Sikorski’s Personal Support For A No-Fly Zone Over Ukraine Might Not Translate Into Policy

More NATO jamming of Russian drones and missiles over Ukrainian airspace is probable though.

Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski told German media over the weekend that “We already discussed [a no-fly zone over Ukraine] a year ago, when Joe Biden was still US president. Technically, we as NATO and the EU would be capable of doing this, but it's not a decision Poland can make alone, but only with its allies. The protection of our population—for example, from falling debris—would of course be greater if we could combat drones and other flying objects beyond our national territory.”

He then added that “If Ukraine asked us to shoot them down over their territory, that would be to our advantage. If you ask me personally: We should consider it.” This follows Russia’s drone incursion into Poland last week, which this analysis here argues was due to NATO jamming. The incident led to divisions in otherwise solid US-Polish ties after Trump’s conclusion that it was a “mistake” was contradicted by Polish officials from both sides of its ruling duopoly who insisted that it was a deliberate provocation.

For as much as Sikorski personally supports a no-fly zone over at least part of Ukraine in the aftermath of what happened for the reasons that he explained above, this might not ultimately translate into policy. As was assessed a year ago here when this scenario was last discussed per his recent comments, “Polish policymakers (must first) overcome their differences and agree that it’s worth the risks; and (then) the US (must) give them the greenlight”, neither of which can be taken for granted.

New Polish President Karol Nawrocki is even more hardline towards Ukraine than his predecessor Andrzej Duda, both of whom represent the conservative-nationalist opposition to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ruling liberal-globalist government of which Sikorski is a part. Like Duda, Nawrocki also doesn’t want to risk direct Polish involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict, and he even pledged ahead of the second round last spring that he wouldn’t authorize the deployment of Polish troops to that country.

As for Trump, even though he’s reportedly considering escalating US involvement in the conflict either before or after a ceasefire via potential support for a EU-imposed no-fly zone over at least part of the country, he might not approve of this if Russia doesn’t agree due to the risk of a hot NATO-Russia war. Even Sikorski himself told British media over the same weekend that he talked to German media that Western security guarantees are “not very credible” since no one wants to flirt with that scenario.

Of relevance, the Financial Times reported that NATO is vulnerable to drones, in connection with which RT reminded readers in their article on the aforesaid that other sources earlier told them that they only have 5% of the air defenses needed to protect the eastern flank. These concerns reduce the chances of the US approving a no-fly zone over Ukraine against Russia’s wishes since its NATO allies risk destruction if this leads to a hot war with Russia unless the US resorts to nuclear brinksmanship on their behalf.

Considering all of these points, the US is therefore unlikely to approve such plans even in the far-fetched scenario that Nawrocki and Tusk agreed on them unless Trump radically recalibrates his policy to assume responsibility for the potentially apocalyptical risks that this could entail, which he’s still reluctant to do. For these reasons, while more NATO jamming of Russian munitions (drones and missiles) over Ukrainian airspace is probable, direct downing of them via Polish-based air defenses or fighter jets isn’t expected.