It’s In The US’ Interests To Extend India’s Sanctions Waiver For Iran’s Chabahar Port

From the viewpoint of US interests, Russian and Chinese influence in the Central Asian Republics should be simultaneously challenged, otherwise China could replace Russia’s role there and then possibly co-opt Turkiye to keep the US out too.

Last fall’s six-month sanctions waiver to India over its use of Iran’s Chabahar Port just expired, thus prompting India to resume talks with the US on this issue amidst their ongoing negotiations over finalizing the details of the interim Indo-US trade deal. The Ministry of External Affairs’ spokesman acknowledged that “The current conflict is also a complicating factor” in an allusion to the US’ blockade of Iran. Be that as it may, it’s in the US’ interests to extend this waiver, and sooner rather than later.

Prior to the Third Gulf War and last year’s Indo-US tensions before that, US policy beginning with Trump 1.0 and continuing under Biden was to facilitate India’s economic ties with Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) via Iran so that India could function as a counterbalance to Chinese influence there. The aforesaid tensions led to Trump 2.0 briefly weaponizing this policy, which might once again happen in order to compel concessions on whatever it is that’s holding up the signing of their trade deal.

Of course, the cost of doing so is the reduction of Indian economic influence and consequent further strengthening of China’s overall influence in the Eurasian Heartland, but Trump 2.0 might cynically calculate that rival Pakistan’s recent outreaches to the CARs could compensate for that. Instead of Pakistan counterbalancing China there, it complements growing Turkish influence, which is expected to be turbocharged through last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).

“Major Non-NATO Ally” Pakistan has been NATO member Turkiye’s unofficial ally for decades, and each perceives the CARs as being part of their shared civilizational heritage, recalling that this majority-Turkic but historically culturally Persian region was also where Mughal Empire founder Babur was from. Continued Afghan-Pakistani tensions obstruct the latter’s envisaged rail corridor to the CARs, ergo why it’s now relying on transit via Iran just like India has for years, thus expanding the scope of their rivalry.

Pakistan has cozied up to Trump 2.0 since the beginning, and they’re now closer than ever due to its role in mediating the US-Iranian talks, which explains Trump 2.0’s lack of reaction to Pakistan redirecting trade with the CARs away from its prior Afghan route and through the new Iranian roundabout. This is in spite of the US’ intensified “maximum pressure” policy aimed at cutting off Iran’s foreign revenue flows for the purpose of coercing concessions from it in exchange for relief under pain of economic collapse.

Since an exception was already made for Pakistan, likely due to the complementary role that it plays in their shared Turkish ally’s plans to challenge Russian influence in the CARs, then an exception should also be made for its Indian rival due to the role that it plays in challenging Chinese influence. From the viewpoint of US interests, Russian and Chinese influence there should be simultaneously challenged, otherwise China could replace Russia’s role and then possibly co-opt Turkiye to keep the US out too.

It’s unclear whether Trump 2.0 realizes this, however, since its prior policy missteps with India suggest that it doesn’t fully appreciate India’s pivotal role in the balance of power in Eurasia. This accounts at least in part for why its Chabahar sanctions waiver wasn’t automatically renewed. The longer that the fate of this Indian-managed port remains uncertain, the more entrenched Chinese influence in the CARs becomes, which contradicts US interests. Trump 2.0 should therefore extend this waiver without delay.