Poland can realistically lead the “cordon sanitaire’s” western flank and thus become European NATO’s main force for interfacing with Russia in the post-war period if it implements my three-step plan.
Poland’s Role In The Intermarium
Founder of the Ronin Club Józef Orzeł sparked a discussion among some Polish thought leaders with his interview to Radio Wnet wherein he proposed that Poland lead the establishment of an Intermarium Defense Pact between NATO’s Eastern Flank countries, the Scandinavian ones, and Turkiye. Sławomir Dębski, who’s one of Poland’s top foreign policy experts, critiqued Orzeł’s suggestion in a detailed post on X that highlighted its redundancies and inadvertent drawbacks while sharing his advice on the matter.
Editor of the popular Defence24 portal Wojciech Kozioł then added his proverbial two cents by reminding readers that his and senior editor Bartłomiej Wypartowicz’s book from earlier this year about “The War We Don’t Want” touched upon a similar regional security concept. As it turns out, I’ve written a lot on this subject as well, which can broadly be described as Poland’s role in the post-war European security architecture. I’d therefore like to contribute to this discussion among my compatriots.
I recently assessed that “Nawrocki Envisages Poland Playing The Leading Role in Containing Russia” by dint of its geography, nowadays commanding European NATO’s largest army, and recently becoming a $1 trillion economy that can afford continued large-scale military expenditures to this end. Almost a year ago, I wrote that “September 2025 Was The Most Eventful Month For Poland Since The End Of Communism” due to the 18 relevant geostrategic developments that I listed in my hyperlinked analysis.
In my view, the most effective means to the end of reviving Poland’s long-lost Great Power status in a contemporary context is leading the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI, whose post-war importance I elaborated on here) in parallel with reforming the EU like Nawrocki detailed his intent to do here. The ideal scenario is that Poland’s 3SI allies join it in the second-mentioned effort for maximum effect. Whether they do or not, however, the 3SI is the centerpiece of Poland’s post-war geostrategic planning.
That’s because its many connectivity projects have dual-use purposes as it relates to facilitating the flow of troops and equipment in the event of a crisis per the spirit of the “military Schengen” that Poland is formally a part of together with Germany and the Netherlands. In recent months, I realized that a “cordon sanitaire” had been established around Russia over the past year in which Poland currently plays the most important role in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE). I made mention of that here in late June.
The other fronts are the UK-led one in the increasingly merging Arctic-Baltic region, the Turkish-led one that’s opening up along Russia’s entire southern periphery through as a result of August 2025’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’s” (TRIPP) dual purpose as a NATO military logistics corridor, and the emerging Japanese-led front in Northeast Asia. Poland has three imperatives within this US-organized geostrategic construct that I’ll now enumerate.
Poland’s First Imperative: Surmount The German-Ukrainian Challenge To Poland’s Regional Leadership
The first is to maintain its position as the leader of CEE in the face of the German-backed challenge posed by Ukraine. This analysis here elaborates more on what’s meant by this. In brief, Germany wants to dominate the entire EU, in pursuit of which it must subjugate Poland through a combination of the EU and having Ukraine replace Poland’s envisaged leading role in CEE’s post-war regional security architecture. As explained here, the Baltic States are an important front in this competition.
Joint drone production facilities are being built there, and Ukraine has even proposed dispatching troops to those countries once the large-scale phase of its conflict with Russia ends. Nevertheless, “Poland Would Be The Baltic States’ Best Security Guarantor In NATO 3.0”, which would “ensure that Kiev doesn’t provoke a conflict with Russia that puts Poland in a difficult position and turn Poland into [NATO’s] main force for interfacing with Russia in the post-conflict period.”
Poland’s Second Imperative: Optimize Connectivity With The “Viking Bloc” & “Neo-Ottoman Empire”
The part about Poland becoming NATO’s main force for interfacing with Russia in the post-conflict period is the third imperative that’ll be touched upon in this analysis after describing the second one. That’s the need for Poland to integrate with the “Viking Bloc” in the Arctic-Baltic and the “Neo-Ottoman Empire” along Russia’s entire southern periphery through relevant 3SI dual-use connectivity projects. This analysis here talks about Polish-Swedish cooperation and this one here about Polish-Turkish cooperation.
Sweden has an interest in supporting neighboring Finland vis-à-vis Russia, while Finland and the Baltic States have an interest in supporting one another vis-à-vis Russia, which solidifies their “Viking Bloc”. Poland’s most direct interest is in supporting the Baltic States, especially neighboring Lithuania with which it shares the “Suwałki Gap/Corridor”, so this serves as the common ground for connecting its envisaged CEE “sphere of military-strategic influence” (for lack of a better word) with them.
The Baltic States can therefore serve as dual members of these sub-regional blocs that function as the western front of the “cordon sanitaire” around Russia. Sweden’s role in any contingency scenario vis-a-vis a conflict between their Baltic allies and Russia would initially be at sea while Poland’s would be on land through the Via Baltica and (long-delayed) Rail Baltica 3SI projects, but they might also converge on Kaliningrad. Any overwhelming attack on Kaliningrad, however, would likely result in a nuclear response.
As for Poland’s southern integrative role within the “cordon sanitaire”, military-strategic connectivity with Turkiye is cardinally dependent on Poland’s interwar Romanian ally as the mainland-maritime bridge between them, access to which is dependent on Hungary and Slovakia as regards fellow NATO allies. Ukraine is excluded from the Intermarium model due to the ongoing dispute and not being a mutual defense ally like those countries are. Of these three NATO allies, Romania is the most important.
The rationale goes beyond the geostrategic one above and extends to the country’s much larger size compared to those two, which imbues it with greater economic and military potential, not to mention its independently existing tensions with Russia over neighboring Moldova’s Transnistria region. Romania can also serve as a launchpad for other NATO allies’ conventional military interventions in support of Ukraine in contingency scenarios per whatever security guarantees they agree to just like Poland can.
Of note, Romania hosts NATO’s largest airbase, and it might one day order an accelerated naval buildup guided by and possibly even partially financed by the bloc as a means of getting around the limitations on regional naval forces imposed by the Montreux Convention. Just like the Baltic States serve as dual members of the “Viking Bloc” and Poland’s envisaged CEE “sphere of military-strategic influence”, so too can Romania therefore serve the same role vis-à-vis Poland’s “sphere” and Turkiye’s “Neo-Ottoman” one.
Accordingly, just like the Via Baltica and Rail Baltica 3SI projects from Poland to Estonia are integral to Poland’s northern integrative role within the “cordon sanitaire” for optimizing military-strategic cooperation with the “Viking Bloc”, so too is the Via Carpathia 3SI project from Poland to Romania through Slovakia and Hungary equally integral to its southern role for optimizing such cooperation with the “Neo-Ottoman Empire”. Sweden and Turkiye thus have an interest in these 3SI projects’ success.
On that note, Sweden also has an interest in the success of the “Baltic Defense Line”, which refers to those countries’ fortifications on their border with Russia that form part of the “EU Defense Line” when paired with Poland’s (embarrassingly underdeveloped) “East Shield” with Kaliningrad and Belarus. They’re not part of the 3SI, and that’s why they weren’t mentioned earlier, but they’re still relevant to the topic of projects in which Poland and a neighboring sub-regional bloc’s leaders have shared interests.
Poland’s Third Imperative: Become NATO’s Main Force For Interfacing With Russia
Moving along to Poland’s final imperative within the “cordon sanitaire”, it should aspire to become NATO’s main force for interfacing with Russia in the post-war period. The US is actively implementing the NATO 3.0 concept wherein it expects allies with shared interests in containing Russia to shoulder more of the burden as the US gradually “Pivots (back) to (East) Asia” for more robustly containing China. Its role in NATO is thus expected to decrease while engagement with Russia will likely remain mostly bilateral.
Amidst the confluence of these trends, the EU’s de facto German leader is making a €800 billion power play for European NATO’s largest army in order to extend its political control of Europe into the military realm, which would thus lead to Germany becoming the bloc’s main force for interfacing with Russia. In that scenario, Poland’s interests would be subordinated to Germany’s and determined by it, which would also pose a major non-military threat that Nawrocki alluded to late last year and was analyzed here.
The most effective way to avert this dark future is for Poland to solidify its leadership of CEE in the face of the German-backed challenge posed by Ukraine, integrate with the “Viking Bloc” and the “Neo-Ottoman Empire”, and then leverage its resultantly central role along the western front of the “cordon sanitaire” to become NATO’s main force for interfacing with Russia. In furtherance of this final goal that’s of grand strategic significance for Poland, a post-war modus vivendi must be reached with Russia.
That would then position them to jointly lead the construction of the new European security architecture due to the importance of maintaining peace and predictability along NATO’s Eastern Flank that Poland endeavors to lead. The specifics of the Polish-Russian modus vivendi can only be determined through the resumption of dialogue between their experts, military officials, and governments, the proposal of which I’ve long advocated for and was recently echoed by Ilya Fabrichnikov.
He’s a member of the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and wrote about precisely this possibility here in late July for his think tank’s highly esteemed journal, which I then constructively critiqued here. In the event that such a dialogue is resumed, even if only through Track II talks at first and ultra-discreet ones at that such as the two-year-long and newly confirmed Track 1.5 Russian-German talks in Baku, then three subjects would likely figure prominently in these discussions.
Three Subjects Of Discussion If Polish-Russia Dialogue Is Resumed
The first is the creation of a Polish-Russian deconfliction mechanism even before the end of the Ukrainian Conflict. This is urgent given the two significant Russian drone and cruise missile incursions into Poland over the past year (that were arguably caused by electronic jamming). If Poland ended up embroiled in a hot war with Russia by miscalculation, then contrary to the fears of some in Poland, the US and the rest of NATO would likely get involved too since Poland is too important for them to abandon.
The same can’t be said for the Baltic States in a contingency scenario or Ukraine should another large-scale conflict with Russia erupt after the present one ends. As the famous Norman Davies described it as in 1984, Poland is the “Heart of Europe”, and the scenario of its defeat, occupation, and/or destruction by Russia would radically reshape European and therefore global geopolitics in ways that are absolutely against German and especially American interests, ergo their shared interest in preventing that.
This segues into the second subject of discussion in any hypothetical Polish-Russian dialogue regarding Poland’s response to contingency scenarios in the Baltic States, Belarus, and Ukraine seeing as how it presently commands European NATO’s largest army, borders all three, and its involvement would risk escalating what might be minor border incidents (or internal unrest in Belarus’ case) into a hot NATO-Russian war by miscalculation due how it’s too important for the bloc to abandon per the above.
And finally, the Russian side would almost certainly want to discuss the post-war balance of forces between Poland and their country, including NATO troops and possibly (American and/or French) nukes in Poland as well as Russia’s own troops, nukes, and hypersonic missiles in Kaliningrad and Belarus. The purpose, from the Kremlin’s presumed perspective at least, would be to explore the possibility of mutual limits and/or reductions for easing tensions or at least better managing them in the post-war era.
The best-case scenario, which is admittedly far-fetched but should nevertheless be broached with a view towards ultimately moving their talks in this direction even if the following goal remains unattainable, is that such discussions lead to a resumption of dialogue between Russia and (in this scenario) Polish-led European NATO aimed at new arms control and other military-security agreements. Of particular importance for Russia is the future of Western European NATO members’ forces in the Baltic States.
Even if they remain, they might not serve their envisaged tripwire role if the decision is made by their governments to have them either stand down, be sacrificed, or withdrawn out of “pragmatism” in a contingency scenario, which further contextualizes the importance of Poland becoming their security guarantor in NATO 3.0. The possibility still exists that they could escalate a minor border incident into a hot NATO-Russian war by miscalculation, however, and that’s why the Kremlin is eyeing them very warily.
In any case, it’s premature to speculate on the specifics of this subject, but it’s sufficient to mention that such arms control and other military-security talks – including the scenario of Poland replacing Western European NATO forces in the Baltic States – could emerge from the resumption of Polish-Russian dialogue. Poland’s centrality in the Intermarium, the geography of which overlaps with the “cordon sanitaire’s” western flank, imbues the country with outsized military-strategic influence vis-à-vis Russia.
Russia will naturally play a role in the construction of the post-war European security architecture, but it remains unclear whether its leading counterpart representing European NATO will be the Eastern Flank’s de facto Polish leader or the EU’s de facto German one, which will be decided through the outcome of their competition over leadership of CEE in which Ukraine is functioning as Germany’s proxy. Poland mustn’t lose and consequently leave its national security vulnerable to a possible German-Russian deal.
It’s therefore objectively in Poland’s interests to become European NATO’s main force for interfacing with Russia, which requires the resumption of Polish-Russian dialogue similar in spirit to the two-year-long German-Russian talks in Baku that were recently confirmed. Remaining passive for whatever reason, whether out of misguided solidarity with NATO and/or Ukraine or principled opposition to resuming dialogue with Russia, risks Poland losing its competition for regional leadership of CEE to Germany.
A Personal Message To My Expert Compatriots
On a personal note, whether with respect to Messrs. Orzeł, Dębski, Kozioł, or any other Polish expert, I’d be happy to help put you in touch with Russian experts if you’re interested, just reach out to me and I promise that I’ll keep our conversation discreet. As I mentioned in my recent critical review of Tim Kirby’s article on Polish-Ukrainian tensions here, I consider it my life’s task to bridge the differences between Poland/Poles and Russia/Russians due to my unique identity profile.
I talked about my roots in detail here when explaining why I’m a proud Volhynia Genocide activist, but for those of you who are unaware, I’m a proud American-Pole with partial “Old Rus” roots (my preferred term for the East Slavs in modern-day Western Ukraine that didn’t refer to themselves as “Ukrainian” at the time). I’m a dual citizen who was born and raised in the US, and I don’t speak Polish since I only saw my Polish dad on weekends after my parents divorced when I was young, but I proudly identify as Polish.
While some of you might consider me to a “puppet” since I’ve lived in Moscow for 13 years and worked with Sputnik from 2014-2019, as I explained here in response to Przemysław Staciwa’s hit piece against me in May, I constructively critique Russia whenever I believe that it’s required for optimizing policy formulation and implementation. I also revealed that I’ve been “canceled” by many here in Moscow because of it, including recently for politely rebuking Medvedev for his two “Polack” slurs in 2024.
Whatever your opinion of me might be, just know that I’m willing and able to help if you’d like to even just casually – but discreetly – explore the possibility of entering into dialogue with Russian experts, whether on your own and/or on behalf of whatever organization you might represent. I sincerely believe that this is required for advancing Polish and Russian interests alike, which rest in reaching a post-war modus vivendi that maintains peace and predictability along the “cordon sanitaire’s” western flank.
Poland is not going to be leading anything and Poland has no interest in any kind of dialogue with Russia.
The analytical framework here is interesting but the specific political function it serves deserves naming alongside the analysis. The Intermarium concept, the Piłsudski-era project of a Polish-led bloc from the Baltic to the Black Sea as a third force between the great powers, is being deployed here not primarily as a security architecture but as a credential enhancement for Poland's positioning within the American alliance network. The argument's logic runs: if the Intermarium is the indispensable Eastern European security formation, then Poland as its natural hub becomes the indispensable American partner, warranting the preferential resource allocation and strategic collaboration that Germany's Ostpolitik tradition and energy dependence on Russia made Germany an unreliable recipient of. The analysis arrives at a conclusion that happens to coincide precisely with Polish strategic interest, which is not disqualifying but is worth noting before evaluating the architecture on its merits.
On the merits: the Intermarium's constituent states have their own bilateral tensions that the concept consistently underweights. Poland and Lithuania carry historical grievances that complicate the seamless bloc the concept requires. Romania and Hungary have the unresolved Transylvania wound that has periodically disrupted their bilateral relationship and that the Orbán period made more acute. The Baltic states and Poland have different threat perceptions about Belarus, for the Baltics, the Suwalki corridor is the existential chokepoint; for Poland, the eastern frontier with Ukraine is the primary concern. These are not minor coordination problems. They are the specific bilateral tensions that made the interwar Intermarium unachievable despite Piłsudski's genuine commitment to it, and that the current enthusiasm for the concept tends to paper over with the shared threat perception from Russia that is real but insufficient to resolve the underlying tensions.
The deeper analytical problem is that the Intermarium, as a within-NATO formation rather than a genuinely autonomous third force, does not address the specific security architecture question that the Istanbul Charter of 1999 and the Astana Declaration of 2010 identified as the foundational one: indivisible security, meaning that no state or alliance strengthens its own security at the expense of another's. A Polish-led Intermarium bloc resourced preferentially by the United States and oriented toward Russian containment strengthens the security of its members at the expense of Russian security perceptions, which is precisely the dynamic that the December 2021 Russian proposals, whatever their other problems, correctly identified as the underlying driver of the current crisis. The Intermarium does not solve the European security architecture problem. It accelerates the specific dynamic that produced the current catastrophe by creating a more coherent and more heavily resourced Eastern flank whose primary strategic logic is confrontation rather than the mutual restraint framework that the Istanbul and Astana principles require.
The question the analysis does not ask: what security architecture would address Russian security concerns about forward-deployed NATO capability while genuinely protecting Eastern European sovereignty, not through a bloc whose coherence depends on maintaining the Russian threat at a level that justifies the bloc's existence, but through the binding mutual restraint and collective enforcement mechanisms that the OSCE process has been trying and failing to institutionalise since 1975? That is the harder analytical question, and the Intermarium concept's specific appeal is precisely that it avoids it.