Separating Fact From Fiction Amid Reports That JNIM Resumed Its Blockade Of Bamako

Hyping up this scenario that hasn’t yet happened is part of an information warfare operation aimed at demoralizing Malians.

Conflicting reports have emerged about “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (JNIM) radical Islamists allegedly resuming their blockade of Bamako, the Malian capital, after their first such one from late last year was broken with the help of Russia’s Africa Corps (AK). Some reports claim that this is already in effect, others claim that it’s only been threatened, while the AK’s official X account shared footage of their forces escorting a convoy of 800 tanker trucks. It’s thus understandable why folks are confused.

What’s most likely happening is that JNIM and its media sympathizers are carrying out an information warfare operation “to undermine the morale and psychological state of the troops and the civilian population” in Mali exactly as the AK assessed in a related post here. JNIM’s call for Malians to rise up, overthrow the interim military authorities, and work with the group to institute Sharia is part of this operation. They hope to make the capital’s residents desperate enough to do what they demand.

To that end, they’re threatening to resume their full blockade, though it remains unclear whether they’ll succeed given the AK’s aerial and drone superiority that was already employed to escort that huge tanker convoy. Nevertheless, it can’t be discounted that JNIM might stage attacks against those convoys and/or target fuel depots inside the capital, including through suicide bombings of the sort that assassinated the Defense Minister during the opening phase of their ongoing offensive in late April.

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and their AK allies must therefore stop JNIM’s conventional offensive that’s approaching the more populated central part of the country from the sparsely populated east simultaneously with securing the capital from the group’s terrorist sabotage. Focusing too much on the first goal could lead to the loss of the capital, while focusing too much on the second one could lead to the loss of the country, thus requiring a very careful balance of finite military resources.

Logistical factors further complicate the fulfilment of each goal. Algeria is suspected of aiding JNIM and their “Azawad Liberation Front” (FLA) allies for the reasons explained here, thus, the JNIM-FLA conventional offensive cannot easily be defeated by FAMA-AK unless this ends, which is unlikely. Similarly, Bamako is supplied from the Guinean port of Conakry, so sabotage of its terminals (such as through drone attacks) and/or insurgent-terrorist attacks en route to Mali could cut the capital off.

Drawing attention to these logistical challenges isn’t meant to “undermine the morale and psychological state of the troops and the civilian population” like JNIM and its media sympathizers’ information warfare operation. Rather, the purpose is solely to enable observers to better understand the Malian Crisis’ rapidly evolving military, strategic, and especially logistical dynamics, the latter of which are now incredibly important in determining the course of this conflict.

Circling back to the title, the facts are that JNIM unsuccessfully blockaded Bamako late last year and they’re threatening to do so once again, but the AK has thus far prevented that from happening. Meanwhile, the fiction is that this blockade is already in full effect or is inevitable, not to mention the innuendo it’ll lead to a citywide uprising that “opens the gates” for JNIM to capture the capital. To be sure, the situation is extremely serious, but predictions of Mali’s defeat are definitely premature.