Rubio & Vance Are A Masterful Good Cop, Bad Cop Duo Vis-à-vis The EU

The first more softly criticizes them and conveys “politically inconvenient” realities with a bit more tact while the second is much harsher and comparatively uncouth.

Rubio’s speech at this year’s Munich Security Conference was loudly cheered by the Europeans, some of whom sharply contrasted it with Vance’s from the year prior, which they considered insulting. Vance had chastised them for their embrace of liberal-globalist policies such as radical climate change ones, mass migration, and the persecution of conservative-nationalists, et al. Rubio said much of the same, however, he just did it in a more diplomatic way while also admitting that the US made these policy mistakes too.

In the intervening year between their speeches, Trump imposed tariffs on the EU to coerce them into a lopsided trade deal, re-engaged Russia and thus spooked the Europeans into fearing that he’ll cut a deal with Putin at their perceived expense, and threatened Denmark over Greenland, among other moves. These cumulatively had the effect of humbling the EU and making its leaders realize that their bloc is subordinate to the US in the new world order that Trump 2.0 envisages building.

Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever explicitly acknowledged this reality when remarking at Davos that “Being a happy vassal is one thing. Being a miserable slave is something else.” Vance’s speech was such a shock to the Europeans due to how direct he was with is criticisms, them still somewhat remaining in denial over Trump’s return to office, and their obsession at the time with dwelling on how difficult Trans-Atlantic ties were during his first time. This context arguably shaped their reaction to his speech.

Rubio’s was viewed by the Europeans as more reassuring after they’d already managed to reach a modus vivendi with Trump 2.0 by then, not to mention his much more diplomatic approach towards leveling almost the same criticisms as Vance, which is why it was perceived much more positively. In all actuality, however, nothing has changed; top US officials are still criticizing the EU over its liberal-globalist policies, the US is still subordinating the EU, and the US still does what it wants no matter what the EU thinks.

Rubio and Vance are therefore functioning as a masterful good cop, bad cop duo vis-à-vis the EU whereby the first more softly criticizes them and conveys “politically inconvenient” realities with a bit more tact while the second is much harsher and comparatively uncouth. In a sense, despite being a conservative, Rubio is seen as more “European” by the European liberal-globalists than Vance, who’s considered by them to be a caricature of an American nationalist just like they view Trump as being.

With this in mind, Trump 2.0 can manipulate the Europeans’ perceptions to have Vance or even Trump himself get tough with them whenever the US believes that this is needed and then have Rubio soften the blow, soothe them, and calmly persuade them to comply with the US’ demands. For instance, Vance recently told them to “stop sabotaging themselves” through policies that the US disapproves of, while Rubio could easily spin the demanded reforms as pragmatic adaptations to a new US-led world order.

Whether by design or just the way that everything naturally unfolded, Rubio’s and Vance’s stylistically different engagements with the Europeans have now enabled them to function as a masterful good cop, bad cop duo for most effectively advancing American policy towards the EU. The bloc tacitly accepts its junior partner status vis-à-vis the US but some resentment over this still remains, which could complicate their ties, ergo the importance of Trump 2.0 strategically relying on Rubio for assuaging this as needed.