’s partners like Egypt and Eritrea want to have happen since their regional strategies are predicated on containing Ethiopia, which could be pursued in this context by proxy means via the SAF and/or AS, who’d fight Ethiopia to the last Somali on their behalf. Others like Ethiopia’s close Turkish military partner might send arms to Somalia, where it has its largest foreign base, with the sincerely innocent intent of them being used for anti-terrorist operations.
The best way for Turkiye and those like it to maintain their complicated Ethio-Somali balancing acts is for forthcoming arms shipments to be conditional on strict end-user agreements that would avoid inadvertently worsening the regional security dilemma. Following the US-Pakistani precedent, it could be stipulated that all or some arms can only be used for anti-terrorist operations, though that doesn’t mean that Somalia will comply just like Pakistan reportedly didn’t without strong verification mechanisms.
Therein lies the importance of Somalia’s partners behaving responsibility towards this issue by making arms shipments conditional on strict end-user agreements with strong verification mechanisms if they sincerely have innocent intentions in arming that country. Declining to do so could further destabilize the region as explained and would also expose their ulterior motives, though those that have them could go through these motions to cover up their schemes, but they might also not want to hide them either.
Nevertheless, the point is that shipping arms to the FGS in the context of its latest tensions with Ethiopia and newfound converging interests with AS vis-à-vis that country without these end-user agreements and verification mechanisms in place raises the risk of a regional war. Those who sincerely don’t harbor such intentions should implement these policies to preserve regional peace, maintain their complicated Ethio-Somali balancing acts, and reduce the chances of AS following in the Taliban’s footsteps to power.