Pakistan is functioning as the force multiplier in the Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian proxy campaign against the UAE in Africa that it’s finally participating in after sitting on the sidelines for so long.
Thank you for explaining how intricate those alliances are in that region. It appears that Türkiye’s strategic goal is to restore the Ottoman Caliphate and become a regional hegemon.
Turkey has big worries. They made sure that Al sharaa obeyed Israel's request, i.e. a military free zone between Syria and Israel's border.
Then Turkey called on Kurds in Aleppo to disarm, the Kurds did not do so. Then Turkey made sure that the Syrian military attacked Aleppo.
Turkey wants to show its people that they can handle the conflicts and have stated that Aleppo is and will be under Turkish control.
With elections coming up soon, they want to show that they have control.
But now information is starting to leak out about the imprisoned Kurdish leader Ocalan in Turkey,.
They don't dare touch northeastern Syria because there are European militaries there. Turkey will never be able to have power for an Ottoman Empire 2.0, regardless of whether Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia back each other.
As much as it has swung in alliances between each other and changed sides in alliances, there will continue to be alliance changes in the future between/against each other and towards Haftar in Libya. Turkey has major internal problems, especially now that they are involved in the attacks against Kurds in Aleppo, it will activate the hatred of the Kurds in Turkey against Erdoğan, which is a big problem for Erdoğan.
One of those "Jewish dogs" Bernard-Henri Levy has stirred the pot, as he did in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libanon. As the Turkish government has called a controversial intellectual who is in all likelihood involved in the new "alliance" between certain countries.
Strangely overlooked is the fact that Iran, along with Turkey, benefits from these developments. Up until the past year and a half Saudi–Emirati strategic ties had deepened quite a bit; both sides credited each other with progress—whether in economics or security. The Sudan conflict, stoked in large part by Biden-era U.S. meddling, effectively disrupted Saudi–Emirati concord. The collapse of Saudi–Emirati relations over the Horn of Africa weakens the anti-Iran/-Houthi coalition, while also empowering Jolani’s Syria (by giving it leeway in a contest between Israel and Syria); it also effectively allows Turkey and Iran to eclipse the traditional GCC heavyweights as regional powers, especially in wartime.
In this case, Saudi policy is really mirroring Turkey and Iran’s shared interest rather than vice versa; both Iranian and Turkish media have been heavily criticizing the UAE’s role in the Horn, especially the ties among the STC, Somaliland, and Israel. Saudi attempts to back Somalia reflect an effort to prevent its influence from being diminished by Turkey, showing that the latter is dictating the tempo of events. A Somaliland war also gives the Houthi separatists and their Iranian patrons much-needed relief from a U.S.-sponsored “Arab NATO” in the Red Sea, while the Abraham Accords look to be a moot point without Syria. So one may ask whether Iran or its allies had any role in subtly bringing about the Saudi–Emirati rift.
A digression: the inability of the Trump administration to influence the situation—or to prevent itself from being misled into becoming Biden 2.0—contrasts sharply with the Biden administration’s role in creating it. Reversing himself on Ukraine, India, Gaza, the EU, and Syria, Trump has now also presided over the unraveling of the Abraham Accords, with MbS increasingly taking an anti-Israeli line. (I thoroughly expect him to cave on Greenland for the sake of retaining NATO as a bludgeon in Ukraine.) The evolution of the Red Sea crisis, along with Iran’s concealment of enriched uranium (hence its unwillingness to negotiate on Trump’s terms), shows that Israel’s strategic position has greatly eroded.
Lets be realistic. How much force can Israel logically project in the possible base in Somaliland. The base will not survive any prolonged attacks by "militants".
Thank you Andrew for helping us to understand the complexities in the Mi ddle East.
Thank you for explaining how intricate those alliances are in that region. It appears that Türkiye’s strategic goal is to restore the Ottoman Caliphate and become a regional hegemon.
Turkey has big worries. They made sure that Al sharaa obeyed Israel's request, i.e. a military free zone between Syria and Israel's border.
Then Turkey called on Kurds in Aleppo to disarm, the Kurds did not do so. Then Turkey made sure that the Syrian military attacked Aleppo.
Turkey wants to show its people that they can handle the conflicts and have stated that Aleppo is and will be under Turkish control.
With elections coming up soon, they want to show that they have control.
But now information is starting to leak out about the imprisoned Kurdish leader Ocalan in Turkey,.
They don't dare touch northeastern Syria because there are European militaries there. Turkey will never be able to have power for an Ottoman Empire 2.0, regardless of whether Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia back each other.
As much as it has swung in alliances between each other and changed sides in alliances, there will continue to be alliance changes in the future between/against each other and towards Haftar in Libya. Turkey has major internal problems, especially now that they are involved in the attacks against Kurds in Aleppo, it will activate the hatred of the Kurds in Turkey against Erdoğan, which is a big problem for Erdoğan.
One of those "Jewish dogs" Bernard-Henri Levy has stirred the pot, as he did in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libanon. As the Turkish government has called a controversial intellectual who is in all likelihood involved in the new "alliance" between certain countries.
Which does not bode well for either.
Strangely overlooked is the fact that Iran, along with Turkey, benefits from these developments. Up until the past year and a half Saudi–Emirati strategic ties had deepened quite a bit; both sides credited each other with progress—whether in economics or security. The Sudan conflict, stoked in large part by Biden-era U.S. meddling, effectively disrupted Saudi–Emirati concord. The collapse of Saudi–Emirati relations over the Horn of Africa weakens the anti-Iran/-Houthi coalition, while also empowering Jolani’s Syria (by giving it leeway in a contest between Israel and Syria); it also effectively allows Turkey and Iran to eclipse the traditional GCC heavyweights as regional powers, especially in wartime.
In this case, Saudi policy is really mirroring Turkey and Iran’s shared interest rather than vice versa; both Iranian and Turkish media have been heavily criticizing the UAE’s role in the Horn, especially the ties among the STC, Somaliland, and Israel. Saudi attempts to back Somalia reflect an effort to prevent its influence from being diminished by Turkey, showing that the latter is dictating the tempo of events. A Somaliland war also gives the Houthi separatists and their Iranian patrons much-needed relief from a U.S.-sponsored “Arab NATO” in the Red Sea, while the Abraham Accords look to be a moot point without Syria. So one may ask whether Iran or its allies had any role in subtly bringing about the Saudi–Emirati rift.
A digression: the inability of the Trump administration to influence the situation—or to prevent itself from being misled into becoming Biden 2.0—contrasts sharply with the Biden administration’s role in creating it. Reversing himself on Ukraine, India, Gaza, the EU, and Syria, Trump has now also presided over the unraveling of the Abraham Accords, with MbS increasingly taking an anti-Israeli line. (I thoroughly expect him to cave on Greenland for the sake of retaining NATO as a bludgeon in Ukraine.) The evolution of the Red Sea crisis, along with Iran’s concealment of enriched uranium (hence its unwillingness to negotiate on Trump’s terms), shows that Israel’s strategic position has greatly eroded.
Andrew, what is the US attitude toward the UAE and its rivals?
And Russia? It has not a project of port in Somaliland? And Ethiopia which back Somaliland? Who are its allies and friends?
Lets be realistic. How much force can Israel logically project in the possible base in Somaliland. The base will not survive any prolonged attacks by "militants".