The Nascent “Islamic NATO” Might Soon Set Its Sights On Somaliland
The Somali Defense Minister’s request for Saudi Arabia to replicate its South Yemeni campaign in Somaliland coupled with reports about those two’s and Egypt’s impending alliance that would thus de facto include their Eritrean ally strongly suggest that something big might soon be afoot.
Reports have recently circulated about three separate but complementary military pacts in which Saudi Arabia might soon participate, which could form the core of an “Islamic NATO”. Bloomberg got the ball rolling by reporting that Turkiye wants to join September’s “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, who’s still influential, then proposed including Egypt and presumably his own country too.
Bloomberg reported right after that Saudi Arabia is finalizing a military pact with Turkish-allied Somalia and Egypt for curtailing the UAE’s influence in Africa, the concept of which was analyzed here regarding how those three, Pakistan, and Turkiye could jointly advance this goal. On that note, it’s relevant to add that Pakistan clinched its own security pact with Somalia over the summer and then its top military official visited Egypt to discuss regional security, thus signaling Pakistan’s growing role in Africa.
The members of this emerging Saudi-centric coalition all oppose Somaliland’s 1991 redeclaration of independence, which was recently recognized by Israel. Somaliland also has close ties with the UAE and Ethiopia, and all three of its top partners are close with one another too. Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland on 1 January 2024 for recognizing its redeclaration of independence in exchange for access to the sea was exploited by its historic Egyptian rival to assemble a containment coalition with Somalia and Eritrea.
Although this nascent “Islamic NATO” might first aim to defeat the allegedly UAE-backed “Rapid Support Forces” in Sudan, they’re much more heavily armed and battle-hardened than the Somaliland Armed Forces, the latter of which might be perceived as so-called “low-hanging fruit”. Moreover, South Yemen’s “Southern Transitional Council” was just steamrolled by Saudi air support and local Yemeni forces, which might have emboldened Riyadh and its partners to consider replicating that campaign in Somaliland.
It would take time to position Saudi (and possibly Egyptian, Pakistani, and/or Turkish) warplanes in the region (likely based in reoccupied South Yemen if this comes to pass) and for its emerging coalition to train the Somali National Army so this probably won’t happen anytime soon. Additionally, UAE-aligned Puntland between Somaliland and rump Somalia must first return to the federal fold for enabling an invasion of Somaliland, unless Djibouti joins the coalition and allows its territory to be used for this.
Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland’s 1991 redeclaration of independence and the possibility of it basing troops there as well as entering into their own mutual defense pact might deter them, however, as could Ethiopia doing the same (whether in coordination with Israel or independently thereof). On that note, it should be pointed out that Israeli, Emirati, and Ethiopian interests converge in Somaliland, which is where the nascent “Islamic NATO’s” do too but for the opposite reasons. This spikes the risk of conflict.
The Somali Defense Minister’s request for Saudi Arabia to replicate its South Yemeni campaign in Somaliland coupled with reports about those two’s and Egypt’s impending alliance that would thus de facto include their Eritrean ally strongly suggest that something big might soon be afoot. Time is therefore of the essence, and if Somaliland’s top partners don’t soon act in meaningful ways to deter the emerging Saudi-centric coalition, then it might not be able to defend itself from this existential threat.
This constellation of major defense agreements cannot have come about overnight; moreover, the fact that it operates at variance with U.S. strategic aims vis-à-vis Israel is significant. Before 2021–3 the UAE–Saudi relationship, with some exceptions, had generally improved, with both sides respecting each other’s spheres of influence in Yemen (the Saudis in the north, the Emiratis along the coast). Relations began to crack as doubts about the Biden administration’s commitment to the coalition there, as well as the incipient U.S.–Iran détente, prompted a renewal of Saudi–Iran ties, including via China and the restoration of Saudi–Qatari relations. So arguably U.S. policy under Biden had more to do with the dramatic Saudi–Emirati unraveling (notably in Sudan) rather than organic evolution.
The persistence of dynamics under Trump, however, suggests that supranational “deep-state” and some state actors are dictating events, foiling efforts by regional and international players to effect stability. (The unfolding of events, arguably by design, has also shaped reactions, ensnaring state interests.) Probably they are also spreading disinformation to spread mistrust, but their level of access to elite levels—with its ability to reverse policy in short order—is remarkable. The fact that the Saudi core of Trump’s “Arab NATO” is now directly clashing with a central U.S.–Israeli priority—the security of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa—is nothing short of astonishing. The biggest winners appear to be Iran and the Houthis, given that this conflict offers them room to revive.
How much of the Saudi success in South Yemen can be attributed to American ISR, AWACS, and AI?
To the extent that this may be the case, it is doubtful that the Americans would extend the same assistance to a campaign against Somaliland.
Further, all of these countries are entirely dependent on the United States. They can do nothing that the Americans do not permit.