Russia supports the rise of “Middle Powers” that cooperate with one another for optimizing their respective balancing acts since it considers this trend to be a multipolar one that erodes American hegemony so it’s very odd to say the least that his Special Envoy to the US publicly mocked this policy.
So, Andrew, I understand why nobody important in Russia never contacted you. What faction could have do that? The turbo patriots? You are a foreigner, they will never trust you. The Lavrov gang chinese lovers? You're pro Indian, you love Poland and you don't like too much China and even less Iran. They prefer Escobar or Johnson. People who are ready to tell everything they want.
The west lovers? You are a Yankee who loves Russia. They prefer Yankees who despise Russia because they deeply despise Russia too.
My only point in relating that the other day was to highlight the incongruity between how the West (and presumably the East as I’m India, China, Turkiye, etc.) treats probably reliable, well-informed, and credentialed foreigners.
Most Russian experts and related foreign policy officials either lie to themselves and/or to their superiors that “everything is going according to plan”, and that’s what they want to hear from whomever they request to share insight with them.
As for being foreigner, well there are many foreign-born experts in the US who’ve risen to the top of the think tank hierarchy. Regarding India, it’s officially supposed to be Russia’s “special and privileged” strategic partner, but it’s unofficially highly encouraged nowadays to harshly criticize — even malign — it as proven by what the top NRPR: do with full approval.
Russian experts in general think that Poland is a US puppet without any autonomy, ambition, nor capabilities, something to be talked over and not talked with. I very much doubt this would change. Others here have very perceptibly begun a new infowar campaign since last year blaming the Nazis for Katyn and inadvertently whitewashing the OUN by grossly exaggerating the situation with Ukrainians in interwar Poland.
The consequence is that they’re blinded to the role that Poland is playing in the emerging European security architecture to their detriment, but as I’ve learned from Russians here over the years, “not your country, not your problem” (despite my 13 years here, probably reliability, false implication by US intel in summer 2020 in a fake GRU election meddling scandal, owning my apartment, my wife and two kids being Russian citizens, and my entire life savings being in rubles).
Honestly, I don’t even want to go out of my way and advise anyone on anything anymore even if someone asked: “not my country, not my problem”, and I’m not going to tell anyone what they want to hear. I always try my best to accurately analyze whatever it is that I’m writing about, and they can rely on that, but I truly do feel nowadays that it’s “not my country, not my problem”.
It’s been 4.5 years, Darras, and they footed an enormous bill to fly all those other folks out here, lodge them, and presumably remunerate them for their time when it wouldn’t have cost anything for me to meet someone for a coffee. I also know from various sources that public association with me has been taboo for some, though they never gave me a clear answer why.
I have a macabre fascination generally being right with my warnings about latent threats, them never being listened to, and then watching the “Cassandra Curse” unfold over and over again. I console myself that maybe one day someone will come along who’ll try to discover why so much went off the rails and they’ll discover my work and learn about how I’ve de facto been “blacklisted”.
They can keep their collection of clowns, I as a self-respecting person can’t publicly associate with them at the same event, especially not those who’ve publicly defamed me I worked 1,278 consecutive days too from 24 February 2022 to 24 August 2025 publishing unique analyses daily from the perspective of the Russian School of Geopolitics. I’ve done my part, and what I’ve done put to shame every single person in this field (NRPRs) who presents themselves as my “peer”.
The cultural shock of being a Germanic-raised person with a solid work ethic at the center of my life seeing how I seriously many experts here take their jobs amidst what their government has presented as an “existential conflict” (and which I truly believe it is to a large degree is unforgettable and instilled within me the belief that Germanics and Russians are fundamentally different people (I still enjoy living with Russians more than with any other group but I have zero interest engaging with Russian experts anymore).
The way it works in the West, and it’s all public and not secret whatsoever, is that relevant foreigners with much-needed insight into sensitive matters are invited to contribute to think tanks, journals, conferences, etc., share their views with various figures of significance, and then they remain part of the “ideational infrastructure”.
It’s a relatively smooth transition and usually begins even before they finish their studies (most gifted foreigners or those with insight arrive around university age). This is especially so amidst long-running conflicts like the “Global War On Terror” for the US.
To be sure, I do occasionally meet and discuss things with various folks, but it’s inconsequential, we both know it, I just like to believe that maybe I’m helping out somehow. In my experience, the private or at least semi-private sector (as in companies, including those in which the state owns shares) are much, much more proactive and interested in learning as much as they can than anything that’s purely owned by the state (like 99% of think tanks here).
If businesses don’t have the right insight into regional trends, they’ll lose money, thus dealing a direct blow to their owners and shareholders; if the state messes up, there are indeed tangible consequences, but they only rarely affect actual people in the bureaucracy who are responsible (post-Stalin Russia isn’t known for accountability).
I'd also like to add that my MFA-run MGIMO PhD in Political Science is on Russian-Pakistani relations, the subject of which is admittedly niche but represented at the time the last remaining piece of Russia's "Greater Eurasian Partnership" (GEP) puzzle that had yet to discovered by Russian diplomacy.
Humbly speaking, I personally accelerated their rapprochement through my proactive engagements at the time with the Pakistani Embassy here, which led to me being hosted by the National Defense University on five occasions to discuss bilateral relations, Hybrid Warfare, and other such topics.
By my late 20s, I was already informally advising parts of the Pakistani Government in a purely personal and unremunerated capacity (they'd pay for my flights and lodging but I always had meetings, interviews, and events planned, I obviously wasn't vacationing in Islamabad).
I did this due to wanting to advance this element of Russia's explicitly stated policy -- the GEP -- since I didn't have the Old Cold War-era Afghan War-related baggage that Russians and Pakistanis had, which was hindering their rapprochement, and I therefore injected totally fresh thinking into this.
Through my work, which I crystallized in my PhD (essentially the elaboration of my vision that I shared in 2015-2017 and developed in the years since), I laid the blueprint for a lot of what's presently unfolding between them, albeit in a totally different geostrategic context than anyone expected.
The "Pakistan experts" that Russia has are mostly language specialists or historians, very few have any understanding of contemporary Pakistan, let alone during the "anomaly" of former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan, who's since been persecuted and jailed on political charges.
What I accomplished during the five trips that I took to Islamabad from 2017-2019 was to personally help take ties to the next level by sharing a unique vision of bilateral relations centered on Eurasian integration via Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, and Iran.
Absolutely nobody had ever thought of that before in the way that I expressed it, yet there was absolutely ZERO support here in Russia -- if anything, some people pushed back against it, some politely and others less so -- but I carried out for the good of Russia and multipolarity.
After April 2022's post-modern coup against Khan, I severed my ties with Pakistan in protest of the pro-US de facto military dictatorship's persecution of him personally and his opposition party, people with whom I shared a lot of similar ideas and thus felt kindred feelings towards.
I couldn't in good conscience continue voluntarily advising a foreign government that just carried out a pro-US coup against a multipolar, Russian-friendly leader and was now on the brink of -- as was later proven from leaked documents -- arming Ukraine to kill Russians.
That could also have entailed SIGNIFICANT legal risks for me here in Russia in the SMO context, keeping in mind that I had ABSOLUTELY ZERO state support here for what I was doing despite telling Sputnik in the past and then MGIMO about my trips, etc., just to keep them in the loop.
There were NEVER any so-called "debriefings", "coordination", "input", etc., if anything, there was only informal pushback from friends (whom I suspect shadowy figures passed along messages) to "reconsider" building bridges between Russia and Pakistan, etc., but I shrugged them off.
In any case, I finally received my MFA-run MGIMO PhD in Poli-Sci for my dissertation on Russian-Pakistani relations in September 2023 after carrying out certain revisions thereof as recommended at the defense from December 2022, which itself was held after a long delay.
Expert after expert refused to sit in on my defense DESPITE BEING REMUNERATED FOR THEIR TIME (!!!) for inexplicable reasons that I came to suspect had to do with what I later discovered to be my unofficial "blacklisting" for reasons that I can only speculate.
I was therefore grateful to those who turned up (perhaps unaware of this de facto "blacklist) and helped me finally receive the credentials that I deserved for my years of direct, media, analytical (I was already contributing to some Pakistani think tanks), and academic work.
I'm explaining all of this in detail to show you that I'm an indisputable expert on Russian-Pakistani relations, one of few in this country, in fact, and certainly the most recent person to have received my PhD credentials on this subject in September 2023, the timing of which is very important.
That's because the Russian Academy of Sciences held a major Russian-Pakistani conference, I think it was their first-ever or there was something unique about it that they marketed afterwards, yet it wasn't advertised in advance and I wasn't informed, including by my MFA-run university.
I was essentially uninvited to an event of national significance for Russia despite having all the credentials required to participate, and after looking at the guestlist once it was done and over with, my credentials in all respects surpassed many of the participants'.
That's when I knew for sure that I was unofficially "blacklisted" because that particular arm of the state, the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Affairs (at least one member of which declined to sit at my defense), chose not to invite me despite the fact that my presence could help Russia.
You'd likely never see anything similar in any other country, especially the West: even critics of whatever government it may be like I became of Pakistan are invited to US Government-organized events for at least presenting a respectfully expressed critical or contrarian take on things.
Yes, there are exceptions, but Pakistan isn't among them. Likewise, given how much pushback I'd received in the past for voluntarily pioneering the completion of Russia's GEP puzzle by directly helping to discover the last remaining Pakistani piece for Russian diplomacy, I thought I'd be invited.
Remember, I hadn't heard of it in advance, it wasn't widely (if at all) advertised as far as I was aware, my MFA-run alma mater from whom I just received my PhD on this particular subject didn't inform me, and at least one of the Oriental Institute's members declined to sit for my defense.
That's not the way that it's supposed to work worldwide in this professional sphere: if any analogue of mine was a provably friendly foreigner who just received a top state PhD on a specific subject, they'd absolutely be invited to contribute their insight in the "expert ecosystem", not "blacklisted".
Honestly, I feel like I have at least one "guardian angel" or more because I personally suspect that these people who deeply dislike me here (and that's indisputable since they'd rather "cut their nose to spite their face" by excluding me from events about that which I specialize) want me gone.
My MFA-recognized expertise on this subject could have directly benefited Russia -- it benefited Pakistan by positively reshaping its perceptions of Russia and presenting an actionable blueprint for the future of bilateral ties and thus indirectly helped Russia -- but Russia didn't want it.
Imagine how it feels to have devoted eight years of a your life, 2015-2023, to a cause -- in this case Russian-Pakistani relations -- and receive top state recognition of your expertise only to right then after be "blacklisted" (I suspect I was "blacklisted" earlier in fact) and excluded from expert talks.
I still feel passionate about the subject as anyone who reads my work knows, but the example inadvertently set by me should make Russian-friendly foreigners think twice about dedicating years of their life to this country's causes (in my case GEP) because they too can be "blacklisted" .
It's therefore bittersweet that (as my recent work has drawn attention to) top Russian officials are hinting that arms and terrorists enter Afghanistan from Pakistan (they're obviously not coming from Central Asia, China, or Iran!) and the US military might re-enter the region from it too.
I'd been shouting from the rooftops since shortly after April 2022's post-modern coup against Khan that this new de facto pro-US military dictatorship was going to do something like this but Russia's experts had now flip-flopped on Pakistan and completely trusted it.
I suspect that's part of the reason why I had such internal bureaucratic challenges at MGIMO at the end regarding my defense because the "official narrative" radically flip-flopped from "Pakistan is an adversary with which only limited contact is acceptable" to "Pakistan should be fully trusted".
I was ahead of the curve in personally pioneering this final part of Russia's GEP and was ahead of the curve in foreseeing that Pakistan would create problems for Russia in Afghanistan once more, in part at the US' behest (but not entirely), and Russian experts' egos are too big to admit that.
They're also a very different type of person who mostly looks like down on those who used to work in media like I worked at Sputnik (I met many during in-personal weekly interviews for a program I used to co-host) so they don't even see us as the same professional class in fact.
Add to it that they rarely ever publish anything at variance with the "official narrative" and pathologically fear being associated with anyone like me that does, and it makes perfect sense in hindsight why they "blacklisted" me at the expense of Russia's objective national interests vis-a-vis Pakistan.
And this in spite of my being a MFA-recognized expert on the subject who one would have automatically assumed would be invited into the "expert ecosystem" per protocol the world over after earning this accolade, yet nope, cultural factors (predictably in hindsight) got in the way, again.
To make it even more surreal, I was already part of the "expert ecosystem" in Pakistan and was very honored to be as well, but which I quietly removed myself from in protest of what happened.
This entire time, not a single person here in Russia was interested in what I was doing even though I was very open about wanting to meet with others to discuss ways of expanding bilateral cooperation via my model.
By global standards, I was and still am an indisputable expert on Pakistan (even more so today due to my Russian MFA-recognized PhD on bilateral relations), and I could have probably moved to Pakistan if I wanted to.
That wasn't something that I was interested in for many reasons, but what I'm saying is that my ties with the NDU -- which were always very gracious hosts! -- could have turned into a professorship for example.
Not only that, but from there I could have engaged with a wide array of global experts (many attended the events that I participated in, and I once even chaired a major event there too, which was a high honor!).
That's something that I've always wanted to do, share insight with my actual peers (not these uncredentialed and unexperienced podcasters that Russia passes off as "experts"), but it wasn't meant to be.
I admittedly thought more highly of Russia's expert community and relevant structures like the Institute of Oriental Studies and MFA than they deserved and learned my lesson the hard way.
I personally suspect that my "blacklisting" is due to a combination of incompetence, petty jealousy, and -- in RARE cases! -- ethno-national bigotry against me as an American-Pole with a "Ukrainian" surname.
Regarding the first, I now know how incompetent many experts are and that there isn't any "talent scouting" here unlike in the West. Most simply can't recognize talent due to bureaucratic cultural factors.
As for the second, my consecutive 1,278-day work in support of Russia from 24 February 2022-24 August 2025 inadvertently made them all look bad by comparison (they also took vacations while I worked).
And finally, some people here just cannot accept that a non-ethnic Russian and at least a non-citizen can in some ways analyze aspects relating to Russian policy better than they can, and they hate me for it.
Again, I've made my peace with it and nowadays write with the triple goal in mind of informing average folks, foreign experts, and maybe the rare Russian expert of what I truly believe to be happening.
The first two categories read my work regularly while I assume that maybe once in a while a member of the last one stumbles upon it randomly, such as when Russian outlets translate and republish it.
About that, it'll never cease to amaze me how I'm de facto "blacklisted" by Russian experts and the like while Russian media sometimes make my analyses go viral here in Russia.
That's one of the reasons why I've concluded that this years-long "blacklisting" is some personal grudge that some unknown high-level folks have against me for who-knows-what but likely due to my work.
It's obviously not being perfectly implemented and those who defy it aren't punished since some of the same outlets occasionally translate, republish, and help my work go viral here in Russia.
That said, having an analysis go viral isn't the same as participating in expert discussions, including informal ones, so what I long ag hoped to achieve with my work remains beyond reach.
I wouldn't even grab it if it finally came within reach because the disrespect afforded to me by the years-long "blacklist" is too much for a self-respecting person like me to accept.
Russian experts will therefore only have access to my published materials, they won't receive personal briefings, except for those few with whom I'm already in contact with and who defy the "blacklist".
Why would I inconvenience my busy self and disrespect myself too by running to advise the same groups that "blacklisted" me just because they hypothetically lift it as if I'm some little puppy desperate for love?
I'm certain that most people would, they'd get such an ego trip out of it, but while I respect these people's positions and the roles that their groups play in helping Russia, I don't respect them personally.
That doesn't mean that I'd disrespect them, but I'm not going out of my way to help anyone. Also, the "blacklist" encouraged some top NRPRs to publicly defame me, and I can't forgive them for that.
So much has happened over the years and I've had so much "personal development" as some could call it that I just want to continue writing analyses, advising my small circle of expert friends, and that's it.
I'm content to continue watching the "Cassandra Curse" unfold with macabre fascination as in a sense living out the Stanczyk role for the rest of my life without any regrets whatsoever at all:
One more point just to hammer home how anomalous my situation has been, I've done "everything right" in every single way:
1. MGIMO MA
2. Voice of Russia internship that turned into a Sputnik job before graduation
3. Contributions to top Russian think tanks (before the "blacklisting", which I believe came into effect after I left Sputnik in 2019 and might have speculatively played a role in their decision not to retain my job amidst their restructuring at the time
4. MGIMO PhD
5. Freelancing for Chinese media from 2019-2022, the media of Russia's top strategic partner
6. Personally pioneering the acceleration of the Russian-Pakistani rapprochement from 2015-2023 and especially from 2017-2019 when I visited Islamabad a total of five times to lecture at NDU and do other associated things for advancing this goal explicitly aligned with Russia's GEP
7. Applied for permanent residency, bought an apartment, married a Russian citizen, have two kids who are Russian citizens, and converted my entire life savings into rubles, not to mention staying here during the SMO with all the growing restrictions instead of leaving like many foreigners and even some Russians have
8. Publishing daily analyses from the Russian School of Geopolitical Thought for 1,278 consecutive days (3.5 years) without a break till I fell ill from exhaustion despite the death of my grandfather who raised me as the son he never had, buying an apartment, moving into my new apartment, completing various bureaucratic tasks associated with now owning an apartment, getting married (we chose not to honeymoon out of solidarity with the troops since we felt guilty celebrating too much during the ongoing SMO -- compare that to Russian experts vacationing all across the world during the same time!!!), the birth of my son, finishing my PhD (including defending it), seasonal and occasional illnesses, and occasionally meeting with the handful of Russian experts who gratefully appreciate my input on various matters (though it never translated into policy and they don't feel comfortable publicly associating with me due to the suspected "blacklist"), et al.
So if someone like me ends up "blacklisted", then it can happen to anyone, yet they lack such self-awareness here that they don't realize what an indictment my example is of their expert system that someone who devotes over 1/3 of their life (13 years and I just turned 38 in May) to this country ends up "blacklisted", and not only that, maliciously defamed by some top NRPRs, one of whom even went as far as to try to persuade a top diplomat who's in an X chat group (doesn't contribute but remains a member and occasionally reads it since they "liked" a post there before) that I'm an "Israeli spy in Russia" for the purpose of manipulating the security services into destroying my life and my innocent family's, none of whom did anything wrong since we're not "spies" or anything else, just average people.
I truly enjoy living here, and I'd rather live with Russians than with anyone else since they're very easy to live with (their bureaucracy is another matter though! lol), but I still struggle to this day with either remaining proud of all that I've done given my Germanic upbringing or regretting that I ever took my work anywhere near as seriously as I did after all that's happened. It's sincerely a mix: I'm proud of it and would do it again, but I wouldn't have any of the expectations that I did (which were based on GLOBAL STANDARDS in this profession and the FALSE ASSUMPTION that Russia respected them!) of meaningfully helping Russia in the way that all other fellow experts the world over expect to help the countries in which they live.
I would have probably still done the same level of work but without the emotional attachment thereto that I had up until a few years ago. I might also not have worked for 1,278 consecutive days in solidarity with Russia and also to show that anyone can be Russian-friendly, even someone with my identity profile as an American-Pole with partial "Old Rus" ("Ukrainian") ancestry (the point of which I still to this day maintain helps Russia's overall cause but which is utterly unappreciated among those that matter here). I still support Russia and its global causes, but I wish that I had learned long ago, and not the hard way either, that it's "not my country, not my problem", and "don't help if they don't ask for it" (especially regarding my proven contributions to improving Russian-Pakistani relations).
«It's really difficult to understand the true political context of Poutine»
For me it is not difficult to understand his constraints: a limited power base, the need to compose conflicts of interests among powerful factions, and sad awareness of how weak the RF is.
What many people forget is that after the CW1 defeat "the west" bribed everybody who was anybody in the ex-USSR and bought all the secrets of the ex-USSR, for very small amounts too. They found that the USSR was much weaker than they expected (no surprise after the devastations of (WW1, civil war, WW2). The RF is much smaller and spends a lot less of GDP than the ex-USSR on military, and is much weaker than the ex-USSR was (also because of the devastation of the 1990s).
«Back in the days when I was one of the British state’s more efficient functionaries, I spoke with British officers who had been in Russia during the Yeltsin period, when they had been able to get up close and effectively inventory the Russian armed forces. (For those who don’t know, I was First Secretary at the British Embassy in Warsaw, I was British Ambassador in Tashkent, and I was taught to be fluent in both Polish and Russian, which included living in St Petersburg as a language student while Ambassador designate).
What we (as I was then a cog in this machine) found was that the strength of the Soviet Union’s Red Army had been massively exaggerated in all our intelligence estimates, on which defence strategy had been based for decades. We had over-estimated the numbers, the mobility and above all the capability of Soviet weapons systems. Much of it was barely functional; the problems with both quality and maintenance were not just the product of the disintegration of the Soviet system, they evidently went back decades.»
Reason why USSR never ever had a plan to invade western Europe. It was, again, a lie of USA and european "elites".
During the Glasnost and Perestroika, when Fooly Gorby opened every archives of USSR , the western academics were astonished by discovering that fact and also that all the correspondances between generals showed rather that they were terrified to be attacked by NATO.
I'v pointed this out before about Dimitriev, but it bears saying again. He moved to the US in his youth and received a BA in economics from Standord University, then an MBA from Harvard's Business School. He then went to work for the financial giant, Goldman Sachs, and later was involed in investment funds.
If anyone doesn't think he was at least approached by the CIA, I've got a bridge to sell in the Sahara Desert!
I find it hard to believe he isn't a CIA assett in some way.
Furthermore, he's a through and through vulture capitalist. To me, that says a lot about the liberal, western-leaning Capitalist class in Russia, i.e. money driven Oligarchs, corporations, and other liberals in and outside the government. It is money that is keeping the war in Ukraine, and all wars, going. Millions die, while business profits.
His assertion that "middle-power" politics is incoherent also does not make sense, given that one of Russia's premier partners, India, has followed a very coherent "middle-power" road for decades. Middle-tier powers often advance multipolar forms of non-alignment.
If Dmitriev sees international relations as zero-sum, then he should not be so incoherent himself (by alternately hailing and dismissing "middle-power" politics). Also, being a middle power by necessity means engagement with the U.S. as well as other great powers, so his angst seems misplaced.
«one of Russia's premier partners, India, has followed a very coherent "middle-power" road for decades.»
The indian government has tried like the english or italian etc. ones to do a both-sides policy, but they are far too dependent on USA corporations as customers and on USA controlled supply routes, plus the USA governments have been actively supporting indian nuclear proliferation efforts. When Trump snapped the whip of tariffs the indian government promptly "aligned".
«Middle-tier powers often advance multipolar forms of non-alignment.»
No doubt the oligarchs of middle-tier powers would like to play both sides without any pushback from the suzwerain of their sphere of influence but that would require that westphalian logic were still respected, but they know that within spheres of influences there is no westphalian logic.
«discredit the “Middle Power” strategy and his championing of the US’ military presence around the world challenges Russian interests»
What challenges "Russian interests is real power to "color revolution", invade, bomb, seize, sanction, not mere words by Colby or Dimitriev, it is not a debate based on the cleverest arguments. When "Russia" has a list of successes at doing those things as the USA oligarch maybe it will be.
«Dmitriev wrote that “The EU/UK’s faulty ‘middle power’ strategy started to freak out the US. EU/UK vassals should know their place.”»
Nothing strange here: Dimitriev knows that the EU+UK oligarchs simply do not have the leverage to even pretend to be independent as they utterly depend on imports and exports controlled by the the USA military, and have huge pro-USA-oligarch fifth columns. There is no point in pretending otherwise.
«He then quoted the Financial Times’ chief foreign affairs commentator, Gideon Rachman, who posed a critical question to Elbridge asking whether he realizes that countries are experimenting with this approach due to the newfound threats that they perceive from the US.»
Rachman and the FT are proudly and explicitly on the side of the globalist-financialist faction so they cooperate in the conceit that the current EU+UK oligarchs are really trying to be semi-independent "middle powers" even if the don't have the cards (leverage) to do so; I reckon that their pretending to do that is because they are as subordinate as ever to the USA globalist-financialist faction that is using them to oppose Trump and the nationalist-consolidationist faction with the "Trump is giving Europe away to his boss Putin" argument.
I would argue that the EU has used the threat of a NATO split to force Trump to reverse himself on many crucial issues, among them Greenland, tariffs, and Ukraine. The EU elite is similar to the Israeli in wielding influence over its U.S. "master", turning its weakness into a means of control.
A good example is Pakistan. The current military regime was installed by "liberal-globalist" Western factions (2022) to serve as the lynchpin of an "Islamic NATO" allied to Ukraine. It has refused to help Trump attack Iran (though it has extended diplomatic aid) while secretly arming Kiev.
Yet today Trump is a major sponsor of Islamabad—whose regime is a byproduct of his ideological foes. The case of Pakistan shows that "liberal-globalist" trend-setters are in charge and able to force Trump to adopt their policy (until they change it yet again to pressure him).
Another is Syria. The ouster of Assad was spearheaded by "liberal-globalist" agents in league with Turkish–Qatari Islamists and Ukrainian mercenaries. The EU quickly lifted sanctions on Syria, while Trump initially was slow to deal with HTS leader Jolani (but shifted due to pressure).
«I would argue that the EU has used the threat of a NATO split»
That to me seems a purely imaginary possibility, and if it were to happen it would be engineered by the USA opposition to Trump. Regardless I remember Obama's "pivot" away from Europe, and how cheered it was in the USA.
«to force Trump to reverse himself»
I have not seen much evidence of that except the delusional claims by TDS sufferers that Trump Always Chickens Out. My understanding is that Trump has a style of starting a debate by making outlandish demands in vulgar style and see how much of it sticks and then work with that.
«on many crucial issues, among them Greenland, tariffs,»
Far from crucial. People who read "mainstream" propaganda fail to notice that as fellow NATO member Germany sent 15 soldiers to help the danish army defend Greenland, and tariffs *worked* as a bludgeon because exporting state oligarchs cannot afford the risk, and anyhow they have been weakened by USA courts, not the begging of european governments.
«and Ukraine.»
Strange claim: currently the EU government are paying USA corporates to send weapons to Ukraine, while previously the USA government paid them. Even so it is the USA government and not the EU governments that is still in control of the ukrainian government (as much as a messy mob can be controlled).
«The EU elite is similar to the Israeli in wielding influence over its U.S. "master"»
Not even remotely, there is no American-European PAC, no EU-origin billionaires funding USA election campaigns, no legislation against anti-european hate speech, etc.
«A good example is Pakistan. [...] Another is Syria. [...]»
These are pawns of little consequences, semi-failed or failed states for sale to the bidder of the day. Besides both the liberal-globalist and the nationalist-consolidationist factions of the USA over overlapping interests as well as divergent ones, there is not much ideology in their conflict.
EU financial aid to Ukraine as of March 2025 totaled over $251 billion since the SMO began—more than twice U.S. amounts in the same period. Trump 2.0 has since cut U.S. assistance other than weapons (PURL itself was mostly pushed by the EU to prevent a U.S. cutoff of arms), so at this point the EU's share of Kiev has only grown. Kiev's black market ties in with this.
The current arms purchases benefit the EU and Ukraine's shared strategic aims more than it does America's, despite the largesse given U.S. contractors. At one point Europe feared a U.S.–Russia détente based on mineral rights at Kiev's expense. Lobbying and provocations successfully got Trump to distrust Putin before and after Anchorage.
There is no formal "European" lobby, but there is a globalist one. The globalists behind the EU are able to finance their own operations inside the U.S., including bribery. I suspect—but cannot prove—that the latter influenced court rulings against Trump's tariffs. EU money seeps through U.S. filters.
EU-based globalist pressure, exerted in part through NATO secretary Rutte, did force Trump to retreat from his maximal demands re: Greenland. The EU offered him a vague deal whose terms have not yet been disclosed; the fact that he is still talking about "buying" Greenland suggests Trump was conned.
The Iran war, just like the Ukraine show, exposes Trump's vacillation. First he promised to level all bridges and power plants were Iran to refuse his terms; he still has not done so, despite the breakdown in U.S.–Iran talks. Trump also violated his pledge to Putin that he would rein in Kiev.
I am not rabidly anti-Trump, but TDS is not always a form of delusion. It is based on a solid grasp of Trump's psychology that his base at times fails to recognize. Both his friends and foes inflate Trump's credentials. He neither boasts such acumen nor is as authoritarian as either side avers. He is also very manipulable.
On Wikipedia, which in 2026 is nothing more than a western influencer tool disguised as a public knowledge library, there are exactly 3 Russians who are portrayed as the flawless angel, walking perfection, outright genius. All other Russians are described as a distant, dubious, flawed, do-not-trust-them species.
One of the West's 3 flawless angels is Kirill Dmitriev. How come???????
" The financial filings, infrastructure plans, and military data prove that Western and Gulf powers had already mapped out their ideal economic futures. When Iran escalated the conflict in March 2026, these actors possessed the precise financial and legal scaffolding required to instantly turn the destruction into a lucrative restructuring exercise. The article successfully proves that the economic outcomes of the war were highly unequal and heavily premeditated"
I previously wrote that «the EU+UK oligarchs simply do not have the leverage to even pretend to be independent as they utterly depend on imports and exports controlled by the the USA military».
For a power to be independent the most obvious condition is that it must not be dependent on another power, that is it must be to a large degree autarkic. That does not mean that the suzerain country must be almost autarkic but that the empire as a whole must be almost autarkic and its internal supply lines must be defensible.
There is a tendency perhaps to confuse international power politics with diplomacy but diplomacy is just a fancy wrapper for international power politics, which is the continuation of war by other means, and power international power politics and war are based on resources (people, technology, raw materials) to a point where in the industrial war era it is easy to confuse logistics with strategy.
The USA government and understand not-dependence and logistics very well, here is how the WW2 strategic planners reasoned as to how wide a resource base the USA empire needed to have to confront a nazi Europe:
"To the Grand Area and Beyond: The Sudden Transformation of the United States’ Strategic Space" Stephen Wertheim August 23, 2023
«Starting in July 1940, CFR planners began to enlarge the United States’ strategic space, at first to the whole hemisphere. Alas, they deemed the Western Hemisphere an insufficient unit. It could not absorb large surpluses of agricultural goods that South America typically exported to Europe. Those surpluses mattered chiefly for geopolitical reasons, not because the planners were stringent free-marketeers and economic maximizers. Their basic aim was to map a postwar area that would be more economically self-sufficient than a projected Nazi-led greater Europe, meaning that the U.S.-led area would be less dependent on external trade. That way, the United States would possess superior bargaining power and keep its area cohesive during the indefinite armed truce expected to follow the war. Moreover, the planners, seeking to preserve liberal capitalism, wished to avoid regimenting the economy as a means of resolving trade imbalances. That left only one way to get rid of surplus goods: expand the area under U.S. protection.»
Someone else used the expression "lack of testicular fortitude" when I pointed out that the european elites learned the repeated lessons of WW1, WW2, Suez, Cold War 1, Libya, and have no appetite for being "color revolutioned" or "sanctioned" by the USA oligarchs. Contrary to the assumptions of many commenters online most of the EU elites do not like being vassals of the USA but seethe with resentment against them (none more so than the english elites) as they remember their grandparents were ruling large empires.
BTW I mentioned Libya because it is yet another example of a situation:
* The french government wanted to topple Gaddafi to switch Libya from italian to french influence and got UK help (like at Suez) and astonishingly also italian help (perhaps bribery?).
* Apparently this time they asked for USA permission and Obama consulted the Pentagon and told them to "go ahead if you really think that you can do this, I am laughing".
* The french, UK, italian military run out of ammunition etc. early as the Pentagon had predicted and had to beg Obama to intervene with USA aviation and do the job.
* The end result is that half of coastal Libya is under russian and half under turkish influence and the rest is a mess.
This is pretty standard European trajectory of grand aims though....start strong, very complex plan, talk a good game...at some point, things turn south. Again.
European strategy since 1917 has been to get Americans to do their fighting for them. Note how the europeans wail at the thought that the Americans may have lost interest in them..
The "middle powers" have a common goal, if not pursued homogeneously or consistently, and that is the removal or reduction of the US/USD hegemony so there is indeed an international law and order. Think about it: what if the USA had pursued all its goals through the UN? The US did not go that way because the US strategists and leaders knew for sure that their agenda could not have possibly gotten the majority of the UN members to concur. Therefore, the US was "forced" to take unilateral actions. In other words, I want to do this no matter what you think. How can other folks on Earth not pursue a common goal of reducing US influence?
«the removal or reduction of the US/USD hegemony so there is indeed an international law and order.»
I think that the oligarchs of "middle powers" would horrified if there real international law and order that would apply to them too and limit their sovereignty over their own possessions. What they fantasize is indeed "the removal or reduction of the US/USD hegemony" but is to play both sides (USA, PRC, RF) and get paid better for selling out their subjects.
«Think about it: what if the USA had pursued all its goals through the UN»
Think about it: count the numbers of U.N. general assembly members voting to denounce the DPR-LPR-RF reaction against the invading ukrainian forces, and the number of U.N. general assembly members voting to denounce the bombings of Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, Iran, etc.; also count the numbers of members sanctioning the RF and the PRC and those sanctioning the USA. In third world streets there are stalls selling t-shirts with the burning WTC towers and Osama's portrait, their governments "know better".
The U.N. was designed like all post-WW2 institutions as transmission belt of USA policy, but also as a harmless "letting off steam" forum for those denouncing USA policy, plus it has the inconvenient RF and PRC Security Council "vetos" so the USA oligarchs are ambiovalent about it, and prefer to use as transmission belts more "technical" international institutions like IMF, WB, WHO, or ad-hoc created ones.
Of course, if you want to find the imperfection to severe defects, no person is a saint, and certainly no country is without its own flaws and attempts to bully through difficult situations. "International law and order" will always be a relative term. You said the oligarchs in the "Middle Power" would be so and so. Actually, even the oligarchs in the "little potatoes" would be the same. How these oligarchs deal with their respective domestic issues is more or less nobody else's business. If we can get some sort of law and order between nation and nation, that would already be beyond the hope of many. PRC may be better than the US in the international arena, it does have problems with some of its neighbors. For example, China's mob societies operate in neighboring nations under the protection of China's public and national security devices. The fact that the world is not perfect does not dictate we should not make small improvements here and there.
«Actually, even the oligarchs in the "little potatoes" would be the same. How these oligarchs deal with their respective domestic issues is more or less nobody else's business.»
That was the westphalian principle and so in Europe Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, Luxembourg, Saint Marino still exist as "states" but in practice after WW2 empire suzerain states do interfere in the domestic affairs of their vassals (even if suzerainty is supposed to mean just control of defense and foreign issues) and even in the vassals of other (weaker) suzerain states.
«If we can get some sort of law and order between nation and nation, that would already be beyond the hope of many. [...] The fact that the world is not perfect does not dictate we should not make small improvements here and there.»
Indeed but the question is whether today's "middle powers" like Germany or Kazakhstan or India or Italy have the leverage to avoid vassalization or whether loud declamations made from tall platforms can only be posturing and their choice is simply how much of a fee their oligarch get for working for their suzerain.
For a mid-size country to claim "mid-power", it will have to do its homework. Singapore has a larger-than-life influence not just because of its geography, but also because it has been a well-managed country (up to the elder Lee, at least). People in Singapore, in general, push hard and take initiative. Not all similarly-sized countries can claim the same international influences. The same can be said for SK, Japan, and Taiwan. At one point, one could even cite Hong Kong.
As for the current Germany, there are indeed few levers for Germany to exercise. It has not been well managed, perhaps for a decade or more. It has run low on natural resources. Its once highly respected education system may not be as good as before. I don't know. But size and history do not give Germany any particular advantage. Location? Yes, Germany is still a crossroads and good for business. Then you have to compare Germany to Japan, and ask about the paths for both from before to after WW2.
Even the US, as the current hegemony, at one point in time indeed had a lot to boast, even if only all of its potential competitors were all buried under rubble. Had the US maintained its lead after WW2, nobody would be talking about whether the empire is into sunset today. However, it is always difficult for a person, an organization, or a nation to maintain high vigilance. Power and influence have to be earned, not granted just because "America is special".
«It’s veritably in Russia’s interests for there to be a Russian-German rapprochement that leads to the outcome that he described, yet that can only happen if Germany successfully practices the “Middle Power” strategy that Dmitriev inexplicably mocked.»
The idea that the "comprador" oligarchs of Germany have the cards (leverage) to pursue a "middle power" course can be considered at the same time a nice idea if it were possible and a ridiculously unlikely one.
That specifically for Germany; but in a broader perspective Dimitriev is not only assessing realistically the chances of "middle power" courses being tenable, he is doing something very much aligned with the main geopolitical strategy of the RF:
* The RF geopolitical strategy seems to be that each of the 3 major powers should stay out of each other's sphere of influence, so each can consolidate them. The RF government seems to have got the curious impression at Anchorage that the USA government have agreed.
* In particular it is in the interests of the RF oligarchs that the oligarchs of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iran, etc. do not pursue a "middle power" course; by recognizing that Germany is a vassal of the USA oligarchs Dimitriev is realistically not losing anything, and *may* be gaining some more chances that the USA government will respect the RF sphere of influence.
«In his words, “’Middle powers’ don’t have a coherent basis for alignment. [Their strategy] also isn’t borne out by reality, in our experience.” He continued: “We see an *upsurge* in desire for engagement with the United States, not a reduction. [...]”»
Totally unsurprised: after examples like Yugoslavia and Milosevic, Iraq and Hussein, Libya and Gaddafi, Panama and Noriega, Ukraine and Yanukovich, Venezuela and Maduro, Iran and Khamenei (and many more "interventions for democracy") and having seen venezuelan, russian, iranian oil tankers being attacked and seized in "freedom of navigation" operations, I guess they understand well whose "compradors" they should be if they want to avoid being "color revolutioned" and "sanctioned" and want to keep their oil and gas imports flowing and their exports going out. Very few oligarch classes see the oligarchs of Korea-north, Iran, Cuba as great examples.
As usual our author talks of "Russian Interests" as if they were a particularly useful concept for international power politics, like "Residents in the same timezone interests", or "Living within 100km from the Atlantic interests". Sure there is some commonality of interests but it is quite weak.
I reckon that in the modern era as a rule the same interest groupings that are useful to understand national power politics are also useful to understand international power politics; the modern era is not like the "golden age of diplomacy" during the Ancien Regime when both national and international politics were mainly based on personal allegiance to territorial-based dynasties.
Objectively speaking, as I explained, Russia's stated goal from Putin on down of eroding the US' unipolar hegemony over global affairs in order to facilitate the emerging of a Multipolar World Order isn't advanced by mocking countries -- including officially designated "unfriendly" ones -- that partake in balancing acts aimed at reducing US influence over them.
Denying this is dishonest and, judging by your quip about "as usual our author...", it seems like you have some problem with me due to my prior work and are therefore expressing it now after being upset by my latest piece. You're welcome to explain why Russia's interests are advanced by violating the policy above but I expect your explanation to be nonsensical.
«Russia's stated goal from Putin on down of eroding the US' unipolar hegemony over global affairs in order to facilitate the emerging of a Multipolar World Order»
I personally think that is just "aspirational verbiage" because it is an unrealistic ambition for the RF government to have, and I am pretty sure they know; they just use BRICS and multipolarity to look cool before the third-world street.
My understanding of the stated and often repeated goal of the RF government is to achieve respect of each other's spheres of influence and "near abroads" (and that is a reason why the RF government has little to say about Greenland or even Cuba or Venezuela). The Ukraine war was triggered not by Putin's goal «to facilitate the emerging of a Multipolar World Order» but by the USA government goal to interfere into the RF "near abroad" from 1993, 2004, and 2014 onwards.
«isn't advanced by mocking countries -- including officially designated "unfriendly" ones»
But is neither hindered by doing so. Germany is gone for good in 1991 and I think that fantasizing that Dimitriev's words can influence either way Germany's situation is not dishonest but delusional: whether the German oligarchs can afford to choose between being USA vassals or a playing both-sides "middle-power" does not depend on Dimitriev's encouragement or mockery, but on leverage, and Germany does not have that leverage.
What I think is that Dimitriev was not speaking about Germany but about Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc. in one of two possible ways:
* He was addressing the USA government to propose recognition of their "de facto" control of Germany, Italy, etc. in exchange for the recognition by the USA government of non-interference in the RF sphere of influence. That would be delusional because RF recognition of USA "de facto" control over their sphere of influence is worthless as the RF government has no means to interfere with it, but the USA oligarchs have plenty of leverage to interfere with RF sphere of influence, and one by one they have been shrinking it for 35 years.
* He was addressing indirectly the Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc. to suggest that just as the USA government have "de facto" control over their sphere of influence and are not going to let Germany play both sides, the RF government will not let their partners in their sphere of influence do the same. See Ukraine for belated proof.
«that partake in balancing acts aimed at reducing US influence over them.»
You may think that the German oligarchs etc. do that sincerely, but I think that it is all mere talk aimed at reducing *Trump's influence over the the USA* and they do so obediently as directed by the anti-Trump USA faction.
That is their pretend "balancing acts aimed at reducing US influence over them" are actually a demonstration of how deeply vassalized the german oligarchs are to USA interests, just not those of Trump's factions. The EU/NATO countries simply do not have the leverage to disobey the USA oligarchs.
If the EU vassals wanted to de-vassalize themselve they would be spending enormous amounts to remove their dependence on USA controlled imports and exports (which is what the PRC government is trying to do slowly), instead they are making just loud proclamations and theatrical posturing, and it is all anti-Trump.
RUSSIA the nuclear Super Power is wha matters. All the lower level arguements count for little. The 2 level of arguements are just that One is talk talk the other is what really matters.
It's really difficult to understand the true political context of Poutine . And it's ironic to see those who said he is a tyrant who submit everybody.
What I can say is that Poutine, and Russia , is loosing all the sympathies he build in West
So, Andrew, I understand why nobody important in Russia never contacted you. What faction could have do that? The turbo patriots? You are a foreigner, they will never trust you. The Lavrov gang chinese lovers? You're pro Indian, you love Poland and you don't like too much China and even less Iran. They prefer Escobar or Johnson. People who are ready to tell everything they want.
The west lovers? You are a Yankee who loves Russia. They prefer Yankees who despise Russia because they deeply despise Russia too.
So? What faction can call you?
My only point in relating that the other day was to highlight the incongruity between how the West (and presumably the East as I’m India, China, Turkiye, etc.) treats probably reliable, well-informed, and credentialed foreigners.
Most Russian experts and related foreign policy officials either lie to themselves and/or to their superiors that “everything is going according to plan”, and that’s what they want to hear from whomever they request to share insight with them.
As for being foreigner, well there are many foreign-born experts in the US who’ve risen to the top of the think tank hierarchy. Regarding India, it’s officially supposed to be Russia’s “special and privileged” strategic partner, but it’s unofficially highly encouraged nowadays to harshly criticize — even malign — it as proven by what the top NRPR: do with full approval.
Russian experts in general think that Poland is a US puppet without any autonomy, ambition, nor capabilities, something to be talked over and not talked with. I very much doubt this would change. Others here have very perceptibly begun a new infowar campaign since last year blaming the Nazis for Katyn and inadvertently whitewashing the OUN by grossly exaggerating the situation with Ukrainians in interwar Poland.
The consequence is that they’re blinded to the role that Poland is playing in the emerging European security architecture to their detriment, but as I’ve learned from Russians here over the years, “not your country, not your problem” (despite my 13 years here, probably reliability, false implication by US intel in summer 2020 in a fake GRU election meddling scandal, owning my apartment, my wife and two kids being Russian citizens, and my entire life savings being in rubles).
Honestly, I don’t even want to go out of my way and advise anyone on anything anymore even if someone asked: “not my country, not my problem”, and I’m not going to tell anyone what they want to hear. I always try my best to accurately analyze whatever it is that I’m writing about, and they can rely on that, but I truly do feel nowadays that it’s “not my country, not my problem”.
It’s been 4.5 years, Darras, and they footed an enormous bill to fly all those other folks out here, lodge them, and presumably remunerate them for their time when it wouldn’t have cost anything for me to meet someone for a coffee. I also know from various sources that public association with me has been taboo for some, though they never gave me a clear answer why.
I have a macabre fascination generally being right with my warnings about latent threats, them never being listened to, and then watching the “Cassandra Curse” unfold over and over again. I console myself that maybe one day someone will come along who’ll try to discover why so much went off the rails and they’ll discover my work and learn about how I’ve de facto been “blacklisted”.
They can keep their collection of clowns, I as a self-respecting person can’t publicly associate with them at the same event, especially not those who’ve publicly defamed me I worked 1,278 consecutive days too from 24 February 2022 to 24 August 2025 publishing unique analyses daily from the perspective of the Russian School of Geopolitics. I’ve done my part, and what I’ve done put to shame every single person in this field (NRPRs) who presents themselves as my “peer”.
The cultural shock of being a Germanic-raised person with a solid work ethic at the center of my life seeing how I seriously many experts here take their jobs amidst what their government has presented as an “existential conflict” (and which I truly believe it is to a large degree is unforgettable and instilled within me the belief that Germanics and Russians are fundamentally different people (I still enjoy living with Russians more than with any other group but I have zero interest engaging with Russian experts anymore).
The way it works in the West, and it’s all public and not secret whatsoever, is that relevant foreigners with much-needed insight into sensitive matters are invited to contribute to think tanks, journals, conferences, etc., share their views with various figures of significance, and then they remain part of the “ideational infrastructure”.
It’s a relatively smooth transition and usually begins even before they finish their studies (most gifted foreigners or those with insight arrive around university age). This is especially so amidst long-running conflicts like the “Global War On Terror” for the US.
To be sure, I do occasionally meet and discuss things with various folks, but it’s inconsequential, we both know it, I just like to believe that maybe I’m helping out somehow. In my experience, the private or at least semi-private sector (as in companies, including those in which the state owns shares) are much, much more proactive and interested in learning as much as they can than anything that’s purely owned by the state (like 99% of think tanks here).
If businesses don’t have the right insight into regional trends, they’ll lose money, thus dealing a direct blow to their owners and shareholders; if the state messes up, there are indeed tangible consequences, but they only rarely affect actual people in the bureaucracy who are responsible (post-Stalin Russia isn’t known for accountability).
I'd also like to add that my MFA-run MGIMO PhD in Political Science is on Russian-Pakistani relations, the subject of which is admittedly niche but represented at the time the last remaining piece of Russia's "Greater Eurasian Partnership" (GEP) puzzle that had yet to discovered by Russian diplomacy.
Humbly speaking, I personally accelerated their rapprochement through my proactive engagements at the time with the Pakistani Embassy here, which led to me being hosted by the National Defense University on five occasions to discuss bilateral relations, Hybrid Warfare, and other such topics.
By my late 20s, I was already informally advising parts of the Pakistani Government in a purely personal and unremunerated capacity (they'd pay for my flights and lodging but I always had meetings, interviews, and events planned, I obviously wasn't vacationing in Islamabad).
I did this due to wanting to advance this element of Russia's explicitly stated policy -- the GEP -- since I didn't have the Old Cold War-era Afghan War-related baggage that Russians and Pakistanis had, which was hindering their rapprochement, and I therefore injected totally fresh thinking into this.
Through my work, which I crystallized in my PhD (essentially the elaboration of my vision that I shared in 2015-2017 and developed in the years since), I laid the blueprint for a lot of what's presently unfolding between them, albeit in a totally different geostrategic context than anyone expected.
The "Pakistan experts" that Russia has are mostly language specialists or historians, very few have any understanding of contemporary Pakistan, let alone during the "anomaly" of former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan, who's since been persecuted and jailed on political charges.
What I accomplished during the five trips that I took to Islamabad from 2017-2019 was to personally help take ties to the next level by sharing a unique vision of bilateral relations centered on Eurasian integration via Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, and Iran.
Absolutely nobody had ever thought of that before in the way that I expressed it, yet there was absolutely ZERO support here in Russia -- if anything, some people pushed back against it, some politely and others less so -- but I carried out for the good of Russia and multipolarity.
After April 2022's post-modern coup against Khan, I severed my ties with Pakistan in protest of the pro-US de facto military dictatorship's persecution of him personally and his opposition party, people with whom I shared a lot of similar ideas and thus felt kindred feelings towards.
I couldn't in good conscience continue voluntarily advising a foreign government that just carried out a pro-US coup against a multipolar, Russian-friendly leader and was now on the brink of -- as was later proven from leaked documents -- arming Ukraine to kill Russians.
That could also have entailed SIGNIFICANT legal risks for me here in Russia in the SMO context, keeping in mind that I had ABSOLUTELY ZERO state support here for what I was doing despite telling Sputnik in the past and then MGIMO about my trips, etc., just to keep them in the loop.
There were NEVER any so-called "debriefings", "coordination", "input", etc., if anything, there was only informal pushback from friends (whom I suspect shadowy figures passed along messages) to "reconsider" building bridges between Russia and Pakistan, etc., but I shrugged them off.
In any case, I finally received my MFA-run MGIMO PhD in Poli-Sci for my dissertation on Russian-Pakistani relations in September 2023 after carrying out certain revisions thereof as recommended at the defense from December 2022, which itself was held after a long delay.
Expert after expert refused to sit in on my defense DESPITE BEING REMUNERATED FOR THEIR TIME (!!!) for inexplicable reasons that I came to suspect had to do with what I later discovered to be my unofficial "blacklisting" for reasons that I can only speculate.
I was therefore grateful to those who turned up (perhaps unaware of this de facto "blacklist) and helped me finally receive the credentials that I deserved for my years of direct, media, analytical (I was already contributing to some Pakistani think tanks), and academic work.
I'm explaining all of this in detail to show you that I'm an indisputable expert on Russian-Pakistani relations, one of few in this country, in fact, and certainly the most recent person to have received my PhD credentials on this subject in September 2023, the timing of which is very important.
That's because the Russian Academy of Sciences held a major Russian-Pakistani conference, I think it was their first-ever or there was something unique about it that they marketed afterwards, yet it wasn't advertised in advance and I wasn't informed, including by my MFA-run university.
I was essentially uninvited to an event of national significance for Russia despite having all the credentials required to participate, and after looking at the guestlist once it was done and over with, my credentials in all respects surpassed many of the participants'.
That's when I knew for sure that I was unofficially "blacklisted" because that particular arm of the state, the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Affairs (at least one member of which declined to sit at my defense), chose not to invite me despite the fact that my presence could help Russia.
You'd likely never see anything similar in any other country, especially the West: even critics of whatever government it may be like I became of Pakistan are invited to US Government-organized events for at least presenting a respectfully expressed critical or contrarian take on things.
Yes, there are exceptions, but Pakistan isn't among them. Likewise, given how much pushback I'd received in the past for voluntarily pioneering the completion of Russia's GEP puzzle by directly helping to discover the last remaining Pakistani piece for Russian diplomacy, I thought I'd be invited.
Remember, I hadn't heard of it in advance, it wasn't widely (if at all) advertised as far as I was aware, my MFA-run alma mater from whom I just received my PhD on this particular subject didn't inform me, and at least one of the Oriental Institute's members declined to sit for my defense.
That's not the way that it's supposed to work worldwide in this professional sphere: if any analogue of mine was a provably friendly foreigner who just received a top state PhD on a specific subject, they'd absolutely be invited to contribute their insight in the "expert ecosystem", not "blacklisted".
Honestly, I feel like I have at least one "guardian angel" or more because I personally suspect that these people who deeply dislike me here (and that's indisputable since they'd rather "cut their nose to spite their face" by excluding me from events about that which I specialize) want me gone.
My MFA-recognized expertise on this subject could have directly benefited Russia -- it benefited Pakistan by positively reshaping its perceptions of Russia and presenting an actionable blueprint for the future of bilateral ties and thus indirectly helped Russia -- but Russia didn't want it.
Imagine how it feels to have devoted eight years of a your life, 2015-2023, to a cause -- in this case Russian-Pakistani relations -- and receive top state recognition of your expertise only to right then after be "blacklisted" (I suspect I was "blacklisted" earlier in fact) and excluded from expert talks.
I still feel passionate about the subject as anyone who reads my work knows, but the example inadvertently set by me should make Russian-friendly foreigners think twice about dedicating years of their life to this country's causes (in my case GEP) because they too can be "blacklisted" .
It's therefore bittersweet that (as my recent work has drawn attention to) top Russian officials are hinting that arms and terrorists enter Afghanistan from Pakistan (they're obviously not coming from Central Asia, China, or Iran!) and the US military might re-enter the region from it too.
I'd been shouting from the rooftops since shortly after April 2022's post-modern coup against Khan that this new de facto pro-US military dictatorship was going to do something like this but Russia's experts had now flip-flopped on Pakistan and completely trusted it.
I suspect that's part of the reason why I had such internal bureaucratic challenges at MGIMO at the end regarding my defense because the "official narrative" radically flip-flopped from "Pakistan is an adversary with which only limited contact is acceptable" to "Pakistan should be fully trusted".
I was ahead of the curve in personally pioneering this final part of Russia's GEP and was ahead of the curve in foreseeing that Pakistan would create problems for Russia in Afghanistan once more, in part at the US' behest (but not entirely), and Russian experts' egos are too big to admit that.
They're also a very different type of person who mostly looks like down on those who used to work in media like I worked at Sputnik (I met many during in-personal weekly interviews for a program I used to co-host) so they don't even see us as the same professional class in fact.
Add to it that they rarely ever publish anything at variance with the "official narrative" and pathologically fear being associated with anyone like me that does, and it makes perfect sense in hindsight why they "blacklisted" me at the expense of Russia's objective national interests vis-a-vis Pakistan.
And this in spite of my being a MFA-recognized expert on the subject who one would have automatically assumed would be invited into the "expert ecosystem" per protocol the world over after earning this accolade, yet nope, cultural factors (predictably in hindsight) got in the way, again.
To make it even more surreal, I was already part of the "expert ecosystem" in Pakistan and was very honored to be as well, but which I quietly removed myself from in protest of what happened.
This entire time, not a single person here in Russia was interested in what I was doing even though I was very open about wanting to meet with others to discuss ways of expanding bilateral cooperation via my model.
By global standards, I was and still am an indisputable expert on Pakistan (even more so today due to my Russian MFA-recognized PhD on bilateral relations), and I could have probably moved to Pakistan if I wanted to.
That wasn't something that I was interested in for many reasons, but what I'm saying is that my ties with the NDU -- which were always very gracious hosts! -- could have turned into a professorship for example.
Not only that, but from there I could have engaged with a wide array of global experts (many attended the events that I participated in, and I once even chaired a major event there too, which was a high honor!).
That's something that I've always wanted to do, share insight with my actual peers (not these uncredentialed and unexperienced podcasters that Russia passes off as "experts"), but it wasn't meant to be.
I admittedly thought more highly of Russia's expert community and relevant structures like the Institute of Oriental Studies and MFA than they deserved and learned my lesson the hard way.
I personally suspect that my "blacklisting" is due to a combination of incompetence, petty jealousy, and -- in RARE cases! -- ethno-national bigotry against me as an American-Pole with a "Ukrainian" surname.
Regarding the first, I now know how incompetent many experts are and that there isn't any "talent scouting" here unlike in the West. Most simply can't recognize talent due to bureaucratic cultural factors.
As for the second, my consecutive 1,278-day work in support of Russia from 24 February 2022-24 August 2025 inadvertently made them all look bad by comparison (they also took vacations while I worked).
And finally, some people here just cannot accept that a non-ethnic Russian and at least a non-citizen can in some ways analyze aspects relating to Russian policy better than they can, and they hate me for it.
Again, I've made my peace with it and nowadays write with the triple goal in mind of informing average folks, foreign experts, and maybe the rare Russian expert of what I truly believe to be happening.
The first two categories read my work regularly while I assume that maybe once in a while a member of the last one stumbles upon it randomly, such as when Russian outlets translate and republish it.
About that, it'll never cease to amaze me how I'm de facto "blacklisted" by Russian experts and the like while Russian media sometimes make my analyses go viral here in Russia.
That's one of the reasons why I've concluded that this years-long "blacklisting" is some personal grudge that some unknown high-level folks have against me for who-knows-what but likely due to my work.
It's obviously not being perfectly implemented and those who defy it aren't punished since some of the same outlets occasionally translate, republish, and help my work go viral here in Russia.
That said, having an analysis go viral isn't the same as participating in expert discussions, including informal ones, so what I long ag hoped to achieve with my work remains beyond reach.
I wouldn't even grab it if it finally came within reach because the disrespect afforded to me by the years-long "blacklist" is too much for a self-respecting person like me to accept.
Russian experts will therefore only have access to my published materials, they won't receive personal briefings, except for those few with whom I'm already in contact with and who defy the "blacklist".
Why would I inconvenience my busy self and disrespect myself too by running to advise the same groups that "blacklisted" me just because they hypothetically lift it as if I'm some little puppy desperate for love?
I'm certain that most people would, they'd get such an ego trip out of it, but while I respect these people's positions and the roles that their groups play in helping Russia, I don't respect them personally.
That doesn't mean that I'd disrespect them, but I'm not going out of my way to help anyone. Also, the "blacklist" encouraged some top NRPRs to publicly defame me, and I can't forgive them for that.
So much has happened over the years and I've had so much "personal development" as some could call it that I just want to continue writing analyses, advising my small circle of expert friends, and that's it.
I'm content to continue watching the "Cassandra Curse" unfold with macabre fascination as in a sense living out the Stanczyk role for the rest of my life without any regrets whatsoever at all:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sta%C5%84czyk_(painting)
One more point just to hammer home how anomalous my situation has been, I've done "everything right" in every single way:
1. MGIMO MA
2. Voice of Russia internship that turned into a Sputnik job before graduation
3. Contributions to top Russian think tanks (before the "blacklisting", which I believe came into effect after I left Sputnik in 2019 and might have speculatively played a role in their decision not to retain my job amidst their restructuring at the time
4. MGIMO PhD
5. Freelancing for Chinese media from 2019-2022, the media of Russia's top strategic partner
6. Personally pioneering the acceleration of the Russian-Pakistani rapprochement from 2015-2023 and especially from 2017-2019 when I visited Islamabad a total of five times to lecture at NDU and do other associated things for advancing this goal explicitly aligned with Russia's GEP
7. Applied for permanent residency, bought an apartment, married a Russian citizen, have two kids who are Russian citizens, and converted my entire life savings into rubles, not to mention staying here during the SMO with all the growing restrictions instead of leaving like many foreigners and even some Russians have
8. Publishing daily analyses from the Russian School of Geopolitical Thought for 1,278 consecutive days (3.5 years) without a break till I fell ill from exhaustion despite the death of my grandfather who raised me as the son he never had, buying an apartment, moving into my new apartment, completing various bureaucratic tasks associated with now owning an apartment, getting married (we chose not to honeymoon out of solidarity with the troops since we felt guilty celebrating too much during the ongoing SMO -- compare that to Russian experts vacationing all across the world during the same time!!!), the birth of my son, finishing my PhD (including defending it), seasonal and occasional illnesses, and occasionally meeting with the handful of Russian experts who gratefully appreciate my input on various matters (though it never translated into policy and they don't feel comfortable publicly associating with me due to the suspected "blacklist"), et al.
So if someone like me ends up "blacklisted", then it can happen to anyone, yet they lack such self-awareness here that they don't realize what an indictment my example is of their expert system that someone who devotes over 1/3 of their life (13 years and I just turned 38 in May) to this country ends up "blacklisted", and not only that, maliciously defamed by some top NRPRs, one of whom even went as far as to try to persuade a top diplomat who's in an X chat group (doesn't contribute but remains a member and occasionally reads it since they "liked" a post there before) that I'm an "Israeli spy in Russia" for the purpose of manipulating the security services into destroying my life and my innocent family's, none of whom did anything wrong since we're not "spies" or anything else, just average people.
I truly enjoy living here, and I'd rather live with Russians than with anyone else since they're very easy to live with (their bureaucracy is another matter though! lol), but I still struggle to this day with either remaining proud of all that I've done given my Germanic upbringing or regretting that I ever took my work anywhere near as seriously as I did after all that's happened. It's sincerely a mix: I'm proud of it and would do it again, but I wouldn't have any of the expectations that I did (which were based on GLOBAL STANDARDS in this profession and the FALSE ASSUMPTION that Russia respected them!) of meaningfully helping Russia in the way that all other fellow experts the world over expect to help the countries in which they live.
I would have probably still done the same level of work but without the emotional attachment thereto that I had up until a few years ago. I might also not have worked for 1,278 consecutive days in solidarity with Russia and also to show that anyone can be Russian-friendly, even someone with my identity profile as an American-Pole with partial "Old Rus" ("Ukrainian") ancestry (the point of which I still to this day maintain helps Russia's overall cause but which is utterly unappreciated among those that matter here). I still support Russia and its global causes, but I wish that I had learned long ago, and not the hard way either, that it's "not my country, not my problem", and "don't help if they don't ask for it" (especially regarding my proven contributions to improving Russian-Pakistani relations).
«It's really difficult to understand the true political context of Poutine»
For me it is not difficult to understand his constraints: a limited power base, the need to compose conflicts of interests among powerful factions, and sad awareness of how weak the RF is.
What many people forget is that after the CW1 defeat "the west" bribed everybody who was anybody in the ex-USSR and bought all the secrets of the ex-USSR, for very small amounts too. They found that the USSR was much weaker than they expected (no surprise after the devastations of (WW1, civil war, WW2). The RF is much smaller and spends a lot less of GDP than the ex-USSR on military, and is much weaker than the ex-USSR was (also because of the devastation of the 1990s).
https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2022/03/the-universal-boosting-of-putin/
«Back in the days when I was one of the British state’s more efficient functionaries, I spoke with British officers who had been in Russia during the Yeltsin period, when they had been able to get up close and effectively inventory the Russian armed forces. (For those who don’t know, I was First Secretary at the British Embassy in Warsaw, I was British Ambassador in Tashkent, and I was taught to be fluent in both Polish and Russian, which included living in St Petersburg as a language student while Ambassador designate).
What we (as I was then a cog in this machine) found was that the strength of the Soviet Union’s Red Army had been massively exaggerated in all our intelligence estimates, on which defence strategy had been based for decades. We had over-estimated the numbers, the mobility and above all the capability of Soviet weapons systems. Much of it was barely functional; the problems with both quality and maintenance were not just the product of the disintegration of the Soviet system, they evidently went back decades.»
Reason why USSR never ever had a plan to invade western Europe. It was, again, a lie of USA and european "elites".
During the Glasnost and Perestroika, when Fooly Gorby opened every archives of USSR , the western academics were astonished by discovering that fact and also that all the correspondances between generals showed rather that they were terrified to be attacked by NATO.
Yes. The propaganda worked and remains an article of faith.
Nicely done, Andrew!
I'v pointed this out before about Dimitriev, but it bears saying again. He moved to the US in his youth and received a BA in economics from Standord University, then an MBA from Harvard's Business School. He then went to work for the financial giant, Goldman Sachs, and later was involed in investment funds.
If anyone doesn't think he was at least approached by the CIA, I've got a bridge to sell in the Sahara Desert!
I find it hard to believe he isn't a CIA assett in some way.
Furthermore, he's a through and through vulture capitalist. To me, that says a lot about the liberal, western-leaning Capitalist class in Russia, i.e. money driven Oligarchs, corporations, and other liberals in and outside the government. It is money that is keeping the war in Ukraine, and all wars, going. Millions die, while business profits.
His assertion that "middle-power" politics is incoherent also does not make sense, given that one of Russia's premier partners, India, has followed a very coherent "middle-power" road for decades. Middle-tier powers often advance multipolar forms of non-alignment.
If Dmitriev sees international relations as zero-sum, then he should not be so incoherent himself (by alternately hailing and dismissing "middle-power" politics). Also, being a middle power by necessity means engagement with the U.S. as well as other great powers, so his angst seems misplaced.
«one of Russia's premier partners, India, has followed a very coherent "middle-power" road for decades.»
The indian government has tried like the english or italian etc. ones to do a both-sides policy, but they are far too dependent on USA corporations as customers and on USA controlled supply routes, plus the USA governments have been actively supporting indian nuclear proliferation efforts. When Trump snapped the whip of tariffs the indian government promptly "aligned".
«Middle-tier powers often advance multipolar forms of non-alignment.»
No doubt the oligarchs of middle-tier powers would like to play both sides without any pushback from the suzwerain of their sphere of influence but that would require that westphalian logic were still respected, but they know that within spheres of influences there is no westphalian logic.
Dmitriev wrote that “The EU/UK’s faulty ‘middle power’ strategy started to freak out the US. EU/UK vassals should know their place.”
Stop kidding yourself europeans know they are puppets, slaves and vassals and what's more, they like being puppets, vassals and slaves.
Just as the dog doesn’t really want the responsibilities of being master.
«discredit the “Middle Power” strategy and his championing of the US’ military presence around the world challenges Russian interests»
What challenges "Russian interests is real power to "color revolution", invade, bomb, seize, sanction, not mere words by Colby or Dimitriev, it is not a debate based on the cleverest arguments. When "Russia" has a list of successes at doing those things as the USA oligarch maybe it will be.
«Dmitriev wrote that “The EU/UK’s faulty ‘middle power’ strategy started to freak out the US. EU/UK vassals should know their place.”»
Nothing strange here: Dimitriev knows that the EU+UK oligarchs simply do not have the leverage to even pretend to be independent as they utterly depend on imports and exports controlled by the the USA military, and have huge pro-USA-oligarch fifth columns. There is no point in pretending otherwise.
«He then quoted the Financial Times’ chief foreign affairs commentator, Gideon Rachman, who posed a critical question to Elbridge asking whether he realizes that countries are experimenting with this approach due to the newfound threats that they perceive from the US.»
Rachman and the FT are proudly and explicitly on the side of the globalist-financialist faction so they cooperate in the conceit that the current EU+UK oligarchs are really trying to be semi-independent "middle powers" even if the don't have the cards (leverage) to do so; I reckon that their pretending to do that is because they are as subordinate as ever to the USA globalist-financialist faction that is using them to oppose Trump and the nationalist-consolidationist faction with the "Trump is giving Europe away to his boss Putin" argument.
I would argue that the EU has used the threat of a NATO split to force Trump to reverse himself on many crucial issues, among them Greenland, tariffs, and Ukraine. The EU elite is similar to the Israeli in wielding influence over its U.S. "master", turning its weakness into a means of control.
A good example is Pakistan. The current military regime was installed by "liberal-globalist" Western factions (2022) to serve as the lynchpin of an "Islamic NATO" allied to Ukraine. It has refused to help Trump attack Iran (though it has extended diplomatic aid) while secretly arming Kiev.
Yet today Trump is a major sponsor of Islamabad—whose regime is a byproduct of his ideological foes. The case of Pakistan shows that "liberal-globalist" trend-setters are in charge and able to force Trump to adopt their policy (until they change it yet again to pressure him).
Another is Syria. The ouster of Assad was spearheaded by "liberal-globalist" agents in league with Turkish–Qatari Islamists and Ukrainian mercenaries. The EU quickly lifted sanctions on Syria, while Trump initially was slow to deal with HTS leader Jolani (but shifted due to pressure).
«I would argue that the EU has used the threat of a NATO split»
That to me seems a purely imaginary possibility, and if it were to happen it would be engineered by the USA opposition to Trump. Regardless I remember Obama's "pivot" away from Europe, and how cheered it was in the USA.
«to force Trump to reverse himself»
I have not seen much evidence of that except the delusional claims by TDS sufferers that Trump Always Chickens Out. My understanding is that Trump has a style of starting a debate by making outlandish demands in vulgar style and see how much of it sticks and then work with that.
«on many crucial issues, among them Greenland, tariffs,»
Far from crucial. People who read "mainstream" propaganda fail to notice that as fellow NATO member Germany sent 15 soldiers to help the danish army defend Greenland, and tariffs *worked* as a bludgeon because exporting state oligarchs cannot afford the risk, and anyhow they have been weakened by USA courts, not the begging of european governments.
«and Ukraine.»
Strange claim: currently the EU government are paying USA corporates to send weapons to Ukraine, while previously the USA government paid them. Even so it is the USA government and not the EU governments that is still in control of the ukrainian government (as much as a messy mob can be controlled).
«The EU elite is similar to the Israeli in wielding influence over its U.S. "master"»
Not even remotely, there is no American-European PAC, no EU-origin billionaires funding USA election campaigns, no legislation against anti-european hate speech, etc.
«A good example is Pakistan. [...] Another is Syria. [...]»
These are pawns of little consequences, semi-failed or failed states for sale to the bidder of the day. Besides both the liberal-globalist and the nationalist-consolidationist factions of the USA over overlapping interests as well as divergent ones, there is not much ideology in their conflict.
EU financial aid to Ukraine as of March 2025 totaled over $251 billion since the SMO began—more than twice U.S. amounts in the same period. Trump 2.0 has since cut U.S. assistance other than weapons (PURL itself was mostly pushed by the EU to prevent a U.S. cutoff of arms), so at this point the EU's share of Kiev has only grown. Kiev's black market ties in with this.
The current arms purchases benefit the EU and Ukraine's shared strategic aims more than it does America's, despite the largesse given U.S. contractors. At one point Europe feared a U.S.–Russia détente based on mineral rights at Kiev's expense. Lobbying and provocations successfully got Trump to distrust Putin before and after Anchorage.
There is no formal "European" lobby, but there is a globalist one. The globalists behind the EU are able to finance their own operations inside the U.S., including bribery. I suspect—but cannot prove—that the latter influenced court rulings against Trump's tariffs. EU money seeps through U.S. filters.
EU-based globalist pressure, exerted in part through NATO secretary Rutte, did force Trump to retreat from his maximal demands re: Greenland. The EU offered him a vague deal whose terms have not yet been disclosed; the fact that he is still talking about "buying" Greenland suggests Trump was conned.
The Iran war, just like the Ukraine show, exposes Trump's vacillation. First he promised to level all bridges and power plants were Iran to refuse his terms; he still has not done so, despite the breakdown in U.S.–Iran talks. Trump also violated his pledge to Putin that he would rein in Kiev.
I am not rabidly anti-Trump, but TDS is not always a form of delusion. It is based on a solid grasp of Trump's psychology that his base at times fails to recognize. Both his friends and foes inflate Trump's credentials. He neither boasts such acumen nor is as authoritarian as either side avers. He is also very manipulable.
I am truely fed-up with his always-grinning mask.
On Wikipedia, which in 2026 is nothing more than a western influencer tool disguised as a public knowledge library, there are exactly 3 Russians who are portrayed as the flawless angel, walking perfection, outright genius. All other Russians are described as a distant, dubious, flawed, do-not-trust-them species.
One of the West's 3 flawless angels is Kirill Dmitriev. How come???????
misplaced....
" The financial filings, infrastructure plans, and military data prove that Western and Gulf powers had already mapped out their ideal economic futures. When Iran escalated the conflict in March 2026, these actors possessed the precise financial and legal scaffolding required to instantly turn the destruction into a lucrative restructuring exercise. The article successfully proves that the economic outcomes of the war were highly unequal and heavily premeditated"
https://morganc000.substack.com/p/strait-theatre
I previously wrote that «the EU+UK oligarchs simply do not have the leverage to even pretend to be independent as they utterly depend on imports and exports controlled by the the USA military».
For a power to be independent the most obvious condition is that it must not be dependent on another power, that is it must be to a large degree autarkic. That does not mean that the suzerain country must be almost autarkic but that the empire as a whole must be almost autarkic and its internal supply lines must be defensible.
There is a tendency perhaps to confuse international power politics with diplomacy but diplomacy is just a fancy wrapper for international power politics, which is the continuation of war by other means, and power international power politics and war are based on resources (people, technology, raw materials) to a point where in the industrial war era it is easy to confuse logistics with strategy.
The USA government and understand not-dependence and logistics very well, here is how the WW2 strategic planners reasoned as to how wide a resource base the USA empire needed to have to confront a nazi Europe:
https://strategicspace.nbr.org/to-the-grand-area-and-beyond-the-sudden-transformation-of-the-united-states-strategic-space/
"To the Grand Area and Beyond: The Sudden Transformation of the United States’ Strategic Space" Stephen Wertheim August 23, 2023
«Starting in July 1940, CFR planners began to enlarge the United States’ strategic space, at first to the whole hemisphere. Alas, they deemed the Western Hemisphere an insufficient unit. It could not absorb large surpluses of agricultural goods that South America typically exported to Europe. Those surpluses mattered chiefly for geopolitical reasons, not because the planners were stringent free-marketeers and economic maximizers. Their basic aim was to map a postwar area that would be more economically self-sufficient than a projected Nazi-led greater Europe, meaning that the U.S.-led area would be less dependent on external trade. That way, the United States would possess superior bargaining power and keep its area cohesive during the indefinite armed truce expected to follow the war. Moreover, the planners, seeking to preserve liberal capitalism, wished to avoid regimenting the economy as a means of resolving trade imbalances. That left only one way to get rid of surplus goods: expand the area under U.S. protection.»
Europeans like being slaves.
«Europeans like being slaves.»
Someone else used the expression "lack of testicular fortitude" when I pointed out that the european elites learned the repeated lessons of WW1, WW2, Suez, Cold War 1, Libya, and have no appetite for being "color revolutioned" or "sanctioned" by the USA oligarchs. Contrary to the assumptions of many commenters online most of the EU elites do not like being vassals of the USA but seethe with resentment against them (none more so than the english elites) as they remember their grandparents were ruling large empires.
BTW I mentioned Libya because it is yet another example of a situation:
* The french government wanted to topple Gaddafi to switch Libya from italian to french influence and got UK help (like at Suez) and astonishingly also italian help (perhaps bribery?).
* Apparently this time they asked for USA permission and Obama consulted the Pentagon and told them to "go ahead if you really think that you can do this, I am laughing".
* The french, UK, italian military run out of ammunition etc. early as the Pentagon had predicted and had to beg Obama to intervene with USA aviation and do the job.
* The end result is that half of coastal Libya is under russian and half under turkish influence and the rest is a mess.
This is pretty standard European trajectory of grand aims though....start strong, very complex plan, talk a good game...at some point, things turn south. Again.
European strategy since 1917 has been to get Americans to do their fighting for them. Note how the europeans wail at the thought that the Americans may have lost interest in them..
The "middle powers" have a common goal, if not pursued homogeneously or consistently, and that is the removal or reduction of the US/USD hegemony so there is indeed an international law and order. Think about it: what if the USA had pursued all its goals through the UN? The US did not go that way because the US strategists and leaders knew for sure that their agenda could not have possibly gotten the majority of the UN members to concur. Therefore, the US was "forced" to take unilateral actions. In other words, I want to do this no matter what you think. How can other folks on Earth not pursue a common goal of reducing US influence?
«the removal or reduction of the US/USD hegemony so there is indeed an international law and order.»
I think that the oligarchs of "middle powers" would horrified if there real international law and order that would apply to them too and limit their sovereignty over their own possessions. What they fantasize is indeed "the removal or reduction of the US/USD hegemony" but is to play both sides (USA, PRC, RF) and get paid better for selling out their subjects.
«Think about it: what if the USA had pursued all its goals through the UN»
Think about it: count the numbers of U.N. general assembly members voting to denounce the DPR-LPR-RF reaction against the invading ukrainian forces, and the number of U.N. general assembly members voting to denounce the bombings of Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, Iran, etc.; also count the numbers of members sanctioning the RF and the PRC and those sanctioning the USA. In third world streets there are stalls selling t-shirts with the burning WTC towers and Osama's portrait, their governments "know better".
The U.N. was designed like all post-WW2 institutions as transmission belt of USA policy, but also as a harmless "letting off steam" forum for those denouncing USA policy, plus it has the inconvenient RF and PRC Security Council "vetos" so the USA oligarchs are ambiovalent about it, and prefer to use as transmission belts more "technical" international institutions like IMF, WB, WHO, or ad-hoc created ones.
Of course, if you want to find the imperfection to severe defects, no person is a saint, and certainly no country is without its own flaws and attempts to bully through difficult situations. "International law and order" will always be a relative term. You said the oligarchs in the "Middle Power" would be so and so. Actually, even the oligarchs in the "little potatoes" would be the same. How these oligarchs deal with their respective domestic issues is more or less nobody else's business. If we can get some sort of law and order between nation and nation, that would already be beyond the hope of many. PRC may be better than the US in the international arena, it does have problems with some of its neighbors. For example, China's mob societies operate in neighboring nations under the protection of China's public and national security devices. The fact that the world is not perfect does not dictate we should not make small improvements here and there.
«Actually, even the oligarchs in the "little potatoes" would be the same. How these oligarchs deal with their respective domestic issues is more or less nobody else's business.»
That was the westphalian principle and so in Europe Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, Luxembourg, Saint Marino still exist as "states" but in practice after WW2 empire suzerain states do interfere in the domestic affairs of their vassals (even if suzerainty is supposed to mean just control of defense and foreign issues) and even in the vassals of other (weaker) suzerain states.
«If we can get some sort of law and order between nation and nation, that would already be beyond the hope of many. [...] The fact that the world is not perfect does not dictate we should not make small improvements here and there.»
Indeed but the question is whether today's "middle powers" like Germany or Kazakhstan or India or Italy have the leverage to avoid vassalization or whether loud declamations made from tall platforms can only be posturing and their choice is simply how much of a fee their oligarch get for working for their suzerain.
For a mid-size country to claim "mid-power", it will have to do its homework. Singapore has a larger-than-life influence not just because of its geography, but also because it has been a well-managed country (up to the elder Lee, at least). People in Singapore, in general, push hard and take initiative. Not all similarly-sized countries can claim the same international influences. The same can be said for SK, Japan, and Taiwan. At one point, one could even cite Hong Kong.
As for the current Germany, there are indeed few levers for Germany to exercise. It has not been well managed, perhaps for a decade or more. It has run low on natural resources. Its once highly respected education system may not be as good as before. I don't know. But size and history do not give Germany any particular advantage. Location? Yes, Germany is still a crossroads and good for business. Then you have to compare Germany to Japan, and ask about the paths for both from before to after WW2.
Even the US, as the current hegemony, at one point in time indeed had a lot to boast, even if only all of its potential competitors were all buried under rubble. Had the US maintained its lead after WW2, nobody would be talking about whether the empire is into sunset today. However, it is always difficult for a person, an organization, or a nation to maintain high vigilance. Power and influence have to be earned, not granted just because "America is special".
«It’s veritably in Russia’s interests for there to be a Russian-German rapprochement that leads to the outcome that he described, yet that can only happen if Germany successfully practices the “Middle Power” strategy that Dmitriev inexplicably mocked.»
The idea that the "comprador" oligarchs of Germany have the cards (leverage) to pursue a "middle power" course can be considered at the same time a nice idea if it were possible and a ridiculously unlikely one.
That specifically for Germany; but in a broader perspective Dimitriev is not only assessing realistically the chances of "middle power" courses being tenable, he is doing something very much aligned with the main geopolitical strategy of the RF:
* The RF geopolitical strategy seems to be that each of the 3 major powers should stay out of each other's sphere of influence, so each can consolidate them. The RF government seems to have got the curious impression at Anchorage that the USA government have agreed.
* In particular it is in the interests of the RF oligarchs that the oligarchs of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iran, etc. do not pursue a "middle power" course; by recognizing that Germany is a vassal of the USA oligarchs Dimitriev is realistically not losing anything, and *may* be gaining some more chances that the USA government will respect the RF sphere of influence.
«In his words, “’Middle powers’ don’t have a coherent basis for alignment. [Their strategy] also isn’t borne out by reality, in our experience.” He continued: “We see an *upsurge* in desire for engagement with the United States, not a reduction. [...]”»
Totally unsurprised: after examples like Yugoslavia and Milosevic, Iraq and Hussein, Libya and Gaddafi, Panama and Noriega, Ukraine and Yanukovich, Venezuela and Maduro, Iran and Khamenei (and many more "interventions for democracy") and having seen venezuelan, russian, iranian oil tankers being attacked and seized in "freedom of navigation" operations, I guess they understand well whose "compradors" they should be if they want to avoid being "color revolutioned" and "sanctioned" and want to keep their oil and gas imports flowing and their exports going out. Very few oligarch classes see the oligarchs of Korea-north, Iran, Cuba as great examples.
«Russian Interests Aren’t Advanced»
As usual our author talks of "Russian Interests" as if they were a particularly useful concept for international power politics, like "Residents in the same timezone interests", or "Living within 100km from the Atlantic interests". Sure there is some commonality of interests but it is quite weak.
I reckon that in the modern era as a rule the same interest groupings that are useful to understand national power politics are also useful to understand international power politics; the modern era is not like the "golden age of diplomacy" during the Ancien Regime when both national and international politics were mainly based on personal allegiance to territorial-based dynasties.
Objectively speaking, as I explained, Russia's stated goal from Putin on down of eroding the US' unipolar hegemony over global affairs in order to facilitate the emerging of a Multipolar World Order isn't advanced by mocking countries -- including officially designated "unfriendly" ones -- that partake in balancing acts aimed at reducing US influence over them.
Denying this is dishonest and, judging by your quip about "as usual our author...", it seems like you have some problem with me due to my prior work and are therefore expressing it now after being upset by my latest piece. You're welcome to explain why Russia's interests are advanced by violating the policy above but I expect your explanation to be nonsensical.
«Russia's stated goal from Putin on down of eroding the US' unipolar hegemony over global affairs in order to facilitate the emerging of a Multipolar World Order»
I personally think that is just "aspirational verbiage" because it is an unrealistic ambition for the RF government to have, and I am pretty sure they know; they just use BRICS and multipolarity to look cool before the third-world street.
My understanding of the stated and often repeated goal of the RF government is to achieve respect of each other's spheres of influence and "near abroads" (and that is a reason why the RF government has little to say about Greenland or even Cuba or Venezuela). The Ukraine war was triggered not by Putin's goal «to facilitate the emerging of a Multipolar World Order» but by the USA government goal to interfere into the RF "near abroad" from 1993, 2004, and 2014 onwards.
«isn't advanced by mocking countries -- including officially designated "unfriendly" ones»
But is neither hindered by doing so. Germany is gone for good in 1991 and I think that fantasizing that Dimitriev's words can influence either way Germany's situation is not dishonest but delusional: whether the German oligarchs can afford to choose between being USA vassals or a playing both-sides "middle-power" does not depend on Dimitriev's encouragement or mockery, but on leverage, and Germany does not have that leverage.
What I think is that Dimitriev was not speaking about Germany but about Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc. in one of two possible ways:
* He was addressing the USA government to propose recognition of their "de facto" control of Germany, Italy, etc. in exchange for the recognition by the USA government of non-interference in the RF sphere of influence. That would be delusional because RF recognition of USA "de facto" control over their sphere of influence is worthless as the RF government has no means to interfere with it, but the USA oligarchs have plenty of leverage to interfere with RF sphere of influence, and one by one they have been shrinking it for 35 years.
* He was addressing indirectly the Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc. to suggest that just as the USA government have "de facto" control over their sphere of influence and are not going to let Germany play both sides, the RF government will not let their partners in their sphere of influence do the same. See Ukraine for belated proof.
«that partake in balancing acts aimed at reducing US influence over them.»
You may think that the German oligarchs etc. do that sincerely, but I think that it is all mere talk aimed at reducing *Trump's influence over the the USA* and they do so obediently as directed by the anti-Trump USA faction.
That is their pretend "balancing acts aimed at reducing US influence over them" are actually a demonstration of how deeply vassalized the german oligarchs are to USA interests, just not those of Trump's factions. The EU/NATO countries simply do not have the leverage to disobey the USA oligarchs.
If the EU vassals wanted to de-vassalize themselve they would be spending enormous amounts to remove their dependence on USA controlled imports and exports (which is what the PRC government is trying to do slowly), instead they are making just loud proclamations and theatrical posturing, and it is all anti-Trump.
RUSSIA the nuclear Super Power is wha matters. All the lower level arguements count for little. The 2 level of arguements are just that One is talk talk the other is what really matters.