The Türkiye–Pakistan–Ukraine ambit and its interface with India (as shown by Operation Sindoor) probably pose the most potent threat to Russia on multiple fronts, while complicating Saudi ties to the latter two. Türkiye and Pakistan have given military aid both to each other and to Ukraine in ways that have harmed Russia or its Indian friend, while the Saudi financial role in Islamabad—given China's lesser role over time—indirectly subsidizes the latter's security challenges to Russia in South–Central Asia.
The fact that the Mecca Pact is more or less informal arguably worsens the security dilemma for its signers and other states alike, as its vagueness invites scrutiny by its possible targets (notably Russia's Israeli–Indian partners) while lacking internal mechanisms to foster the durability of a true alliance, such as a chain of command, means to enforce compliance, or actual steps to be taken were its Article V-like provision (regarding an attack on one or more signatories) challenged.
Given the tense and complex regional environment, all this raises the potential for misunderstandings—hence miscalculations—that could redound on Russia negatively, even if a conflict involves third parties such as India, Israel, or their Emirati allies. Notably these three are at odds with the Türkiye–Pakistan bloc in some of the same areas in which the latter is competing with Russia, such as Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the TRIPP corridor (Black Sea–Caucasus–Caspian area).
Agree completely. The Türkiye-Pakistan coalition is set to work against Russia, Israel and India. Whether Saudis are going to fund them is a different question, since they indirectly endanger the Saudi countrol of Saudi resources. If Türkiye and Pakistan move on Saudis (like Iraq did on Kuwait in 1990), who is going to save the Saudis?
The Saudi–Pakistani relationship is very different from the Saudi–Iraqi one (1958–2003), given that post-Hashemite Iraq posed a Baathist, republican threat to the Wahhabi monarchy; only shared hostility to Iranian (Persian) hegemony united the two, as in the Iraq–Iran war—an exceptional circumstance.
Pakistan is far more ideologically compatible with and financially dependent on Saudi Arabia than Baathist Iraq ever was, notably since the Zia era. The likelihood that Pakistan would war with Riyadh is much lower than the chance that Türkiye would, but I think all three's shared threat matrix rules this out too.
Historically the Saudis, like other Sunni (Gulf) elites, were more often than not aligned with the Brothers, while the latter tutored or formed numerous Islamist movements—both Sunni and Shia—including the precursors to groups like al-Qaida. Even today the MB have a say in Kuwait and other GCC states besides Qatar.
The Saudis served as the main base of the MB after Nasser evicted its Egyptian nucleus, siding with the latter against secular nationalism and Soviet Marxism. Saudi-backed MB such as Abdullah Azzam spearheaded the Arab Mujahideen in Afghanistan while networking with Osama bin Laden, for instance.
Saudi quarrels with the MB had more to do with MB-inspired, Salafi-flavored splinter factions whose Islamist populism clashed with the statist Wahhabi elite, not to say its royal backers. OBL, Jamal Khashoggi, and others show this. Saudi and MB ideology are more or less religiously compatible, in the Salafi sense.
Saudi–MB strains have more or less moderated since Biden began pivoting away from MbS on Yemen and Iran, a thaw accelerated by regional changes since 7 October 2023, including UAE/Israeli friction with the KSA, as well as the growth of Turkish–Qatari power. Now a wider Sunni "ummah" bloc exists.
As you noted, the West, notably the EU, is heavily reliant on petrodollar Islamist debt-financiers like Qatar or its new KSA ally, further compounded by Muslim demographic boons. Major Sunni powers like the "Islamic NATO" have net advantages and leverage over the West (and Russia).
Pakistan has a history of acting as mercenaries in the region. Off the top of my head, in no particular order:
1. Saudi
2. Jordan
3. Qatar
4. Kuwait
Also they send "advisors" and trainers to Bahrain, Oman etc. Syria and Iraq too, I think.
Last year when Israel/US first attacked Iran, there were (conflicting) news items that Pakistan had offered nukes to Iran. While having their first pack with Saudi, and now this new pact.
Long story short they will go wherever they can get money.
The Saudis have more or less refused to back Trump 2.0's push for a "Sunni NATO" offensive in Iran or against its "Axis" allies (notably the Houthis, whose attacks have neither ended nor been answered since the Mecca Pact). Instead Riyadh is joining Ankara and Islamabad's relatively neutral stance on the war, while all three have assumed a distinctly cool position toward shared U.S.–Russian partners like Israel or India.
The latter is most evident in MbS' and "Islamic NATO" ally Sharaa/Jolani's aloofness from the Abraham Accords, despite Syria's importance to the emergent Turkish-centric logistics network linking the KSA to TRIPP via Jordan. Without Saudi backing—much less a friendly Türkiye—Israel is isolated both from the U.S. and the Sunni Muslim "ummah", further worsening its strategic predicament vis-à-vis Iran or its now-dead IMEC.
As noted before, there is more solidarity within the new Sunni-led "ummah" (transcending the Sunni–Shia divide to a point) than between the "ummah" and its non-Muslim rivals. Hence the fact that the Mecca signatories are doing less to fight Iran (other than in a rather limited "defensive" capacity, though the Houthis have somewhat exposed this) than to counter Russia, Israel, and/or India.
You rank counties as you do baseball teams. Major league, triple AAA. mnior league. You need to treat RUSSIA as Major league. When you do thet you come out with the understanding tht you do not MESS with RUSSIA.
I think Russia (and also the U.S., to a point) is overlooking the fact that the Middle East has become much more "ummah"-centric since 7 October 2023, partly overriding sectarian or other divides. The fact that two of the three Mecca parties are aiding Ukraine, while none of them has responded to subsequent Houthi attacks (one of which just recently killed three Pakistanis) or gotten directly involved in Iran, shows this.
In other words, all three powers see non-Muslim rivals—such as Russia or its Israeli–Indian partners—as greater emergent threats than their traditional sectarian and regional rival Iran, hence the recent security deals with Zelensky, TRIPP, and joint Turkish–Pakistani defense projects, not to mention Türkiye's major disagreements with Israel's Mediterranean–IMEC aims (tying Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and India).
Israel and India see this more clearly than Trump, Putin, or their diplomatic corps do, however, raising the risk of costly mistakes that could harm the latter's outreach to their shared "ummah"–Israeli–Indian partners, such as Saudi Arabia. The regional constellation and threat perceptions by key actors have fundamentally changed since 2023, in ways that favor "ummah" over U.S. or Russian interests.
Yes, I agree. One often talk about the century of shame for China.
But Muslim world have known more than a century of shame, humiliation, blood and tears since 1830.
Turks ruled the Mediterranean, middle east and even south east Europe during more than 500 years, and Muslims 1000.
Russians, like westerners were part of the crime. Crimes of Russia in center-Asia was at the same level than westerners in north Africa or middle east.
There is absolutely no reason why central Asia countries should be grateful and loyal to Russia.
But USA must take care of this Muslim alliance. The rape of Muslim territories by making Israel exist in 1948 and the rape of holy Muslim territory of Saudi Arabia in 1992 is a unforgiven crime for a Muslim. And the first quality of a Muslim is patience : " sit by the riverbank and watch your enemy's corps float by"
I definitely concur that the Muslim "ummah" is reasserting itself as an independent force and acting through regional realignments such as the Sunni-led "Islamic NATO". Part of this is related to geopolitics, but also to historical and religious legacies, as you noted.
Putin himself has conceded that Russia's lenient policy toward Chechen autonomy (Kadyrov's ethnic-religious scheme) has to do with this, as well as the higher birth rates among Muslim vs. non-Muslim Russian subjects—notwithstanding drawbacks from Moscow's POV.
I have mixed feelings about all this, as I acknowledge both the "ummah"'s self-interest and its implications for Western security, mainly on the domestic front due to migration, lobbying, and so on (some of which also apply to Israeli, Jewish, or other ethnic-religious interests).
Both the West and Russia must recognize that the Muslim "ummah" is (re)emerging as a distinct power with its own aims. Failing to do so will likely reproduce past misreadings and policy failures on an even bigger scale, given the stakes at hand.
That is Putin's and Russia's great mistake (or fault?): siding with the Israeli genocidaire in both deed and cause alienates everyone who is disgusted by that country, and obviously all its enemies.
From the Arab and Turkish point of view, Russia is no better than the USA on this issue.
While I partly agree, I think the Muslim world is shaped by deeper conflicts with non-Muslim states and societies, as shown by the various wars or "jihads"—defensive or offensive—throughout history. Islamists, moreover, are not merely driven by grievances such as Israel or foreign imperialism, but also by a dualistic vision that will not accept alternatives to their global project.
Above all, therefore, I am inclined to believe that even if Western and Eastern superpowers were to stop meddling in the Muslim world, Islamists would go on the offensive rather than relish a chance to tend to themselves. Their ultimate aim is to mold the world rather than be left alone. Even if Zionism and interventionism were to vanish, they would not cease to attack outside rivals—as indeed they are.
Even the whitewashed history of Islamic attacks, in all directions, can not hide the fact that this is not a mere theology, it's a political system hiding behind theology with the ultimate goal of taking over the entire world.
I think it is time for some of the like-minded countries to have much deeper cooperation and for Russia the most obvious partner in the middle east is Iran. They should look at deeper defence intelligence and industrial partnership with Iran than what is there currently. It is really a win win for both the countries and somewhat surprising that it has not happened yet
The Türkiye–Pakistan–Ukraine ambit and its interface with India (as shown by Operation Sindoor) probably pose the most potent threat to Russia on multiple fronts, while complicating Saudi ties to the latter two. Türkiye and Pakistan have given military aid both to each other and to Ukraine in ways that have harmed Russia or its Indian friend, while the Saudi financial role in Islamabad—given China's lesser role over time—indirectly subsidizes the latter's security challenges to Russia in South–Central Asia.
The fact that the Mecca Pact is more or less informal arguably worsens the security dilemma for its signers and other states alike, as its vagueness invites scrutiny by its possible targets (notably Russia's Israeli–Indian partners) while lacking internal mechanisms to foster the durability of a true alliance, such as a chain of command, means to enforce compliance, or actual steps to be taken were its Article V-like provision (regarding an attack on one or more signatories) challenged.
Given the tense and complex regional environment, all this raises the potential for misunderstandings—hence miscalculations—that could redound on Russia negatively, even if a conflict involves third parties such as India, Israel, or their Emirati allies. Notably these three are at odds with the Türkiye–Pakistan bloc in some of the same areas in which the latter is competing with Russia, such as Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the TRIPP corridor (Black Sea–Caucasus–Caspian area).
Agree completely. The Türkiye-Pakistan coalition is set to work against Russia, Israel and India. Whether Saudis are going to fund them is a different question, since they indirectly endanger the Saudi countrol of Saudi resources. If Türkiye and Pakistan move on Saudis (like Iraq did on Kuwait in 1990), who is going to save the Saudis?
The Saudi–Pakistani relationship is very different from the Saudi–Iraqi one (1958–2003), given that post-Hashemite Iraq posed a Baathist, republican threat to the Wahhabi monarchy; only shared hostility to Iranian (Persian) hegemony united the two, as in the Iraq–Iran war—an exceptional circumstance.
Pakistan is far more ideologically compatible with and financially dependent on Saudi Arabia than Baathist Iraq ever was, notably since the Zia era. The likelihood that Pakistan would war with Riyadh is much lower than the chance that Türkiye would, but I think all three's shared threat matrix rules this out too.
What's about the relations Turcs-Qatar( good) and Saoudis-Qatar( bad).?
Turcs and Qataris are majors of Muslim Brotherhood. Saoudis are enemy to it.
Qatar is no a small actor. It owns a big part of french and european economy. And in France, it's the main media owner.
Historically the Saudis, like other Sunni (Gulf) elites, were more often than not aligned with the Brothers, while the latter tutored or formed numerous Islamist movements—both Sunni and Shia—including the precursors to groups like al-Qaida. Even today the MB have a say in Kuwait and other GCC states besides Qatar.
The Saudis served as the main base of the MB after Nasser evicted its Egyptian nucleus, siding with the latter against secular nationalism and Soviet Marxism. Saudi-backed MB such as Abdullah Azzam spearheaded the Arab Mujahideen in Afghanistan while networking with Osama bin Laden, for instance.
Saudi quarrels with the MB had more to do with MB-inspired, Salafi-flavored splinter factions whose Islamist populism clashed with the statist Wahhabi elite, not to say its royal backers. OBL, Jamal Khashoggi, and others show this. Saudi and MB ideology are more or less religiously compatible, in the Salafi sense.
Saudi–MB strains have more or less moderated since Biden began pivoting away from MbS on Yemen and Iran, a thaw accelerated by regional changes since 7 October 2023, including UAE/Israeli friction with the KSA, as well as the growth of Turkish–Qatari power. Now a wider Sunni "ummah" bloc exists.
As you noted, the West, notably the EU, is heavily reliant on petrodollar Islamist debt-financiers like Qatar or its new KSA ally, further compounded by Muslim demographic boons. Major Sunni powers like the "Islamic NATO" have net advantages and leverage over the West (and Russia).
Pakistan has a history of acting as mercenaries in the region. Off the top of my head, in no particular order:
1. Saudi
2. Jordan
3. Qatar
4. Kuwait
Also they send "advisors" and trainers to Bahrain, Oman etc. Syria and Iraq too, I think.
Last year when Israel/US first attacked Iran, there were (conflicting) news items that Pakistan had offered nukes to Iran. While having their first pack with Saudi, and now this new pact.
Long story short they will go wherever they can get money.
The Americans would never have tolerated the "Islamic NATO" if it could not be used on America's enemies.
Newsflash: yes, Russia, you are America's enemy. You may not want to be, any more than a rabbit wants to be the enemy of a hungry cat, but you are.
Muslims know exactly that. And I think they play with that. The big cat is more vanglorious than hungry.
The Saudis seek to end Shia Iran once and for all.
Not at all.
What makes you so sure?
The Saudis have more or less refused to back Trump 2.0's push for a "Sunni NATO" offensive in Iran or against its "Axis" allies (notably the Houthis, whose attacks have neither ended nor been answered since the Mecca Pact). Instead Riyadh is joining Ankara and Islamabad's relatively neutral stance on the war, while all three have assumed a distinctly cool position toward shared U.S.–Russian partners like Israel or India.
The latter is most evident in MbS' and "Islamic NATO" ally Sharaa/Jolani's aloofness from the Abraham Accords, despite Syria's importance to the emergent Turkish-centric logistics network linking the KSA to TRIPP via Jordan. Without Saudi backing—much less a friendly Türkiye—Israel is isolated both from the U.S. and the Sunni Muslim "ummah", further worsening its strategic predicament vis-à-vis Iran or its now-dead IMEC.
As noted before, there is more solidarity within the new Sunni-led "ummah" (transcending the Sunni–Shia divide to a point) than between the "ummah" and its non-Muslim rivals. Hence the fact that the Mecca signatories are doing less to fight Iran (other than in a rather limited "defensive" capacity, though the Houthis have somewhat exposed this) than to counter Russia, Israel, and/or India.
Since Trump applauded the "Islamic NATO" the writing is more or less on the wall.
Saudi refusal to joint he Abraham Accords is basically optics. They already are a de facto Israeli ally.
You rank counties as you do baseball teams. Major league, triple AAA. mnior league. You need to treat RUSSIA as Major league. When you do thet you come out with the understanding tht you do not MESS with RUSSIA.
That reminds me the snake Khaa in Jungle Book. This man is paid to asleep people, not to light or wake them.
I think Russia (and also the U.S., to a point) is overlooking the fact that the Middle East has become much more "ummah"-centric since 7 October 2023, partly overriding sectarian or other divides. The fact that two of the three Mecca parties are aiding Ukraine, while none of them has responded to subsequent Houthi attacks (one of which just recently killed three Pakistanis) or gotten directly involved in Iran, shows this.
In other words, all three powers see non-Muslim rivals—such as Russia or its Israeli–Indian partners—as greater emergent threats than their traditional sectarian and regional rival Iran, hence the recent security deals with Zelensky, TRIPP, and joint Turkish–Pakistani defense projects, not to mention Türkiye's major disagreements with Israel's Mediterranean–IMEC aims (tying Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and India).
Israel and India see this more clearly than Trump, Putin, or their diplomatic corps do, however, raising the risk of costly mistakes that could harm the latter's outreach to their shared "ummah"–Israeli–Indian partners, such as Saudi Arabia. The regional constellation and threat perceptions by key actors have fundamentally changed since 2023, in ways that favor "ummah" over U.S. or Russian interests.
Yes, I agree. One often talk about the century of shame for China.
But Muslim world have known more than a century of shame, humiliation, blood and tears since 1830.
Turks ruled the Mediterranean, middle east and even south east Europe during more than 500 years, and Muslims 1000.
Russians, like westerners were part of the crime. Crimes of Russia in center-Asia was at the same level than westerners in north Africa or middle east.
There is absolutely no reason why central Asia countries should be grateful and loyal to Russia.
But USA must take care of this Muslim alliance. The rape of Muslim territories by making Israel exist in 1948 and the rape of holy Muslim territory of Saudi Arabia in 1992 is a unforgiven crime for a Muslim. And the first quality of a Muslim is patience : " sit by the riverbank and watch your enemy's corps float by"
I definitely concur that the Muslim "ummah" is reasserting itself as an independent force and acting through regional realignments such as the Sunni-led "Islamic NATO". Part of this is related to geopolitics, but also to historical and religious legacies, as you noted.
Putin himself has conceded that Russia's lenient policy toward Chechen autonomy (Kadyrov's ethnic-religious scheme) has to do with this, as well as the higher birth rates among Muslim vs. non-Muslim Russian subjects—notwithstanding drawbacks from Moscow's POV.
I have mixed feelings about all this, as I acknowledge both the "ummah"'s self-interest and its implications for Western security, mainly on the domestic front due to migration, lobbying, and so on (some of which also apply to Israeli, Jewish, or other ethnic-religious interests).
Both the West and Russia must recognize that the Muslim "ummah" is (re)emerging as a distinct power with its own aims. Failing to do so will likely reproduce past misreadings and policy failures on an even bigger scale, given the stakes at hand.
That is Putin's and Russia's great mistake (or fault?): siding with the Israeli genocidaire in both deed and cause alienates everyone who is disgusted by that country, and obviously all its enemies.
From the Arab and Turkish point of view, Russia is no better than the USA on this issue.
While I partly agree, I think the Muslim world is shaped by deeper conflicts with non-Muslim states and societies, as shown by the various wars or "jihads"—defensive or offensive—throughout history. Islamists, moreover, are not merely driven by grievances such as Israel or foreign imperialism, but also by a dualistic vision that will not accept alternatives to their global project.
Above all, therefore, I am inclined to believe that even if Western and Eastern superpowers were to stop meddling in the Muslim world, Islamists would go on the offensive rather than relish a chance to tend to themselves. Their ultimate aim is to mold the world rather than be left alone. Even if Zionism and interventionism were to vanish, they would not cease to attack outside rivals—as indeed they are.
Agree completely.
Even the whitewashed history of Islamic attacks, in all directions, can not hide the fact that this is not a mere theology, it's a political system hiding behind theology with the ultimate goal of taking over the entire world.
Until the arrival of the Mahdi.
Completely agree! That guy is a piece of work.
I think it is time for some of the like-minded countries to have much deeper cooperation and for Russia the most obvious partner in the middle east is Iran. They should look at deeper defence intelligence and industrial partnership with Iran than what is there currently. It is really a win win for both the countries and somewhat surprising that it has not happened yet
It's not the fault of Poutine. Not once, but two times, he proposed a defensive alliance, North Korea like , to Iran and it's Iran which refused it.
Why do you spell Putin as Poutine? Is that French? My dictionary app says this is Canadian French for pudding.