for framing these recollections as an assessment of the status quo between two players—both of whom must unfortunately be considered utterly unreliable and prone to ruthless power politics. That said, the Saudi political model—fueled by vast wealth and requiring no significant social spending—has no need for war to sustain itself.
The fact that American weapons stockpiles would become largely worthless in the event of an escalation contrary to US interests—simply because the software lacks the necessary authorization—is a single point that, for me, directly negates at least two of the points you listed, and creates a cascading effect that invalidates the rest.
Consequently, I view the Arab states' courting of the US as a major victory for the US in maintaining its hegemony.
It remains a mystery to me why none of these countries seem to grasp a simple fact:
Weapons produced in the West—even when exported—ultimately serve only one master: the USA.
The West is the worst possible supplier, and by far the most expensive one, too.
The question that arises for me regarding this "Arab NATO" concerns the role of Pakistan, which has skillfully positioned itself between the competing interests of China and the US. After all, Pakistan purchases a staggering 60%—or more—of all Chinese arms exports.
I believe this could be a decisive factor regarding the "Islamic NATO" (which, so far, is merely another vehicle for arms exports).
US weapons fighting against US weapons has always been in the US interest. However, if geopolitics brings a player into the mix against whom simply switching off weapon systems won't work, things get a lot more volatile. And the moment there is a shift toward the "petroyuan," the risk of immediate war would skyrocket—because, as history has shown time and again, the US tends to start bombing indiscriminately.
I think the complex situation between the US and the Saudis—which you summarized so well—must be viewed within the broader context of Pakistan, the quintessential "geopolitically dual state." The assessment regarding Saudi Arabia holds true as long as Pakistan continues to act as a stabilizer, as it currently does. However, should the US lash out because Pakistan is becoming an unyielding hub for China, Pakistan could just as easily find itself at the center of a negative dynamic—in other words, in the US crosshairs.
Since the ousting of Musharraf—a type of event that rarely ends well in other regions—Pakistan has been the positive surprise of the last 15 years.
And let us not forget: Pakistan is a nuclear power.
I generally agree except I'm very critical of the ruling arrangement that followed Imran Khan's ouster, which I consider to have been a post-modern coup for placing into power a pro-US de facto military dictatorship.
I view developments since the time of Imran Khan—whom I trusted even less than Musharraf—with the same critical eye.
That makes the positive turn of events all the more surprising to me.
There is likely one inherent factor in this development:
The US influence on Pakistan’s domestic politics—specifically regarding destabilization and regime change whenever the incumbent leader stops playing ball.
However, I do not think Pakistan will submit here. No more than Iran would.
They are keeping their options open.
Otherwise, they wouldn't be buying so many weapons from China—likely at a very favorable price driven by geopolitics.
Next factor: What if Tehran manages to strengthen its historic ties with Islamabad—ties rooted in some of the oldest shared origins in civilized world history, including linguistically?
That is a razor’s edge to walk, especially since Islamabad is, as mentioned, a nuclear power.
And this brings me back to Kim: nuclear bombs (like those Pakistan possesses) offer protection against US bombs.
Whether the Saudis—as Wahhabis representing a distinct minority—can continue playing their own game here, or whether they will be forced to cooperate with regional Shiite forces, is not merely a military question; it is even more a religious one, given the deep-seated animosity between Shiites and Sunnis.
In short: reconciliation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Alevis would spell the end for the US in this region.
That explains many of the wars fought there.
And that is hardly a new insight, is it?
That is why I consider it a mistake for the Saudis to cooperate with the US—a nation that brings war.
This comment is beautifully written, and very thoughtful. I am, truthfully, bewildered that Saudi Arabia seems so gullible, and accepting of whatever the US proposes. Clearly they know better; know how they are only pawns that will receive no support when needed; and that the US is completely untrustworthy. Why do they continue to subjugate themselves when they could be a major force in establishing a new, independent, regional security architecture?
If KSA tried to use its leverage against the U.S., the U.S. would simply steal of all its dollar holdings, and if necessary, take over the country and steal its oil.
Knowing Trump's seeming egotistical and temperamental nature (I'd say it's at least unclear how much of both are performative for a purpose on behalf of an agenda), his remarks can be seen as 1/ unwise and creating unnecessary enmity in an ally, 2/ intentionally creating enmity with what may soon be an ex-ally, or 3/ conveying that he has intelligence suggesting a potential betrayal and warning KSM to move carefully.
As events are playing out in global energy markets, I'm beginning to suspect more intentionality and less irrationality in Trump's pronouncements. Based on his public statements and erratic behavior, Trump is rather easy to dismiss as unserious. But adversaries are always wise to treat their competitors with the utmost caution and to always search for an obfuscated agenda.
Agreed. Behind the clownish and apparently self-destructive antics of Trump, I think I see the shadowy outline of a rational Eldridge Colby master plan.
I suspect Colby is one of the very few in the US administration that is actually capable of strategic thinking. But that simply cannot compensate for 40 years of abject failures in what the military industrial complex produces (or doesn't)...
Saudi Arabia did invest not hundreds, but thousands of billions of Dollars in US assets. Ever since the 1930ies when Oil was discovered in Saudi soil.
From enormous stretches of farmland and cattle, to entire skyscrapers, to tourist resorts, to cutting edge Silicon Valley Tech firms, to worthless Government Bonds, their investments are endless. Trump can steal (no, it's called "freezing") all of this overnight.
So their only option is to remain good puppies. De-investing would take app. 10 years, and their security aparatus, the machine that keeps the royals alive, is infested with British SAS and US SpecOps personnel.
If any Arab king ever tries to de-invest, his wonderful "security" forces will definitely kill him.
Concerning 2. and 3.: where else would thr Tragic Kingdom get arms ans invest piles of cash? The whole rationale behind the clownish Saudi investment projects was to find somewhere internal to park fat stacks.
Concerning 5.: why would the Saudis accumulate huge piles of currency that isn't freely convertible?
Concerning 4 (I think): the Saudis aren't going to lead anything, except by buying.
They are used, or more than ten centuries, to be dominated by a strong foreigner. They are big big, big masters of Taqiya. And something is absolutely sure, if there is a country in the world which hate USA, it's Saudi Arabia. Much much more than Iran or North Korea.
It will take time, a lot of time( Saudis are patient) but each of the thousands offenses that USA made to Arabia, will be paid.
KSA's only wealth, however, is oil, which makes it vulnerable to price and demand shocks. As for its projection of US power across the Ummah, I imagine that Iran is about to take its place as the main power in the region once the US is kicked out, as appears to be happening step-by-step.
What about it? The Japanese supposedly owned half of America in the 1980s...until it didn't. Investments can change if the valuations change, and I imagine that US defense technology is increasingly looking like a bad investment.
That really isn't the impression I am getting - - many, many arms orders, even those that have been paid for, are on hold: "Sorry, it will be several years before we can deliver what you ordered" "Sure, you can buy F-35s - - but they will be delivered without any radar capabilities" etc. "Oh, and by the way, we need to take back the Patriots and THAADS you bought from us, but we will replace them, we promise"
Saudi Arabia's biggest problem is that a) it doesn't trust its own military to not overthrow the royal family and b) it doesn't trust its militaries' competency in any real defensive situation anyway.
The other issue is that they seem spooked by the rise of Green Energy(tm). Eventually there's a risk that their power will erode simply due to reduced demand for oil/gas...long before the fields run out. The EU and China are of course leading electrification. That makes the US and Russia the most sympathetic powers.
The Saudi-US alliance is, strange as it seems, probably one of the stronger geopolitical alliances in terms of match-quality. Trust? Maybe not.
Cowardice and bullying are the dominant features of the KSA - even more so than the USA. The critiques about relying on US weapons ring true. The US does remain dependent on Saudi money and oil. Could the US and Israel simply seize both? Possibly, but I would no longer bet on it.
Certainly if I was the KSA I would be fervently diversifying where I keep my money and where I buy my arms (and nuclear reactors).
After the latest double cross insult from Trump I would sign the nuclear power (and enrichment) deal with China overnight. And get them to throw in a big stack of airspace control systems.
One would have thought that Trump would have made Saudi–Israel normalization integral to a nuclear-sharing deal to start with. Perhaps MbS has already agreed to join the Abraham Accords in return.
Still, the Saudis have not done much to support the Iran war; neither has Trump finessed Pakistani or Turkish backing other than diplomacy. (Trump has already recanted his empty threats to level all bridges or power plants.)
Thanks, Andrew,
for framing these recollections as an assessment of the status quo between two players—both of whom must unfortunately be considered utterly unreliable and prone to ruthless power politics. That said, the Saudi political model—fueled by vast wealth and requiring no significant social spending—has no need for war to sustain itself.
The fact that American weapons stockpiles would become largely worthless in the event of an escalation contrary to US interests—simply because the software lacks the necessary authorization—is a single point that, for me, directly negates at least two of the points you listed, and creates a cascading effect that invalidates the rest.
Consequently, I view the Arab states' courting of the US as a major victory for the US in maintaining its hegemony.
It remains a mystery to me why none of these countries seem to grasp a simple fact:
Weapons produced in the West—even when exported—ultimately serve only one master: the USA.
The West is the worst possible supplier, and by far the most expensive one, too.
The question that arises for me regarding this "Arab NATO" concerns the role of Pakistan, which has skillfully positioned itself between the competing interests of China and the US. After all, Pakistan purchases a staggering 60%—or more—of all Chinese arms exports.
I believe this could be a decisive factor regarding the "Islamic NATO" (which, so far, is merely another vehicle for arms exports).
US weapons fighting against US weapons has always been in the US interest. However, if geopolitics brings a player into the mix against whom simply switching off weapon systems won't work, things get a lot more volatile. And the moment there is a shift toward the "petroyuan," the risk of immediate war would skyrocket—because, as history has shown time and again, the US tends to start bombing indiscriminately.
I think the complex situation between the US and the Saudis—which you summarized so well—must be viewed within the broader context of Pakistan, the quintessential "geopolitically dual state." The assessment regarding Saudi Arabia holds true as long as Pakistan continues to act as a stabilizer, as it currently does. However, should the US lash out because Pakistan is becoming an unyielding hub for China, Pakistan could just as easily find itself at the center of a negative dynamic—in other words, in the US crosshairs.
Since the ousting of Musharraf—a type of event that rarely ends well in other regions—Pakistan has been the positive surprise of the last 15 years.
And let us not forget: Pakistan is a nuclear power.
I generally agree except I'm very critical of the ruling arrangement that followed Imran Khan's ouster, which I consider to have been a post-modern coup for placing into power a pro-US de facto military dictatorship.
Of course it was a coup. Of course the Americans were behind it.
Pakistan will get dragged into America's war.
I view developments since the time of Imran Khan—whom I trusted even less than Musharraf—with the same critical eye.
That makes the positive turn of events all the more surprising to me.
There is likely one inherent factor in this development:
The US influence on Pakistan’s domestic politics—specifically regarding destabilization and regime change whenever the incumbent leader stops playing ball.
However, I do not think Pakistan will submit here. No more than Iran would.
They are keeping their options open.
Otherwise, they wouldn't be buying so many weapons from China—likely at a very favorable price driven by geopolitics.
Next factor: What if Tehran manages to strengthen its historic ties with Islamabad—ties rooted in some of the oldest shared origins in civilized world history, including linguistically?
That is a razor’s edge to walk, especially since Islamabad is, as mentioned, a nuclear power.
And this brings me back to Kim: nuclear bombs (like those Pakistan possesses) offer protection against US bombs.
Whether the Saudis—as Wahhabis representing a distinct minority—can continue playing their own game here, or whether they will be forced to cooperate with regional Shiite forces, is not merely a military question; it is even more a religious one, given the deep-seated animosity between Shiites and Sunnis.
In short: reconciliation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Alevis would spell the end for the US in this region.
That explains many of the wars fought there.
And that is hardly a new insight, is it?
That is why I consider it a mistake for the Saudis to cooperate with the US—a nation that brings war.
Not very smart of the Prince.
The United States has many pressure points over Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Neither will get a choice.
This comment is beautifully written, and very thoughtful. I am, truthfully, bewildered that Saudi Arabia seems so gullible, and accepting of whatever the US proposes. Clearly they know better; know how they are only pawns that will receive no support when needed; and that the US is completely untrustworthy. Why do they continue to subjugate themselves when they could be a major force in establishing a new, independent, regional security architecture?
If KSA tried to use its leverage against the U.S., the U.S. would simply steal of all its dollar holdings, and if necessary, take over the country and steal its oil.
Knowing Trump's seeming egotistical and temperamental nature (I'd say it's at least unclear how much of both are performative for a purpose on behalf of an agenda), his remarks can be seen as 1/ unwise and creating unnecessary enmity in an ally, 2/ intentionally creating enmity with what may soon be an ex-ally, or 3/ conveying that he has intelligence suggesting a potential betrayal and warning KSM to move carefully.
As events are playing out in global energy markets, I'm beginning to suspect more intentionality and less irrationality in Trump's pronouncements. Based on his public statements and erratic behavior, Trump is rather easy to dismiss as unserious. But adversaries are always wise to treat their competitors with the utmost caution and to always search for an obfuscated agenda.
Agreed. Behind the clownish and apparently self-destructive antics of Trump, I think I see the shadowy outline of a rational Eldridge Colby master plan.
Same.
I suspect Colby is one of the very few in the US administration that is actually capable of strategic thinking. But that simply cannot compensate for 40 years of abject failures in what the military industrial complex produces (or doesn't)...
I would be interested in a study of the degree of agency available to vassal states.
Saudi leverage ?
Saudi Arabia did invest not hundreds, but thousands of billions of Dollars in US assets. Ever since the 1930ies when Oil was discovered in Saudi soil.
From enormous stretches of farmland and cattle, to entire skyscrapers, to tourist resorts, to cutting edge Silicon Valley Tech firms, to worthless Government Bonds, their investments are endless. Trump can steal (no, it's called "freezing") all of this overnight.
So their only option is to remain good puppies. De-investing would take app. 10 years, and their security aparatus, the machine that keeps the royals alive, is infested with British SAS and US SpecOps personnel.
If any Arab king ever tries to de-invest, his wonderful "security" forces will definitely kill him.
Concerning 2. and 3.: where else would thr Tragic Kingdom get arms ans invest piles of cash? The whole rationale behind the clownish Saudi investment projects was to find somewhere internal to park fat stacks.
Concerning 5.: why would the Saudis accumulate huge piles of currency that isn't freely convertible?
Concerning 4 (I think): the Saudis aren't going to lead anything, except by buying.
Beware Saudis.
They are used, or more than ten centuries, to be dominated by a strong foreigner. They are big big, big masters of Taqiya. And something is absolutely sure, if there is a country in the world which hate USA, it's Saudi Arabia. Much much more than Iran or North Korea.
It will take time, a lot of time( Saudis are patient) but each of the thousands offenses that USA made to Arabia, will be paid.
It's written.
KSA's only wealth, however, is oil, which makes it vulnerable to price and demand shocks. As for its projection of US power across the Ummah, I imagine that Iran is about to take its place as the main power in the region once the US is kicked out, as appears to be happening step-by-step.
Saudis invest in the all world. It investifed dozens of thousands of billion dollars those last 50 years.
Ask yourself about the part of the western economy that belongs to Saudis and Émiratis.
What about it? The Japanese supposedly owned half of America in the 1980s...until it didn't. Investments can change if the valuations change, and I imagine that US defense technology is increasingly looking like a bad investment.
Not really. The world is clamoring harder than ever for American arms.
That really isn't the impression I am getting - - many, many arms orders, even those that have been paid for, are on hold: "Sorry, it will be several years before we can deliver what you ordered" "Sure, you can buy F-35s - - but they will be delivered without any radar capabilities" etc. "Oh, and by the way, we need to take back the Patriots and THAADS you bought from us, but we will replace them, we promise"
All thatnare signs that the world wants more American arms than America can deliver.
If there is any truth to the allegations about "Operation Sandman", then Saudi Arabia might indeed be the catalyst for the collapse of the dollar...
Saudi Arabia's biggest problem is that a) it doesn't trust its own military to not overthrow the royal family and b) it doesn't trust its militaries' competency in any real defensive situation anyway.
The other issue is that they seem spooked by the rise of Green Energy(tm). Eventually there's a risk that their power will erode simply due to reduced demand for oil/gas...long before the fields run out. The EU and China are of course leading electrification. That makes the US and Russia the most sympathetic powers.
The Saudi-US alliance is, strange as it seems, probably one of the stronger geopolitical alliances in terms of match-quality. Trust? Maybe not.
Cowardice and bullying are the dominant features of the KSA - even more so than the USA. The critiques about relying on US weapons ring true. The US does remain dependent on Saudi money and oil. Could the US and Israel simply seize both? Possibly, but I would no longer bet on it.
Certainly if I was the KSA I would be fervently diversifying where I keep my money and where I buy my arms (and nuclear reactors).
After the latest double cross insult from Trump I would sign the nuclear power (and enrichment) deal with China overnight. And get them to throw in a big stack of airspace control systems.
One would have thought that Trump would have made Saudi–Israel normalization integral to a nuclear-sharing deal to start with. Perhaps MbS has already agreed to join the Abraham Accords in return.
Still, the Saudis have not done much to support the Iran war; neither has Trump finessed Pakistani or Turkish backing other than diplomacy. (Trump has already recanted his empty threats to level all bridges or power plants.)