Poland’s De Facto Blockade Of Ukraine Is Its Outgoing Government’s Last Power Play
This is also Poland’s last realistic chance to defend its territorial integrity in the face of the coming years’ threats.
Poland is poised to become Germany’s largest-ever vassal state upon former Prime Minister and European Commission President Donald Tusk’s likely return to the premiership following the liberal-globalist opposition coalition’s victory in last month’s elections. Those who are interested in learning more about how this is expected to unfold should review this analysis here, which focuses on how the interplay between EU, German, and NATO policies will likely lead to this geopolitical outcome.
Since that fateful vote took place, Polish truckers now even farmers have imposed a de facto blockade against Ukraine that the outgoing government hasn’t broken, which can be regarded as that party’s last power play aimed at giving their country a fighting chance at preserving some of its sovereignty. Here’s a collection of news items about this development from the beginning of the month in order to bring readers up to speed since the Western media hasn’t given it the attention that it deserves:
* “EU state blocking Ukrainian vehicles – Spiegel”
* “Ukrainian envoy condemns Polish trucker blockade”
* “Protesters in EU state blocking aid to Kiev – Ukrainian official”
* “Polish farmers to join Ukraine blockade – Bloomberg”
* “Ukrainians warned of food shortages”
* “Ukraine counting costs of Polish border blockade”
* “Polish truckers blocking Ukraine military cargos – media”
This scenario was actually forecast in early October in the author’s piece about how “Morawiecki Suspects That Zelensky Struck A Deal With Germany Behind Poland’s Back”. It was predicted that Poland could impose a de facto blockade against Ukraine if the ruling party won in order to coerce that country into distancing itself from Germany to a degree, which sought to replace Poland’s desired sphere of influence there as part of its regional power play against it. Here’s the pertinent excerpt from that piece:
“Poland could threaten to stop the transit of third countries’ (especially Germany’s) military and economic aid to Ukraine until Kiev pays restitution for [the Przewodow incident] in the form of institutionalizing its envisaged sphere of influence there. What’s being proposed is a remix of the 1938 ultimatum that Poland gave to Lithuania, albeit this time without the implied threat of armed force if Ukraine doesn’t agree. Nevertheless, the threat of cutting off that country’s military and economic lifeline would likely be sufficient for coercing Kiev into complying with Warsaw’s demands.”
As it turned out, Poland did indeed impose a de facto blockade against Ukraine, though the ruling party and its potential allies failed to win the majority of parliamentary seats during last month’s elections. Nevertheless, their refusal to break up the trucker-farmer blockade of that former Soviet Republic strongly implies tacit approval for it, and nobody should be surprised if it’s later revealed that that they played a role in organizing this behind the scenes to some extent.
From the outgoing government’s perspective, the restoration of Poland’s sphere of influence over Ukraine in the face of aggressive German attempts to replace it is required for their country to have a fighting chance at preserving its sovereignty vis-à-vis Germany during Tusk’s next premiership. Even though he’s expected to subordinate Poland to German hegemony as the hyperlinked analysis at the beginning of this piece explained, this desired geopolitical reversal could impede that.
To elaborate, the worst-case scenario for Poland is that it becomes Germany’s largest-ever vassal state and then plays second fiddle to Ukraine in Berlin’s envisaged “Mitteleuropa”, which would run the risk of Berlin rewarding Kiev for forthcoming preferential reconstruction contracts with influence over Warsaw. This could in practice take the form of forcing Poland to accept even more Ukrainian migrants than it already has, all with the intent of them then becoming citizens and forming their own voting bloc.
If these “Weapons of Mass Migration” concentrate along the border region that the briefly lived post-WWI Ukrainian state at one time claimed as its own, then these newfound demographic realities and the creation of a powerful German-backed voting bloc could one day threaten Poland’s territorial integrity. It’s therefore imperative to avert this worst-case scenario through all realistic means possible, ergo why the outgoing government strongly appears to tacitly approve of the ongoing de facto blockade.
If it succeeds in coercing Ukraine into restoring Poland’s sphere of influence over the country that Germany just recently replaced over the summer, ideally by institutionalizing it in some legal form prior to the incumbents leaving office, then Poland’s territorial integrity can more confidently be defended. As regards Tusk’s plans to subordinate Poland to German hegemony, he’ll struggle to do so completely since that would necessitate a full-fledged purge of his country’s permanent bureaucracy.
In particular, he’d have to remove all conservative-nationalists from the military, intelligence, and diplomatic branches thereof (collectively referred as the “deep state”), which is a herculean task that he might possibly attempt but won’t be able to completely implement. Any serious moves in this direction could also provoke large-scale protests or similar such socio-economic disruptions that could be orchestrated by those same forces exactly as they’re suspected of partially orchestrating the blockade.
Just like the liberal-globalist “deep state” worked against Trump’s agenda in the US, so too could Poland’s conservative-nationalist counterparts work against Tusk’s in order to sabotage his goal of subordinating Poland to German hegemony. To be clear, they won’t be able to stop it entirely even in the best-case scenario just like Trump’s “deep state” opponents couldn’t entirely stop his agenda, but they could still largely derail it and buy time till the next elections, which is good enough given the circumstances.
If they don’t restore Poland’s recently lost sphere of influence over Ukraine before handing over control of the government to Tusk, however, then impending threats to Poland’s territorial integrity could become a fait accompli by the time the next polls are held in the worst-case scenario. That’s why the de facto blockade of Ukraine can be regarded not just as the outgoing government’s last power play, but as Poland’s last realistic chance to defend its territorial integrity in the face of the coming years’ threats.