Russia Is Fine-Tuning Its State Interethnic Policy

This represents a model for managing multiculturalism in historically diverse countries.

Putin announced during a meeting of the Council on Interethnic Relations, which was held the day after National Unity Day in early November, that Russia must fine-tune its State Interethnic Policy. He warned that foreign spy agencies are actively working to exploit identity divisions, both ethnic and religious. “The migration factor”, as he phrased it, contributes to this. Although not mentioned in his remarks, it’s relevant to add that the FSB thwarted a plot last month to manipulate anti-Israeli sentiment to this end.

The other threat that Putin brought up was the rhetoric about “decolonizing” Russia, which the US Government’s “Helsinki Commission” began to actively push in summer 2022 and was later picked up by former Polish President Andrzej Duda two years later. Readers can learn more about that here and here. These forces’ end goal is a so-called “post-Russia”, which Putin described as “a territory stripped of its sovereignty and split into small fragments subordinate to the West.”

This political fantasy could only come about through the destruction of the Russian people. Accordingly, Putin warned that “the ideology of aggressive Russophobia is spearheaded against all peoples of our country, because there is no Russia without the Russian people, the Russian ethnos and the Russian factor.” In reverse order, the last threat is being thwarted by “nurturing and protecting” the “Russian identity, the traditions, culture and language of our state-forming people”, ethnic Russians.

As for counteracting plots to “decolonize” Russia, Putin called for more sociological research into interethnic and interreligious relations at the community, city, and regional levels along with the creation of “precision tools” for preemptively averting conflicts and promptly dealing with those that arise. He also suggested empowering regional leaders in this regard and fostering closer work between them and local officials. It’s assumed that social media and other forms of monitoring will likely be employed.

The last main threat to Russian unity, “the migration factor”, is already being dealt with through more stringent controls on foreign guest workers and better enforcement of existing laws. This dimension of Russia’s State Interethnic Policy has been prioritized since spring 2024’s Crocus terrorist attack. It’s important to note in connection with this that Putin and the Patriarch reminded Russians that ethno-religious hate speech is unacceptable. Article 282 of the Criminal Code is also directed against this.

Putin’s approach to fine-tuning Russia’s State Interethnic Policy will be bolstered by “do[ing] everything to strengthen our unity…our civil and national identity, which encompasses both state and Russian identity.” Moreover, he acknowledged that “Many conflicts are natural” and advised that “we have no right, especially today, to inflate any, even seemingly small, disagreements. We should do the opposite.” Calm and proportional responses to emerging and nascent identity conflicts will thus become the norm.

What Putin proposed is basically a model for managing multiculturalism in historically diverse countries. The primary threats to them are uncontrolled migration, Balkanization plots, and discrimination against their state-forming people, all of which are exacerbated by external forces that seek to exploit “natural” conflicts between identity groups as they arise together with provoking them. The response to each will vary in substance due to each country’s uniqueness but is expected to follow Russia’s lead as explained.