Poland Might Be Seeking American Approval To Conventionally Intervene In Ukraine

So long as World War III doesn’t occur by miscalculation, then rump Ukraine would remain formally under its representatives’ political control regardless of whoever they may be by then, while the western part that used to be part of Poland would fall under its “sphere of economic influence”. Formal reincorporation is unlikely though for socio-economic reasons, let alone the lack of public support, though a confederation of some kind could eventually take shape at a later time.

Polish President Duda and Prime Minister Tusk met with Biden in DC to commemorate their country’s quarter-century in NATO, during which time these fierce political rivals lobbied for more Ukraine aid in what Politico described as an “absolutely unique sign of political unity”. Although Deputy Defense Minister Wziatek recently contradicted Foreign Minister Sikorski’s implied support of French President Macron’s proposal for NATO to conventionally intervene in Ukraine, this scenario still can’t be ruled out.

President Putin just warned in an interview that aired the day after those leaders met that:

“If, let's say, Polish troops enter the Ukrainian territory to - as it is said - protect the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, for example, or in some other places in order to free up Ukrainian military contingents to participate in hostilities on the line of contact, then I think that Polish troops will never leave. Well, it seems so to me.

Because they will want to return... they are dreaming, they want to return those lands that they consider historically theirs, and which were taken away from them by the Father of Nations, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, and transferred to Ukraine. Of course, they want them back. And if official Polish units enter there, they are unlikely to leave.”

His assessment will now be analyzed in light of recent developments in order to appraise its accuracy.

It was explained last July “How Poland Is Slyly Taking Control Of Western Ukraine” through economic means instead of military ones because the former are considered to be much more cost-effective and less risky. Meanwhile, this piece here from January explained why Hungarian and Romanian populists’ plans to reincorporate the lands that their nations lost to Ukraine is unlikely due to the difficulty posed by their totally different post-World War II demographics, which is also relevant for Poland.

By mid-February, however, the military-strategic calculations drastically changed after Russia’s victory in Avdeevka made it more likely than ever that it might achieve a breakthrough across the Line of Contact (LOC) by sometime later this year. It was this development that prompted Macron to publicly propose a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine’s support in order to prevent that country’s collapse and draw a red line in the sand as far east as possible to stop the Russian steamroller in that scenario.

Most Western leaders reacted coolly to his suggest with the notable exception of the Baltic States and Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski, though the latter’s implied support of this proposal came after a week after Tusk said that this isn’t in the cards and was then contradicted by the Deputy Defense Minister. Nevertheless, this analysis here argued that Tusk’s reluctance is due to the fear that Poland could be hung out to dry by NATO if its forces clashed with Russia, hence the need to secure American approval.

Absent that, Poland might feel more confident participating in this mission together with at least nuclear-armed France and the UK, who could resort to nuclear brinksmanship in the event that the US advises NATO as a whole not to consider extending Article 5 over members’ troops in a third country. The best-case scenario from Poland’s perspective, however, is that American approves this mission and agrees to the aforementioned legally dubious interpretation in order to have its back if that happens.

Poland’s bipartisan pathological fear of Russia is why Duda and Tusk might take their “absolutely unique sign of political unity” to the next level by agreeing to conventionally intervene in Ukraine to stop the Russian steamroller should the frontlines collapse in the coming future. Formally reincorporating the erstwhile Second Polish Republic’s lands that it lost to Ukraine after 1939 might not be feasible for socio-economic reasons and a lack of public support, however, but a prolonged military presence is possible.

To explain, the Polish economy sharply slowed last year and the European Council on Foreign Relations’ poll from January showed that 40% of Poles regard Ukrainians as a threat, which is the highest anywhere among the 12 European countries that they surveyed and beats Kiev-skeptic Hungary by 3%. The formal reincorporation of what are nowadays the Ukrainian Oblasts of Lvov, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopol, Volyn, and Rivne would bring over 6 million Ukrainians into Poland per their total estimated 2022 populations.

In a country of approximately 37 million people that’s been ethno-religiously homogenous since World War II, that would increase the population to around 43 million and lead to over 1/8 of its citizens being minorities, whose socio-economic security would be provided for by pre-“reunification” taxpayers. Socio-economic development in post-1945 Poland would almost certainly be neglected in favor of rebuilding these “recovered territories” and helping their people meet Poland’s associated standards.

It's therefore easy to see why this wouldn’t be popular with the masses, 40% of whom already view Ukrainians as a threat, not to mention Poland’s beloved farmers who are already blockading the border in order to prevent the influx of cheap Ukrainian agricultural products from destroying their livelihoods. For that reason, it’s unlikely that either Duda or Tusk would move forward with such plans, but a prolonged military presence there is an altogether different matter that they’d likely agree to.

What President Putin said about Polish troops “protect[ing] the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, for example, or in some other places in order to free up Ukrainian military contingents to participate in hostilities on the line of contact” is credible due to that being in Poland’s military-strategic interests. They could also help maintain law and order should the state collapse if Russia achieves a breakthrough across the LOC, which could prevent an influx of Ukrainian migrants/refugees and stop arms smuggling.

Just as importantly, these Polish troops could secure their country’s envisaged “sphere of economic influence” in Western Ukraine from encroachment by the G7 ahead of that bloc’s reported plans to appoint a special envoy there that would likely be tasked with divvying up spheres between them. Not only that, but Duda and Tusk might have promised Biden that approval of a conventional Polish intervention in Ukraine could see Warsaw use some of its profits from there to purchase more US arms.

France, Germany, and the UK have their own arms industries and are thus unlikely to reinvest a portion of their Ukrainian-derived profits in the US’, so Washington has a natural financial incentive to support Warsaw defending its own envisaged “sphere” there by approving its conventional intervention. If that’s indeed what Duda and Tusk sought during their meeting with Biden and the US agrees to not to hang Poland out to dry, then this dangerous scenario might materialize sooner than later.

So long as World War III doesn’t occur by miscalculation, then rump Ukraine would remain formally under its representatives’ political control regardless of whoever they may be by then, while the western part that used to be part of Poland would fall under its “sphere of economic influence”. Formal reincorporation is unlikely though for the socio-economic reasons that were explained, let alone the lack of public support, though a confederation of some kind could eventually take shape at a later time.