How Can The US Manage Turkish-Russian Tensions In The South Caucasus & Central Asia?

The essence of these five policy proposals is to preemptively avert another NATO-Russian security dilemma and the rise of associated threats along Russia’s frontiers that could lead to a repeat of their current proxy war in the worst-case scenario for sabotaging the promising Russian-US “New Détente”.

A hypothetical NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact (NRNAP), the merits of which were argued here and the contours described here, would require the US to manage Turkish-Russian tensions in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in order to last. In brief, they’re expected to intensify as a result of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) turbocharging the expansion of Turkish influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery, which readers can learn more about here, here, and here.

If Trump 2.0 is sincere about the renascent Russian-US “New Détente”, which he and his team appear to be as suggested by the Wall Street Journal’s report about the megadeals that they’re negotiating with Moscow, then this must be their priority after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. The most optimal way to achieve this would be to include the following five policies into the Turkish dimension of the proposed NRNAP. Each one will now be described and then some concluding thoughts will round out the piece:

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1. Allow Russia To Provide Security For TRIPP As Was Agreed To Five Years Ago

The ninth clause of the Moscow-mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire in November 2020 stipulates that the FSB’s Border Guards Service will secure the southern Armenian corridor that’s now known as TRIPP. The US should therefore respect this arrangement as a means of managing Turkish-Russian tensions in the South Caucasus by allowing the FSB to ensure that TRIPP isn’t exploited for (re-)exporting Western and/or Turkish military-technical equipment to Russia’s CSTO allies in Central Asia.

That could lead to their armed forces conforming to NATO standards with time like Azerbaijan’s just achieved, which could provoke a Ukrainian-like crisis, especially if Kazakhstan – which boasts the world’s longest land border with Russia – makes any moves in this direction. The likelihood of this happening would be greatly reduced if Russia was able to ensure that this corridor isn’t used for such military purposes, however, ergo the original reason why the FSB was tasked with fulfilling this role.

2. Prohibit The (Re-)Export Of US Military-Technical Equipment To Russia’s CSTO Allies

Building upon the above, the US should also promise not to export military-technical equipment to Russia’s CSTO allies nor authorize the re-export of such by Turkiye or whoever else (whether through TRIPP or whichever other means), ideally through a legally binding agreement with Russia. From Russia’s perspective, keeping its allies within its military-technical ecosystem is the most effective way of averting the emergence of a conventional security dilemma along the lines of what happened in Ukraine.

It’s with this in mind that Putin proposed a large-scale weapons program to his country’s CSTO allies during the bloc’s latest summit in Kyrgyzstan late last month. If any of them begin to “rebalance” their mutually beneficial military-security ties with Russia, which helps them counter unconventional threats like terrorists and drug gangs, then Russia would naturally suspect that they have ulterior motives. It would look like they’re being exploited as Ukrainian-like proxies against Russia and tensions could spike.

3. Prohibit Any NATO Exercises With Russia’s Southern Neighbors (Except For Azerbaijan)

The preceding proposals segue into the third one of prohibiting any NATO exercises with Russia’s southern neighbors except for Azerbaijan, which is already NATO member Turkiye’s mutual defense ally, but such drills mustn’t take place in Azerbaijan if Trump 2.0 is serious about managing Turkish-Russian tensions. This proposal was first made in Article 7 of Russia’s security guarantee requests to NATO in December 2021, but it only prohibited drills on their territory, not with them like is now being proposed.

Russia fears that the Turkish-led “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS) could one day assume a military-security role that replaces the CSTO’s, thus leading to their overlapping Kyrgyz and Kazakh members ditching the CSTO for the OTS, which would catalyze the earlier described dark scenario sequence. Given that Azerbaijan’s armed forces now conform with NATO standards, they too should be prohibited from drilling with these states, otherwise Baku could advance this process as NATO’s and/or Turkiye’s proxy.

4. Expand The Caspian Pipeline Consortium & Build A Complementary Gas Pipeline

Conor Gallagher’s analysis about how “The Trans-Caspian Pipeline Is Resurrected as the U.S. Plots a Return to Central Asia” draws attention to a re-emerging source of regional tensions. This can be averted by expanding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC, a Western co-owned oil pipeline across Russia connecting the Caspian and Black Seas) and building a complementary gas pipeline. Relying on this route as opposed to provoking a heated dispute over an undersea Turkmen-Azeri pipeline would be pragmatic.

American energy companies, chief among them Chevron and Exxon (which are already involved in the CPC), would wildly profit while Europe would receive an alternative to Russian energy (that the Kremlin would still profit from too from transit fees) without risking a dangerous regional crisis. To Russia’s credit, it never interfered with the CPC during the special operation, so Trump 2.0 could present its proposed expansion and complementary gas pipeline as a reliable flagship megaproject of their “New Détente”.

5. Replace Competition In Armenia & Georgia With Cooperation For Keeping Turkiye In Check

US meddling in Armenia and Georgia threatens regional stability, the first by turbocharging Turkiye’s rise as a Eurasian Great Power through TRIPP and the second by provoking another special operation if a future pro-Western government attacks Russian troops in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia. Replacing their competition there with cooperation would unlock the mutual trust required for taking their “New Détente” to the next level while also importantly keeping Turkiye in check to both of their benefit.

While Turkiye helps contain Russia, it might one day become so strong of a Eurasian Great Power through the eastward expansion of its “sphere of influence” that it “goes rogue” and turns against the US. This could break the US’ planned containment of China if Turkiye cooperates closely with it in Central Asia. Brokering a Russian-Georgian Non-Aggression Pact and abandoning pressure on Armenia to kick Russian troops out, after which they’d be allowed to secure TRIPP as proposed, could prevent all of this.

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The essence of these five policy proposals is to preemptively avert another NATO-Russian security dilemma and the rise of associated threats along Russia’s frontiers that could lead to a repeat of their current proxy war in the worst-case scenario for sabotaging the promising Russian-US “New Détente”. These two nuclear superpowers can jointly shape the ongoing global systemic transition more effectively than any other duo can to ensure that it’s as stable as is realistically possible under the circumstances.

US management of Turkish-Russian tensions in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the vast region of eight former Soviet Republics (over half of the former USSR’s constituent members) all along Russia’s southern periphery, is required for this to happen. Anything less greatly risks another outbreak of NATO-Russian tensions that could also abruptly reverse the US’ planned “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more muscularly containing China after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. Trump 2.0 should therefore prioritize this.