How Much Of A Strategic Game-Changer Would It Be If Australia Hosts US Nukes?

The unmistakable trend is that US-backed blocs are spreading across the Eurasian Rimland for containing Russia, Iran, and China.

Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergey Shoigu warned during a Russian-ASEAN security meeting in late May that “Japan and the Republic of Korea are preparing to host American nuclear weapons on their territory. Such weapons could also end up on the territory of Australia because of its participation in the AUKUS partnership.” The Japanese and Korean scenarios were touched upon here in mid-May, while the Australian one has been speculated about since AUKUS’ unveiling in late 2021.

It was also separately assessed last month that “Japan & The Philippines Are Poised To Play Greater Roles In Containing China” due to their geographic proximity to Taiwan in light of the US encouraging the expansion of their bilateral military ties. Between them and Australia lies Indonesia, which agreed to a “Major Defense Cooperation Partnership” with the US in mid-April and is reportedly considering allowing US military overflights as well.

Being the furthest away from China of all the aforementioned countries apart from the US, casual observers might therefore wonder why the US might consider deploying its nuclear weapons to Australia. One possibility is that attacking China from the southern hemisphere could reduce the risk of interception. Another complementary one is that ground-deployed nukes could be fired from Australia’s vast uninhabited interior and thus mitigate the consequences of Chinese retaliation.

While there’s always the chance of China striking the populated eastern coast, it might decline due to the presence of many Chinese nationals who moved there in recent decades and the many Chinese-Australians who already live there, or at least the US and Australia might calculate. The scenario of the US rotating air-launched nukes between Northeast Asia and Australia could also create a regular military air corridor between them, one in which nuclear-capable aircraft regularly fly to maintain “deterrence”.

It goes without saying that everything in between would fall within the US’ sphere of influence, with any holdouts or unexpectedly resistant states (such as could follow the election of a US-critical leader who might win despite the US meddling against them) being subverted prior to more publicly pressured. The goal is to consolidate what can be called AUKUS+, or the Asian NATO, which might be less a mutual defense bloc and more a US-backed network of partners “sharing the burden” for containing China.

Australia’s role therein is as the regional founding father which also serves the dual purpose of a continent-sized US aircraft carrier in relative proximity to China’s southern doorstep for militarily supplying allied states and threatening China with potentially countless nukes launched from this vector. This is the natural evolution of Australia’s changing geostrategic role in the global systemic transition brought about by years of US influence, including infowars, aimed at weaponizing it against China.

In terms of the broader picture, NATO’s consolidation throughout the course of the Ukrainian Conflict is the blueprint for what might follow in West Asia should the Abraham Accords be expanded after the Third Gulf War like Trump demands. As regards the Asia-Pacific, no equivalent war of regional magnitude has yet to break out there, but AUKUS+ could still consolidate even without one. The unmistakable trend is that US-backed blocs are spreading across the Eurasian Rimland for containing Russia, Iran, and China.