Reference Vietnam, that leaves the question of why, if there was little to gain, the US went in in the first place.
The fact remains that the US committed itself and then, due to internal instability, had to withdraw even though, as we know, Tet 68 was a tactical US victory. The same thing is true of both the Soviet and US fiascoes in A…
Reference Vietnam, that leaves the question of why, if there was little to gain, the US went in in the first place.
The fact remains that the US committed itself and then, due to internal instability, had to withdraw even though, as we know, Tet 68 was a tactical US victory. The same thing is true of both the Soviet and US fiascoes in Afghanistan.
The political class is powerful and, yes, it can get its way, despite popular opposition, in many cases. But not in all. And prosecuting a war with Russia in Ukraine with very low levels of public support from the get-go is a political trap few American pols will be willing to enter.
Moreover, without the US as the central power of a "peace-keeping" force in Ukraine, I can't imagine the whole thing even getting off the ground. Look at what's going on in Romania as we speak. Even if Georgescu is successfully kept out of power, Romania is a weak reed (just like it was for the Third Reich in WW II.)
Bottom line for me: If and when we actually see some discernible preparations for a NATO forced entry into Ukraine under the guise of peace-keeping, then I'll start to take it seriously.
Yes, the West is in a bind. It does view Ukraine as somehow existential. But at the same time, it lacks the political will to retool its defense industry or to intervene in the conflict directly. Trump appears to think he can cut that Gordian knot, but I'm doubtful.
And I do think that it was assumed that rolling Russia out of Ukraine would be easy. After all, the rest of Eastern Europe and even Estonia, on Saint Petersburg's doorstep, had seemed amazingly easy. But of course, for those willing to look at the reality, all the signals were there that Ukraine and Belarus were viewed in a very different light by the Russians.
Well, if NATO sees it as an easy war, then they certainly will jump in, once the supply of warm live Ukrainian bodies to soak up Russian munitions starts to run low.
It seemed easy to Victoria Nuland and the political/media class up to 2014. Then, it seemed that West could build up the UAF and let them terminate the DPR and LPR while Russia was forced to watch. Then it seemed that the Russian army was a joke and in the process of collapse.
Now, it no longer looks easy, and I don't think the West really knows what to do to salvage Ukraine.
I dpn;t think anyone thought that the Russian army was a joke in 2014. The idea was that Ukraine would steamroll the DNR and LNR without giving Russia a chance to intervene. That is why Ukraine did not dare make a move on Crimea - because the Russians already were there.
And when Russia attacked in 2022, the assumption was that they would be in Kiev in days or hours. Now the West talks of Russia as a joke.
I was referring to 2022 at the nadir of the Russian war effort in the summer-fall.
I guess I wasn't very clear. I meant to convey the idea that up through the anti-Yanukovych coup in early 2014, Nuland et al thought that manipulating Ukrainian politics to detach Ukraine from any link to Russia would be easy and was going along swimmingly. Then after the cold water of Crimea and the partial success of the DPR/LPR forces, they began to think it would be easy, under Minsk 2, to build up the UAF so it could eventually overwhelm the rebels while Russia would be forced to watch helplessly. Then after the shock of the Russian invasion, the problems of the Russian Army made them think, by the fall of 2022, that it would be easy to use the "amazing" Ukrainian army to defeat Russia and destabilize Putin.
But now, things no longer look easy, and I don't see anything in prospect that could be taken by the West as a new source of optimism.
Reference Vietnam, that leaves the question of why, if there was little to gain, the US went in in the first place.
The fact remains that the US committed itself and then, due to internal instability, had to withdraw even though, as we know, Tet 68 was a tactical US victory. The same thing is true of both the Soviet and US fiascoes in Afghanistan.
The political class is powerful and, yes, it can get its way, despite popular opposition, in many cases. But not in all. And prosecuting a war with Russia in Ukraine with very low levels of public support from the get-go is a political trap few American pols will be willing to enter.
Moreover, without the US as the central power of a "peace-keeping" force in Ukraine, I can't imagine the whole thing even getting off the ground. Look at what's going on in Romania as we speak. Even if Georgescu is successfully kept out of power, Romania is a weak reed (just like it was for the Third Reich in WW II.)
Bottom line for me: If and when we actually see some discernible preparations for a NATO forced entry into Ukraine under the guise of peace-keeping, then I'll start to take it seriously.
The US entered Vietnam because they thought it to be an easy win.
I don't think anyone serious considers Ukraine an easy win. But the West has already poured so much into Ukraine that it is now existential.
Yes, the West is in a bind. It does view Ukraine as somehow existential. But at the same time, it lacks the political will to retool its defense industry or to intervene in the conflict directly. Trump appears to think he can cut that Gordian knot, but I'm doubtful.
And I do think that it was assumed that rolling Russia out of Ukraine would be easy. After all, the rest of Eastern Europe and even Estonia, on Saint Petersburg's doorstep, had seemed amazingly easy. But of course, for those willing to look at the reality, all the signals were there that Ukraine and Belarus were viewed in a very different light by the Russians.
Well, we'll see.
Well, if NATO sees it as an easy war, then they certainly will jump in, once the supply of warm live Ukrainian bodies to soak up Russian munitions starts to run low.
It seemed easy to Victoria Nuland and the political/media class up to 2014. Then, it seemed that West could build up the UAF and let them terminate the DPR and LPR while Russia was forced to watch. Then it seemed that the Russian army was a joke and in the process of collapse.
Now, it no longer looks easy, and I don't think the West really knows what to do to salvage Ukraine.
I dpn;t think anyone thought that the Russian army was a joke in 2014. The idea was that Ukraine would steamroll the DNR and LNR without giving Russia a chance to intervene. That is why Ukraine did not dare make a move on Crimea - because the Russians already were there.
And when Russia attacked in 2022, the assumption was that they would be in Kiev in days or hours. Now the West talks of Russia as a joke.
I was referring to 2022 at the nadir of the Russian war effort in the summer-fall.
I guess I wasn't very clear. I meant to convey the idea that up through the anti-Yanukovych coup in early 2014, Nuland et al thought that manipulating Ukrainian politics to detach Ukraine from any link to Russia would be easy and was going along swimmingly. Then after the cold water of Crimea and the partial success of the DPR/LPR forces, they began to think it would be easy, under Minsk 2, to build up the UAF so it could eventually overwhelm the rebels while Russia would be forced to watch helplessly. Then after the shock of the Russian invasion, the problems of the Russian Army made them think, by the fall of 2022, that it would be easy to use the "amazing" Ukrainian army to defeat Russia and destabilize Putin.
But now, things no longer look easy, and I don't see anything in prospect that could be taken by the West as a new source of optimism.