Is The “Azawad Liberation Front” A Terrorist Group, A Separatist One, Or A Blend Of Both?

Opinions naturally differ, but its legacy will ultimately be determined by whether it wins or loses, with victory leading to its legitimization and normalization following the Syrian model.

The “Azawad Liberation Front’s” (FLA) spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane published a statement from his organization last week pushing back against those members of the international community that describe it as terrorists following the example of Mali’s interim military authorities. The FLA denied that it engages in terrorism, justified its actions as defending civilians from alleged crimes by the Malian Armed Forces and their Russian allies, and reaffirmed its self-determination goal.

Radio France Internationale (RFI) cited separate remarks from Ramadane in their report on the FLA’s abovementioned statement to inform readers of his explanation for the group’s alliance with al-Qaeda-affiliated “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (JNIM) radical Islamists. According to him, “It is a tactical military coordination to confront a common enemy. The FLA is in no way responsible for the actions carried out by JNIM.” To their credit, they also reported on a Bamako-based expert’s critical take.

In the words of Ahmadou Touré, “It has entered into an explicit operational alliance with JNIM, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, to carry out coordinated actions against strategic Malian positions.” This “hybridisation of separatism and international jihadism”, he warned, “threatens Mali’s territorial integrity, causes population displacement and undermines national stability.” Touré concluded that the FLA’s cause doesn’t justify allying with UN-designated terrorists and called on it to disarm.

It’s impressive that RFI included such a critical take in their report considering the reasonable speculation that their French state patron supports the FLA and even JNIM, but this editorial balance might be meant to discredit those who talk about Paris’ interests in using those two to regain its lost influence over Mali. Regardless of one’s opinion on this hypothesis, the question remains about whether the FLA should be considered terrorists or not, and it’s here where the matter of perspective comes into play.

Those that support Mali and the Alliance of Sahel States that it leads likely agree with Bamako’s designation of them as terrorists for the same reasons that Touré touched upon, which are shared by their Russian ally, whose Africa Corps is one of the main players in this war. The FLA’s decision to allow themselves to be used as foreign proxies, at the very least Algeria’s as explained here and here, further discredits their cause even more than it already was after they allied with al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM.

From Algeria’s perspective and that of the Tuareg’s supporters, however, “the ends justify the means” in the name of self-determination or at minimum coercing Bamako’s compliance with the 2015 Algiers Accord that it withdrew from in early 2024. Likewise, those who are on the West’s side in the New Cold War feel the same, but only because they want the FLA to kill more Russians, not because they support the Tuareg’s cause. They’d condemn the FLA in the scenario of a Russian-brokered peace with Bamako.

Therein lies the most important point, the outcome of the Malian Crisis, which will determine the FLA’s legacy. If it emerges victorious, then its cause would likely be legitimized and ties with it normalized following the Syrian model, which saw Putin meet twice already with previously al-Qaeda-affiliated and terrorist-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. The same goes if the FLA makes peace with Bamako. If the FLA loses, however, then it’ll likely go down in history as terrorists.