Lavrov Warned About The US’ Attempt To Establish Strategic Superiority Over Russia
Russia has proven that it’s capable of retaining its nuclear second-strike capabilities, but the US’ continued attempt to neutralize them is very unfriendly, which greatly impedes any possible “New Détente” after the end of the Ukrainian Conflict.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held his first press conference of the year on Tuesday, during which time he elaborated on Russian policy towards a wide range of issues. Among the most important ones that he addressed was the impending end of the New START early next month. Trump had earlier declined Putin’s proposal to extend its terms for another year. Lavrov interpreted this as reaffirming the US’ attempt “to establish superiority in certain areas of strategic stability” over Russia.
He then elaborated on the four interconnected ways in which this is being pursued. The first is the US’ deployment of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-ranged missiles in Japan, the Philippines and soon Germany. This policy was made possible by Trump 1.0’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In practical terms, the US could equip these missiles with nukes to obtain an edge in any first strike scenario since they could hit their target before they have time to assess the threat.
The second element is the US’ plans to expand the deployment of its nuclear weapons in Europe, little of which is known to the public. Nevertheless, this policy complements the abovementioned as was explained and signals that the US won’t abandon its strategic nuclear outposts in Europe. It also heightens the strategic threats that Russia faces from the western vector, thus ensuring that the bulk of its strategic capabilities remain aimed in that direction even after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.
The third way in which the US is attempting to establish strategic superiority over Russia is through Trump’s “Golden Dome”, the purpose of which is to neutralize Russia’s silo-based second-strike capabilities. The US’ acquisition of Greenland would enable it to intercept Russian ICBMs over the Arctic. Russia’s response is to build more nuclear submarines for launching second strikes from other directions in parallel with building more Poseidon nuclear underwater drones for unleashing devastating tsunamis.
And finally, the last part was what Lavrov spent the most time on, and that’s the US’ weaponization of outer space. He said that the US only proposes banning nuclear weapons there, not non-nuclear ones, which is a tacit admission of its plans in this domain. Lavrov didn’t mention it, but the “Golden Dome” also has a space-based component, which could be exploited to clandestinely position offensive weapons there instead of purely defensive interceptors. This possibility poses many problems for Russia.
Putting these four constituent parts together, it becomes clear that Trump wants to restore the US’ hitherto declining unipolar hegemony over global affairs, which he envisages achieving in large part by obtaining strategic superiority over Russia and China in order to then blackmail them with first strikes. Preempting this dark scenario was one of the reasons behind Russia’s special operation after the Kremlin learned of the US’ clandestine plans to one day deploy offensive and defense strategic assets to Ukraine.
Under Trump 2.0, the US is now globalizing such threats to Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities, thus sparking an undeclared strategic arms race. Russia’s test late last year of the unlimited-range nuclear-powered Burevestnik missile along with the related development of other offensive strategic assets prove that it’s capable of retaining its aforesaid capabilities. Even so, the US’ attempt to establish strategic superiority over Russia is very unfriendly, which greatly impedes any possible “New Détente”.
That is an excellent analysis of a rather complex problem, thanks Andrew. If the EU nations throw Greenland under the bus they are performing a self-mutilation act. By allowing the US taking a major step toward an imaginary nuclear superiority, they actually increase the possibility of a nuclear war where they can be only the losers.
I mentioned this before: There is a serious issue with Lavrov, all the late night pizza consumers at the White House and the Pentagon together are unable to think up something that will pass by him unnoticed.
There is no more sentiment for Mutual Assured Destruction or Detente. That political thinking is long gone in mainstream American political parties. It's ALL about First Strike capabilities and not just in nuclear war but conventional wars as well. I read with both Biden and Trump. It will be a nuclear race to the bitter end. There is no reasoning with power-hungry, de-humanized corrupted human beings. The US is BEYOND unfriendly to Russia, China and Iran. And to other countries that challenge it's hegemony. For the US elites it's an existential battle. The same seems to apply to the crazy leaders of Europe.
More from Google AI on why Defense Dept does not want to renew START.
"Treaty Status: The New START treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2026, and cannot be extended again under its current terms. Russia suspended its participation in 2023 but indicated a willingness to discuss a follow-on agreement.
Defense Perspective: The U.S. military has historically supported the treaty because it provides predictability and transparency regarding Russian nuclear forces. However, some analysts and policy groups argue that the treaty should not be renewed in its current form because it restricts U.S. modernization, does not cover new Russian systems (like hypersonics), and ignores China's nuclear expansion.
Key Arguments Against Renewal: Those opposing a simple extension argue it rewards Russian non-compliance and prevents the U.S. from building up its own forces to address a "two-nuclear-peer" threat environment.
Modernization Focus: The focus for the U.S. defense sector is on the modernization of the nuclear triad (land, sea, and air components), which continues regardless of the treaty's fate. "