Israel’s Opening Of An Embassy In Turkmenistan Is Mostly A Psychological Move Against Iran
It would of course be ideal if Iran and Israel didn’t compete in third countries, but that’s unrealistic to expect since states are always balancing and multi-aligning in response to one another’s actions, especially their rival’s. Iran’s rapprochement with its southern Gulf neighbors is being matched by Israel strengthening its presence along that country’s northern periphery, with the Azerbaijani aspect having clear security/strategic dimensions to it while the Turkmen one is mostly just psychological.
Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, who previously served as Minister of Intelligence, recently traveled to the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat to inaugurate his country’s new embassy there. The Times of Israel reported that Tel Aviv has had an ambassadorial presence in this former Soviet Republic for a decade already, but its top representative in Turkmenistan was hitherto operating out of hotels and a temporary office. Of symbolic significance, this new diplomatic outpost is just 10 miles from the Iranian border.
Therein lies the likely reason for this move in that it’s mostly meant to apply psychological pressure on the Islamic Republic, especially considering that it closely follows the strengthening of Israeli-Azerbaijani relations amidst the latter’s worsening ties with Iran. In fact, Cohen declared in late March while commemorating the opening of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tel Aviv that those two are part of a so-called “united front against Iran”, which drastically heightened Tehran’s threat perception of Baku.
To be fair, Baku also has a drastically heightened threat perception of Tehran too, with more insight into this triangle being available for intrepid readers to review here. The purpose of referencing that in this present piece, however, is to reinforce the observation that Israel is strengthening its diplomatic presence along Iran’s northern periphery in parallel with Iran strengthening its own diplomatic presence in the Gulf. Both developments took a lot of planning, but their timing is nevertheless uncanny.
By building an embassy in Ashgabat, Israel wants to make Iran feel increasingly uncomfortable, to which end Tel Aviv hopes that Tehran might eventually react in such a way that a self-sustaining cycle of mistrust begins to infect the Iranian-Turkmen relationship exactly as it’s infected the Iranian-Azeri one. At present, that first-mentioned pair of ties is actually rather stable and remains mutually beneficial, but there’s also no overlooking the newfound psychological pressure that Israel just placed upon them.
From the Turkmen perspective, this reclusive country is able to continue its gradual opening to the world by means of Azerbaijan, Baku’s Turkish ally, and all three’s shared Israeli partner. Ashgabat didn’t have any anti-Iranian intentions in letting Israel finally build an embassy in its capital, but it isn’t ignorant of the way in which Iran will perceive this event either. For that reason, it can also be interpreted as a symbolic expression of Turkmen sovereignty aimed at showing Iran that it’s truly independent.
This is important for domestic and international soft power reasons, both of which are connected to the growth in bilateral trade that’s expected to follow them playing greater roles in the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) between Russia and India. The day after Cohen inaugurated the new Israeli Embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s railway company signed a memorandum of understanding with its Kazakh and Russian counterparts over streamlining logistical and other cooperation along that route.
The resultant press release explicitly states that “The parties agreed to combine their competencies to form competitive tariff rates and ‘seamless’ transportation of goods from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan to Iran, India, the countries of the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.” This adds further credence to the assessment that Turkmenistan has no anti-Iranian intentions, but wants to show its people and their partners abroad that it won’t fall under its southern neighbor’s economic influence.
Without a symbolic expression of sovereignty such as the opening of the Israeli Embassy in Ashgabat preceding Turkmenistan’s reaffirmed commitment to playing a crucial role in the NSTC, then a US information warfare campaign could have been commenced to sow seeds of doubt about its sovereignty. Some locals might have been misled to fear that their country is “strategically surrendering” to Iran, the false perception of which could have eventually served as a trigger for Color Revolution unrest.
On the foreign front, Turkmenistan’s close Azerbaijani and Turkish partners could be manipulated into thinking that Iran might be plotting to quietly expand its influence there via economic means with the intent of pressuring Ashgabat into distancing itself from those two with time. A multisided “security/strategic dilemma” might have taken root at the expense of Eurasian stability, but that was just averted by the opening of the Israeli Embassy, which greatly reduces the prospects of this scenario.
It would of course be ideal if Iran and Israel didn’t compete in third countries, but that’s unrealistic to expect since states are always balancing and multi-aligning in response to one another’s actions, especially their rival’s. Iran’s rapprochement with its southern Gulf neighbors is being matched by Israel strengthening its presence along that country’s northern periphery, with the Azerbaijani aspect having clear security/strategic dimensions to it while the Turkmen one is mostly just psychological.
As Iranian-Turkmen trade ties expand due to their growing roles in the NSTC, it also made sense for Ashgabat to symbolically flex its sovereignty in order to preemptively avert the false and potentially weaponized perception at home and abroad that it’s at risk of falling under Tehran’s influence. Israel was more than happy to oblige by opening up an embassy there, which served its messaging/psychological purposes while complementing its host’s balancing/multi-alignment ones as was explained.
In summary, the Iranian-Israeli interplay across the broader region and especially along one another’s periphery represents an enduring trend in the New Cold War that’ll remain place for the indefinite future. Each rival will keep trying to outplay the other in creative ways, which have recently come to be diplomatically driven instead of staying focused on subversion like before. Even so, it’s premature to conclude that their competition is stabilizing, though it would be to everyone’s benefit that it does.