It might be “narratively inconvenient” for some to acknowledge the organic origins of non-Western internecine disputes, but the US arguably isn’t to blame for this particular one.
15 June marks three years since the Sino-Indo clashes over the Galwan River Valley, which was the first time in decades that blood flowed across their disputed frontier. These two’s ties haven’t been the same since then, though they’ve thankfully taken steps to prevent a large-scale war from breaking out between them. In hindsight, those clashes were a turning point in Sino-Indo ties, whose consequences are still being felt and might continue shaping 21st-century Asian geopolitics for the foreseeable future.
Both sides blame the other for what happened, but tensions were simmering for so long that it was seemingly inevitable that one of them would make the first military move. From China’s perspective, India had begun colluding with the US to contain it, while India began to suspect that China wanted to impose a form of unipolarity in Asia. This security dilemma makes it difficult for observers to agree on who struck first since each had a motive to teach the other a lesson for deterrence purposes.
Leaving aside speculation about who set these clashes into motion and why, many were surprised by the US’ lack of support for India. After all, their growing military ties over the past decade and Trump’s rivalry with China raised expectations of more than just rhetoric from the American side. This suggests that the US didn’t want to escalate matters, perhaps out of concern that a large-scale war would shatter global supply chains after they were already being unprecedentedly stressed by the pandemic.
Whatever its calculations may have been, this lack of a meaningful response extends credence to claims from the Indian side that their clashes with China were purely a bilateral affair and not the result of America pushing them to attack like lots of influencers in the Alt-Media Community thought at the time. Popular perceptions of an Indo-US alliance against China were further dispelled 15 months later after the creation of AUKUS, the American-led anti-Chinese nuclear submarine alliance with Australia and the UK.
India was omitted from this structure after its announcement in September 2021, which showed that its growing military ties with the US over the past decade didn’t presage an alliance like many mistakenly predicted was in the process of being formed. Chinese perceptions of India’s role in 21st-century Asian geopolitics were accordingly recalibrated in light of the fact that it didn’t become an American ally, but this didn’t lead to it compromising on its stance towards their border dispute as a goodwill gesture.
Likewise, the lack of US support didn’t lead to India bandwagoning with China by enacting its own compromises either, albeit from what would have in that context been the weaker position. This serves as further proof that those two’s problems are purely bilateral and not the product of a third party’s divide-and-rule meddling. It might be “narratively inconvenient” for some to acknowledge the organic origins of non-Western internecine disputes, but the US arguably isn’t to blame for this particular one.
After all, if India was really an American proxy for containing China like some are still convinced is supposedly the case, then it would have complied with its alleged patron’s demands to sanction Russia over the past 15 months or at the very least let Zelensky attend September’s G20 Summit. Neither has happened, and India actually strengthened their strategic partnership in parallel with remaining neutral in the NATO-Russian proxy war despite immense US pressure upon it during this same period.
India’s brave defiance of these foreign demands to sacrifice its national interests for the sake of the US’ also contributed to China recalibrating its perception about that country’s role in 21st-century Asian geopolitics, but its stance towards their border dispute still remains the same. Likewise, so too does India’s, which isn’t interested in compromising either even though peacefully resolving their impasse would make it much easier for them to jointly accelerate financial multipolarity processes through BRICS.
Quite clearly, the blood that was spilled three years ago still remains fresh in their leaders’ minds, and neither wants to risk being perceived as conceding towards the other after what happened. These proud Asian Great Powers want to project an image of strength at home and abroad, which is why they’re both reluctant to meet in the middle on this issue out of fear of being seen as weak. It’s simply too soon since those deadly clashes for their people to seriously consider a compromise on this very sensitive issue.
These political and soft power dynamics that are responsible for perpetuating Sino-Indo tensions since summer 2020’s Galwan River Valley clashes are therefore naturally occurring, self-sustaining, and have nothing to do with American meddling. Observers need to acknowledge this fact no matter how “narratively inconvenient” it might be. Those two’s split will likely remain irreconcilable for the foreseeable future, but that doesn’t mean that they’ll be divided-and-ruled or are doomed to go to war.
Without wanting to be sycophantic or come over as patronising, I would like to use this excellent, succinct, highly relevant and well-timed analysis to point out what an outstanding journalist you are. I can't imagine how or where else I could have learnt so much about the issue, which has come at a most opportune moment — when it's not referring to some recently arisen issue or currently emerging situation — with so little effort: such comfortable flow; a three-minute read and I feel, as I'm sure I am, far, far better informed than I was only a few minutes ago.