Korybko To Fabrichnikov: Any Hypothetical Russian-Polish Talks Must Have A Realistic Agenda

A discussion about regional security aimed at reaching a post-war modus vivendi for positioning them to jointly lead the construction of a new security architecture is a much more realistic agenda than dividing Ukraine, coordinating against the EU, and Poland’s potential role in Sino-EU trade via Russia.

The “Russia In Global Affairs” (RIGA) journal published an article by Ilya Fabrichnikov, a member of the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, titled “A Time for Stranger Things: On the Prospects of Russia-Poland Relations”. This publication was founded by the aforementioned council on which Fabrichnikov sits, the Editor-in-Chief is Valdai Club’s Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov, and the Editorial Board is headed by Sergey Karaganov. It therefore suffices to say that RIGA directed at the Russian elite.

This explains the importance of Fabrichnikov proposing within its pages for Russia to reach out to Poland. Unlike the Russian people, the Russian elite tend to be as Polonophobic as the Polish elite are Russophobic, with each viciously hating the other for historical and political reasons. Nevertheless, Fabrichnikov argues that Russian interests in the emerging world order would be best served by entering into talks with Poland, which is true. The agenda that he proposed, however, is totally unrealistic.

He suggests that they discuss “not simply the post-war fate of Ukraine and the Ukrainian part of Kresy Wschodnie (Eastern Borderlands), but rather Poland’s key role in the post-war European Union” and its potential role as a hub for post-war Sino-EU trade via Russia. Although “Poland Finally Realizes The Geostrategic Challenge Posed By Ukraine”, namely as a German-backed rival for regional leadership (including over the Baltics), Poland won’t retake Western Ukraine for the five reasons that I listed here.

My aforesaid points still stand despite Putin recently claiming that Poland will one day do precisely that. Moving along to the second part of Fabrichnikov’s proposed agenda, conservative President Karol Nawrocki envisages reforming the EU as like elaborated here last November, not leaving it. As I explained here, talk about a “Polexit” only comes from the politically irrelevant fringe and is exploited by liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk to fearmonger about his rivals ahead of fall 2027’s next Sejm elections.

Regarding Fabrichnikov’s final point, no serious political force in Poland is interested in resuming pre-war trade with Russia, let alone expanding it to become a logistical hub for Sino-EU trade via Russia. Russian International Affairs Council expert on Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) Ksenia Smertina seemed to suggest here that former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki might be interested in this if he returns to power next year through his new party, Rozwój Plus (Development Plus), but that’s still very unlikely.

Instead of Fabrichnikov’s three proposed topics of discussion, none of which would result in Poland agreeing to any talks with Russia in the first place, the agenda should remain within the exclusive realm of regional security. If Poland succeeds in leading CEE and especially the Baltics, then any hypothetical crisis along NATO’s Eastern Flank would only escalate with Warsaw’s agreement due to its irreplaceable military and logistical role, thus enabling it to serve as the bloc’s main force for interfacing with Moscow.

I elaborated on my vision here in mid-July, which built upon my piece here from last November, concluding that they could reach a post-war modus vivendi that would then position them to jointly lead the construction of a new security architecture. Nawrocki is Poland’s Commander-in-Chief and thus the only person who could agree to anything of the sort, but seeing as how he didn’t rule out talking to Putin last September, Russian diplomats should inquire whether Nawrocki would indeed pick up if he called.