The Newly Signed Russian-Iranian Transit Roadmap Is Promising But Still Incomplete
The two greatest obstacles to the North-South Transport Corridor are the Azerbaijani-Iranian security dilemma and the US’ reinstated “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic.
Russia and Iran signed a transit roadmap for this year late last month for maximizing trade along the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC). The most important part concerns their plans for making progress on the Rasht-Astara railway between Iran and Azerbaijan and holding a high-level trilateral meeting between their countries sometime later this year. The project’s delay has impeded the NSTC’s most direct route and redirected lots of transit across the Caspian or along its eastern banks.
That’s not to say that the other two routes are being neglected, however, since they too were discussed during the meeting between the associated Russian and Iranian ministers who signed that roadmap. Plans are underway to organize a Caspian transport consortium among the region’s five countries and a comprehensive maritime transport roadmap between Russia and Iran. The Iranian minister also spoke about how Russia and Pakistan can employ the NSTC’s eastern branch for expanding bilateral trade.
For as promising as their transit roadmap and related future plans are, they’ll remain incomplete pending the normalization of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations and the NSTC’s partner countries deciding whether they’ll risk Trump’s wrath by violating his reinstated “maximum pressure” policy against Iran. The first represents a technical obstacle since it stands in the way of direct Russian-Iranian rail connectivity while the second is a political-economic one since it could lead to secondary sanctions.
Both remain very serious uncertainties since the former is driven by mutual suspicions of the other’s intentions per their long-running up-and-down security dilemma while the second figures into their respective relations with Trump’s America at this crucial moment in the global systemic transition. The NSTC will remain viable even if the Rasht-Astara railway is once again delayed but will cease viability if partner countries decide against utilizing it out of fear of the US’ reaction if they dared to do so.
While the solution to the Rasht-Astara railway issue remains bilateral, the one to the US’ secondary sanctions threats will involve America, particularly convincing Trump that it’s in his interest to either turn a blind eye to trade along the NSTC or issue sanctions waivers for it. This was elaborated on more in detail in mid-January here, but the gist is that the NSTC enables India to serve as a partial counterweight to China in Central Asia, which the US might be more receptive to given its ongoing talks with Russia.
It was motivated to initiate this dialogue in spite of near-universal condemnation from its nominal allies due to the desire to shape the conditions by which Russia might limit its cooperation with China, specifically in the resource sector and then possibly in the military-technical one with time. To be clear, a “Reverse Nixon” in the sense of “splitting” Russia and China is out of the question, but what’s being pursued is meant to erode some of China’s competitive advantages in its rivalry with the US.
In pursuit of this, allowing at least limited (ex: mostly Indian) trade along the NSTC as part of the incentives for Russia agreeing to whatever deal the US proposes on Ukraine could be a pragmatic means to this end, especially if it’s paired with the resumption of US-Iranian talks on the nuclear issue. This arrangement could create the circumstances by which Trump could ease his “maximum pressure” policy without “losing face” all while motivating Russia and Iran to reach deals with the US.
Readers can learn more about the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” in the three preceding hyperlinked analyses, but the most pertinent takeaway is that the US’ motivations predispose it to at least seriously considering a more flexible sanctions enforcement policy in furtherance of its grander goals. These are to leverage America’s existing strategic partnership with India and envisaged one with Russia for eroding some of China’s competitive advantages vis-a-vis the US via mutually beneficial deals with those two.
How all of this relates to the newly signed Russian-Iranian transit roadmap is that the possibility therefore exists that the US might reconsider applying its “maximum pressure” policy towards the NSTC. This scenario would likely be contingent on progress being made in reaching deals with Russia, Iran, and even India (the latter in regard to tariffs), but it would advance all four of their interests and thus retain the NSTC’s viability, albeit reconceptualizing it as a means for balancing Chinese influence in Central Asia.
If the US were able to stop the eastern NSTC route by financial coercion on the central Asia countries, i.e meddling in a nearly landlocked region out of its military reach and in the backyard of Russia and China, that would resound as a major failure of the BRICS project: everybody would see its inability to allow free trade even in the most favourable context.
It would be a major loss of face not only for Russia, which has the most economic interest in this specific case, but also for China whose credibility as independent economic power would be greatly tarnished around the world.
So while prima facie the India balancing act might suggest a limited, if not even negative, chinese interest on the NSTC project, it could instead be argued that its success is actually a primary chinese interest.
Just one more addition to the multidimensional world of American nightmares. Once an Iran, Russia, India, China alliance is hammered out the U.S. will not be able to resist and apply pressure on this alliance. At that point the sovereignty of the landlocked Central Asian nations will melt like butter in a hot pan and there you have it: Halford John Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, already published in 1904. If you do not know what it is be afraid, very afraid. At least this is what Mackinder wrote it for. While studying about this in graduate school I was not really afraid and argued that in the early 20th century it was not realistic as the critical area was under populated and extremely poorly developed. Now, the theory seems to have a lot better chance to cross into the real world.