France Is Playing A Leading Role In The West’s “War Of Attrition” Against Russia

Its leadership apparently calculated that the associated risks are worth becoming the US’ top ally in “NATO 3.0”, but its competition with Germany and the UK for this role is still far from over.

The Financial Times published a detailed report last week about how “Ukraine adapts strikes on Russian energy industry to hit critical components”. The gist is that Ukraine is now trying to knock Russian energy infrastructure out for as long as possible by targeting parts thereof that are hard to replace and hitting nodes within the wider system for maximum disruption. All of this is being facilitated by the US and France, which help Ukraine not only map routes to its targets, but even select the targets for it to hit.

Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi told the Financial Times that “The objective is clear: 1) to destroy the sources that finance Putin’s war [oil trade] and 2) [to destroy] the military-industrial complex that supplies the occupying army with weapons.” This amounts to the West’s attempted deindustrialization and demilitarization of Russia as part of the new Ukrainian-fronted “war of attrition” being waged against it after Trump decided to “escalate to de-escalate”.

The US’ involvement isn’t any surprise, but France’s might be for those who haven’t been following its moves. France extended its nuclear umbrella eastward over Poland in the spring as part of its “forward deterrence” policy and then agreed shortly thereafter that the E3, which also includes Germany and the UK, will deploy troops to Ukraine after a ceasefire. All of this is aimed at presenting France as Europe’s military-security leader in “NATO 3.0” amidst its competition with Germany and the UK for this role.

While Germany is now Ukraine’s second-most-important military patron behind the US and the UK has done a lot in this regard too (even before Germany did), neither of them is playing the role that France is in this new “war of attrition” against Russia, which gives France a unique value vis-à-vis the US. If Trump 2.0 ever decided to disengage from the conflict, perhaps as part of a new peace push with Russia, then it could rely on France to continue waging their “war of attrition” in adherence to the “NATO 3.0” principle.

Furthermore, due to France’s involvement in the attempted deindustrialization and demilitarization of Russia, any significant escalation could hypothetically provoke a Russian response against French interests in Europe instead of American ones for perceived escalation-control purposes. This could take the form of striking its military base in Romania. Although the odds of Putin authorizing such retaliation are low, especially after he recently reaffirmed his “cautious” approach, it could still be in the cards.

The US therefore benefits from France’s role in this unprecedented campaign against Russia by having its partner either continue it on autopilot if the US disengages from the conflict or bear the brunt of the costs if Putin finally snaps and authorizes even only symbolic action against French interests in Europe. For France’s part, its leadership apparently calculated that these risks are worth becoming the US’ top ally in “NATO 3.0”, but its competition with Germany and the UK for this role is still far from over.

As regards their “friendly rivalry”, the only tangible benefit to be derived from it is more profits for their military-industrial complexes in which a statistically insignificant minority of their people invests, with the primary motivation actually being “national prestige” more than anything else. In pursuit of regaining its lost glory from the Napoleonic era, France risks provoking Putin into abandoning his “cautious approach” (that some supporters fear has become excessive), so it should urgently reconsider.