Houthi-Controlled North Yemen Is Poised To Become A Regional Power If Nothing Changes
This scenario can only realistically be averted by the Houthis’ enemies collectively shouldering and thus more fairly sharing the immense costs of doing what’s needed to defeat them, which is in all of their interests, but the “prisoner’s dilemma” prevents them from doing so.
The Houthis shocked Israel by penetrating several layers of air defense systems to successfully strike Ben Gurion Airport on Sunday morning. They then threatened to impose an air blockade on Israel by repeatedly targeting its airports, while Israel promised a sevenfold response against the Yemeni rebels. The problem for Israel though is that it’s unlikely to achieve what the US itself couldn’t over nearly the past 18 months of it bombing the Houthis in an attempt to end to their blockade of the Red Sea.
About that, the group announced at the time that this is in solidarity with the Palestinians and won’t be lifted until after the Israeli military operation in Gaza ends, which the Houthis consider to be a genocide. Prior missile attacks against Israel were a nuisance but hadn’t posed a serious national security threat till now. The fact that the Houthis are expanding their naval blockade to include a threatened air blockade of Israel also serves to powerfully defy the Trump Administration’s intensified bombing campaign.
Three reasons account for why the US and Israel are struggling to defeat the Houthis: 1) the partial blockade on Yemen has failed to stop the import of (Iranian?) missile technology; 2) Saudi Arabia won’t intercept Houthi missiles fired towards Israel due to their lack of mutual recognition and fears of reigniting the hottest phase of this decade-long conflict; and 3) nobody – neither the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, nor the last two’s local Yemeni allies – is considering a ground invasion of North Yemen.
Tightening the partial blockade on Yemen could worsen its famine, dangerously place more foreign naval assets in range of Houthi missiles, and risk provoking the group into attacking Saudi Arabia and/or the UAE (whether their energy, military, and/or civilian targets) out of desperation. The preceding point also accounts for why Saudi Arabia won’t help Israel intercept Houthi missiles. As for the last reason, it would entail enormous physical costs that nobody wants to risk, thus perpetuating this dilemma.
If nothing changes, then even if the Houthis lifted their naval blockade of the Red Sea and threatened air blockade of Israel upon Israel ending its military operation in Gaza and the international community de facto accepting their indefinite control over North Yemen, the military threat will remain. Not only that, but it’ll grow due to the Houthis’ predictably continued import of missile technology and the hardening of their mountainous defenses, thus giving them hitherto unthinkable leverage over their enemies.
Such an outcome would revolutionize regional affairs. It can only realistically be averted by the Houthis’ enemies collectively shouldering and thus more fairly sharing the immense costs of doing what’s needed to defeat them, which is in all of their interests, but the “prisoner’s dilemma” prevents them from doing so. Neither trusts the other enough, nor are they comfortable accepting even the comparatively more equally dispersed damage that the Houthis could inflict on each of them, which is why it’s unlikely.
Accordingly, so long as the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the last two’s local Yemeni allies prioritize their self-interests over their shared ones, the scenario of Houthi-controlled North Yemen becoming a regional power is a fait accompli. All the aforementioned would therefore have to accept a future where Houthi missiles are held over their heads like a Damocles’ sword. If that doesn’t soon spur them into collective action, then nothing will, and they’ll just have to adapt to this new strategic reality.
Go Houthi’s: F Israel
Intelligence reports suggest that the Houthis are going to lose bigtime. Real big punishment to them from their adversaries is in the offing. Houthies are basically counting their days, because their time is about to be up.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are aware of this reality, which ironically has goaded them into complacency. They do not want to take initiative in overt hostities against the houthies (or at least want to create an illusion of not intending to do so) because they believe that Israel and the USA will finish the job of crushing the Houthies anyways. Eventhough a bigger coalition of the willing ganging up against the Houthies will mean wider dispersal or dissipation of retaliatory strikes that Houthis might undertake, thus mitigating their efficacy, yet Saudia and the UAE do not seem to want sharing the brunt at all. From the Israeli standpoint, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are shirking their responsibilities, in the same way the EU wants America to have the former's back against Russia without having to foot an equitable share of the bill. Tails you lose, heads I win! Alternatively, the other extreme possibility could be that Saudi Arabia is covertly co-operating with Israel in missile-interception and all, but simply does not want to admit it for fear of provoking backlash from restive sections of its own populace who profess broad ideological alignment in some measure or the other with Hamas of Gaza.
Critics of Saudi policy among the sympathisers with the Axis of Resistance go so far as to allege that on the flip side, Saudi Arabia has in principle reconciled itself to the spectre of a peaceful geographical expansion of Israel into Northern and Central Hijaz, something which partakes of certain "Greater Israel" features. The events of October 7 and the gangup of Al Ansar in solidarity with Hamas subsequently, combined with unreliable or lackadisical co-operation with Israel from important neighbours like Saudi Arabia, have convinced many even among the sceptics in Israel of the perceived need for Israel to increase its strategic depth for safeguarding its security, maybe say in form of a larger strategic footprint on the Red Sea littoral. There are indications that Saudi Arabia will not be entirely averse to the prospect of ceding some
territorial concessions to Israel in the larger interest of normalisation and lasting peace not only with Israel but also one guaranteed by an Israeli nuclear umbrella against Iran. The Saudi and UAE dynasties have been shown to prioritise stability within their kingdoms over fanciful but unrealistic ambitions of exports of ideology and
influence. Talks between the UAE and Israel for an Israeli missile base in UAE for protection against Iran have been the subject of much interest and speculation in both mainstream and alternative media.