Saudi Arabia’s new Muslim allies aren’t riding to its rescue and even the US reportedly rebuked its request to directly intervene in the latest phase of this over-decade-long conflict.
Russian expert Farhad Ibragimov accurately assessed that “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Muslim NATO’ faces its first trial by fire” in the face of growing Houthi attacks against targets inside the kingdom. Pakistan reportedly passed along a warning to Iran from its Saudi ally to rein in the Houthis just as its Defense Minister suggested that continued attacks against Saudi Arabia would operationalize their mutual defense alliance. Shortly afterwards, however, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry downplayed this possibility.
Around the same time, Axios reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman requested US strike support against the Houthis but was rebuked by Trump, while CNN reported that the “US expanded intel, targeting support for Saudi campaign against Iranian ally” in recent weeks. These reports discredit the wishful thinking among some that the Islamic NATO complicates the US’ interests. Saudi Arabia clearly isn’t distancing itself from the US and still remains largely dependent on it for security.
The latest Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are connected to the increasingly protracted Third Gulf War since it appears that Iran tasked its allies with opening up another front in the Bab el-Mandab that could complement Tehran’s partial blockade of Hormuz for more leverage in talks with the US. In parallel with more attacks against the kingdom, the group launched an offensive that already led to the capture of Yemen’s strategic Red Sea port of Mocha and the Hanish Islands at the northern approach to the strait.
It’s difficult to predict what might come next given the speed with which everything is unfolding, but seven conclusions can already be drawn from these developments. The first is that the Islamic NATO isn’t as consolidated as some thought since there hasn’t yet been even a joint statement on the matter. Second, Pakistan fears getting bogged down in a quagmire in Yemen that could sap its national military strength like it did Nasser-era Egypt’s, ergo its mixed signals about direct involvement in this conflict.
Third, any potential Pakistani involvement would likely be limited to defending Saudi Arabia from Houthi strikes and possibly carrying out its own strikes against them, but boots on the ground in Yemen are unlikely. The fourth conclusion is that Saudi Arabia prefers US strike support over Pakistani strike support per Axios’ report, which in turn leads to the fifth conclusion that the Islamic NATO was never intended by Riyadh to replace its security dependence on Washington.
The sixth conclusion is that Saudi-backed forces in Yemen are undertrained, underequipped, and have poor morale, all of which is responsible for the Houthis blitzing down the strategic Red Sea coast. And finally, the last conclusion is that Saudi Arabia’s war on the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council from late 2025 to early 2026 destroyed the only realistic military-political bulwark against the Houthis, the briefly revived state of South Yemen. Had it survived, then the Houthis might have been repelled.
It was foreseen over 15 months ago in May 2025 that “Houthi-Controlled North Yemen Is Poised To Become A Regional Power If Nothing Changes” and that’s now more likely than ever. Unless decisive action is soon taken to defend Saudi Arabia and push back the Houthis in Yemen, then the kingdom risks losing this new war of attrition that’s being waged against it through the latest attacks on its energy infrastructure and its Yemeni ally might fall. Regional geopolitics would be revolutionized in that event.
Given the lack of regional support, the Saudis should quietly disengage. Neither the Houthis nor their Hadramawt foes have had the means to fully master Yemen's regional, tribal schisms any more than foreign powers have, hence the inability of any side to fully overcome centrifugal forces.
Rifts within the Hadi coalition between Emirati-backed southern separatists and Saudi-linked centralizers show this, hindering the cohesion of anti-Houthi fighters while limiting the appeal of the Houthis beyond their fastnesses.
Given that the prospects for a unified Yemen are and have been chimerical for decades, a better move would be to de facto federalize or partition the country rather than continue the war. More airstrikes and GCC mercenaries will not work better than before.
The conclusion is likely right, but probably based on weak evidence. KSA is militarily weak because its forces are mostly mercenaries, so powerful weapons are not enough to compensate for that weakness. However, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt (not in the game yet) all have large national armies. Ditto for Iran. Yet it is always difficult to get one's troops to fight with the full spirit when fighting in another country for yet another country's interests, even when the troops are well fed and housed. To paraphrase somebody quoted by Chester Wilmot, you can't expect a Pakistani peasant soldier to fight against the Ansar Allah in Yemen for Saudi Arabia's sake to protect the US regional hegemony.
Maybe it will take the destruction of all seawater desalination plants in the entire region to show which nation can stand on its own feet. Teaching "go back to the basics" is always hard because the student usually has to be totally shaken up to appreciate it.