Russia might be thrown into a grand strategic dilemma over whether to rely on China to replace its lost Indian oil market at the risk of becoming too dependent on it or agree to tough compromises with the US over Ukraine for phased sanctions relief that would gradually return its oil to the global market.
The Indian economy will be used and abused by America but this is going to be the minor problem. It is not a smart geopolitical move for them to face China, Pakistan and Russia at the same time. India does not seem to realize all the long term consequences, the seriousness of America to confront China. The US is shopping for a proxy, not a business partner.
Trading blocks are idiotic unless the trade is restricted to nations in those block. As stupid as all the multiple military agreements most countries are part of . Pure idiocy.
Hmmm, seems like the USA is making promises about Venezuelan oil it doesn’t have, to deliver oil that doesn’t exist yet. Venezuelan oil is fit for tarmac and roads, not tractors and trucks in India. Trumps promises will take years.
Wow, that was an avalanche of explorative/defensive opinions. I think we all should bear in mind that situations change, that analysis have multiple trigger-points, that consistent intelligent insights of a person creates admiration even when one's trigger-point was different. What concerned me most is your 2 paragraphs below, Andrew:
"There was a time some years ago where I sometimes couldn't sleep because of this stuff, wondering what'll happen with whatever it might be, or be so excited when something that I really supported happened.
No longer, and I don't mean to "black pill" anyone ("ignorance is bliss" as they say and I've also learned so sometimes it's better to be remain "innocent" of how all this works), but that's honestly how I am nowadays"
I sure wish you will get back to the stage of writing with excitement on those things that offer a glimmer of hope in creating a better place for the human race.
Now that Russian weakness and indeicsion have basically let europe declare open season on the Russian shadow fleet, India is left in the position of having to take what it can get.
Since horrible Kazan BRICS summit which seen Poutine publicly disavowed by China, Brazil and India and russian economy minister forced to publicly disavow what said Poutine the day before about the creation of a currency to fight the dollar to weaken definitely West.
Since Kazan, it's the stampede. Armenia, lost. Friendly Iranian president killed ...back from Azerbaijan. The new one who break the axis of resistance. Murder of Hamas chief in Teheran three weeks after election, absolutely no move when Hezbollah has been hardly( and definitely) attacked by Israël, Nasrallah and dozens Hezbollah chiefs and officials killed by Israël at a secret urgent meeting with.... Iran officials to explain why Iran let Hezbollah dying without a move nor a word. Surrender of Iranian troops in Syria in front of Al Qaeda offensive...
So, lost of Syria for Russia, lost of Venezuela. And now lost of India.
Russia can't fight the world alone and Poutine probably don't want to make hundreds thousands Russians die to allow India and others to get fat on those deaths.
Russian is probleem is Putin he work for Tel Aviv he is destructief for Russian state end people if Russia want to survive mast takeover power of Putin Kremlin FSB Krypto maffia end oligarch.
This has bearings on the U.S.–Pakistan détente, given that the U.S./EU–India deals directly compete with Pakistan in key sectors such as textiles, clothing, and rice. A return to a pro-India tilt by the West could affect Pakistan’s ‘security dilemma‘ vis-à-vis Afghanistan, given the quid pro quo by India that it will further reduce Russia ties (thus vying with Pakistan for U.S. favor). As a result, more instability in Pakistan’s border areas could impact China’s presence, hindering CPEC, even if West–China ties thaw in the short term. Notably, over time Trump has backed off on access to Bagram (he has barely mentioned it recently), hinting at U.S.–India accommodation via the Taliban.
«whether to rely on China to replace its lost Indian oil market at the risk of becoming too dependent on it»
«strengthening ties with Pakistan IN PARALLEL with doing the same with India in order to more adroitly balance between China and the US, the world's two superpowers.»
«Right now Russia can either submit to becoming a de facto Chinese vassal with time by replacing its lost Indian oil market with China, cut a tough deal with the US for then balancing between those two, or the aforesaid but importantly all while retaining India's role in helping it avert dependent on China and the US alike.»
Let us be realistic: the RF as a country "does not have the cards" to be a real superpower as the USSR was, it has become too small in population with too weak an industrial sector, so it cannot balance between PRC and USA so whatever its government is or becomes it must choose. Similarly once upon a time for the UK, as mentioned by Tony Benn, 1965: “Defence, colour television, Concorde, rocket development - these are all issues raising economic considerations that reveal this country's basic inability to stay in the big league. We just can’t afford it. The real choice is — do we go in with Europe or do we become an American satellite? Without a conscious decision being taken the latter course is being followed everywhere.”
Given that the USA government is absolutely committed to "color-revolution" and breakup the RF, whatever their current fake-friendly noises are, in order to get "invited" by a vassal Siberian government to build a chain of DOW+CIA bases on the immense northern and western PRC borders to destabilize it with many brigades of "freedom fighters", it is in the interests of both the current RF and PRC factions in power to hang together and given the disparity between the two obviously the PRC must have the leading role. Such is "Realpolitik".
Fortunately the PRC ("flowered people") culture is still a bit too insular to meddle with the XiRong/YueZhi (mere "western barbarians of the steppes") so as long as the RF (and Kazakhstan) keep being reliable buffer states against USA operations on its borders they will be inclined to interfere little.
“I mentioned that some of my close relatives are studying Chinese; I was referring to my granddaughter, whose nanny is from Beijing. She speaks Chinese fluently with her,” Mr Putin said.
«whether to rely on China to replace its lost Indian oil market at the risk of becoming too dependent on it or agree to tough compromises with the US over Ukraine for phased sanctions relief»
The debate about RF oil exports is somewhat absurd because the RF is independent in oil and cereals so on a basic level it does not need export revenue from selling oil abroad. What does the RF *want* as opposed to *need* importing?
«In 2024, the top exports of Russia were Crude Petroleum ($124B), Refined Petroleum ($45.9B), Petroleum Gas ($40.6B), Coal, Briquettes and Similar Manufactured Solid Fuels ($22.4B), and Gold ($12.3B).
The top destinations were China ($130B), India ($66.4B), Turkey ($25.9B), Kazakhstan ($18.2B), and Brazil ($12.2B).
In 2024, the top imports of Russia were Cars ($17.3B), Packaged Medicaments ($8.04B), Telephones ($5.39B), Computers ($4.35B), and Motor vehicles; parts and accessories (8701 to 8705) ($3.62B).
The top origins were China ($114B), Kazakhstan ($9.55B), Turkey ($8.5B), Germany ($8.13B), and India ($4.84B).»
* For the durable (and some consumable) consumer goods that the RF imports for the current "butter and guns"policy the supplier is *overwhelmingly* the PRC already. The USSR industrial capacity was more "guns" than "butter" so it was concentrated on the military but the consumer goods industry did exist even if it produced somewhat shoddy stuff, but "yeltsinization" destroyed it and it is proving hard for the RF government to restart it. The RF does not utterly *need* PRC consumer goods but without those the RF people would be very annoyed.
* Exports of fuel to India are sort of redundant because India does not pay for them with imports as there is huge difference between the $66.4B of exports to India and the $4.8B of imports from India -- in practice oil to India is largely charity especially as much of it is paid in rupees nowadays.
Note: obviously Kazakhstan and in part Turkey are just "laundering" EU, USA, Japan, etc. goods.
«what I called for was Russia comprehensively strengthening ties with Pakistan IN PARALLEL with doing the same with India in order to more adroitly balance between China and the US, the world's two superpowers.»
As to this I strongly disagree because Pakistan is a crazy place like Myanmar and is not positioned right for the RF and it is mainly contested by the PRC and the USA, and the PRC is contesting it with the USA, like Myanmar, because the PRC has very few options indeed and are pretty desperate.
For the RF to try to compete in Pakistan with PRC "imperial gifts" or with USA "destabilization" is a losing game. I would rather think that the RF should be very friendly with the current iranian ruling factions and keep the historical friendship with the current indian ruling factions.
While for centuries the RF and the persians have been fighting over the Caucasus and Central Asia and persians are still resentful about that and the occupation by the USSR in WW2 etc. etc. etc. my guess is that their current ruling factions know their biggest risk is their large USA fifth-column internal faction and becoming even just a "junior partner" of the RF would be good for them. The other advantages are:
* There is a direct route via the Caspian from RF to Iran (the route from RF to Pakistan goes either through some "stans" where the USA fifth-column may take power at any time) or through China and it is far less convenient.
* Having Iran as "junior partner" would make it much harder (despite the Turkye-Azerbaijan corridor) for the USA to do "active measures" in the "stans" and also in the Caucasus.
There is a much longer term issue of overwhelming importance which is water and oil issues:
* Water supply issues are hitting both Pakistan and Iran (as well as Egypt and the whole Arab peninsula) and I think that they are terminal for Pakistan but Iran *might* survive them even if in much reduced form.
* The oil reserves of Iran seem to be vastly overstated and like in Arabia local consumption is drawing them at a high rate, so fairly soon Iran will need to do to a very painful transition away from oil exporter (that is why their government is desperate to develop their nuclear industry, not to bomb Tel Aviv, and the Israeli government know that well and want to undermine an iranian nucaclear industry to keep Iran weak).
* For both water and oil the RF cannot do much for Pakistan but it can somewhat help Iran and therefore gain much influence.
BTW as to the water and oil issues I am afraid that in some decades drought and oil exhaustion will mean that dozens of millions if not a hundred million or more will have to escape Egypt, Arabia, Pakistan and most will try to go north towards wetter areas and fortunately Iran is between them and the RF.
The real problem is whether the ruling factions of Iran and India would be stuck on a futile "sovereignist" position and refuse to consider being "junior partners" to the RF and the PRC. The problem they have is that no matter which factions is in power they "don't have the cards" to be actually independent now and even more so in the future.
Thanks for writing interesting stuff and I particularly appreciated your several responses to "Darras" and you come across as not just competent but also as sincerely passionate which is good (despite your recent "apathetic" period).
But there are is a big deal in what you write which is rather common: you keep writing phrases like "India's and Russia's complementary roles in each other's geostrategic balancing acts" as if "India" and "Russia" were well defined communities of shared interests; even if you write "Russia's pro-BRI policymaking factions" your analysis is as a rule in terms of "Russia", "India", etc.
My impression is that it is far more fruitful to talk of international (as well as domestic) politics as done among *factions* which in political science are often described as "transversal" that is extending across national boundaries. For example when you write:
«India for its very pro-Western grand strategic drift in the preceding years [...] India withstood IMMENSE Western pressure, including from the EU as well, in order to maintain domestic economic and therefore
political stability in furtherance of its self-interests»
For in neither case it was "India" that had first a very pro-USA posture and then a rather more independentist one:
* For a period the indian faction that makes money from exports to the USA (a giant pro-USA fifth-column) simply wanted integration in the USA neoliberal sphere of influence as a protectorate like the EU members and the indian "deep state" faction that might have found that going too far was appeased by the switch to a nuclear proliferation policy by the USA government.
* Then the "deep state" faction started to realize that the long term goal of the USA elites is as always to surround, isolate and breakup potential regional powers and that "Bharat" was next on the list after the PRC (and Brazil eventually and Indonesia perhaps after that). Even some of the business factions in India started to reckon that they did not after all really need USA "protection" and might be better off by owning their own state, like some business factions in the PRC.
BTW I am pretty sure that the policymakers also think international politics not in terms of countries but in terms of local or transversal factions (groups with shared interests) as for example the standard USA government approach to manipulating a country is to support a compatible faction (nowadays in particular financial businesses and property owners) within that country.
If all that is true, India is really what I always thought and say about it: a big fat turkey.
With such a mentality of slave, I understand how a so huge civilization has been colonized during centuries by a handful Englishmen.
Russia is doomed.
Or.
Or it's Russia wich give up slowly, freeing India to deal with USA to. That would explain the disgrace of patriot Lavrov.
When Lavrov wore a USSR sweater, it was not a provocation for Rubio but for all the bastard who surround Poutine, urged to make again big money in selling their country.
But Andrew, sorry, but you were wrong when you said repeatedly that India was the future of Russia. Nobody's perfect.
No, what I repeatedly emphasized was India's and Russia's complementary roles in each other's geostrategic balancing acts, all while also drawing attention to the creeping influence of what I call Russia's pro-BRI policymaking factions and growing US economic pressure on India.
My model, which I introduced in summer 2022 at the RIAC think tank (where Lavrov serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees and whose work informs other comparatively less significant policymakers here) accurately contextualized their relationship till this latest development:
In fact, Darras, I was extremely critical from 2015-late 2021 or so of India's rapid pro-US drift and then accounted for its grand strategic recalibration at RIAC right before the SMO began:
Anytime that my models, assessments, etc. are proven to be inaccurate, even if only to a minor but nonetheless important degree, I always -- without exception -- account for that, whether in stand-alone analyses, in my Substack comments section, and/or on social media.
It's antithetical to the way in which I was raised to eschew responsibility for the words that I've previously written when they're proven to not be accurate or are now outdated. You apparently interpreted everything in a way that I didn't intend, but that's not my fault.
You can reread all my work and you'll see for yourself that I never, ever suggested that India's purchase of Russian oil was ideologically driven instead of market-driven, though I usually emphasized the role that these purchases played in their complementary balancing acts.
I also very proudly still maintain that India can still function as the most pivotal element of Russia's geostrategic balancing act if the political exists among Russian policymakers.
Right now Russia can either submit to becoming a de facto Chinese vassal with time by replacing its lost Indian oil market with China, cut a tough deal with the US for then balancing between those two, or the aforesaid but importantly all while retaining India's role in helping it avert dependent on China and the US alike.
The strategic logic is sound, consistent, and absolutely nothing has changed in this respect other than India finally, after nearly four long years, having costs imposed upon it by the US that made the continued large-scale purchase of discounted Russian oil no longer worth it (provided that the relevant term that Trump mentioned is indeed accurate, and for what it's worth, I personally think that it more or less is).
India withstood IMMENSE Western pressure, including from the EU as well, in order to maintain domestic economic and therefore political stability in furtherance of its self-interests as I've always said, specifically going as far as to describe its policy as "Hyper-Realist" since Jaishankar explicitly articulates India's interests in this regard so that there's no ambiguity and nobody can therefore feign ignorance of them.
You can continue to think that I was wrong, but the objectively existing and easily verifiable fact is that my model accurately explained everything up until this point in time, after which I promptly accounted for what just happened in the present piece, being able to do so this swiftly precisely because I'd already expected it for a while actually and generally had in mind what its motives would be if/when it happened.
Here, you and anyone else who hadn't followed my work (whether at all or closely) from 2016/7-late 2021 when I expended immense time and effort publishing literally hundreds of India-critical analyses on South Asia can review the gist of my perspective at the time from my PhD dissertation:
I completed the first draft during my first month of the program, so in September 2019, and there were only very minimal changes required for the penultimate draft and then a few more for the final one after my defense.
What happened between 2019 and finally receiving my diploma in September 2023 was typical administrative/bureaucratic delays due to program obligations (i.e. exams that can only be taken at certain times, requirement to publish x-amount of academic articles that also take time to process, etc.).
Also, I personally suspect that one of the reasons why so many reviewers declined to literally be remunerated for participating in my defense is because of how "revolutionary" my idea was at the time.
I was the only person in Russia loudly criticizing India for its very pro-Western grand strategic drift in the preceding years, including in the text of my dissertation from the Russian MFA-run MGIMO, so some might not have wanted to associated with it due to how "politically incorrect" my insight was.
Therefore, this notion that I've presented India as an "eternal friend" of Russia's like you wrote under another post (I thought you were speaking in general, perhaps in response to Alt-Media, but only now realize you were addressing me personally) is categorically and provably false.
I did indeed have an epiphany of sorts from late 2021 onward due to how impressed I was with Jaishankar, under Modi's guidance, recalibrating Indian grand strategy and thus averting the adverse geostrategic consequences that I spent the preceding years raising maximum awareness about.
Unlike most of my peers, I also remained optimistic that India would continue resisting Western pressure to dump Russian oil since it wasn't going to tank its own economy by spiking costs across the board importing much higher-priced oil in the scenario of Russian oil no longer being on the market (or being almost exclusively consumed by China).
What changed, as I explained in this analysis, was Trump 2.0 imposing such tremendous costs on India while now providing a similarly priced alternative from Venezuelan oil that Modi couldn't realistically continue buying Russian oil (at least at scale like before) unless it really was for ideological reasons, not market-centric ones, but it was never ideological so that's why he pivoted.
If Russia cuts a deal with the US which provides for phased sanctions relief that gradually returns Russian oil to the global market, then I'd expect that India would resume some of the imports that it's now reportedly stopping, again, purely due to market factors, never ideological ones (unlike how some Alt-Media frauds tried to spin its purchases thus far).
Circling back to my PhD dissertation and over-simplifying it, what I called for was Russia comprehensively strengthening ties with Pakistan IN PARALLEL with doing the same with India in order to more adroitly balance between China and the US, the world's two superpowers.
Pakistan would play a quadruple role in this respect:
1) it was at the time the last remaining piece of Russia's "Greater Eurasian Partnership" that had yet to be put into place due to lingering resentment from the 1980s Afghan War, ergo the role that I personally played in pioneering a breakthrough in their relations through my literally hundreds of analyses on the region and my five trips to Pakistan (including to lecture at its National Defense University, hold off-the-record talks with experts, officials, etc. for advising on the best way to improve bilateral ties, all in a STRICTLY PERSONAL capacity);
2) accordingly open up another North-South corridor from Russia to the Indian/Global Ocean via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for diversifying Russia's trade partnerships from disproportionate dependence on the West (mostly the EU in this context) and China;
3) the comprehensive expansion of Russian-Pakistani relations IN PARALLEL with Russian-Indian relations would help keep India's grand strategic drift towards the West in check due to concerns in Delhi that Russia could sharply shift its attention to Pakistan if India sharply shifts towards the US, thus enabling Russia to restore a sense of regional strategic balance that would be disrupted by India de facto joining any US coalition against China;
4) and reassuring China of Russia's positive intentions amidst the comprehensive expansion of relations with India since Pakistan hosts CPEC, BRI's flagship project, which is of inordinately more strategic significance than any other BRI project, therefore enabling Russia to adroitly balance the US, China, and India through the comprehensive expansion of relations with Pakistan.
You can also refer to what I shared in detail yesterday under an unrelated post (but relevant with respect to the Ummah Pivot tie-in) about the role that I humbly played in this grand strategic "game":
So again, you couldn't be more wrong about you claim that I wrote about India. I've always been fair as I truly understand my takes to be, including my critical ones about India, but I've also criticized India a lot.
I just say that recently, I find( it's just a personal feeling, not an analysis and even less a critic) that you had to much hope about the reliability of India.
I consider your work and your analysis very precious and ,for me, among the two or three best currently living.
It's just I'm sometimes no ok with you concerning only two topics, Poland and India.
"There can be no sincere praise without the freedom to criticize." Beaumarchais, Le Mariage de Figaro.
The Indian economy will be used and abused by America but this is going to be the minor problem. It is not a smart geopolitical move for them to face China, Pakistan and Russia at the same time. India does not seem to realize all the long term consequences, the seriousness of America to confront China. The US is shopping for a proxy, not a business partner.
Wake up, it's an Indian surrender, a huge strategic pain in ass for Russia, a great US victory and the termination of BRICS.
Trading blocks are idiotic unless the trade is restricted to nations in those block. As stupid as all the multiple military agreements most countries are part of . Pure idiocy.
Hmmm, seems like the USA is making promises about Venezuelan oil it doesn’t have, to deliver oil that doesn’t exist yet. Venezuelan oil is fit for tarmac and roads, not tractors and trucks in India. Trumps promises will take years.
They don't give a shit about venezuelan oil, Trump said "possibly".
They want to flood India with their agricultural product but above everything, they succeeded in forcing India to stop buying russian oil.
Midi now have to deal with his peasants.
Right! And let's wait and see if it is true that the Indians have promised to stop buying Russian oil.
Don't kid yourself. Modi has already confirmed.
He actually hasn't.
Wow, that was an avalanche of explorative/defensive opinions. I think we all should bear in mind that situations change, that analysis have multiple trigger-points, that consistent intelligent insights of a person creates admiration even when one's trigger-point was different. What concerned me most is your 2 paragraphs below, Andrew:
"There was a time some years ago where I sometimes couldn't sleep because of this stuff, wondering what'll happen with whatever it might be, or be so excited when something that I really supported happened.
No longer, and I don't mean to "black pill" anyone ("ignorance is bliss" as they say and I've also learned so sometimes it's better to be remain "innocent" of how all this works), but that's honestly how I am nowadays"
I sure wish you will get back to the stage of writing with excitement on those things that offer a glimmer of hope in creating a better place for the human race.
The countries that matter the most are those who have nuclear weapons and vast reserves of energy and mineral resources, Russia fits this caregory.
No one here knows what they're talking about.
Ok genius, tell us the true and show us the spread of your wisdom, you knowledge and your intelligence.
Jester.
They don’t know that power in Kremlin is not work for interes for Russian people.
The question is how permanent and foolproof this deal is.
I don’t see any reason why India won’t keep importing cheap Russian oil for re exporting. Possibly “washed” through countries like Azerbaijan.
The profits are too big.
Now that Russian weakness and indeicsion have basically let europe declare open season on the Russian shadow fleet, India is left in the position of having to take what it can get.
I mean to ask in plain language; is Russia toast? In your opinion what is Russia’s best course of action and its most desirable outcome?
Since horrible Kazan BRICS summit which seen Poutine publicly disavowed by China, Brazil and India and russian economy minister forced to publicly disavow what said Poutine the day before about the creation of a currency to fight the dollar to weaken definitely West.
Since Kazan, it's the stampede. Armenia, lost. Friendly Iranian president killed ...back from Azerbaijan. The new one who break the axis of resistance. Murder of Hamas chief in Teheran three weeks after election, absolutely no move when Hezbollah has been hardly( and definitely) attacked by Israël, Nasrallah and dozens Hezbollah chiefs and officials killed by Israël at a secret urgent meeting with.... Iran officials to explain why Iran let Hezbollah dying without a move nor a word. Surrender of Iranian troops in Syria in front of Al Qaeda offensive...
So, lost of Syria for Russia, lost of Venezuela. And now lost of India.
Russia can't fight the world alone and Poutine probably don't want to make hundreds thousands Russians die to allow India and others to get fat on those deaths.
Stampede. Every one for himself.
Russian is probleem is Putin he work for Tel Aviv he is destructief for Russian state end people if Russia want to survive mast takeover power of Putin Kremlin FSB Krypto maffia end oligarch.
This has bearings on the U.S.–Pakistan détente, given that the U.S./EU–India deals directly compete with Pakistan in key sectors such as textiles, clothing, and rice. A return to a pro-India tilt by the West could affect Pakistan’s ‘security dilemma‘ vis-à-vis Afghanistan, given the quid pro quo by India that it will further reduce Russia ties (thus vying with Pakistan for U.S. favor). As a result, more instability in Pakistan’s border areas could impact China’s presence, hindering CPEC, even if West–China ties thaw in the short term. Notably, over time Trump has backed off on access to Bagram (he has barely mentioned it recently), hinting at U.S.–India accommodation via the Taliban.
«whether to rely on China to replace its lost Indian oil market at the risk of becoming too dependent on it»
«strengthening ties with Pakistan IN PARALLEL with doing the same with India in order to more adroitly balance between China and the US, the world's two superpowers.»
«Right now Russia can either submit to becoming a de facto Chinese vassal with time by replacing its lost Indian oil market with China, cut a tough deal with the US for then balancing between those two, or the aforesaid but importantly all while retaining India's role in helping it avert dependent on China and the US alike.»
Let us be realistic: the RF as a country "does not have the cards" to be a real superpower as the USSR was, it has become too small in population with too weak an industrial sector, so it cannot balance between PRC and USA so whatever its government is or becomes it must choose. Similarly once upon a time for the UK, as mentioned by Tony Benn, 1965: “Defence, colour television, Concorde, rocket development - these are all issues raising economic considerations that reveal this country's basic inability to stay in the big league. We just can’t afford it. The real choice is — do we go in with Europe or do we become an American satellite? Without a conscious decision being taken the latter course is being followed everywhere.”
Given that the USA government is absolutely committed to "color-revolution" and breakup the RF, whatever their current fake-friendly noises are, in order to get "invited" by a vassal Siberian government to build a chain of DOW+CIA bases on the immense northern and western PRC borders to destabilize it with many brigades of "freedom fighters", it is in the interests of both the current RF and PRC factions in power to hang together and given the disparity between the two obviously the PRC must have the leading role. Such is "Realpolitik".
Fortunately the PRC ("flowered people") culture is still a bit too insular to meddle with the XiRong/YueZhi (mere "western barbarians of the steppes") so as long as the RF (and Kazakhstan) keep being reliable buffer states against USA operations on its borders they will be inclined to interfere little.
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/putin-says-grandchild-speaks-fluent-chinese-has-beijing-nanny
“I mentioned that some of my close relatives are studying Chinese; I was referring to my granddaughter, whose nanny is from Beijing. She speaks Chinese fluently with her,” Mr Putin said.
«whether to rely on China to replace its lost Indian oil market at the risk of becoming too dependent on it or agree to tough compromises with the US over Ukraine for phased sanctions relief»
The debate about RF oil exports is somewhat absurd because the RF is independent in oil and cereals so on a basic level it does not need export revenue from selling oil abroad. What does the RF *want* as opposed to *need* importing?
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus
«In 2024, the top exports of Russia were Crude Petroleum ($124B), Refined Petroleum ($45.9B), Petroleum Gas ($40.6B), Coal, Briquettes and Similar Manufactured Solid Fuels ($22.4B), and Gold ($12.3B).
The top destinations were China ($130B), India ($66.4B), Turkey ($25.9B), Kazakhstan ($18.2B), and Brazil ($12.2B).
In 2024, the top imports of Russia were Cars ($17.3B), Packaged Medicaments ($8.04B), Telephones ($5.39B), Computers ($4.35B), and Motor vehicles; parts and accessories (8701 to 8705) ($3.62B).
The top origins were China ($114B), Kazakhstan ($9.55B), Turkey ($8.5B), Germany ($8.13B), and India ($4.84B).»
* For the durable (and some consumable) consumer goods that the RF imports for the current "butter and guns"policy the supplier is *overwhelmingly* the PRC already. The USSR industrial capacity was more "guns" than "butter" so it was concentrated on the military but the consumer goods industry did exist even if it produced somewhat shoddy stuff, but "yeltsinization" destroyed it and it is proving hard for the RF government to restart it. The RF does not utterly *need* PRC consumer goods but without those the RF people would be very annoyed.
* Exports of fuel to India are sort of redundant because India does not pay for them with imports as there is huge difference between the $66.4B of exports to India and the $4.8B of imports from India -- in practice oil to India is largely charity especially as much of it is paid in rupees nowadays.
Note: obviously Kazakhstan and in part Turkey are just "laundering" EU, USA, Japan, etc. goods.
«what I called for was Russia comprehensively strengthening ties with Pakistan IN PARALLEL with doing the same with India in order to more adroitly balance between China and the US, the world's two superpowers.»
As to this I strongly disagree because Pakistan is a crazy place like Myanmar and is not positioned right for the RF and it is mainly contested by the PRC and the USA, and the PRC is contesting it with the USA, like Myanmar, because the PRC has very few options indeed and are pretty desperate.
For the RF to try to compete in Pakistan with PRC "imperial gifts" or with USA "destabilization" is a losing game. I would rather think that the RF should be very friendly with the current iranian ruling factions and keep the historical friendship with the current indian ruling factions.
While for centuries the RF and the persians have been fighting over the Caucasus and Central Asia and persians are still resentful about that and the occupation by the USSR in WW2 etc. etc. etc. my guess is that their current ruling factions know their biggest risk is their large USA fifth-column internal faction and becoming even just a "junior partner" of the RF would be good for them. The other advantages are:
* There is a direct route via the Caspian from RF to Iran (the route from RF to Pakistan goes either through some "stans" where the USA fifth-column may take power at any time) or through China and it is far less convenient.
* Having Iran as "junior partner" would make it much harder (despite the Turkye-Azerbaijan corridor) for the USA to do "active measures" in the "stans" and also in the Caucasus.
There is a much longer term issue of overwhelming importance which is water and oil issues:
* Water supply issues are hitting both Pakistan and Iran (as well as Egypt and the whole Arab peninsula) and I think that they are terminal for Pakistan but Iran *might* survive them even if in much reduced form.
* The oil reserves of Iran seem to be vastly overstated and like in Arabia local consumption is drawing them at a high rate, so fairly soon Iran will need to do to a very painful transition away from oil exporter (that is why their government is desperate to develop their nuclear industry, not to bomb Tel Aviv, and the Israeli government know that well and want to undermine an iranian nucaclear industry to keep Iran weak).
* For both water and oil the RF cannot do much for Pakistan but it can somewhat help Iran and therefore gain much influence.
BTW as to the water and oil issues I am afraid that in some decades drought and oil exhaustion will mean that dozens of millions if not a hundred million or more will have to escape Egypt, Arabia, Pakistan and most will try to go north towards wetter areas and fortunately Iran is between them and the RF.
The real problem is whether the ruling factions of Iran and India would be stuck on a futile "sovereignist" position and refuse to consider being "junior partners" to the RF and the PRC. The problem they have is that no matter which factions is in power they "don't have the cards" to be actually independent now and even more so in the future.
Thanks for writing interesting stuff and I particularly appreciated your several responses to "Darras" and you come across as not just competent but also as sincerely passionate which is good (despite your recent "apathetic" period).
But there are is a big deal in what you write which is rather common: you keep writing phrases like "India's and Russia's complementary roles in each other's geostrategic balancing acts" as if "India" and "Russia" were well defined communities of shared interests; even if you write "Russia's pro-BRI policymaking factions" your analysis is as a rule in terms of "Russia", "India", etc.
My impression is that it is far more fruitful to talk of international (as well as domestic) politics as done among *factions* which in political science are often described as "transversal" that is extending across national boundaries. For example when you write:
«India for its very pro-Western grand strategic drift in the preceding years [...] India withstood IMMENSE Western pressure, including from the EU as well, in order to maintain domestic economic and therefore
political stability in furtherance of its self-interests»
For in neither case it was "India" that had first a very pro-USA posture and then a rather more independentist one:
* For a period the indian faction that makes money from exports to the USA (a giant pro-USA fifth-column) simply wanted integration in the USA neoliberal sphere of influence as a protectorate like the EU members and the indian "deep state" faction that might have found that going too far was appeased by the switch to a nuclear proliferation policy by the USA government.
* Then the "deep state" faction started to realize that the long term goal of the USA elites is as always to surround, isolate and breakup potential regional powers and that "Bharat" was next on the list after the PRC (and Brazil eventually and Indonesia perhaps after that). Even some of the business factions in India started to reckon that they did not after all really need USA "protection" and might be better off by owning their own state, like some business factions in the PRC.
BTW I am pretty sure that the policymakers also think international politics not in terms of countries but in terms of local or transversal factions (groups with shared interests) as for example the standard USA government approach to manipulating a country is to support a compatible faction (nowadays in particular financial businesses and property owners) within that country.
" at the risk of becoming too dependent on it "
I wouldn't worry about oil. How many nations are totally depend on China for consumer goods now ?
If all that is true, India is really what I always thought and say about it: a big fat turkey.
With such a mentality of slave, I understand how a so huge civilization has been colonized during centuries by a handful Englishmen.
Russia is doomed.
Or.
Or it's Russia wich give up slowly, freeing India to deal with USA to. That would explain the disgrace of patriot Lavrov.
When Lavrov wore a USSR sweater, it was not a provocation for Rubio but for all the bastard who surround Poutine, urged to make again big money in selling their country.
But Andrew, sorry, but you were wrong when you said repeatedly that India was the future of Russia. Nobody's perfect.
No, what I repeatedly emphasized was India's and Russia's complementary roles in each other's geostrategic balancing acts, all while also drawing attention to the creeping influence of what I call Russia's pro-BRI policymaking factions and growing US economic pressure on India.
My model, which I introduced in summer 2022 at the RIAC think tank (where Lavrov serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees and whose work informs other comparatively less significant policymakers here) accurately contextualized their relationship till this latest development:
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/asian-kaleidoscope/india-is-irreplaceable-balancing-force-in-global-systemic-transition/
In fact, Darras, I was extremely critical from 2015-late 2021 or so of India's rapid pro-US drift and then accounted for its grand strategic recalibration at RIAC right before the SMO began:
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/andrew-korybko/the-twists-turns-of-russianindian-ties-over-the-past-few-years/
Anytime that my models, assessments, etc. are proven to be inaccurate, even if only to a minor but nonetheless important degree, I always -- without exception -- account for that, whether in stand-alone analyses, in my Substack comments section, and/or on social media.
It's antithetical to the way in which I was raised to eschew responsibility for the words that I've previously written when they're proven to not be accurate or are now outdated. You apparently interpreted everything in a way that I didn't intend, but that's not my fault.
You can reread all my work and you'll see for yourself that I never, ever suggested that India's purchase of Russian oil was ideologically driven instead of market-driven, though I usually emphasized the role that these purchases played in their complementary balancing acts.
I also very proudly still maintain that India can still function as the most pivotal element of Russia's geostrategic balancing act if the political exists among Russian policymakers.
Right now Russia can either submit to becoming a de facto Chinese vassal with time by replacing its lost Indian oil market with China, cut a tough deal with the US for then balancing between those two, or the aforesaid but importantly all while retaining India's role in helping it avert dependent on China and the US alike.
The strategic logic is sound, consistent, and absolutely nothing has changed in this respect other than India finally, after nearly four long years, having costs imposed upon it by the US that made the continued large-scale purchase of discounted Russian oil no longer worth it (provided that the relevant term that Trump mentioned is indeed accurate, and for what it's worth, I personally think that it more or less is).
India withstood IMMENSE Western pressure, including from the EU as well, in order to maintain domestic economic and therefore political stability in furtherance of its self-interests as I've always said, specifically going as far as to describe its policy as "Hyper-Realist" since Jaishankar explicitly articulates India's interests in this regard so that there's no ambiguity and nobody can therefore feign ignorance of them.
You can continue to think that I was wrong, but the objectively existing and easily verifiable fact is that my model accurately explained everything up until this point in time, after which I promptly accounted for what just happened in the present piece, being able to do so this swiftly precisely because I'd already expected it for a while actually and generally had in mind what its motives would be if/when it happened.
Here, you and anyone else who hadn't followed my work (whether at all or closely) from 2016/7-late 2021 when I expended immense time and effort publishing literally hundreds of India-critical analyses on South Asia can review the gist of my perspective at the time from my PhD dissertation:
https://mgimo.ru/upload/diss/2022/Korybko_diss.pdf
I completed the first draft during my first month of the program, so in September 2019, and there were only very minimal changes required for the penultimate draft and then a few more for the final one after my defense.
What happened between 2019 and finally receiving my diploma in September 2023 was typical administrative/bureaucratic delays due to program obligations (i.e. exams that can only be taken at certain times, requirement to publish x-amount of academic articles that also take time to process, etc.).
Also, I personally suspect that one of the reasons why so many reviewers declined to literally be remunerated for participating in my defense is because of how "revolutionary" my idea was at the time.
I was the only person in Russia loudly criticizing India for its very pro-Western grand strategic drift in the preceding years, including in the text of my dissertation from the Russian MFA-run MGIMO, so some might not have wanted to associated with it due to how "politically incorrect" my insight was.
Therefore, this notion that I've presented India as an "eternal friend" of Russia's like you wrote under another post (I thought you were speaking in general, perhaps in response to Alt-Media, but only now realize you were addressing me personally) is categorically and provably false.
I did indeed have an epiphany of sorts from late 2021 onward due to how impressed I was with Jaishankar, under Modi's guidance, recalibrating Indian grand strategy and thus averting the adverse geostrategic consequences that I spent the preceding years raising maximum awareness about.
Unlike most of my peers, I also remained optimistic that India would continue resisting Western pressure to dump Russian oil since it wasn't going to tank its own economy by spiking costs across the board importing much higher-priced oil in the scenario of Russian oil no longer being on the market (or being almost exclusively consumed by China).
What changed, as I explained in this analysis, was Trump 2.0 imposing such tremendous costs on India while now providing a similarly priced alternative from Venezuelan oil that Modi couldn't realistically continue buying Russian oil (at least at scale like before) unless it really was for ideological reasons, not market-centric ones, but it was never ideological so that's why he pivoted.
If Russia cuts a deal with the US which provides for phased sanctions relief that gradually returns Russian oil to the global market, then I'd expect that India would resume some of the imports that it's now reportedly stopping, again, purely due to market factors, never ideological ones (unlike how some Alt-Media frauds tried to spin its purchases thus far).
Circling back to my PhD dissertation and over-simplifying it, what I called for was Russia comprehensively strengthening ties with Pakistan IN PARALLEL with doing the same with India in order to more adroitly balance between China and the US, the world's two superpowers.
Pakistan would play a quadruple role in this respect:
1) it was at the time the last remaining piece of Russia's "Greater Eurasian Partnership" that had yet to be put into place due to lingering resentment from the 1980s Afghan War, ergo the role that I personally played in pioneering a breakthrough in their relations through my literally hundreds of analyses on the region and my five trips to Pakistan (including to lecture at its National Defense University, hold off-the-record talks with experts, officials, etc. for advising on the best way to improve bilateral ties, all in a STRICTLY PERSONAL capacity);
2) accordingly open up another North-South corridor from Russia to the Indian/Global Ocean via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for diversifying Russia's trade partnerships from disproportionate dependence on the West (mostly the EU in this context) and China;
3) the comprehensive expansion of Russian-Pakistani relations IN PARALLEL with Russian-Indian relations would help keep India's grand strategic drift towards the West in check due to concerns in Delhi that Russia could sharply shift its attention to Pakistan if India sharply shifts towards the US, thus enabling Russia to restore a sense of regional strategic balance that would be disrupted by India de facto joining any US coalition against China;
4) and reassuring China of Russia's positive intentions amidst the comprehensive expansion of relations with India since Pakistan hosts CPEC, BRI's flagship project, which is of inordinately more strategic significance than any other BRI project, therefore enabling Russia to adroitly balance the US, China, and India through the comprehensive expansion of relations with Pakistan.
You can also refer to what I shared in detail yesterday under an unrelated post (but relevant with respect to the Ummah Pivot tie-in) about the role that I humbly played in this grand strategic "game":
https://open.substack.com/pub/korybko/p/russias-interests-in-syria-go-far?utm_campaign=comment-list-share-cta&utm_medium=web&comments=true&commentId=208694808
So again, you couldn't be more wrong about you claim that I wrote about India. I've always been fair as I truly understand my takes to be, including my critical ones about India, but I've also criticized India a lot.
Andrew,
I just say that recently, I find( it's just a personal feeling, not an analysis and even less a critic) that you had to much hope about the reliability of India.
I consider your work and your analysis very precious and ,for me, among the two or three best currently living.
It's just I'm sometimes no ok with you concerning only two topics, Poland and India.
"There can be no sincere praise without the freedom to criticize." Beaumarchais, Le Mariage de Figaro.
A pretty comprehensive refutation there Andrew
Thanks for sharing your PhD dissertation Andrew. It is a great entry point into the subject.