Interpreting Lavrov’s Latest Remarks About Pakistan

They generated a lot of media attention in South Asia but there’s nothing new in what he said.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was asked during a recent press conference about how Pakistan can “use its relations with SCO and BRICS countries within [Russia’s maritime] doctrine to promote safe and mutually beneficial cooperation” and to comment on bilateral ties. He began by praising their relations as “the most positive period in decades” in an allusion to their rapid rapprochement that most recently took the form of comprehensively expanding resource cooperation.

He then segued into talking about how Pakistan, as a victim of terrorism, can work within associated SCO mechanisms to combat this scourge. He suggested closer cooperation between it, Afghanistan, and India, both of which Pakistan has previously accused of supporting terrorists. Lavrov specifically proposed that India’s inclusion in the Moscow format on Afghanistan – which includes Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan – would help a lot in this respect and said that his country will assist however possible.

His latest remarks generated a lot of media attention in South Asia but there’s nothing new in what he said. Russia had already earlier recognized Pakistan as a victim of terrorism and acknowledged its related threats emanating from Afghanistan, albeit without blaming the Taliban or India for them. It also consistently proposed mediating between the disputing parties, whether through a trilateral format or within more multilateral ones, in order to prevent them from being divided-and-ruled from abroad.

Lavrov’s comments are therefore consistent with these policies. It’s also important for observers to note that they were prompted by a question that he was asked about this and weren’t part of his prepared remarks at the beginning of Tuesday’s press conference. This confirms that they were a policy reaffirmation and not the unveiling of something new. Nevertheless, it’s understandable why some regional observers interpreted them otherwise, which will now be briefly explained.

Some in Pakistan have very high hopes about the future of their country’s ties with Russia, but these remain hamstrung by its military leadership’s reluctance to defy the US, ergo why no large-scale energy deal has yet to be agreed to despite years of negotiations about this. From the Indian perspective, some have suspected that Russia has fallen under Chinese influence in recent years, which they fear could have implications for its South Asian policy by moving it closer to Pakistan at India’s expense.

The reality is that India remains Russia’s special and privileged strategic partner, not only in the region, but across all of Eurasia. China plays an equal role in this regard, but Russia arguably relies on India as a counterweight to preemptively avert the scenario of potential disproportionate dependence on the People’s Republic. Even so, Russian-Indian relations aren’t at China’s expense, nor are Russian-Chinese and Russian-Pakistan ones at India’s expense. The Kremlin always tries to keep its ties balanced.

To that end, it makes perfect sense for Russia to support India’s inclusion in the Moscow format on Afghanistan, which can serve to lessen some of the mistrust between India-China and India-Pakistan. India used to be one of Afghanistan’s closest partners prior to the Taliban’s return to power and has since sought to reclaim that status. This goal would be advanced through inclusion in the aforesaid format, but it’s precisely for that reason that China and Pakistan might object to it despite Russia’s lobbying.