Nearly Half Of Poles Now Want To Stop Arming Ukraine

The reason is Poles’ radically shifting views towards Ukraine since the start of their spiraling dispute sparked by Zelensky’s state-level glorification of the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits.

Leading Polish conservative newspaper Rzeczpospolita published the results of a survey that it commissioned showing that 45.2% of Poles now want to stop arming Ukraine. The majority are from the opposition, which includes conservative and libertarian-nationalist (populist in American political parlance) groups who a separate survey recently showed could form a coalition government after fall 2027’s next Sejm elections, and is almost three times larger than the 18.3% from December 2022.

Krzysztof Bosak, one of the populist Confederation’s co-leaders, is quoted as reaffirming his party’s consistent policy of supporting conditional aid to Ukraine that tangibly advances Polish interests. Its rapid growth in popularity per the second-mentioned survey above is likely due to the public realizing that Confederation was right all along about Ukraine amidst their country’s spiraling dispute with it that was sparked by Zelensky’s state-level glorification of the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits.

This palpable sentiment is arguably responsible for why the conservative “Law & Justice” (PiS) opposition’s prime ministerial candidate boldly broke with this party’s leadership earlier in the week by calling on the EU to stop funding Ukrainian arms till it “enters the path of pro-human values.” PiS is also separately embroiled in a power struggle between co-founder Jarosław Kaczyński and former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki over the latter’s refusal to shutter his sub-group within the party.

The combination of these factors could lead to more disgruntled PiS supporters flocking towards Confederation, thus potentially turning the party in the senior partner in any coalition that could be formed after fall 2027’s next Sejm elections, which could lead to serious changes in Polish foreign policy. The second survey that was hyperlinked to in the introduction shows that Confederation and the Confederation of the Polish Crown that earlier split from it have more support combined than PiS.

It’s therefore within the realm of political reality that the populists maintain their role as the country’s most powerful opposition force, especially if support for PiS continues declining while support for Confederation continues growing, with Poles’ radically shifting views towards Ukraine being the reason. Rzeczpospolita’s report cites the Defense Ministry’s recently declassified statistics showing that the former PiS government gave Ukraine around €3.4 billion worth of military equipment from 2022-2023.

The National Security Bureau disclosed in early 2025 that Poland’s aid to Ukraine totaled 4.91% of its GDP by then (most going to refugees and the above statistics showing that the liberal coalition only sent around €350 million by mid-2026) and constituted hundreds of pieces of equipment. Although PiS has since hardened its approach towards Ukraine, just like its opponents did under public pressure, it could have preemptively averted Ukraine’s descent into an anti-Polish state had it attached strings to its aid.

For example, aid could have been sent only if Ukraine first allowed the full exhumation and proper reburial of the Volhynia Genocide’s victims, officially recognized and apologized for this war crime, and banned Banderism. That didn’t happen and now “Poland Finally Realizes The Geostrategic Challenge Posed By Ukraine”, thus further contextualizing why nearly half of Poles no longer want to arm what’s at this point their top regional rival, which also poses a latent security threat if it’s not soon denazified.