Poles’ Support For Poland Helping The Balts If Russia Attacks Might Come With Some Caveats

The recent poll that showed overwhelming support for this policy doesn’t detail the nature of Russia’s hypothetical aggression nor of Poland’s help, both of which could widely vary depending on the circumstances, thus meaning that the result is nowhere near as clear-cut as it’s being presented.

Notes From Poland drew attention to the scandal caused by former Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak, who now serves as the conservative opposition’s parliamentary leader, after he was noncommittal when asked whether Polish troops should help the Baltic States if Russia attacks them. He told Radio ZET that “Polish soldiers should defend Poland. We need to be strong in our alliances…We should prioritise cooperation with the United States.”

Notes From Poland added that “With the interviewer continuing to press the question, Błaszczak simply said that ‘it all depends on the circumstances’ and ‘it’s not a straightforward issue’.” Their report then mentioned the pushback that he received from the ruling liberal coalition and cited the results from a survey on this subject that Radio ZET commissioned afterwards asking Poles the following question: “In the event of possible Russian aggression, should Poland help Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia?”

77.8% said yes, 16.1% said no, and 6.1% were unsure. The huge support among Poles for their country “helping” the Baltic States “in the event of Russian aggression” might come with some caveats, however, since the nature of the Russian aggression isn’t described nor is Poland’s help. For instance, aggression could take the form of a hybrid attack, small-scale strikes without any cross-border incursion, a small-scale cross-border incursion, large-scale strikes without any cross-border incursion, or an invasion.

Moreover, the circumstances in which the aforesaid might be authorized aren’t described either, and it can’t be ruled out that they’d be retaliatory actions in response to provocations (including from possible Ukrainian troops or secret agents operating from the Baltic States). Likewise, Polish help could take the form of replicating the Ukrainian model of arms and funds, facilitating allies’ military logistics to the Baltic front, dispatching troops there to stop a Russian invasion, and/or striking Russia and/or Belarus.

Błaszczak was therefore correct in concluding that “it all depends on the circumstances” and “it’s not a straightforward issue”. His reminder during the interview that “We border Russia directly, and we border a Russia that has effectively taken over Belarusian territory. So we’re also on the front line” suggests that he envisages only moderate support if the alleged aggression is only small scale. That’s reasonable, and detailed polling might discover that most Poles hold similar views, but it remains to be confirmed.

Poland’s indispensable role in facilitating allies’ military logistics to the Baltic States during crises and its command of European NATO’s largest army imbue it with outsized influence over their security. It was thus argued that “Poland Would Be The Baltic States’ Best Security Guarantor In NATO 3.0”. If Poland led the Intermarium to become the main European NATO ally with which Russia negotiates the post-war security architecture, then such crises might be averted, thus making questions about its response moot.

If Poland doesn’t become the Baltic States’ security guarantor, then it wouldn’t be able to influence the course of whatever crises might erupt between them and Russia, which would predestine Poland to remain a passive player in major events instead of becoming an active one. The consequence would be that others would shape one of the scenarios most central to Polish security. Poland should therefore strive to take maximum control over its destiny instead of letting others determine it once again.