The Algerian-Malian Rapprochement Could Have Far-Reaching Reverberations

The best-case scenario is that Algeria gets the Tuareg rebels to defect from their radial Islamist allies in exchange for broad autonomy in Mali, Algeria replaces Libya’s Russian supply role to Mali, and they all fight the radical Islamists together instead of letting them conquer Mali and destroy the region.

The Algerian and Malian governments confirmed the restoration of their relations in mid-July after they were suspended for over a year following the downing of a Malian drone by Algeria. The larger reason, however, arguably had to do with Algeria’s patronage of Mali’s Tuareg rebels with whom the central government was already on a collision course by then after pulling out of a 2015 peace deal. The rationale was alleged violations by the Tuareg and their Algerian patrons but those two disputed that.

These same Tuareg rebels then allied with radical Islamists for the second time in less than two decades to launch a Western-backed joint insurgency earlier in the spring. Russia is Mali’s top military ally and has thus joined it in fighting against the “Azawad Liberation Front” (FLA) and “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (JNIM). Even prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Moscow’s backing of Bamako after it pulled out of the 2015 peace deal in early 2024 caused problems with Algiers, but the new war worsened them.

As for that ongoing conflict, it’s presently at a stalemate as both sides prepare for their next moves, and it’s in this context that the Algerian-Malian rapprochement was just clinched. The reverberations could be far-reaching too if they result in Algeria doing what’s needed to get its FLA partners to defect from the JNIM in exchange for Mali agreeing to restore their 2015 peace deal. That could also improve Russian-Algerian relations and thus prevent a newly pro-US Libya from cutting off Moscow’s air bridge to Mali:

* 28 April: “The West Aims To Achieve Five Goals Through Its Sponsorship Of The Latest Malian Insurgency”

* 2 May: “Algeria’s Saudi-Like Pivot Is Responsible For The Latest Malian Insurgency”

* 6 May: “Is The ‘Azawad Liberation Front’ A Terrorist Group, A Separatist One, Or A Blend Of Both?”

* 8 May: “Nigeria Intimated That It’s Preparing To Intervene In Mali”

* 11 May: “French Media Confirmed That Paris Is Backing Ukraine In Mali”

* 3 June: “A Pro-Government Tuareg Leader Shared Some Insight Into The Malian Crisis”

* 9 July: “Pakistani & Russian Interests In Libya Are At Cross-Purposes”

To briefly review the importance of the abovementioned background briefings, the West essentially aims to turn Mali into Syria 2.0 as part of the US’ Neo-Reagan Doctrine for rolling back Russian influence, to which end several countries replicated the Syrian War’s workflow in Mali. The FLA plays a key role in publicly legitimizing the JNIM’s radical Islamist foot soldiers, which is why its potential defection at Algeria’s encouragement as part of a possible quid pro quo with Mali could be such a game-changer.

Time is of the essence too given the stalemated battlefield conditions that Western-backed Ukraine might soon try to help its FLA-JNIM allies break via more state-of-the-art drone warfare. Moreover, if a Pakistani-fronted but US-mediated peace deal results in a united pro-American government in Libya, then the Russian-friendly east might cut off Moscow’s air bridge to Mali via Niger. That could catalyze Mali’s collapse and serve as the catalyst for a US-backed Nigerian anti-terrorist intervention.

To be sure, this dark scenario sequence might not be averted even in despite the Algerian-Malian rapprochement, but the aforesaid unexpected development is likely connected in some way or another to the latter’s conflict given that it was in the run-up thereto that their relations were suspended. The best-case scenario is therefore that Algeria gets the FLA to defect from JNIM in exchange for broad autonomy in Mali, Algeria replaces Libya’s Russian supply role to Mali, and they all fight JNIM together.