Its top diplomat there called for the creation of a UN-led peace process, condemned what he considers to be the false equivalence of the rebels with the government, and criticized US sanctions on Sudan.
Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia shared an update on Sudan in late August. He began by drawing attention to the humanitarian implications of its over-three-year-long war as regards internally displaced people and acute food shortages. All international assistance must be delivered in close coordination with the Government of Sudan (GOS), he declared, echoing his country’s traditional position by implying the scenario of others exploiting aid deliveries as a pretext for meddling.
Another of Nebenzia’s points was that the conflict is increasingly affecting Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan, but the Quintet comprising the UN, EU, the AU, the League of Arab States, and IGAD and the Quartet of the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE have yet to achieve anything with their peace efforts. In his view, this is largely because “the Quartet’s actions have essentially boiled down to pressure, blackmail and arm-twisting aimed at forcing the Government of Sudan to make unacceptable concessions.”
He thus called for mediation efforts to begin under UN auspices instead. Nebenzia also condemned what he considered to be the false equivalence of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rebels with the GOS. In his words, “one side is sowing chaos and violence, while the other is essentially conducting an operation to neutralize those who are, in essence, insurgents destroying the country.” He concluded his speech by condemning the US’ latest sanctions on Sudan. Here are ten background briefings on the conflict:
* 11 June 2022: “Analyzing Russia’s Strategic Interests In Sudan”
* 30 September 2022: “America’s Neo-Imperialist Pressure On Sudan Exposes Its True Intentions Towards Africa”
* 16 April 2023: “Sudan’s ‘Deep State’ War Could Have Far-Reaching Geostrategic Consequences If It Continues”
* 21 April 2023: “Here’s Why The US Is Trying To Pin The Blame For Sudan’s ‘Deep State’ War On Russia”
* 27 April 2023: “Russia Is Right: ‘Political Engineering’ From Abroad Is Responsible For The Sudanese Crisis”
* 19 November 2024: “Russia’s Veto Of The UNSC Resolution On Sudan Saved It From A Neocolonialist Plot”
* 21 December 2025: “Russia’s Long-Delayed Sudanese Naval Base Might Be Back On Track”
* 13 January 2026: “Pakistan’s Reportedly Planned Arms Deal With Sudan Presages Problems For The UAE In Africa”
* 25 January 2026: “Why Might Ethiopia One Day Decide To Support Sudan’s ‘Rapid Support Forces’?”
* 6 May 2026: “Egypt & Saudi Arabia Are Pitting Sudan Against Ethiopia”
To briefly summarize the above for readers’ convenience, the US’ “political engineering” of Sudan during its protracted leadership transition exacerbated the already growing rivalry between the GOS and the RSF, after which the US tried to blame Russia in an attempt to roll back its influence there. The UAE has always been the RSF’s patron, while the GOS’ is now a combination of Egypt and the Islamic NATO (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye), which has internationalized this conflict as a regional proxy war.
From the perspective of Russia’s interests, the GOS is the only internationally recognized leadership of the country, so it’s thus the only one that can implement their long-delayed naval base plans. It also controls Port Sudan, the base’s planned location, and retook the capital of Khartoum from the RSF last year. Furthermore, while the RSF’s Emirati patron remains a close Russian partner, more Russian partners support the GOS. These facts contextualize Russia’s decision to also support the GOS against the RSF.
This takes the form of arms exports and diplomatic support, the scale of which might expand depending on the conflict’s dynamics, but direct support such as the dispatch of the Africa Corps isn’t expected. That’s because they’re busy fighting terrorism in Mali and the GOS’ regional patrons can more easily provide such support if Khartoum requests it. That might happen once the Third Gulf War finally ends as the Islamic NATO’s first decisive show of force in partnership with Egypt (if it’s not a member by then).
The irony is that the U.S. initially provoked the conflict by sidelining the SAF–RSF alliance (Transitional Sovereignty Council junta) in favor of the civilian PM Hamdok. Then the U.S. manipulated both Burhan and Hemedti into fighting each other, eventually goading the former into hitting the RSF. The Biden administration was rather hostile toward both military actors yet leaned toward Burhan at times.
So the fact that Russia now backs the central Sudanese authorities is a bit amusing, given that the latter are backed by key "Islamic NATO" states—part of a concept that threatens Russian interests from the Sahel to South–Central Asia. Right now Russia should favor either a political solution or back the RSF aggressively rather than condemn the latter as it has.