Its conservative president is totally against this project and can veto related legislation tabled by the liberal prime minister since the latter’s ruling coalition doesn’t have the two-thirds majority to overrule him, thus enabling Poland to play the role that Hungary did prior to Orban’s downfall.
As the rise of nationalist movements in France, England and Germany show, it's not the Germans or the FRench or English who are looking to establish control. The globalists including their NeoCon US section allow only for one country to be a Nation State. The rest of the Western world are designated to be colonies with populations to be farmed.
Good article Andrew, I will probably end up thinking hard for a few days on an optimal solution for Poland, if there is any. Trump, their main mentor seems to be giving up on them, Germany and Russia never liked them. They have to think this over many times, they just can’t afford to slide into a hole where everybody around in Europe becomes an opponent. They need to think of a long-term strategy, their economy and potential alliances.
It's not that Jerry and Johnny don't like Poles, the latter have an unfortunate position north of the Pripyat, making Poland a geostrategic corridor. Likes and dislikes sprung out of the geography.
It does not happen to often I disagree with you, Andrew, but this time I think you have overstated the situation. The European Union is not on the verge of becoming a centralized federal state, nor is it one veto away from doing so. It is a:
-multi-level governance system
-held together by shared economic interest
-constrained by national democracies
-and repeatedly reshaped by external crises
The real story is not an approaching European superstate, but a fragile balance between integration and sovereignty that shifts depending on circumstance.
Poland is not the “last barrier” to federal Europe. It is one of many states negotiating the boundaries of a system that is still fundamentally neither a federation nor a confederation—but something in between, and deliberately so.
Orban's Hungary performed the "public service" that Greece used to with Turkey, being the "only reason" that they weren't accepted. When Greece dropped their objection in principle, the French, Germans, Austrians and Dutch immediately came out to object to Turkey. Many Europeans and their governments object to this excessive federalism, but could stay silent while Orban took the blame. Those opinions are now going to be voiced publicly, even if only at the last minute.
Europe's bigger problem is lack of leadership, stupid policies and centrifugal forces that will more likely lead to fracture than integration. Divorce proceedings rather than more "involuntary group intimacy".
of course not, Italy is not a federalist, and so most of Eastern Europe. Merz declared he never believed in the united states of Europe. Most leaders are not
This is a good thing, but can't help wonder how long it will last. Poland seems to be as gifted at only thinking short term as Russia is at long term planning.
All of the EU countries neeed know that Russia ,half of EUROPE will determ what happens. FIRST, Ukraine is not joining NATO nor joining the EU. The other half of Europe can do as it pleases. The mess the EU countries are in are their own making. Russia dust your hands and forget about the EU. You are the nuclear super power, the EU is a bunch of small countries of limitted power.
You are aware that Putin himself would much prefer a strong Germany to a strong Poland?
If you’re going to write articles like this, you should provide a fair degree of balance in the interest of clarity and responsible reporting. That is to say, you should explain in an honest, impartial manner why some people would want to see a strong, united Europe with Germany at the helm.
You couldn't be more wrong on so many levels. For one, even if Putin preferred that -- which he doesn't as I'm going to show -- I don't care because I'm not Putin's puppet and thus retain my independent agency to share constructive critiques of Russian policy.
After all, I'm a credentialed expert with an MA in International Relations and a PhD in Political science from the Russian MFA-run MGIMO, Lavrov's alma mater, so I indisputably have the right to analyze and critique Russian foreign policy even if it offends you.
Putin doesn't even want "a strong Germany" either though as proven by Medvedev's magnum opus warning about the latent threat posed by Germany's remilitarization, which he compared to summer 1941 on the eve of the Nazi invasion.
For you to to not only mistakenly assume that he wants that, but then suggest that I'm unfair, dishonest, and partial is so personally offensive -- and against my only community rule of not attacking me personally -- that I really should ban you right now.
I'm not going to do that, however, because I'm in a pretty good mood and -- probably, as always, naively -- think that maybe you'll realize the error of your ways, but I do indeed expect you to spit in my face, insult me again, and then compel me to ban you.
I understand that you have had bad experiences with trolls and other assorted bad actors in the past, but I am not one of them, no personal insult was intended.
I actually read you more these days than many other analysts for the very reason that I generally regard you as a dispassionate and astute observer of world affairs, and so that is why I felt this article to be rather out of character for you. So, yes, I do stand by my initial criticism that it was biased and more polemical than your usual work. And, you have every right to have biases, but, as I said, in your capacity as an analyst, the responsible thing to do would be to give a balanced presentation which includes the other side of the argument, even if you state your disagreement.
As for the crux of the matter, I could provide many examples of Putin’s solicitous overtures to Germany, but just the recent example of his invoking Herr Schröder’s name as an “ideal” intermediary for a rapprochement between Europe and Russia is one to note. You will not find any comparable examples from Putin vis à vis Poland.
Furthermore, I think you know that it is not very convincing to cite Medvedev as proof for any of Putin’s core convictions, or, indeed, any of the serious foreign policy orientations of the Russian state. Now, this far from settles the dispute, which is nuanced and complex, certainly not something which can be adequately treated in a comments section, but I did want to raise it for the sake of debate and constructive criticism.
It also happens to be a quite relevant and important issue, which demands substantial consideration.
Thank you, I appreciate that, Ricardo. I'm so used to being attacked, mostly on X by "fellow" NRPRs but sometimes here under my analyses, that I feel like I'm becoming conditioned to react a certain way to specific phrases.
I understand your reaction a lot better now, but in case you missed it, here's my proposal from late last year about how Russia should respond to the zero-sum Polish-German rivalry:
I was elaborated on it in a very detailed report (almost 10,000 words!) that I wrote for a conference last Friday that I couldn't attend due to it being my daughter's birthday and us having plans all day after she ended school.
I'm not sure if they'll publish it, but the organizers -- and they're a prestigious bunch, but since I don't know if the media reported on the event, I'm not going to disclose who they are-- said that it'll be passed along to relevant institutions here.
Yes, thank you for the clarification, and I say again, my comments were made with no ill will.
I am very interested in this particular issue, so I will be keen to read what you have said on it and also what you may say in the coming months and years, especially since Putin is closer to the end of his public life than the beginning. I am deeply curious as to how his successor will deal with Germany and Europe.
Thanks again, Ricardo, and no problem at all. I'm admittedly a bit "sensitive" nowadays due to the barrage of attacks that I've experienced from NRPRs. I also hope that my report will be published by the conference organizers or they'll permit me to publish it on my own so that I can share it with you all.
There's nothing new as I said since I already informed my readers about these three threats in general, but I go into a level of detail that I haven't done here because it's unrealistic to write reports of that length on a regular basis. I only went as far into detail as I did due to it being passed along to state institutions.
The topic was geostrategic threats to Russia till 2050, and the three that I elaborated on in detail were Potemkinism further tainting Russia's already broken feedback loops, the Neo-Reagan Doctrine rolling back Russian influence worldwide, and the need to maintain Russia's Sino-Indo balancing act, so pretty much everything that I've already shared with my readers but in very specific detail and formatted in a way that appeals to Russian experts and diplomats per my experience in the first's community and my time at MGIMO (which is run by the MFA).
As part of the second section, I also covered the "cordon sanitaire" that's forming around Russia in the Arctic, Central & Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Northeast Asia (as led by Japan).
It was in this context that I elaborated in detail on last year's proposal regarding Poland and Germany with reference to Medvedev's magnum opus warning about the latter's remilitarization.
It's anyone's guess whether my proposals will be implemented, but I did my best to help Russia in the best way that I knew how and sincerely hope that at least some of my advice, even if only regarding the need to abandon Potemkinism, will be applied.
And just to elaborate a bit on the dangers inherent in continuing Potemkinist narratives, I've spoken to foreign experts who provide input to their country's policymakers via their respective institutions and they've fallen for some of these claims, which in turn risked them misleading policymakers regarding Russia.
So the danger is very real in fact and has already manifested itself through the "confusion" that one close Russian partner in particular has regarding the way in which certain subjects of sensitivity to bilateral relations are portrayed by provably state-affiliated "Non-Russian Pro-Russian" influencers (especially on state media).
I won't go any further, but I've done my best in my own personal capacity to clarify Russia's actual policy, including through detailed descriptions of Potemkinism and examples of it being applied in other ways that provably contradict Russia's official policies yet nothing is done to change them either. It's really a problem.
Ooooh no, Ricardo. You breaking into the delicate word of international relationships like a wild bull of the Pampa. This is a very-very complex issue where context on various levels, economic issues, military strength and history all has to be very carefully considered. The hardest subject I have seen some time ago.
Not many people in Europe want both a federal Europe and one under German domination. There are the usual federalist idiots who dream of their federal chimera, believing it will save their countries from the dustbin of history where simple demography has thrown them. After that, everyone has their own historical sensitivity. Central Europe sees this federation as a kind of big, impotent softie, like the Holy Roman Empire once was. The Nordics see it more as a dictatorship of merchant plutocracy, like the Hanseatic League. Others, like France, dream that it will be an extension of the French 'Republican model.' The Germans have put their Bismarckian pickelhaube back on. And finally, Southern Europe doesn't count. For decades, they have been left in second class, even third.
Germany has the largest population, by far the largest number of speakers, and its economy is by far the strongest. For the European ruling classes, since Germany has been a slave to the USA for 80 years, they are reassured that German control guarantees US servitude and prohibits any true sovereignty that deviates from the Anglo‑Saxon neoliberal imperial model that makes them the new aristocrats.
The Poles want European money, the US army, and to be treated as if their recent economic rise were the fruit of their own merit alone. This is more a whim due to a monstrous inferiority complex than a real national geostrategic vision.
For once, just for once, I will say: God bless Poland.
As the rise of nationalist movements in France, England and Germany show, it's not the Germans or the FRench or English who are looking to establish control. The globalists including their NeoCon US section allow only for one country to be a Nation State. The rest of the Western world are designated to be colonies with populations to be farmed.
Good article Andrew, I will probably end up thinking hard for a few days on an optimal solution for Poland, if there is any. Trump, their main mentor seems to be giving up on them, Germany and Russia never liked them. They have to think this over many times, they just can’t afford to slide into a hole where everybody around in Europe becomes an opponent. They need to think of a long-term strategy, their economy and potential alliances.
It's not that Jerry and Johnny don't like Poles, the latter have an unfortunate position north of the Pripyat, making Poland a geostrategic corridor. Likes and dislikes sprung out of the geography.
It does not happen to often I disagree with you, Andrew, but this time I think you have overstated the situation. The European Union is not on the verge of becoming a centralized federal state, nor is it one veto away from doing so. It is a:
-multi-level governance system
-held together by shared economic interest
-constrained by national democracies
-and repeatedly reshaped by external crises
The real story is not an approaching European superstate, but a fragile balance between integration and sovereignty that shifts depending on circumstance.
Poland is not the “last barrier” to federal Europe. It is one of many states negotiating the boundaries of a system that is still fundamentally neither a federation nor a confederation—but something in between, and deliberately so.
Orban's Hungary performed the "public service" that Greece used to with Turkey, being the "only reason" that they weren't accepted. When Greece dropped their objection in principle, the French, Germans, Austrians and Dutch immediately came out to object to Turkey. Many Europeans and their governments object to this excessive federalism, but could stay silent while Orban took the blame. Those opinions are now going to be voiced publicly, even if only at the last minute.
Europe's bigger problem is lack of leadership, stupid policies and centrifugal forces that will more likely lead to fracture than integration. Divorce proceedings rather than more "involuntary group intimacy".
of course not, Italy is not a federalist, and so most of Eastern Europe. Merz declared he never believed in the united states of Europe. Most leaders are not
Just like Trump promised us "no more wars". Well, it's not the official leaders who decide.
Pentagon 'Blindsided' As Hegseth Pulls Plug On 4,000-Troop Deployment To Poland
https://www.zerohedge.com/military/pentagon-blindsided-hegseth-pulls-plug-4000-troop-deployment-poland?utm_source=daily_newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8080
This is a good thing, but can't help wonder how long it will last. Poland seems to be as gifted at only thinking short term as Russia is at long term planning.
All of the EU countries neeed know that Russia ,half of EUROPE will determ what happens. FIRST, Ukraine is not joining NATO nor joining the EU. The other half of Europe can do as it pleases. The mess the EU countries are in are their own making. Russia dust your hands and forget about the EU. You are the nuclear super power, the EU is a bunch of small countries of limitted power.
You are aware that Putin himself would much prefer a strong Germany to a strong Poland?
If you’re going to write articles like this, you should provide a fair degree of balance in the interest of clarity and responsible reporting. That is to say, you should explain in an honest, impartial manner why some people would want to see a strong, united Europe with Germany at the helm.
You couldn't be more wrong on so many levels. For one, even if Putin preferred that -- which he doesn't as I'm going to show -- I don't care because I'm not Putin's puppet and thus retain my independent agency to share constructive critiques of Russian policy.
After all, I'm a credentialed expert with an MA in International Relations and a PhD in Political science from the Russian MFA-run MGIMO, Lavrov's alma mater, so I indisputably have the right to analyze and critique Russian foreign policy even if it offends you.
Putin doesn't even want "a strong Germany" either though as proven by Medvedev's magnum opus warning about the latent threat posed by Germany's remilitarization, which he compared to summer 1941 on the eve of the Nazi invasion.
For you to to not only mistakenly assume that he wants that, but then suggest that I'm unfair, dishonest, and partial is so personally offensive -- and against my only community rule of not attacking me personally -- that I really should ban you right now.
I'm not going to do that, however, because I'm in a pretty good mood and -- probably, as always, naively -- think that maybe you'll realize the error of your ways, but I do indeed expect you to spit in my face, insult me again, and then compel me to ban you.
I understand that you have had bad experiences with trolls and other assorted bad actors in the past, but I am not one of them, no personal insult was intended.
I actually read you more these days than many other analysts for the very reason that I generally regard you as a dispassionate and astute observer of world affairs, and so that is why I felt this article to be rather out of character for you. So, yes, I do stand by my initial criticism that it was biased and more polemical than your usual work. And, you have every right to have biases, but, as I said, in your capacity as an analyst, the responsible thing to do would be to give a balanced presentation which includes the other side of the argument, even if you state your disagreement.
As for the crux of the matter, I could provide many examples of Putin’s solicitous overtures to Germany, but just the recent example of his invoking Herr Schröder’s name as an “ideal” intermediary for a rapprochement between Europe and Russia is one to note. You will not find any comparable examples from Putin vis à vis Poland.
Furthermore, I think you know that it is not very convincing to cite Medvedev as proof for any of Putin’s core convictions, or, indeed, any of the serious foreign policy orientations of the Russian state. Now, this far from settles the dispute, which is nuanced and complex, certainly not something which can be adequately treated in a comments section, but I did want to raise it for the sake of debate and constructive criticism.
It also happens to be a quite relevant and important issue, which demands substantial consideration.
Thank you, I appreciate that, Ricardo. I'm so used to being attacked, mostly on X by "fellow" NRPRs but sometimes here under my analyses, that I feel like I'm becoming conditioned to react a certain way to specific phrases.
I understand your reaction a lot better now, but in case you missed it, here's my proposal from late last year about how Russia should respond to the zero-sum Polish-German rivalry:
https://korybko.substack.com/p/whats-russias-best-move-amidst-the
I was elaborated on it in a very detailed report (almost 10,000 words!) that I wrote for a conference last Friday that I couldn't attend due to it being my daughter's birthday and us having plans all day after she ended school.
I'm not sure if they'll publish it, but the organizers -- and they're a prestigious bunch, but since I don't know if the media reported on the event, I'm not going to disclose who they are-- said that it'll be passed along to relevant institutions here.
Yes, thank you for the clarification, and I say again, my comments were made with no ill will.
I am very interested in this particular issue, so I will be keen to read what you have said on it and also what you may say in the coming months and years, especially since Putin is closer to the end of his public life than the beginning. I am deeply curious as to how his successor will deal with Germany and Europe.
Thanks again, Ricardo, and no problem at all. I'm admittedly a bit "sensitive" nowadays due to the barrage of attacks that I've experienced from NRPRs. I also hope that my report will be published by the conference organizers or they'll permit me to publish it on my own so that I can share it with you all.
There's nothing new as I said since I already informed my readers about these three threats in general, but I go into a level of detail that I haven't done here because it's unrealistic to write reports of that length on a regular basis. I only went as far into detail as I did due to it being passed along to state institutions.
The topic was geostrategic threats to Russia till 2050, and the three that I elaborated on in detail were Potemkinism further tainting Russia's already broken feedback loops, the Neo-Reagan Doctrine rolling back Russian influence worldwide, and the need to maintain Russia's Sino-Indo balancing act, so pretty much everything that I've already shared with my readers but in very specific detail and formatted in a way that appeals to Russian experts and diplomats per my experience in the first's community and my time at MGIMO (which is run by the MFA).
As part of the second section, I also covered the "cordon sanitaire" that's forming around Russia in the Arctic, Central & Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Northeast Asia (as led by Japan).
It was in this context that I elaborated in detail on last year's proposal regarding Poland and Germany with reference to Medvedev's magnum opus warning about the latter's remilitarization.
It's anyone's guess whether my proposals will be implemented, but I did my best to help Russia in the best way that I knew how and sincerely hope that at least some of my advice, even if only regarding the need to abandon Potemkinism, will be applied.
And just to elaborate a bit on the dangers inherent in continuing Potemkinist narratives, I've spoken to foreign experts who provide input to their country's policymakers via their respective institutions and they've fallen for some of these claims, which in turn risked them misleading policymakers regarding Russia.
So the danger is very real in fact and has already manifested itself through the "confusion" that one close Russian partner in particular has regarding the way in which certain subjects of sensitivity to bilateral relations are portrayed by provably state-affiliated "Non-Russian Pro-Russian" influencers (especially on state media).
I won't go any further, but I've done my best in my own personal capacity to clarify Russia's actual policy, including through detailed descriptions of Potemkinism and examples of it being applied in other ways that provably contradict Russia's official policies yet nothing is done to change them either. It's really a problem.
Ooooh no, Ricardo. You breaking into the delicate word of international relationships like a wild bull of the Pampa. This is a very-very complex issue where context on various levels, economic issues, military strength and history all has to be very carefully considered. The hardest subject I have seen some time ago.
Not many people in Europe want both a federal Europe and one under German domination. There are the usual federalist idiots who dream of their federal chimera, believing it will save their countries from the dustbin of history where simple demography has thrown them. After that, everyone has their own historical sensitivity. Central Europe sees this federation as a kind of big, impotent softie, like the Holy Roman Empire once was. The Nordics see it more as a dictatorship of merchant plutocracy, like the Hanseatic League. Others, like France, dream that it will be an extension of the French 'Republican model.' The Germans have put their Bismarckian pickelhaube back on. And finally, Southern Europe doesn't count. For decades, they have been left in second class, even third.
Germany has the largest population, by far the largest number of speakers, and its economy is by far the strongest. For the European ruling classes, since Germany has been a slave to the USA for 80 years, they are reassured that German control guarantees US servitude and prohibits any true sovereignty that deviates from the Anglo‑Saxon neoliberal imperial model that makes them the new aristocrats.
The Poles want European money, the US army, and to be treated as if their recent economic rise were the fruit of their own merit alone. This is more a whim due to a monstrous inferiority complex than a real national geostrategic vision.