The EU’s Military-Industrial Plans Could Accelerate The US’ Disengagement From NATO

Interoperability issues could make the US think twice about intervening in the EU’s support against Russia.

“Trump Is Unlikely To Pull All US Troops Out Of Central Europe Or Abandon NATO’s Article 5”, but he’s definitely “Pivoting (back) to Asia” in order to more muscularly contain China, which will have consequences for European security. Although Russia has no intent to attack NATO countries, many of these same countries sincerely fear that it does, which leads to them formulating policy appropriately. This (false) threat perception heightens their concerns about the US’ gradual disengagement from NATO.

To make matters worse, Reuters cited five unnamed sources to report that the US chided the EU for its military-industrial plans, particularly those which relate to production and procurement within the bloc. They’re presumably connected to European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s “ReArm Europe Plan” that calls for members to boost defense spending by 1.5% on average for a collective €650 billion more in the next four years and provide €150 billion worth of loans for defense investments.

This bold program will strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy but will likely come at the cost of accelerating the US’ disengagement from NATO. EU-produced equipment might not be interoperable with American equipment, which could complicate contingency planning. The bloc wants the US to intervene in the event of a military crisis with Russia, yet the US might think twice if its commanders can’t easily take control of European forces in that event.

The US might also be less likely to do so if the EU reduces its reliance on American equipment like the F-35s that are rumored to have “kill-switches”. These could hypothetically be activated if the EU tried provoking a conflict with Russia that the US didn’t approve of for whatever reason. If the EU becomes emboldened to do precisely that and thus becomes a major strategic liability for the US, then the odds of the US intervening in its support would dwindle, thus leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

At the same time, some countries like the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania – which occupy NATO’s strategic eastern flank with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine and are much more pro-American than their Western European counterparts – will likely remain within the US’ military-industrial ecosystem. This could therefore serve to retain American influence along the EU’s periphery, keep those countries out of the bloc’s military-industrial ecosystem, and thus hamstring plans for a “European Army”.

Nevertheless, the US would also do well to share some defense technology with Poland and agree to at least partial domestic production of its large-scale purchases, which could transplant a portion of the American military-industrial ecosystem to Europe for easier export to other countries. That could in turn keep Poland from pivoting to France or at least relying more on it to balance the US like the ruling liberal-globalist coalition might do if its candidate wins the presidency during the next elections in May.

The US could therefore leverage its military-industrial cooperation with Poland by offering preferential terms (i.e. technology-sharing and at least partial domestic production) as a means for retaining American influence along the EU’s periphery amidst the bloc’s own military-industrial plans. That could greatly impede the EU’s strategic autonomy, make any “European Army” more difficult to form due to interoperability issues, and thus pressure Western Europe to relent by purchasing more US equipment.