Pakistan’s reported indirect arming of Ukraine through Poland might expand into direct military cooperation between them that could then also elicit concern from Russia.
Top Indian diplomat Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said during a press conference with his Polish counterpart Radek Sikorski that he wants to discuss the latter’s “recent travels to the region” in an allusion to his trip to Pakistan last fall after spring’s Indo-Pak clashes. He also said that “Poland should display zero tolerance for terrorism and not help fuel the terrorist infrastructure in our neighbourhood.” Sikorski later abruptly ended an interview when asked about Pakistani terrorism against India.
India has good reason to be concerned about Poland’s close ties with Pakistan, not just due to Sikorski’s suspicious behavior during the aforesaid interview which hinted at a seemingly inexplicable fear of offending that country, but because of reports that Poland aids Pakistan’s indirect arming of Ukraine. Although the Russian Ambassador to Pakistan dismissed them as lacking evidence, perhaps in order to not derail their big-ticket energy and infrastructure talks, it’s likely that India believes them.
After all, it wasn’t only Indian media that reported on Pakistan’s indirect arming of Ukraine, but also French media and The Intercept. The second’s report alleged that “U.S. Helped Pakistan Get IMF Bailout With Secret Arms Deal For Ukraine, Leaked Documents Reveal”, which is believable given Pakistan’s financial problems and the US’ former interest in arming Ukraine to the teeth against Russia. Pakistan also has a sizeable defense industry and is a “Major Non-NATO Ally” so this alleged deal is reasonable.
Lending credence to this claim was Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar declaring after last fall’s talks with Sikorski that “We agreed to expand bilateral cooperation in trade, energy, infrastructure, defence, counter-terrorism, science and technology and education.” Their defense cooperation might eventually expand beyond Pakistan indirectly arming Ukraine to it directly arming Poland given the latter’s unprecedented military buildup that’s sold to the public on the pretext of defending against Russia.
The lion’s share of its military-technical equipment comes from the US and South Korea due to how embarrassingly underdeveloped its domestic military-industrial complex is, but it would make sense for Poland to pragmatically diversify suppliers by exploring related options with Pakistan. This is especially so if they’ve already been cooperating on indirectly arming Ukraine and Pakistan took the opportunity to market its other military-technical equipment to Poland. Any such deal would bother Russia and India.
Russia would dislike Pakistan arming Poland amidst their talks on big-ticket deals, which arguably require the US’ approval that Trump might not provide in order for US companies to take advantage of these opportunities instead, while India would object to Poland financing its rival through weapons deals. Pakistan and Poland are also nowadays the US’ top partners in their home regions so each might lobby their shared US patron in support of the other’s interests as a goodwill gesture for bolstering their ties.
It’s therefore not just India which has good reason to be concerned about Poland’s close ties with Pakistan but also Russia, whose associated concerns could be exacerbated if India shares any intelligence with Russia that it might have obtained about their planned defense cooperation. In that scenario, Russia would still be unlikely to end its energy and infrastructure talks with Pakistan since that’s not its diplomatic style, but it might become reluctant to further expand bilateral ties in other spheres.
Another aspect is that Pakistan, despite its promises, has never ceased to abet Islamist ideology, even if only passively. Support for Islamist groups is rife within Pakistani society, both officially and unofficially. In addition to al-Qaida, ISIS-K, and Taliban cliques, militias tied to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have retained camps on Pakistani soil, including occupied Kashmir. The level of favor they enjoy from society is such that they are able to regroup and gain succor at various levels, both communally and from the state. Like the Mexican cartels, they are arguably more powerful than and exert control over the state, however indirectly. Yet they can only do so with some form of official leniency; and this is where geopolitics takes the fore. (Of course, official cover, a convenient PR, and interlocking international agendas play a big role as well.)
Even the most “secular” civilian leaders in Pakistan—like Bhutto, Sharif, and Musharraf—never made a real effort to target the roots of radicalism, such as Pakistan’s role as a petrodollar appendage in its rivalry with India. Pakistan and the U.S. have tied their fortunes to a mechanism that is entangled in the promotion of Islamism as a geopolitical tool. Factors such as ethnic or tribal nepotism, as well as higher fertility, give Islamist groups an edge, whether in terms of manpower, solidarity, fanaticism, or militarism. Plus, Islamist ideology in Pakistan, as in Turkey, Qatar, or HTS’s Syria, melds seamlessly with and functions within official frames, including the MIC (which is far more advanced and larger in Turkey and Pakistan than in the GCC or even many EU states). Synergistically, within an “Islamic NATO” the Pakistan–Turkey–Qatar ambit acts as ISIS with nukes.
Politically, this setup is indeed “nuclear” in more ways than one for powers like India, not to say Russia.
The reason Poland has such ties is because both are loyal American puppets.