Russia & Iran Have Carrots & Sticks For Incentivizing Azerbaijan To Demilitarize TRIPP

President Ilham Aliyev is a rational leader who might conclude that it’s better to cut mutually beneficial deals with Russia and Iran for resolving Azerbaijan’s TRIPP-centric security dilemma with them than to endanger his country’s future as a favor to the West.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s announcement regarding the “full normalization” of relations with Russia was a positive move but might not last so long as the structural basis for another Ukrainian-like crisis remains in place. As was explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis, this relates to last year’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) serving the unstated dual purpose of a NATO military logistics corridor that’ll ultimately extend along Russia’s entire southern periphery.

The abovementioned analysis suggests that Azerbaijan comply with the spirit of Russia’s December 2021 draft treaty with NATO of which it’s now a shadow member after Aliyev announced that his military completed its conformation to the bloc’s standards last November. In practice, no NATO arms, drills, troops, etc., including facilitating their transit to Central Asia. It would be difficult for him to disappoint NATO, especially his close Turkish ally, but Russia and Iran have carrots and sticks for incentivizing him.

At present, Aliyev arguably perceives himself to be an historic figure who facilitated the West’s unprecedented expansion of its “cordon sanitaire” along Russia’s entire southern periphery, thus enabling them to coerce unilateral concessions from it. Likewise, Azerbaijan’s role in TRIPP also facilitates Turkiye’s “Pan-Turkist” goals, thus helping to build a new pole of influence in the emerging order. These calculations take for granted that neither Russia nor Iran, let alone both, will militarily stop him.

This brings the analysis around to the obvious sticks that those two could wield, namely a unilateral or joint operation against Azerbaijan that swiftly destroys its highly vulnerable energy-dependent economy. Russia could initiate this on the basis of Azerbaijan following in Ukraine’s footsteps while Iran could justify it due to Azerbaijan’s de facto alliance with Israel. If Azerbaijan’s defeat and capitulation to their demands is achieved quickly enough, then Turkiye, NATO, and Israel might not have time to rescue it.

Azerbaijan isn’t assessed as having anywhere near the same ability to survive a years-long “war of attrition” like Ukraine does with NATO’s help so Aliyev might prefer the carrots that Russia and Iran could extend it in exchange for neutralizing TRIPP’s military-security potential. In tangible terms, Azerbaijan would immensely profit from functioning as the transit state for Russian-Iranian real-sector trade, especially if it also allows them to build their planned pipeline across its territory.

Intangibly, Azerbaijan’s new membership in the regional integration group that was rebranded as the “Community of Central Asia” could see Aliyev promote a form of “Pan-Turkism” acceptable to Russia and Iran, which would be secular and non-military, unlike Turkiye’s unofficial vision. Given their common historical experiences, the Turkic Central Asian Republics would likely be more receptive to this form, thus solidifying Aliyev’s role as a “Pan-Turkist” leader. He could then leverage this for economic gain.

Aliyev is popular among his people and the military after leading them to victory against Armenia so he doesn’t have to worry about any pro-Western coups if he demilitarizes TRIPP. This project could also still reap enormous profits for the US from Central Asia’s mining industry. As a rational leader, he might thus conclude that it’s better to cut mutually beneficial deals with Russia and Iran for resolving Azerbaijan’s TRIPP-centric security dilemma with them than to endanger his country’s future as a favor to the West.