Israel’s Latest Strike On Syria Reinforces Its De Facto Buffer Zone

The Druze seem to be fine with this since they’d prefer being Israel’s junior partner over the risk of being slaughtered by their non-Druze “compatriots” like what happened to the Alawites last spring.

Israel announced on Friday that it bombed Syrian military positions “in response to the events yesterday, in which Druze civilians were attacked in the Sweida area.” This reinforces its de facto buffer zone by keeping Syria’s southern periphery outside the control of the central government, which keeps hostile non-state groups away from the Golan Heights. It also serves as positive PR amidst criticism over the Third Gulf War by presenting Israel as the champion of a reportedly persecuted minority group.

The Syrian government, which might have possibly been attacking Druze militants and not civilians like their allies infamously did along the coast last spring, possibly thought that Israel was too focused on the Lebanese and Iranian fronts to notice what they just did. That’s understandable considering how intense its campaigns against both of them are, not to mention Iran’s drone and missile retaliations against Israel, but that also goes to show that Israel’s opponents shouldn’t ever underestimate it.

The reality is that Israel is capable of simultaneous military action along several fronts, something that few armed forces can boast of, and its de facto buffer zone in Syria is too important to let Damascus chip away at it and then possibly become emboldened to conduct a full-fledged offensive there. Syria’s “Balkanization” is no longer in the cards like it was last year, however, when questions remained about the future status of its Alawite-inhabited coast and the formerly Kurdish-controlled northeast.

Nevertheless, the Druze-inhabited south still remains outside of Damascus’ grasp, which Israel intends to maintain indefinitely through its punitive strikes against government forces. In turn, Syria might lean closer to Turkiye for help in restoring the state’s writ over that area, which could then exacerbate the already tense Israeli-Turkish rivalry in the Arab Republic. Turkiye might refrain from any dramatic moves for now amidst all the regional uncertainty, but it could possibly help later on once the dust settles.

For the time being, Israel’s latest punitive strike might suffice for deterring Syria from trying to reconquer its lost south, which might become even more difficult to do if the Druze are secretly being armed and trained by it as was previously reported. From Israel’s perspective, it might not be enough to have a buffer zone since its interests in Syria could be advanced even further by building a proxy army there, which could threaten nearby Damascus and thus possibly deter it from implementing anti-Israeli policies.

It’s possible that Israel is considering replicating this policy in South Lebanon, but that would be much more difficult to do given that many of the locals fiercely hate it, unlike the Israeli-friendly Druze. Israel might still try, however, though it would have to ethnically cleanse them first. Israel hasn’t ever been deterred by public criticism from implementing policies that it believes enhances its national security, though it would be a herculean challenge to accomplish this in South Lebanon and it might very well fail.

In any case, Israel’s de facto buffer zone in South Syria is expected to remain in place indefinitely, even in the scenario of Turkiye helping Syria reconquer it. Israel can’t afford to lose this “strategic depth”, nor can it allow Turkish troops on its border, so it would likely risk a major conflict with Turkiye to prevent that. The Druze seem to be fine with this too since they’d prefer being Israel’s junior partner over the risk of being slaughtered by their non-Druze “compatriots” like what happened to the Alawites last spring.